

# PERSPECTIVES ON YOUTH CONNECTIONS and DISCONNECTIONS



Volume 2

## Youth Partnership

Partnership between the European Commission  
and the Council of Europe in the field of youth



EUROPEAN UNION

COUNCIL OF EUROPE



CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

# **PERSPECTIVES ON YOUTH CONNECTIONS and DISCONNECTIONS**

**Volume 2**

Council of Europe

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# Introduction by the editorial team

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Dear readers,

Welcome to “Perspectives on youth: European Youth Partnership Series”. We, the board of publishers and the editorial team of this new journal, are happy to present the second issue of this series.

## **CONNECTIONS AND DISCONNECTIONS**

The pilot issue of *Perspectives on youth* had the futuristic theme of “2020 – what do YOU see?”. We set out to retain a forward-looking orientation in the second issue, while also addressing some key contemporary questions and challenges. The theme of this issue is “connections and disconnections” and in our call for papers we suggested that possible topics might include migration, employment mobility, new familial relations, the Internet and new media, young people’s social and political engagement, their connections with their own countries, with Europe or the wider world, and intercultural contacts in general. We were very pleased that the range of submissions we received dealt with most of these topics, and with others besides.

In choosing the overall theme and in selecting papers for inclusion our interest has been in the potential benefits but also the tensions and contradictions that are inherent in contemporary social, cultural, economic and technological changes. On the one hand such changes are creating opportunities for young people to connect in new and positive ways with other young people, with their families and communities and with social institutions such as the education and training systems, employment, politics and the media, and to do so in ways that increasingly cross various borders. On the other hand, it is clear that such changes do not always take place in a smooth or mutually complementary way: expanded opportunities for online communication are not necessarily accompanied by enhanced opportunities for physical mobility; greatly increased participation in higher education has not translated into more and better employment prospects for young people (quite the reverse); European societies and communities are increasingly diverse (in terms for example of culture, religion or family formation) and yet this is perceived by some as a threat rather than an opportunity, leading to the potential for an increasing sense of disconnection for some groups of young people in particular.

A related question arises as to whether the policies that are designed both to shape and respond to young people's circumstances and the practices that flow from these policies across the full range of administrative, economic and professional sectors (employment, education and training, justice, health, migration and so on) are themselves appropriately connected or disconnected with each other, at all levels from the local to the international.

In the light of the last point it was timely that just as the work on this issue of *Perspectives on youth* was nearing completion the European Commission–Council of Europe Youth Partnership hosted a conference in Budapest on the theme "Youth in 2020 – the Future of Youth Policies". One of the conference organisers was **Professor Howard Williamson**, who is also a member of the Editorial Team of *Perspectives on youth*. Given that addressing the policy dimension is an important part of the overall purpose of this series, the current issue therefore begins with a reflection by Howard Williamson on the discussions and conclusions of that conference, set in the context of his own many years' experience of youth-related policy and practice: "Sniffing glue – scanning some horizons for youth policy in 2020". While the conference was not explicitly designed to link with the theme of this issue, it is nonetheless significant that several of the common themes and transversal issues identified as arising from the conference do indeed touch on matters of connection/disconnection, including the alienating impact of youth unemployment, the need for intergenerational and intercultural solidarity, the role of new social media and the importance of inter-organisational co-operation and knowledge sharing. Moreover, the "glue" that is metaphorically referred to in the paper's title and content is above all else about social connectivity and cohesion.

**Abdeslam Badre**, who was a participant at the same conference, discusses the aftermath of the Arab Spring in the article "Will the Arab youth reap the harvest of the "spring" any day soon?" He states that disconnection remains the predominant feeling among Arab youth. Although young people were perceived as an important resource during the Arab Spring, and their expectations were therefore greatly heightened, these have not been fulfilled. Increased youth unemployment, inadequate social services and mistrust in political institutions are prevalent across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The author suggests that fair and adequate living conditions among Arab youth are central to future political stability and economic development. Creating not just increased employment but high-quality jobs is a key political challenge for the region. The author also stresses the pivotal role of comprehensive, rights-based social policies and programmes for young people to assist them in accumulating critical assets during their transition years. Ensuring the participation of young people and youth organisations in the mainstream of socio-political and economic institutions is also considered key.

The following article also has a link with the Youth in 2020 event, in this case being based on one of the conference papers. Moreover, it further elaborates on the (dis)connection between youth and political systems. In "Youth and politics: towards a new model of citizenship in advanced democracies", **Anne Muxel** takes us back to Europe and suggests that the triptych of mistrust, abstention and political protest is, to a greater or lesser extent, common to all categories of young people (as well as many adults) in European societies today. However, she suggests that this can

be seen “more as a sign of the emergence of a new model of citizenship” than as representing a crisis in democracy. She cautions that if the emerging patterns of political engagement are to have positive rather than negative consequences then three things are required of public policy: a greater focus on intergenerational solidarity (“it is absolutely essential to think of all the generations together rather than separately”); an urgent response to young people’s twofold demand for integration and autonomy; and a “new citizens’ pact laying down the building blocks for the future of our European democracies”.

These arguments complement those of **Metka Kuhar** and **Tanja Oblak Črnič** in the article “Social contexts of political (non-)participation among Slovenian youth”. Kuhar and Oblak Črnič suggest that among young people in Slovenia there is an increasing “connection inwards”, a turning towards the immediate circle of family and friendship and at the same time a turning away from conventional political participation. However, this does not necessarily mean that young people are less socially engaged. The authors highlight the importance of the Internet as “the space for young people” today, in Slovenia and elsewhere, and argue that youth policies at national and European level should take more account of everyday youth culture and “media consumption by a digital generation”, interacting with young people “in their own language, in their own communication style and according to their own tastes”.

The next two articles throw light, from different perspectives, on issues related to mobility and migration. **Simona Isabella** and **Giuliana Mandich** adopt an innovative approach to the study of mobility in “Connecting to the future: the role of spatial mobilities in young people’s imagined biographies”. Their paper is based on an analysis of 250 essays written by 18 and 19-year-old students in Sardinia who were asked to imagine they were 90 and to tell the story of their lives. The authors find that mobility features prominently in the students’ narratives, whether as a “dreamt travel experience”, an account of migration (perhaps based on actual experience) that will hopefully realise professional and personal ambitions, or in a form influenced by popular TV fiction. However, they suggest that in these accounts mobility commonly appears to be a kind of magical device that helps to bypass uncertainty and “somehow seems to substitute [for] concrete biographical projects in young people’s narratives of the future”. They argue that a “rhetoric of mobility” is not enough to empower young people and that more practical support is necessary, particularly from educational institutions.

In “What lies behind school failure, youth gangs and disconnections with the host society for the second generation?”, **Maria Ron Balsera** presents a case study of young people of Latin American origin in Spain. Noting that such young people have more in common with the host culture than some other immigrant groups and yet experience significant xenophobia, educational barriers and economic disadvantages, she asks, “So if it is not language or religion that hinders their integration, then what does? There are many idiomatic and cultural differences which are often ignored”. An important point of this paper is that in addition to issues of culture and ethnicity there are clear and intertwined gender, social class, labour market and age-related patterns underlying migrants’ experiences of inequality.

The themes of gang involvement, migration and fragmented cultural ties link this text to our next contribution, “Youth initiatives in the context of extremism: the Chechnya



case". However, **Evgeniya Goryushina** speaks of young people in their home region and not children from immigrant families in another country. In its references to a post-conflict situation, adverse socio-economic circumstances and political mistrust, the text also bears comparison with the contribution of Abdeslam Badre to this issue. Exploring a topic about which there is very little existing academic research, and therefore necessarily adopting a more descriptive and journalistic approach than some other contributors to this issue, Evgeniya Goryushina relates the context for current youth initiatives in the Chechen Republic to an analysis of the social marginalisation of young Chechens and the spread of extremist ideas. She suggests that there is a need for greater dialogue and understanding with young people in the Chechen Republic in order for stronger connections to be fostered between their cultural and ethnic roots and their economic and social futures.

The following three contributions also deal with young people who are vulnerable or at risk in some way and whose disconnection stems from this. In "Responding to youth crime: reconnecting the disconnected", **Jonathan Evans** considers the nature of young people's offending and appropriate societal and policy responses. He argues that, in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and international conventions relating to juvenile justice, young people below the age of majority should be dealt with outside the criminal justice system, an approach that is consistent with both their stage of development and their social status. For those above this age, he suggests there is merit in a "gentle upward gradient towards full criminal responsibility", especially in the case of vulnerable young adults with complex needs such as those leaving care or with mental health problems.

In their study of "Children at Risk", **Nele Havermans, Sarah Botterman and Koen Matthijs** examine "the effects of socio-economic background and family dissolution on children's school engagement". They focus specifically on the mediating role of "family connections", by which they mean the effectiveness and quality of contact among family members – not just between parents and children but also between parents and between siblings. Based on survey results from a sample of 7 035 pupils in Flemish secondary schools (aged 11 to 21), the authors' main conclusion is that the influence of family background on children's school engagement can largely be explained by disconnections at the family level, and that as a consequence "policy and practice aimed at the social inclusion of youth should take the family into account". The authors also recommend further research into the perspectives of parents and teachers on these matters.

**Katerina Flora** reports on the preliminary findings of a seven-country European study of "Internet addiction disorder among adolescents and young adults", involving more than 13 000 respondents aged 14 to 17. Various terms have emerged in the research literature to refer to the condition under investigation, the key symptoms of which are constant preoccupation with the Internet, withdrawal from other pleasurable activities or from direct personal contact with friends and family, and increased feelings of depression, irritation and anxiety. While for obvious reasons the phenomenon is relatively new the authors suggest that it may have certain aetiological features in common with other addictions. Once again important matters of policy and practice arise as the author considers possible responses in both treatment and prevention, so as to counteract the "disconnection from other forms of support, information, orientation and entertainment".

**Marko Orel** addresses some of the practical challenges facing young people who are attempting to engage in entrepreneurial activity. "Working in co-working spaces: the social and economic engagement of European youth" takes as its starting point a case study of one young Slovenian man who conceived and designed an original and attractive product but was hindered from making any further progress by the lack of financial resources, investment offers, marketing or promotional expertise until he entered into collaboration with a team of other young professionals. Co-working is presented as more than just the sharing of physical space: it is a philosophy that encourages spontaneous networking between professionals of various profiles and interests and that "emphasises the psychological and social importance of such interactions". Striking a note that resonates strongly with the theme of this issue the author says that many European young people "have already recognised that they are better off within a group and are looking for others who think alike, not only within national borders, but far beyond".

We began this editorial with a reference to the Youth in 2020 conference and have included some contributions by conference participants in this issue. A marked feature of the Youth in 2020 conference was the large and diverse attendance of people from all corners of Europe. As one of the last contributions in this issue, we include a personal interview with Doris Pack, who was a member of the European Parliament for almost a quarter of a century. While not denying the risks and challenges for youth policy in Europe – some of which are discussed in this issue – Doris Pack shares with us her optimistic vision of the (future) connections between young people and Europe. We close with a consideration of "connections and disconnections" from the perspective of the contemporary generation of youth in Europe, in an interview with Peter Matjašič, President of the European Youth Forum.

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## Chapter 1

# “Sniffin’ glue” – Scanning some horizons for youth policy in 2020

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*Howard Williamson*

### **INTRODUCTION**

When The Sex Pistols emerged in 1976/77 at a time of social unrest and emergent austerity, a young punk called Mark P established the leading punk fanzine of its day – Sniffin’ Glue – with articles and cartoons depicting the angst of the young.

Some 30 years ago I wrote a short article based on my experiences as a practising youth worker, during which I was witnessing the struggles facing more and more young people in making what came to be known as “transitions to adulthood”. These changing and increasingly complex transitions are now well rehearsed in academic literature where the multiple transitions (from school to work, families of origin to families of destination, dependent housing to independent living and more) and their associated challenges have been repeatedly documented, with – though there are some exceptions (Leccardi and Ruspini 2006, Helve and Evans 2013) – incessant and uniform repetition. My practice piece, entitled “Struggling Beyond Youth” (Williamson 1985), suggested speculatively that public policy for young people remained concerned with the “acute anxieties of adolescence” and was failing to address what I depicted as the “emerging chronic crisis of young adulthood”. That was a generation ago, and the current generation is more seriously afflicted by that crisis in myriad ways that could never have been anticipated. It is the stuff of a great deal of political, journalistic and academic debate – how will the young respond to “The Crisis”, and how should public institutions and political decisions react?

At a recent conference organised by the Youth Partnership between the Council of Europe and the European Commission, exploring a range of issues and the challenges these may present for young people by 2020, one participant suggested that far too few young people in Europe were even being allowed to “sniff” a range of experiences and opportunities that might enhance their personal futures and contribute to more positive futures for their families, communities, regions, nations and Europe itself. On myriad fronts, the “glue” that produces tolerance and understanding, social cohesion, social inclusion and improved life chances needs both to be strengthened and extended.

This paper considers the context in which the conference took place, the reflections and deliberations at the event itself, and the broad themes that represent the essential core for youth policy development in Europe (and indeed beyond) as 2020 approaches.

## **THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT**

It is impossible to consider the contemporary social condition of young people in Europe without confronting, at its very epicentre, the levels of youth unemployment. The shocks of the “one in five” that have routinely challenged policy making around labour market insertion, vocational training and youth support have been replaced with scenarios where half or even more of young people are excluded from the labour market. There are, of course, some exceptions (Germany and Austria are still doing reasonably well in holding their levels of youth unemployment at under 10%) and Greece and Spain (both well over 50%) are extreme cases, but, as politicians are prone to say, there is no room for complacency. Equally, however, there is also no reason for panic or fear: levels of social unrest – notwithstanding some street protests and the Occupy movement – that might have been reasonably anticipated in such circumstances have not (yet?) materialised. The responses of the young to this particular consequence of austerity have been surprisingly muted and unsurprisingly varied (see Williamson 2013).

European leaders may make a huge issue of the need to develop a “knowledge-based” economy but, from young people’s perspective, engagement with education and learning, and the striving for accreditation and qualifications has not been matched with positions in the labour market commensurate with those achievements. This has often produced despondency and demoralisation in the young, who sense a breach of the “generational contract” that is tantamount to what has been depicted as betrayal: promises made to the younger generation have not been honoured. For this, and other reasons, there is growing evidence of alienation from and mistrust of mainstream politics and of the politicians who peddle it.

Yet there has been relatively little indication that this has been replaced by new, alternative democratic politics or stronger affiliation to the political extremes. People will, of course, point to the tragic events visited on young people in Norway by Anders Behring Breivik and his proclaimed rationale of seeking to defend a Christian Europe from an invasion of Islam and the “infidel”. People will draw attention, in contrast, to terrorist attacks by young Muslims in Spain and England. And others will note the rise in popularity of right-wing political parties in countries as diverse as Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Greece. But, though none of this should be dismissed as matters of no concern, there has been no dramatic surge of young people engaged in these ways.

Instead, they are trying to get on with their lives. The knock-on effects of precarious employment opportunities have been illustrated in the areas of family formation and housing stability. Young people are delaying having their own children, are struggling to establish independent living and are generally finding their transitions to autonomy obstructed, protracted and unpredictable. It would be foolish to proclaim, as some youth organisations sometimes tend to do, that all young people

are excluded. This is clearly not so. Some, through good fortune, patronage, family background, social networks, particular achievements and personal determination, are still doing reasonably fine, but many more – a substantial minority now, if not a marginal majority – are facing levels of exclusion that had never been anticipated. This has potential consequences for individuals in terms of despondency and perhaps despair, for societies in relation to deviance and cohesion, and for democracy in terms of commitment and legitimacy. It may be grand rhetoric but that does not devalue the message when it is said “we fail the young at our peril”.

### **TRANSFORMATIVE LEGACIES NEED TRANSFORMATIVE ACTIONS – THE BIG ISSUES OF OUR TIME**

The Budapest conference was not charged with pinning down precise policy objectives. Indeed, that was what it was not permitted to do. Instead, it basked in the luxury of “scanning the horizons”; to detect and discuss trends and challenges reaching beyond the current moment and looking towards and beyond 2020 – a year, we were told, that may seem just hours away for a demographer who looks perhaps one hundred years ahead but feels close enough to herald almost imminent Armageddon for the ecologist.

The youth field has a dreadful tendency to look inwards, navel-gazing in the vernacular, at the expense of hanging its many issues on one of the pegs representing the big issues of our time. Hence the idea that the conference should be opened by a series of “provocations” (or inspirations, depending on one’s point of view) on some of those big issues of our time: demography, ecology, economy, technology, democracy and values. The first evening was spent with participants testing their youth knowledge and experience against the frameworks of those contributions.

An official report has been produced on the conference (Kristiansen 2013), and this details the process and discussion of the event. Here some selected extracts (in italics) will be presented, together with supplementary material recorded by the author.

One of the key messages from the provocation on demography was that even if Europe draws on all its existing human resources in response to its multiple needs, massive immigration from outside of Europe will be needed to maintain stability and ensure growth. With an ageing population, the prolongation of youth, the retirement age and its related pensions challenge, “much more bold thinking is needed” requiring concomitant political drive and determination. And although a much more immediate time frame was considered in the provocation on ecology, a very similar conclusion was reached. While, for the longer term (if there is one), environmental conscientiousness and accountability need to be embedded as an integral part of the education of young people, it was also asserted that sustainable development “requires a major shift in the way we think”. On a rather different tack and track, the provocation on economy focused on the unprecedented levels of youth unemployment in Europe and especially the plight of the 14 million young people who are described as NEETs (Not in Education, Employment or Training), which is associated with high social and economic costs. Indeed, the speaker emphasised the need to “avoid sowing the seeds of disengagement and disillusionment”. Education, of course, is often considered to be the measure that can both

prevent disengagement and promote re-engagement but the prospective role of new information and communication technologies in learning and development is contested and controversial. According to the provocation on technology, there are many grounds for optimism:

It facilitates personalised learning; it enables learners to learn anywhere and anytime; it allows immediate feedback and formative assessment; it makes it possible to reach a wider community of learners; it provides opportunities for seamless learning across a range of devices; it encourages collaborative and project-based learning; it expands the reach and equity of education; it favours situated learning; it minimises educational disruption in conflict and disaster areas; it assists with the integration of learners with disabilities; and it can improve the administration as well as the cost-effectiveness of education and training.

The list of positive possibilities is seemingly endless. Yet however dramatic the paradigm shift in learning that may arise from technological innovation, the fact remains that “education is a social process” requiring human interaction and facilitation.

The provocation on democracy (reported in full in this journal – see the article by Muxel) suggested that young people’s reaction to politicians and policy is composed of mistrust, disgust and boredom as the main ingredients, but that they still express political commitment through social media and place value on such issues as pragmatism, efficiency and individualisation. It was noted that “abstention from voting could be a sign of political vitality”. Past transformations in the political landscape have to be matched by further transformations today and tomorrow, through constructive and not just reactive dialogue between young people and government.

A final, rather more philosophical, provocation on values noted the place of children as natural and active philosophers but that “forming and sustaining values is a mixed business”. Perhaps they should be consistently held, but values are contingent on environment and context and “acting according to your values is not always easy”; moreover:

... we should be aware of the different values that may underlie concepts that we use when trying to interact with people from other backgrounds than ourselves – we therefore cannot take consensus for granted, even though we use the same words.

As an archetypical case in point, the concept of “Europe” carries very different value connotations.

## **SOME KEY CHALLENGES IN YOUTH POLICY DOMAINS**

These six provocations were carried forward, after specific interrogation by participants, into a full day’s discussion within ten thematic working groups, reflecting key issues within the youth field: learning, work, health, inclusion, citizenship and participation, identity and lifestyles, diversity and solidarity, mobility, housing and family, and crime and justice. The four slots in the day were given over to different emphases, beginning with a review of existing knowledge, followed by perspectives from different countries, then the presentation of interesting and instructive case

studies, and finally the identification of key challenges. The latter are reported below, and inevitably, there is some predictable duplication!

With regard to learning, it was felt that more attention needed to be given to demographic change, democratic issues and citizenship, and globalisation and the information society. In relation to work, there needed to be closer links with (both formal and non-formal) learning, more calibrated responses to youth unemployment, and more acknowledgement of the impact of migration on labour market contexts. For health, a rather disparate trio of ideas emerged: the standard question of access to health services was supplemented by questions concerning the changing nature of youth lifestyles and the as yet unknown health implications of protracted and intensive use of social media.

A predictable concern about effective reach emerged in the discussion on inclusion, coupled with the need to ensure appropriate differentiation between different sub-groups of excluded young people. However, a focus on individual pathologies had to be set firmly against some of the structural and socio-political dimensions of youth social exclusion. Possibilities for citizenship and participation hinged, it was argued, on strategies for empowerment, the securing of equal rights for young people and the promotion of new forms of dialogue between government and young people.

On the topic of identity and lifestyles, there was a need to consider youth culture and lifestyles as potentially political statements by young people who have rejected the ballot box. It was also important to be aware that it may be inappropriate to respect and celebrate all forms of diverse lifestyles: some may be anti-democratic and oppressive to others. And from more of a research perspective, more needed to be understood about how young people construct the multiple identities that prevail in the modern world. The broad issue of diversity and solidarity – manifested across cultures, generations and ethnic groups throughout Europe – elicited a call for deeper dialogue and mutual learning, beyond existing practices, and strengthening the contribution to be made through non-formal learning. Furthermore, despite rhetorical commitment to this issue, there was a need for more strategic commitment and concerted, rather than feeble and fragmented, action. Mobility is an equally amorphous concept, demanding clarification. As with health, there is also a question of access, and the need for flexible support, if young people are to take full advantage of its benefits.

Finally, again, one-size-fits-all dialogue and response does not fit with the diversity of challenges facing young people in housing and family life. Furthermore, the voice of young people is rarely engaged in the policy debate, nor are intergenerational issues and possibilities given sufficient attention. And, in relation to crime and justice, the logic of prevention is incontestable, but any responses need stronger collaboration and integration. Moreover, greater understanding is required of new forms of crime and deviance, especially that related to the Internet and new social media.

It was this range of issues that provided the basis for some final reflection, scrutiny and comment, during a panel discussion and a variety of concluding remarks. As the general rapporteur remarked, “desperate times need desperate measures”: did we need more of the same, or new pathways for development?



## **GETTING TO THE HEART OF THE FUTURE FOR YOUTH IN EUROPE**

The bringing together of people with experience and expertise in disparate parts of the youth field, to engage in an almost academic seminar-style debate – with nothing proscribed and everything permissible – produced a rich vein of thought and understanding. Inevitably, a number of common themes and transversal issues emerged.

Both concrete and more conceptual ideas were tabled, some firmly anchored in one of the corners of the “magic triangle” (of research, policy and practice), others spanning two or all of them. Youth unemployment was a pervasive concern, not just for its production of economic marginality but as a result of its connection with the alienation and disenchantment it engenders, and the prospective effects of these on a healthy democratic society. There was also a plea for intergenerational and intercultural solidarity, building more connections, stronger communication and better understanding between people both horizontally and vertically.

There was a strong view that greater understanding and better conceptual clarity of some of the recurring ideas in the youth field was an essential platform for moving forward. In fast-changing times of new social media, its impact on young people, the way it is used by young people, and its potential for supporting the lives of young people are all key questions that should prevail in youth research. Without such a knowledge base, future initiatives can only be built on shifting sand. Finally, the multiple characteristics of youth experiences, conditions and needs demands more inter-organisational co-operation and knowledge sharing. This can never be unconditional – ethical and professional issues would preclude that – but it needs to be the *prima facie* starting point if relevant and meaningful responses to youth needs are to be established, and if young people’s needs are to be suitably and sensibly represented in the spectrum of wider policy debates.

More abstractly, the seminar generated and reinforced some key messages: the need for differentiation within apparently general categories of young people and their presenting issues; the imperative to promote a voice, especially from the voiceless; the challenge of cultivating political will and championship; the importance of spaces for interaction, exchange and dialogue; and the question of access to opportunities and experiences open, theoretically at least, to young people.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

As one of the provocateurs said quite explicitly, and another implied quite forcefully, “transformative legacies need transformative actions”. The legacy of the financial crash and subsequent austerity in Europe has transformed the context of the lives of its young people. There may be more constrained life chances for a greater minority (and, in some places, a majority), but that does not mean that possibilities have completely evaporated. It does mean, however, that they may be harder to find and that, where they are to be found, young people maximise their engagement with them.

As the conference drew to a close, I thought of three specific things. The first, strangely (because I write just three days after the death of Nelson Mandela), is something I first became aware of when I worked with the National Youth Commission in South Africa not long after the inauguration of the democratic government. Its youth challenges at that time were similar to those that tend to exist elsewhere: education and employment, health, housing and crime. The political will to address these things was not in doubt. But the economic resources to address the scale of the challenge were miniscule. Finding the balance between these three things is always going to present dilemmas.

The second was the concept, derived from those heady days of punk rock and its flagship fanzine, *Sniffin' Glue*. I noted next to the word "sniffin": experiences, opportunities, conditions, circumstances, spaces, interaction, association. I noted next to the word "glue": cohesion, connection, solidarity, dialogue, understanding. There is probably quite a lot of overlap between the two. And it is, of course, critically important to bridge the two. Many more young people need to sniff (to have awareness, access and some action) the possibilities open to them, in order to illuminate the pathways of their lives. This, in turn, is likely to contribute to solidarity and social cohesion in Europe, through broader and deeper experiences and opportunities.

The final thought was of a poster on the wall in a remote cottage in the Welsh mountains. It is the first thing you see when you walk in. The cottage is a youth project I have run since 1979. The poster reads: "A ship in the harbour is safe, but that is not what ships are built for". In my head, I quickly made the necessary adaptations to accommodate the Youth Partnership between the European Commission and the Council of Europe – the convenor of the conference. Its work, since the inaugural partnership in 1998 on quality and curriculum development in the field of youth worker training at the European level, has extended to research, history, practice, policy and advocacy. The Youth Partnership is, therefore, a vehicle for promoting, cajoling, persuading and piloting (often innovative) frameworks for thinking and models of practice to these ends: "a (partner)ship in the harbour is safe, but that is not what the (partner)ship was built for"...

The partnership needs to sail into choppy waters if the youth agenda is to be understood and developed by wider policies and practices in education and employment, health and well-being, living conditions (families and housing), creativity and initiative, and crime and justice. The glue that connects this diverse territory is clearly the professional and political experience in the youth field but that alone is not enough and will remain quite inadequate unless more robust and committed action can be nurtured throughout the youth policy domains that affect the lives of the young. Without broader and deeper engagement in this way, young people will become more and more disconnected from, and unable to recreate, structures and measures that have hitherto sustained the European project.

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## Chapter 2

# Will the Arab youth reap the harvest of the “spring” any day soon?

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*Abdeslam Badre*

Normally when we need to know about something we go to the experts, but we tend to forget that when we want to know about youth and what they feel and what they want, that we should talk to them.

– Kofi Annan, Former UN Secretary-General

### **INTRODUCTION**

The outcomes of the current political, social and economic transformations rippling across the Arab world due to the collective awakening and synchronised activities of millions of young men and women since December 2010, will be well remembered by historians in the years ahead since it marks an unprecedented turning point for modern history in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), if not across the world. Disconnection remains the dominant feeling among the Arab youth now challenging their governments, as enormous energy and talent are being unleashed, striving to restore, if not recreate, some of the basic constitutional and social institutions in the fields of governance, economy, freedom, social welfare, culture and media and diplomacy. The situation has also forced large-scale socio-economic and political upheavals onto the agendas of the newly elected governments to harness and nurture the aspirations and expectations of the youth. So far, none of these expectations has been materialised. Rather, the socio-economic exclusion of the “Post-Arab Spring youth” is climaxing, as feelings of social marginalisation, pressures of poverty, corruption and human rights abuses are still perpetuated. This paper highlights, accordingly, some current reflections on the main features characterising the state of the socio-economic and political disconnections Arab youth are still forced to put up with, in such a delicate transitory period in the life of the region, and suggests some operational measures for policy makers to alleviate the burden of unemployment and social exclusion.

## **POST-REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH FRUSTRATION**

Politically, the three years of Arab uprisings opened more doors of confusion and dismay than windows of promised future for the youth. Today, the majority of youth still feel disenfranchised from the political process in their countries. "They do not seem to have a grip over the course their countries are moving to and the new institutions of governance that emerged do not seem to correspond with the role the youth exercised", a recent poll conducted by Al Jazeera Center for Studies concluded. The same report found that most of the 8 045 of women and men aged 17 to 31 surveyed from three Arab Spring nations did not believe that their recently elected parliaments represented them. In Tunisia, for instance, more than 80% did not feel that they were represented by the deputies of the Constituent Assembly; 72% of young Egyptian respondents reported that they did not feel represented by their MPs; and in Libya, 62% of young people said that their National Conference did not voice their aspirations.

Economically, the region's downturn and the fiscal deficit, coupled with mismanagement of resources, poor governance and mismatch of the education system with the needs of the market have negatively affected the labour market. The result of this is an alarming increase in unemployment among the youth, especially newly graduated students. A recent study conducted by the International Labour Organization (ILO: 2013) has revealed that the Arab Spring revolutions were not of much benefit to the Arab youth across the Middle East and North Africa region in terms of employment: unemployment has increased by about 5%, reaching 27%; Egypt and Tunisia top the list with nearly 30%, Morocco's rate is at 27%, and Algeria's 21.5%. Furthermore, the study pointed out that four out of ten young people in the region were living in poverty, while 40% of young people were faced with low wages that did not meet their basic expenses, forcing many of them to live with their families. Finally, the report highlighted that the region has remained below the minimum acceptable volume of work relative to its population, where the ratio stands at 43.6%, compared to the international average of 60.3%.

These economic and political indicators reveal that the Arab youth is not facing a brighter future, as economic and political performances since the outbreak of the Arab Spring continue to disconnect young Arabs from all social fabrics. This predicament is what has given birth to a huge swell of the young population experiencing multidimensional frustration, alienation and disconnection. To devise long-term programme policies for reconstructing sustainable national youth policies, Arab decision makers need first to grasp the needs, expectations and dreams of the youth: an urgent question that begs an answer in this regard is, "are the new Arab leaders ready to bridge connections through which young people can reconcile themselves with politics and reconnect with their societies and restore their civic spirits?" This is not a "yes or no" question. It requires a sincere engagement in a constructive auto-criticism of a decade of failing youth policies.

The last decade has delineated a general decline in basic social services in the Arab region, mainly due to the withering role of the state and the lack of comprehensive social plans. On the one hand, a comprehensive youth social policy has been, and still is, lacking in the region. Although economic development is said to be a vital element

for social development, it does not necessarily ensure a fair redistribution of wealth within society, nor does it provide equal access to basic social services. For instance, in the decade that preceded the Arab revolutions, the Gross Domestic Product of the region was steadily growing at a healthy rate; yet, economic opportunities and living conditions among the youth were plummeting, due to the overspreading spirit of inequality, corruption and social exclusion. National strategies for youth social inclusion have mainly been targeting specific sectors of people living in extreme poverty; but there has been no rights-based approach in support of the vulnerable, and no sustainable strategy for ensuring the basic needs of all citizens. In the same manner, currently developed social action plans in various Arab countries are generally limited to a series of safety nets. They lack a comprehensive vision based on national strategies for social development, including public health, education, job creation and a comprehensive national social security plan.

On the other hand, the forces of globalisation, the open market economy and the heavy and costly requirements of modern forms of education have greatly extended the period of youth and delayed the age associated with ensuring professional status and getting married. Although youth today is defined by the international community as the life-span between 15 and 24, most young men and women in the MENA region join this population segment well into their thirties, if not later. So, even the demographic factor does not help young people connect to their generation. Furthermore, the enormous and rapid increase in a young educated Arab population, particularly among females, has made it even harder for them to become financially and socially independent by finding jobs commensurate with their education, leaving home and setting up a household as part of a married couple. Consequently, the breaking of social ties and loss of social support, unstable living conditions and lack of legal and political rights and security have chased away more than 10 million people from the Southern Mediterranean Arab countries to migrate to developed countries with more social and economic opportunities (Martín 2009b); and a yearly migration flow of 200 thousand people is expected in the period between 2010 and 2020 from Southern Mediterranean Arab countries (approximately 2 million new migrants for this 10-year period). This is a huge migration flux which is already, and will continue, posing big socio-political, economic and legal challenges for host countries (mainly Europe) that are already trying to decipher solutions for the plight of their own youth. As to those young people who remain in their countries, they will continue to insist on achieving their full potential, social justice and equity, the right to hold their governments accountable and more space to express their identities freely.

## **TOWARDS A HOLISTIC REGIONAL STRATEGY OF YOUTH CONNECTION**

Politically, the Arab region has been beset by economic and political challenges which have often linked its young men and women to social unrest and instability. Many foreign policy experts and development practitioners consider young men the group most at risk for involvement in violence and extremism. This view is particularly predominant when it comes to the Arab youth. The consequences of not fully developing and harnessing youth's potential could be dire, including significant economic losses, armed conflict and political and social upheaval and instability. The youth are

more likely to become frustrated because of legitimate grievances, including a lack of feeling of connection, lack of employment opportunities, low educational attainment, little participation in decision making and low social mobility. In this volatile context, greedy and opportunistic politicians could even exploit these grievances by involving these frustrated youth in violent overthrows of legitimate governments.

Economically, there is an increasing realisation that the level of youth unemployment is not simply a mirror of the business cycle, but a persistent structural issue that has distinct causes and requires distinct solutions that cut across fiscal, labour, social security and education policies. For too long, positive aggregate growth figures were hiding the underlying causes of the unrest: unemployment, high inflation, authoritarian rule and a lack of economic opportunities for the majority of the population, especially younger generations. Today, Arab policy makers should realise that a financial system that serves only 20% of the population is a key ingredient in the recipe for political instability. Indeed, economic and financial youth connection in the Middle East and North Africa region lags behind other parts of the world. According to the global financial inclusion survey (Findex), MENA ranks last in regional comparison on financial inclusion. On average, only 18% of adults have an account with a formal financial institution compared to a global average of 50%. At the same time, working age youth comprise one third of the Arab World and one quarter is unemployed, which means that countries in the MENA region need to create 80 million jobs in 15 years (International Monetary Fund 2013). The Manpower Group believes that “the ability to acquire, organize, and apply knowledge to solve business problems – human talent – has become more important than any other form of capital in ensuring economic success for both businesses and individuals”.

The youth’s needs for education, employment, freedom, and political participation are central to the political stability and economic development of the region. These needs might differ among groups within countries (by gender, education level, ethnicity and health status) but the potential feeling of connection they might cultivate is the same across all young generations. Conversely, the size, energy, enthusiasm, innovation and dynamism of youth are assets that can be harnessed for the MENA region’s development with appropriate policies that address adequately and qualitatively the question of connection. When youth’s societal conditions are catered for, young people become a valuable source of human capital as well as consuming power in economic production, which would improve the total productivity in a region of the world where capital formation is limited. When employed, young people could be a reliable source of demand for the economy through their consumption activities. In addition, the Arab youth represents a potential new class of entrepreneurs that the region urgently needs in order to prosper.

As the Middle East undergoes an economic revival, it must address three main challenges: 1) updating and building knowledge on the state of young people to inform effective policies and programmes focusing on the quality of jobs as well as levels of employment; 2) developing policies and programmes that go beyond job creation and assist young people in accumulating critical assets during their transition years; and 3) these interventions must help forge a new social contract that includes a buoyant private sector and an active civil society. The contract must be based on a new development model in which youth connection will be

at the core of decision makers' agendas, before they indulge in any policy making. I think the first step towards youth social inclusion starts with including young people in designing policies and formulating implantation measures. This does not mean that every single young person has to be surveyed; but simply the inclusion of civil society working in the youth field, youth workers, NGOs and the private sector as long-term partners of official bodies. Maybe then, the Arab youth will start reaping the harvest!

## CONCLUSION

Fact and research-based findings have shown worldwide that social exclusion causes far-reaching damage to the living conditions, emotional life, socio-economic participation and health status of young people, leading to intergenerational inheritance of poverty, insecurity in living standards, political and social isolation, feelings of estrangement and unhealthy lifestyles. The outcome is either an ideologically, politically and socially disconnected group of angry people, ready to terrorise innocent lives in the name of fake ideological promises (Al-Qaeda militants) or another more optimistic group hoping to reconnect with their nation who chose to revolt against totalitarian regimes (the Arab Spring youth). During the peak period of the Arab Spring, there was a lot of talk in many of the neighbouring countries about how the youth were an important resource, representing the future. Now is the time to advance in the direction of realising an ambitious vision to place this generation at the centre of development in the region. Having young people as key partners in finding tailored solutions, and ensuring their participation in decision making and service delivery, will be key. That has to translate at a policy level. One of the major recommendations is to help support and bring voice to the youth movements in more formal venues of decision making. Young people need to be brought into the mainstream socio-political and economic institutions. It is true that some governments and agencies have already started to do that. But the practice of youth connection needs to move from sporadic action to a standardised regional strategy, as is the case among states of the Council of Europe, whose model of youth social inclusion and experience in youth connection, youth policy and youth work is considered among the best worldwide.

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## Chapter 3

# Youth and politics: towards a new model of citizenship in advanced democracies

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*Anne Muxel*

**T**ransformations in the relationships between young people and politics are obvious in all Western democracies. In all established democracies, their engagement in traditional political institutions has declined in recent decades, leading to what some have seen as a crisis in citizenship. What are the most characteristic transformations? And what is so special about young people's politics?

Our democracies have become more reflective and the links that ordinary citizens establish with the political system have become more individualised than in the more recent past. Partisan allegiances have become looser in the same way that social allegiances have. The great political narratives have faded and no longer provide a readable map of systems of belonging to which individuals can attach themselves and become involved. In terms of social politicisation, experimentation has won out over identification and affiliation among the younger generations. More and more, political involvement takes place by means of many different types of expression and action. The civic norm linked to the duty to vote has weakened and abstention continues to become more widespread acquiring a certain level of democratic legitimacy as it does so.

The new tools of communication and information available to all have also changed the framework for political and civic engagement. As an instrument for the acquisition of knowledge and a facilitator of exchanges, the Internet provides a stage for anyone who wishes to denounce or publicise a given subject or cause, thus fostering new ways for ordinary citizens to be involved in the world around them. It encourages collective mobilisation in real time, entertains a culture of derision and a critical stance towards politics and politicians. The ever-present image and instantaneous availability of information has created a need for transparency and authenticity that reinforces the requirements of democracy. These new parameters have changed both the demands young people make on the political classes and also the expectations they have of them, thus giving rise to new types of behaviour among young people.

This new political context has led to what some have seen as a crisis in citizenship. However, these transformations can be interpreted in another way and seen more as a sign of the emergence of a new model of citizenship than as a democratic deficit. This new model is relevant within all the categories of the population as a whole and can be considered as an effect of the period rather than as a generational effect. Nevertheless, it is more acute among younger generations who have come into contact with politics in this transformed context, without having experienced the framework of a more traditional political socialisation. For this reason, young people are facing a new and very specific situation, and adopting new attitudes and behaviours.<sup>1</sup>

Before expanding further on the emergence of a new model of citizenship among young generations today, I would like to make a few remarks:

1. Transformations in political attitudes and behaviours do not only concern young people. They can be observed among the entire population, but tend to be less pronounced. Young people function as a kind of magnifying glass reflecting changes in the relationships between ordinary citizens and politicians, and also changes in the practice of politics and political action. New demands on democracy are visible today and are expressed, to a greater or lesser degree, in all categories of the population.

2. Social and political cleavages are clearly present among young people. Some general trends can be observed among the young in general, but these trends do not have the same impact on all categories. There is a clear division between young people with and without qualifications. Those who are educated are deeply attached to representative democracy even though they are highly critical of politics. For less educated young people, although they more readily embrace universal values than older people with the same level of education, their universal beliefs are not sufficiently strong to compensate for their relative rejection of politics. Their trust in representative democracy has been more seriously undermined and they tend to be more detached from all forms of political participation and more attracted by populist leaders and parties. In both cases, there is a danger of an increasing democratic deficit.

3. Despite the existence of these social and political differences among the young and despite the fact that in most European countries they share the same mistrust and express the same doubts about the political system and representative democracy with their elders, the political changes present among younger generations today will have different consequences in the long term and on the future of democracy. Because young people are only discovering politics in a period of mistrust, protest and growing abstention, these new parameters of their relationship to politics will probably continue to influence their future attitudes and behaviours. There has been a profound political change in the intergenerational dynamics and within the socialisation process itself. Future citizens will not be the citizens of yesterday. They will

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1. See Muxel A., "Young People and politics", in Pascal Perrineau and Luc Rouban (eds), *Politics in France and Europe* (2009), Palgrave Macmillan, New York; See also Muxel A., *Avoir 20 ans en politique. Les enfants du désenchantement* (2010), Seuil, Paris.

probably continue to be more critical, more likely to abstain, more likely to protest, more sophisticated and to have less confidence in politics. In this sense, an obvious generational gap does indeed exist. Therefore, the transformations observed today will have an impact not only on the way politics is practised and the expression of political choices, but more broadly speaking they will change the future of democracy.

I would now like to introduce what I believe to be the three most relevant characteristics of these changes for the definition of what could be seen as a new citizenship model in our advanced European democracies. I will essentially focus on France to do this. Even if certain differences and national specificities do exist, most of the traits I will discuss can be also observed in other European countries.

### **FIRST CHARACTERISTIC: GENERAL MISTRUST TOWARDS POLITICS AND ESPECIALLY POLITICIANS**

The crisis of confidence in political institutions and representative democracy has been well established in many European countries for more than 30 years. Dissatisfaction with political representatives can be detected in citizens of all ages. Less than 40% of young Europeans aged between 16 and 29 trust (or neither trust nor distrust) politicians and political parties. Older generations tend to trust (or be neutral to) politicians slightly more than young people do. Conversely, young people are more positive towards political parties than their elders. Trust in national parliaments remains higher than in politicians and political parties, but remains nonetheless below 50%.<sup>2</sup> In France today, fully half the population do not trust either left or right to govern.<sup>3</sup> More than eight people in ten think that politicians do not take care of their problems and their difficulties.<sup>4</sup> There is a very deep gap between the elite and the people. Two thirds of the population consider that politicians are corrupt and do not do their job with integrity and honesty. Young people share the same attitudes and start their life as citizens with this very negative perception of the political sphere.

This new framework clearly reveals the difficulties and dangers at hand. Democracy needs mutual trust between the citizens and their representatives to function. But setting aside the negative consequences of generalised political distrust for the moment (populism, political crisis, civic defection, etc.), it could also be argued that on the one hand it provides an opportunity for the political system to be more demanding of its institutions and of the people who govern. And on the other hand, it provides an opportunity for citizens to strengthen their vigilance and their search for what this democratic system can give to them. Keeping this positive interpretation in mind, and trusting in this optimistic view of the future of democracy, this generalisation of mistrust in the socialisation process could clearly lead to more critical citizens, who both support democratic ideals and are critical of the political system, and who are also more capable, involved and vigilant from a political point of view.

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2. Eurostat Report 2011.

3. *Baromètre de Confiance Politique du CEVIPOF*, December 2012.

4. *Idem*.

## **SECOND CHARACTERISTIC OF THIS NEW MODEL: THE LEGITIMISATION OF ABSTENTION AND THE SPREAD OF INTERMITTENT VOTING**

Abstention has constantly increased in most European countries over the last 30 years.<sup>5</sup> The most recent mid-term French elections involved record levels of non-voting. This growing abstention rate is less explained by social factors than by political factors. Sociological reasons for abstention do still exist. They include lower levels of social integration (among young people, women, the less well-educated, the unemployed, etc.) and social divides which cut across age categories, reflecting divides in electoral turnout. In France, when the last presidential election took place in 2012, 62% of students said that they voted in all elections, while only 49% of the young people in employment said the same, and 42% of the unemployed; 26% of students recognised they were hesitant about who to vote for right up until election day, making their final choice at the last minute, 27% of young people in employment said the same, as did 34% of the unemployed; 75% of voters born before 1945 said their choice was made a long time prior to the election while only 45% of younger voters born after 1980 said the same (-30pts).<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, social factors are not sufficient to explain why citizens abstain more, despite the fact that levels of education continue to improve. Fully 35% of students abstained in the first round of the last presidential election in France.<sup>7</sup> Factors other than sociological and cultural ones must also be considered. Abstention can be used to express political dissatisfaction and protest about the candidates and parties on offer in an election. The spreading of this political use of abstention suggests that it is a behaviour that is being used and legitimised more and more often and above all by young people.

Stepping into this new model of electoral behaviour, young people will adopt the habit of voting or not voting depending on the importance they attach to the result of the election. They tend not to consider mid-term elections such as European elections as crucial. In France, presidential elections are the only ones to be perceived as more decisive. Therefore, intermittent voting became the normal way to practise one's civic duty. This new framework will change ordinary citizenship in the process of political socialisation and will necessarily create a generational gap. It will also have an impact on the electoral system and on competition. This toing and froing between voting and non-voting constitutes real political change and redefines the democratic tools citizens use to express their opinions. Obviously, the consequences of an early socialisation towards abstention among younger generations, and above all its legitimisation, will change the rules of the democratic game. If systematic abstention constitutes a real danger for democracy, in that it threatens the legitimacy of democracy itself, I also strongly suggest that the growth of the political and intermittent expression of abstention could on the contrary be a sign of political vitality.

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5. See Bruno Cautrés and Anne Muxel (eds) (2011), *The New Voter. France and Beyond*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

6. Post-Electoral Survey CEVIPOF, June 2012. The "-30pts" indicates the difference between the 75% of voters born before 1945 who said their choice was made a long time prior to the election and the 45% of younger voters born after 1980 who said the same (-30 points).

7. Idem.

### **THIRD CHARACTERISTIC: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTICIPATORY PROTEST**

The crisis in representative politics has resulted in more calls for direct democracy and greater involvement in protest campaigns by citizens. These trends are particularly clear among the younger generations. Voting, although still regarded as useful and effective by the young, is no longer considered to be the sole means of civic involvement. According to Eurostat, less than 4% of young Europeans declared that they took part in the activities of political parties or trade unions.<sup>8</sup> Expression of political awareness is emerging and protest is increasingly seen as being legitimate. Non-conventional participation is on the increase in all European countries. This is predominantly a generational phenomenon: members of the older generations are unlikely to be involved in protests, baby boomers more likely and young people today more likely still: increasing involvement in protest is a continuing trend. In France, one in two young people has already taken part in a street demonstration.

Conventional participation (voting) and non-conventional participation (demonstrating) are not rival options but are closely linked and often complement each other. Protest movements cannot be seen as an alternative to electoral turnout. The more citizens value conventional participation, the more they also regard participating in protests as important.

This protest-style politicisation can also be found at the ballot box. Many European countries have seen extremist parties or parties outside the system achieve electoral success. In the same way that abstention is more and more used as an instrument to express political protest, the vote has become a means of protest that expresses a rejection of government parties and the conventional political system. When the last presidential election took place in France, many young people voted for extreme right or extreme left candidates. In this sense, protest can have recourse to conventional means of participation. Within this new model of citizenship, conventional and non-conventional types of involvement are not mutually exclusive but rather have become more and more intertwined. The range of tools used in democratic expression has diversified hugely. More than any other, the younger generations know well how to use the different means of collective action to affect political decisions and governments.

### **WHAT SHOULD BE RETAINED?**

This triptych – mistrust, intermittent voting and protest – is common to all categories of young people today. It characterises their politicisation even if it is more or less pronounced according to social insertion and levels of education. This explains why it can be considered as a new framework for citizenship. The widespread idea that young people are no longer political is false. Young people are indeed as critical and distrustful of politicians, parties and politics as they have always been, but they also want something from politics. Pragmatism, efficiency and individualisation are the key words in a type of political action that is more

8. Eurostat Report 2011.

experimental than it was in the past, since it continually needs to be renegotiated and readjusted. Socialised in an atmosphere of disenchantment and mistrust of politics and bearing the disillusionment of their parents, young people have built a new approach to politics on the basis of a new paradigm for engagement. This approach combines intransigence on matters of principle and a desire for pragmatism, demands for values to be upheld and for real effectiveness. Youth is indeed marked by a certain withdrawal from involvement in elections and by a civic moratorium, but, on the other hand, young people are very present on the collective scene and have proved themselves to be extremely reactive politically. However, this ability to react and this relative involvement has moved away from organisations and traditional political institutions towards more individualised and more sporadic forms of action, where achieving an immediate effect and outcome has become the main objective. Young people have a great ability to get involved in issues concerning both local preoccupations and international problems. They move within a kind of “globalised proximity”, combining concerns for both what is near and what is far away. The national framework is no longer the only one within which they build and express their politicisation. Their relationship to politics is more individualised and more directly linked to their life experience. Class interests and partisan or ideological affiliations are less decisive in the process.<sup>9</sup>

**A REAL NEED TO GIVE YOUNG PEOPLE ANOTHER KIND OF SPACE AND, ABOVE ALL, TO CONSIDER THEM DIFFERENTLY**

Young people give rise to recurrent and well-founded preoccupations. They are the object of numerous measures and planning arrangements in many sectors including education, employment, culture, health, sport and even politics. And that is a good thing. Young people are thought of and dealt with through sector-based interventions, about which it is not the intention here to make judgments. However, they are not very present in the minds of politicians and in political speeches when it comes to thinking about them from a future perspective, offering them a vision of society for the future, thereby inviting them to place their hope in politics. Because they upset the apple cart and cause confusion too often and because they are sometimes seen as threatening, they tend to be avoided as a subject by politicians. Because they represent not only the present of a society but also its future, they force politicians to adopt a truthful discourse that is often difficult to assume. This explains the attempts by politicians to both avoid the subject and the convenience of seeing young people as a series of symptoms to look out for or to deal with. Youth can then be divided up into sectors where particular interventions can be staged. Public policies proposing an overarching project for young people are a rarity. Youth is primarily addressed when things go wrong and when it is seen as a risk not only to itself but to the rest of society as well. The focus remains primarily and above all on the negative and threatening aspects of youth. There

9. See James Sloan, “New Voice, Less Equal: The Civic and Political Engagement of Young People in the United States and Europe”, in *Comparative Political Studies*, September 2012, <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/08/30/0010414012453441>.

are reasons for this: as in a magnifying glass they reflect the many failings affecting European societies (endemic unemployment, the slowdown of social and professional integration, decreasing buying power and the danger of impoverishing certain sectors of the population, particularly young people, obstacles to young people's financial autonomy, a failing education system, etc.). Those in power tend to forget that young people need another image of themselves. They are rarely mentioned for positive reasons. They are more often thought of in relation to the symptoms and the malfunctions they are associated with than for their qualities and the potential for the future they incarnate. In the long term, this situation is in danger of becoming a source of anxiety, of malaise and leading to a generalised crisis of confidence that will not only prevent dialogue between the generations but will also prevent thinking about society in terms of what young people can contribute to it. Almost three quarters of French people today (73%) believe that their children will do less well than they did. Of course, it is a well-known fact that French society is among the most pessimistic in advanced industrialised democracies, but it seems to me nonetheless that this profound lack of confidence in intergenerational transmission affects other countries also. All young Europeans are today faced with a particularly problematic environment: austerity budgets that reduce spending on public services and a hostile labour market for new entrants. A feeling of economic and social insecurity together with the perceived risk of a lessening of job opportunities dominates the dynamic between the generations. The development of public policies that lead to a reversal of this feeling of social and economic disorder (going way beyond problems specific only to the young) in successive generations will be a decisive issue. Appropriate policies are needed not only to improve the confidence of ordinary citizens in their governments but also to guarantee the good health and credibility of democracy in many of our societies that are threatened by the rise of different forms of populism and the temptation to turn to authoritarian regimes in the continent of Europe.

From the perspective of a type of politics that would create a space for youth at its centre and above all that would conceive of this space as being part of the planning process for intergenerational social links as a whole (both affective and symbolic), I would like to suggest that three priorities should be highlighted to orientate public policies.

The first is that it is absolutely essential to think of all the generations together rather than separately. Together with much "knowledgeable" discourse, existing policies are much more likely to exacerbate the reasons for generations to oppose each other. Intergenerational bonds and solidarity exist in the private sphere, they now need to be relayed to the public sphere. The conditions need to be created so that the different generations can think in terms of what links them together rather than what opposes them. In order to do that, it is imperative not only to encourage all initiatives made in this area but also to change much of the discourse pronounced on the subject which frequently stigmatises the young.

The second is a reminder of the urgent need to deal with the twofold demand of young people: integration and autonomy. This must be translated into concrete means and measures but also into symbolic markers and benchmarks so that young people feel once more that they are socially useful and that they have a role to play in political decisions.



The third encourages the development of representation for the future, not only for young people but also for society as a whole. Politicians do not talk enough about the future. And yet, there is a real need to give meaning to all the changes and transformations that are shaping the future of younger generations.

There is therefore a real need for a new citizens' pact laying down the building blocks for the future of our European democracies. Such a pact must bring together citizens who, without any doubt, are more critical and demanding and who will remain so. But it must also be able to count on citizens who are capable of building a constructive (and not only reactive) dialogue with those who govern them, and who have confidence in the ability of politics and public policy to improve the societies we live in. Although in the Eurostat 2011 report on young people in Europe older citizens were more pessimistic about the future of ordinary people's involvement in political decisions, a majority of young people (53%) aged 15 to 24 considered that in 20 years from now people would be more involved in political decisions. It is a result we can consider as an optimistic note for the future of our democracies.

## Chapter 4

# Social contexts of political (non-)participation among Slovenian youth

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*Metka Kuhar and Tanja Oblak Črnič*

### **INTRODUCTION**

The youth population has proved to be one of the most sensitive seismographs of social change. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, young people were key players in student and other social movements. Researchers have explained the extent and universality of these movements as an unconscious reaction of the youth to the social changes that were on the horizon. The students' movements were claimed to herald the beginnings of a post-industrial society, an information society or a "knowledge society", where knowledge, innovations, information and communication would become crucial strategic developmental indicators instead of mass industrial production and consumption (Keniston 1971; Inglehart 1977; Ule 2008). These movements brought many changes in the lifestyle and value orientations of modern societies: liberation of sexuality, liberalisation of inter-gender, family and generational relationships, development of ecological consciousness, the change of relations between the dominant culture and subcultural trends, etc. (Ule 2008; 2012).

There have been numerous protests and movements in many European countries in recent years where young people have been protagonists or very important actors, among others in France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Croatia, Finland, the UK, Greece, Portugal and also in Slovenia. There are some parallels with the 1960s tradition: the emphasis on democracy, addressing inequalities and poverty and often also grassroots forms of participation as an alternative to the contemporary "post-democratic" representative democracy (Crouch 2004), where institutions of democracy have increasingly become a formal shell. The energy and innovative drive have passed away from the (deliberative) democratic arena into small circles of a politico-economic elite (Crouch 2004). However, in the 1960s the economy in Europe was ascendant and many opportunities were open to young people. Today it is the opposite; the young are entering a future that seems to be worse than the past and the present of their parents, a future that holds threats rather than promises (Galimberti 2009). The transitions from education to employment, from the family of origin to independent life and family formation, have become prolonged, less predictable in their timing and sequencing and more uncertain and diversified than in the near past (e.g. Furlong and Cartmel 1997; Wallace and Kovacheva 1998; EGRIS 2001; Ule and Kuhar 2003; Leccardi 2005).

It is beyond the scope of this text to ask ourselves whether contemporary movements and protests are not only a reflection of contemporary conditions but are paving the way for future changes in the political and economic landscape. The aim of this contribution is limited to analysing the recent trends in political and social participation of (the representative samples of) youth in Slovenia in the European context. Participation is not easy to define: generally it is understood as the involvement of people in issues that touch them, whereby participation may cover different types, ways, degrees of participation and decision making. In the European context, in a very broad sense, participation takes place in a framework of democratic structures and political institutions (of daily politics) and civil society or community life.

Why would the case of Slovenia be interesting for the European readership? In this article we show that youth participation in Slovenia takes place within an intense “process of retreat to privacy” (Ule 2002). In such a process two contradictory forms of seeking privacy are intertwined: a personal drive toward traditional privacy and a personal wish for individuality. The first aim implies a withdrawal of individuals into their own private world, their trust in authority and traditions, avoidance of risks and is often related to consumerism; the second aim is on the contrary revealed by the personal care for everyday life and good personal relationships, by a wish to be different from others and to be creative. The results of different studies in Slovenia support the thesis that the first “private” trend has become stronger since the 1990s (Ule et al. 2000; Lavrič et al. 2010). The Slovenian youth has retreated from public and from places associated with youth into a micro-world of their supportive and trustful families. Similar findings have also been provided by other studies carried out in western Europe in the mid-1990s (e.g. Chisholm et al. 1995).

Our thesis is that the turn towards a narrow family and friendly circle, this “connection inwards”, does not mean at the same time a connection with public life, rather the opposite – it seems to inhibit young people with regard to the participatory practices and becomes an important barrier to the more critical stand and alternative youth culture, especially compared with the politically committed youth in Slovenia in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>10</sup> We assume that an understanding of political and socio-cultural participation among the youth demands more thorough knowledge of their private intentions, as in their relations within the family climate as well as their ambitions in the educational process and potentials for employment and future realisation in public life.

The Slovenian case is of special interest since it shows how the classical youth transition to adulthood, exemplified by such things as finishing regular education, starting a job and moving out of the parental home, is one of the most prolonged in Europe; while the relationships between parents and youngsters seem to be one of the closest (Health Behaviour in School-aged Children – HBSC – studies; more in Pokrajac 2006). The above-mentioned thesis is not directly tested in the empirical sense; instead, drawing from the representative data on Slovenian youth from different

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10. Youth movements in the 1980s were important factors in a different political culture and sub-cultures. Young people were very critical of the existing institutions, governance and ideology. This led to a needed psychological modernisation as a basis for further political modernisation (Ule 2012).

time periods, two issues are shown: first, in what sense the retreat to privacy within the broader European context is above average; and the second how different forms of participation in Slovenia are changing within time.

## **A RETREAT INTO PRIVACY: THE CONTEXTS OF MODERN YOUTH IN SLOVENIA**

The length of co-residence of young adults with their parents in Slovenia is among the longest in Europe. As shown by the EVS (European Voluntary Service) data (Table 1),<sup>11</sup> up to two thirds of 18 to 34-year-old Slovenes lived with their parents in both 1999 and 2008, including those who also shared the same household with their partner/spouse and/or child/children. The latter phenomenon of living in an extended multi-generational household accounts for only around 10% of the sample. The corresponding percentages from the Slovenian Public Opinion survey 1980<sup>12</sup> indicate a considerable increase in this form of co-residence in the post-socialist period: in 1980, 40.1% of 18 to 34-year-olds had been living with parents and spouse/partner or/and child; 25% only with parents. Among the EU15 countries (those members of the European Union before the accession of ten candidate countries in May 2004), on average just over a third of young adults aged 18 to 34 lived with their parents in 2008. Among the post-socialist member states of the European Union (EU postsoc) the percentage is also far below that of Slovenia.

**Table 1: Percentage of young people living with their parents**  
(answers of 18 to 34-year-olds)

	WVS/EVS 1999/01 With parents, including those with partner/ spouse/child	WVS/EVS 1999/01 With parents only	EVS 2008 With parents, including those with partner/ spouse/child	EVS 2008 With parents only
Slovenia	64.6%	56.8%	63.8%	53.6%
EU15	37.6%	36.1%	34.0%	31.1%
EU postsoc	47.0%	38.0%	51.8%	42.1%

Many studies have demonstrated the impact of the welfare state on the nature of family ties and thereby on the length of co-residence. For example, Reher (1998) associates the so-called northern cluster of countries (Scandinavia, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and to a large extent also Austria and Germany) with early moving away from the family home, which is connected with “weak” family ties and a sense of social (state) rather than family solidarity; as opposed to the southern cluster of Mediterranean countries that are characterised by later

11. The EVS 1999 sample of 18 to 34-year-olds in Slovenia included 352 respondents; the national sample of this age group for 2008 was 362.

12. The Slovenian Public Opinion survey in 1980 encompasses a sample of 703 18 to 34-year-olds, which can be considered as representative for this age group.

moving away from home, “strong” family ties and family-based sense of solidarity. Besides that, in the post-socialist countries extended cohabitation with parents is often interpreted as one aspect of the growing importance of primary relationships and networks to survive in the (economic) uncertainty of the transitional period (e.g. Kovacheva 2006; Tomanović 2002). Iacovou (2010) recently demonstrated that the link between the family of origin’s financial condition and the young person’s tempo of moving away is far from being one-dimensional: the better the financial situation of the family, the sooner a young person obtains independent housing. She has proved that this is a cause and effect relationship only in the countries of northern and western Europe, while in south-eastern and some eastern European countries it is the other way around.

In Slovenia, unlike in the other post-socialist countries, the prolongation of young people’s co-residence with their parents cannot be interpreted only as a survival strategy (although it is connected with an unfavourable housing market and a lack of stable jobs); it is also a cultural practice, a chosen lifestyle, connected with the comfort offered by the “mama hotel” (Ule and Kuhar 2003). The socio-economic transition to the capitalist society with a pluralistic political system in Slovenia was comparably smooth, and the changes that followed were relatively non-traumatic for young people and their parents. Also Western trends in lifestyles, value orientations and family arrangements were already common to Slovenian society during socialism, as the first youth study in 1986 (Ule 1988) was able to reveal.

In spite of such trends – especially the pluralisation of family forms, which in Slovenia was unlike other post-socialist and southern European countries and from the 1960s onwards was more in line with the West, as seen for example in the prevailing trend of cohabitation instead of marriage, birth decline, later births, etc. – the patterns of leaving home resemble those in southern Europe. Namely, from the 1970s onwards in the northern and western European countries, leaving home has become less linked with the creation of young people’s own families, and patterns of leaving home are diversified (Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1993). Data show that a stable partnership, not the young person’s employment status or the family of origin’s financial condition, is the main force affecting home-leaving dynamics in Slovenia (Kuhar and Reiter 2014). Leaving home in Slovenia is strongly connected with partner cohabitation,<sup>13</sup> just as leaving home in the southern European and Balkan countries is strongly connected with marriage (Kuhar and Reiter 2010).

But above all, the prolonged co-residence of parents and their adult children in Slovenia is generally associated with exceptionally supportive and relatively high-quality relationships between young people and parents, especially the mother (Ule and Kuhar 2003; Renner 2006), by international comparison (Pokrajac 2006). The majority of young Slovenes report that they are well provided with parental and emotional support. According to the Youth 2010 survey, only approximately one tenth of 15 to 29-year-olds report that they do (did) not feel comfortable at home (Oblak and Kuhar 2014). Young people enjoy, on average, a fair amount of autonomy in the parental home (Ule and Kuhar 2003).

13. In 2011, 67.3% of first-born children were born to unmarried mothers in Slovenia, and also on average more than half of all children are born to unmarried mothers (SORS 2012).

Comparing the retreat of contemporary youngsters in Slovenia into the private small family world and their dependence on the paternity of adults with “the socially, culturally and lifestyle-defined generation of the 1970s and 1980s”, Ule (2002) labels young people of today as domesticated and socially infantilised. According to empirical evidence a strong relation with family, private life, peace and social stability is in important positive correlation with the other set of variables that exemplify socially conformable and traditional youth. As a consequence, most of these young people follow clichéd forms of identities and lifestyles, which are expressed also in passive commercial and media trends (Ule 2002).

In such a context another trend of this retreat to privacy should not come as a surprise, as it is very specific for Slovenia and is related to prolonged education. In Slovenia, the percentage of schooled people at all levels is above average for European countries, as well as the educational aspirations of young people and their parents (Živoder 2012). The number of young people aged 15 to 19 enrolled in secondary education in Slovenia is among the highest in Europe. The rates were already high in the first years following the transition to post-socialism; for example, 80.5% of the 15 to 19-year-old population 1993 were enrolled according to UNICEF data. In 2011, 94.1% of this age group were enrolled, while the OECD average was 84% for girls and 82% for boys (OECD 2012). The participation in higher education increased significantly in the period after the transition and is one of the highest in Europe, from 23.1% of 19 to 24-year-olds in 1989 (UNICEF data), to 77% in 2011 (OECD 2012). But the tertiary education attainment rates are relatively low. According to the OECD (2010), the completion rate at the tertiary education level in Slovenia was 65% in 2008 compared to 70% in the EU15 countries. What is more, according to Eurostudent (2010), Slovenian students who do finish their studies have the longest average duration of study, 6.9 years.

Despite the high dropout rates of students during study, the labour market in Slovenia cannot absorb the highly educated young people entering it. The yearly inflow of people with secondary education is already one and a half times higher than the number of available workplaces (Kramberger 2007, p. 98). If they get a job, it is likely that this is only for a fixed term or that the job is unstable and relatively low-paid. The solid base for a young educated labour force in the employment system is eroding everywhere – no European country can stem the deep structural problem of rising unemployment. So the transition out of education and into employment remains largely uncertain and the troubled entry into the world of work has serious welfare repercussions for young people.

Parents in Slovenia vigorously encourage and support their children’s prolonged education in order to postpone the confrontation with unemployment and precarious jobs, in the hope of improving their chances of obtaining full-time, permanent, and well-paid employment. High (or as high as possible) formal education has become (almost) a necessity, but not a sufficient “ticket” into the Slovenian labour market. Education, which in Slovenia is free of charge, is also attractive because it is (for the time being still) connected to many direct advantages like social insurance, inexpensive and available places in student dormitories, cheap coupons for meals and student work. On average, every fifth student in Slovenia is granted a scholarship and every third the state’s financial assistance (Eurostudent 2010). However, such prolonged

education and orientation towards personal relations within the private sphere and relatively affluent conditions would, according to the postmodern theory of R. Inglehart (1977), intensify the civic engagement of youth. The Slovenian situation nevertheless is in contrast to such theses, as they reveal some negative aspects of this long education and protective parenting.

## **YOUTH PARTICIPATION: BETWEEN POLITICAL APATHY AND INDIVIDUALISATION OF POLITICS**

Youth researchers in Slovenia and also in other European countries often point at disinterest, passivity or even apathy among young people with regard to the (conventional) political topics and the inclusion of young people in social organisations in a variety of areas (Kovacheva 2005; Spannring 2009). At first glance, passivity seems hard to understand because it is the young who must confront more and more challenges, especially those related to the employment crisis. However, the uncertainty and precariousness can make young people retreat from public life into privacy and focus on coping with their own lives and personal problems (Walther et al. 2009, p. 78).

The purpose of this article is to show trends in the field of political and social participation of young people in Slovenia and their involvement in public and community life, and seek the eventual activation of young people as citizens.

### **Young voters without political ambitions? Trends in youth participation**

#### Stable (dis)interest in politics

The Youth 2000 survey has already showed that the level of political interest among young people in Slovenia is low: more than half of respondents (57%) between 16 and 29 said that they had no or low interest in politics. Only 9% of respondents said that their interest was big or very big. Disinterest declines slightly with age and is also gender dependent: boys were slightly more interested in politics than girls. Also, when it came to rating values on a scale, the same survey showed that interest in politics among the respondents came at the bottom – in contrast with the importance attributed by the young to the values of a private nature, such as health, family life or friendship.

In addition, the survey “Socio-economic situation of students in Slovenia” (Ule et al. 2008), conducted in 2008 on a sample of students, showed a below-average interest in politics. As that research showed, 73% of students have no or little interest in politics and only 6% of the students are very interested in politics.

However, the Eurobarometer 2007 – Youth Survey,<sup>14</sup> showed quite different data for Slovenia and also for European countries in general, although it was done

14. Eurobarometer Survey 2007 was carried out on a representative national sample of 15 to 30-year-olds in the member states of the European Union. In the EU15 (the original 15 member states of the European Union) 11 770 young people were surveyed, 7 855 in NMS12 (12 newer member states of the European Union), 500 of them in Slovenia.

among virtually the same age group as Youth 2000. In the Eurobarometer survey respondents specifically answered “how much interest they have in politics and at the same time also in current affairs at the level of the country, city/region and the European Union”.

The answers show (Table 2) that young people in Slovenia as well as in the EU15 and in the countries which joined later – the 12 so-called new member states, 10 of which are post-socialist (further NMS12) – have most interest in national politics and current affairs (around 80%), followed by an interest in politics and current affairs at the urban/regional level and in politics and current affairs in the EU (both around 70%). Nevertheless, the interest in politics and current affairs of their own country and city/region is lower among young people in Slovenia than the average among young people in the EU15 and roughly the same as in the NMS12. The results of the socio-demographic analysis of these data confirm that with age the interest in politics and current affairs at all levels grows.

**Table 2: Interest of 15 to 30-year-olds in politics and current affairs (in percentages)**

Total “interested” or “very interested”	In your country	In your city/region	In EU
EU15	83.3	73.5	66
NMS12	79.4	70.7	67.3
<b>Slovenia</b>	<b>78.8</b>	<b>68.2</b>	<b>68.3</b>

Source: Eurobarometer 2007 – Youth Survey

The results from the latest survey Youth 2010 show more clearly how the interest in politics in Slovenia and the EU is consistently low over time: the data shows no increase in interest, but the share of the surveyed 15 to 29-year-olds who are not at all or only marginally interested in politics is more than two thirds (66%), while the share of those who are very interested in politics is only 5%. As in previous research, however, the interest slightly increases with age.

An interesting insight into indirect (dis)interest in politics is also given by the indicators about where or how intensely the young consume politics. Does the interest in politics perhaps increase during private consumption of news and during family get-togethers or encounters with friends? The Youth 2000 study highlighted the lack of interest among young people in the dominant politics in Slovenia, demonstrated by the data on the frequency of talking about politics (which is considered to be an indicator of the direct expression of political interests).

About three quarters of the respondents stated that they rarely or very rarely talk about politics with their parents, friends and intimate partners, as well as with classmates or colleagues. In Table 3 we show information on the frequency of monitoring political matters in the media for the year 2010 and changes from 2000 to 2010 with regard to the placement of political topics within the primary groups (family and friends). As the results show, the Internet is becoming the most common window into the world of political topics for young people in Slovenia, at



least according to the survey from 2010, where the electronic media is prominent. Parents and friends are, by contrast, at the bottom of the scale and a comparison with the year 2000 shows a general decline in discussing political topics in the private sphere.

**Table 3: Indirect interest in politics among young people in Slovenia, 2000 and 2010**

	Average frequency (Youth 2010, 15 to 29-year-olds)	Average frequency (Youth 2000, 16 to 29-year-olds)
Internet	2.48	No such data
TV	2.37	No such data
Radio	2.02	No such data
Newspapers	1.88	No such data
Parents	1.29	2.14
Friends	1.29	2.10

### Mistrust in the established political sphere

The same trends (only to a slightly lesser extent) are also typical of the general population. A major proportion of the citizens of the different age groups shows no interest in getting information on the basis of which they could possibly function politically; much less in the operation itself. For example, data suggests that politics is followed by only about 15% of Europeans (Van Deth and Elff 2000). Most people feel that they do not have the power of political influence and are disappointed with political processes. Politics is considered pointless and exclusivist (Wahl-Jorgensen 2002). A very important structural context consists also in the changes in the level of confidence in political institutions and practices of the citizens. The Slovene Public Opinion survey of a representative sample of the Slovenian general population in 2002 (Malnar et al. p. 52-53) shows, for example, that the confidence of citizens in the selected political actors and institutions was low, but nevertheless larger than today: in 2002, one quarter of respondents (25.2%) expressed mistrust in the National Assembly, while in 2010 that figure was 43%. Mistrust in political parties was in 2002 expressed by 38% of respondents; in 2010, however, the share of those expressing mistrust was already a majority (57%). In 2002, the politicians could not be trusted by 41% of respondents, while in 2010, 57% of respondents did not trust them.

Since the Slovene Public Opinion survey does not cover the population under 18, we have to look for potential specifics for young people in youth studies. Data from the year 2000 (unfortunately there is no comparable data for 2010) demonstrates a diametrical contrast between a very high confidence in the friendship ties and parents on one side and a high mistrust in the established political power and political institutions on the other side (see Table 4). Leading politicians and political parties were already in 2000, among young people, the least trusted institutions, right behind the EU and the president of the country. Parents and friends, on

the other hand, have a high degree of confidence, confirming the importance of the already discussed private relationships (and at the same time indicating the dependence on them).

**Table 4: Youth's trust in institutions and primary groups, Slovenia, 2010**

Trust	Average on 1-5 scale N=1262
<b>Friends</b>	<b>4.11</b>
Parents	4.07
Courts	2.89
Schools	2.85
Slovenian Army	2.81
Ecological movements	2.75
President of Slovenia	2.65
EU	2.59
Leading politicians	2.00
<b>Political parties</b>	<b>1.90</b>

Source: Youth 2000

### Decline of conventional forms of political participation

Research among young people in various European countries suggests that interest in the conventional and traditional form of politics built on authority and power is in decline. But interest in politics encompassing sensibilities and commitment to social, moral and ecological problems in their environment is growing (Norris 2002; Hoikkala 2009). In short, most young people do not reject politics per se, but mainly existing structures and forms of organisation in modern democratic countries. In particular they feel a dislike towards politicians and parties (Hurrelmann 2007). However, the distance from politicians or parties is similar to that for other organised social institutions, such as trade unions and youth organisations (Hurrelmann 2007). One of the indicators of the decline of conventional forms of participation is the level of voting or abstention in elections.

Following the results of the Eurobarometer 2007 survey, more than 70% of young people in Slovenia participated in at least one election or referendum in the period 2004-2007, while it is also necessary to mention that in the same period 18.2% of respondents (15 to 30-year-olds) were still without voting rights (Table 5). The percentage of participation in the elections is higher than the percentage in the EU15 and the NMS12 countries, however here the average percentage of those who were still without voting rights is also higher. The socio-demographic analysis of the whole European sample shows that the less educated are half as likely to vote as the more educated.


**Table 5: Participation of 15 to 30-year-olds in (any) election or a referendum in the last three years (in percentages)**

	Yes	No	There were no elections/ referendum	Without voting right at the time of last election/referendum
EU15	61.8	12.6	1.4	23.6
NMS12	64.3	12.2	0.7	22.4
<b>Slovenia</b>	<b>71.3</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>18.2</b>

Source: Eurobarometer 2007 – Youth Survey

As graph 1 illustrates, the share of young people between 15 and 29 who did not take part in parliamentary elections increased in the decade from 1999 to 2008. The same trend also applies to the same cohort within the EU. Adults above 30, by contrast, do not show these tendencies in Slovenia, unlike Europe, where abstention also gradually increases.

**Graph 1: Share of (young) people who would not attend parliamentary elections, Slovenia and EU27, 1999 and 2008**



Source: Lavrič et al. 2010, p. 147


### The attractiveness of unconventional participatory practices?

Research from other European countries suggests that young people feel closer to the ad hoc forms of participation on an “on-off” basis with short-term effects (Roudet 2009; Hurrelmann 2007; Spannring 2009) that are compatible with their lifestyles and are relevant to their lives. In particular at the local level, participation is not

happening necessarily through formal institutionalised channels (e.g. at polling stations or in youth organisations/clubs), but in many informal, more individualised contexts and shapes.

As shown in graph 2, signing a petition, a simple form of expression, is among the most common practices for young people in Slovenia, which has been significantly simplified with the Internet and has spread among online users, since it does not require any serious commitment, just a click on the appropriate link and a signature. Percentages of the remaining activities are, on average, relatively low. In conclusion, political activity is a rather infrequent practice and not a widespread phenomenon among Slovenian youth.

**Graph 2: Share of young people in Slovenia who probably would be or have already been politically active, 2010**




Source: Youth 2010

The Internet nowadays often plays the key role in unconventional participatory processes. Graph 3 illustrates clearly that the Web is “the space for young people” in Slovenia – more than a third of young people often participate in online forums and 16% of them comment on the contributions in media portals. However, these spaces are used substantially less for the expression of political views or opinions.

The Eurobarometer 2007 Youth Survey gives insights into participation in organisations. In 2007, almost a fifth of 15 to 30-year-olds in Slovenia enrolled in an organisation, which is a slightly lower percentage than the average for the EU15 (a quarter), but higher than the average of the last 12 member states to join the EU (one tenth). Correlations with socio-demographic variables indicate that members of organisations are, on average, more often male, higher educated or young people from rural areas. Manual workers are, however, very rarely members of organisations. Answers from the same survey show that where young Slovenians belong to at least one organisation, the majority of those organisations are sports clubs or federations. The proportion of young people in youth organisations in Slovenia is less than one eighth of 15 to 30-year-olds, which is higher than the average in the EU15 but

lower than the average in the NMS12. One eighth of young people in Slovenia can be found in clubs connecting people based on their hobbies or special interests, and one eighth in cultural or artistic organisations, both higher than the averages for the EU15 and NMS12.

**Graph 3: Individualised forms of political participation, Slovenia, 2009**




Source: Lavrič et al. 2010, p. 163

### Low activity as a reflection of perception of (non-)power?

How do young people perceive their influence on political events and social changes? The indicator of the attitude towards conventional politics is the sense of the political (in)efficiency, which is defined as an individual's belief that with his or her effort he or she can (not) affect the political events or the political process. It is measured as the belief of people that they can have their voice over authority and that the government is receptive to those voices.

Low subjective political efficacy is associated with feelings of alienation from politics, distrustfulness to it and helplessness in influencing in any way. The data from the Youth 2000 survey pointed out a high degree of subjective feelings of inefficiency. Most young people did not have a feeling that they understood politics and that they could have an impact on the political decisions and actions of the political elites (Miheljak 2002). In the Youth 2010 survey, two thirds of young people (61%) agreed that they do not understand politics. However, graph 4 clearly illustrates that the sense of inability to affect political decisions among youngsters in Slovenia increases over time. More than two thirds of young people are sceptical about the goals and intentions of politicians, most believe that they do not have any impact on power, however even more see political affairs as quite distanced from their own views. Less confidence in politics and a greater sense of powerlessness in relation to established institutionalised politics continue even in a negative perception of one's own power for impact on social change in general.


**Graph 4: External and internal political efficacy of young people in Slovenia, 2000 and 2010**



Sources: Youth 2000 and Youth 2010

Figures from 2010, compared to those from Youth 1995,<sup>15</sup> show that the proportion of those young people in Slovenia who are willing to become involved only in narrow limited “adolescent activities”, that is for the interest of the young, is growing – this percentage increased by 10% (graph 5).

**Graph 5: students’ readiness for action for social change in Slovenia, 1995 and 2010**



Sources: Youth 1995 and Youth 2010

15. The Youth 1995 survey (Ule et al. 2005) was carried out in 1995 on a sample of 1 829 higher education students in the second and third year courses of (the then two) Slovenian universities.

## DISCUSSION

What is happening with the political and social participation of Slovenian youth in the context of their radical retreat into privacy, which has been part of a (albeit relatively unproblematic) shift from socialist to capitalist system and which has been intensified with the recent economic crisis, with the young generation being even more dependent upon parental economic, social and emotional support? The above-mentioned trends should be understood within the context of the broader Western trend of increasing individualism and disintegration of the old structures that gave a solid orientation to previous generations. The old perceptions of collective obligations and loyalties are disappearing, while – in the best-case scenario – the “individualised ethics of everyday life” are being enforced (Ule et al. 2008). In addition, young people nowadays are flooded with marketing and media-oriented culture and entertainment.

The data from national youth surveys in Slovenia proves a clearly declining trend of conventional forms of political action, which, however, does not mean that young people are politically completely disinterested. The analysis shows the retreat from the classical institutions and engagement, in which new and different forms of action flourish: the tailored, predominantly electronically transmitted political, temporary activation and socio-cultural practices, directly related to the lifestyle of young people. Youth engagement is caught in a strong perception of citizens’ helplessness, which is why young people find their own youth environment or topics associated with them as the most reasonable field of potential “work” for politics.

Young people are – broadly speaking – activated in different ways: they are online, mobile in their technologically mediated relationships and in their social network contexts, where they take (individual) care for their own digital image, friends and consumption. This has been the characteristic also for other European countries, but in Slovenia it has been very much stimulated by the safe comfort of the home, and also the Slovenian education system functions as a safe social system. As demonstrated by the latest political protests in Slovenia in 2013, in our country it is mostly the generation over 30 that is activated: the educated, predominantly working but precarious population – so the one that has awakened from the (safe) extended youth moratorium sleep and dreams. However, considering the current course of these events, one cannot say that this generation, which is just over the age of 30, is characterised by being more tolerant, dialogic or collaborative but rather by having more egocentric value orientations. And younger people are, at most, struggling for existing apparent benefits of extended youth (which are, in fact, traps), such as low-taxed student work and free mass tertiary education. Nevertheless, the hope that new social movements, also in Slovenia, (could) represent a renewed framework for articulation of youth interests, for reflection on societal challenges and collective efforts for change, is not to be abandoned.

In order to better understand the current participatory phenomena, we undoubtedly need more comprehensive studies. So far we have, in Slovenia as well as across Europe, mainly analyses of general practices, which deal insufficiently with the question of what politics is to the young, analyses which insufficiently take into account the changes in the lifestyles of young people, such as their attachment to home and

the impact of the media and social networks. Furthermore, youth politics at the national and European level should be more relevant to everyday youth culture and the media consumption by a digital generation. We need to understand young people's everyday practices in today's society of mediated relationships and we also need to recognise the changeable media world that is becoming intensely mobile and digitised. As a consequence this means we need to focus also on the level of digital content and on the question of how do the most important institutions for younger generations activate (or deactivate) them through their online and mobile representations. If we aim to have an active youth that speaks publicly about their own problems, ambitions and aims, then we also need to interact with them in their own language, in their own communication style and according to their own media tastes (Livingstone 2005).

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## Chapter 5

# Connecting to the future: the role of spatial mobilities in young people's imagined biographies

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*Simona Isabella and Giuliana Mandich*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Arjun Appadurai defines the capacity to aspire “as the ability to read a map of a journey into the future” (2004: 76). Mobility is a key component in the construction of such a journey for young people today – both in public discourse (as a goal to be reached in the field of European youth policies for instance) and as an element for opening up new areas of opportunity and change in individuals’ life and career paths.

According to the “capabilities approach” (Sen 1980) and Appadurai’s further developments of it (2004), we argue that it is important to consider mobility not only as an actual behaviour but also as bringing with it a whole set of cultural elements making mobility possible in people’s lives. In the distinction made by Sen between capability and functioning, the latter indicates an achievement or outcome, while the former is the capacity to achieve such functioning. A capability can be defined as an opportunity or the freedom to act on one’s choices. Therefore, well-being should be assessed not so much by what people are or what people do, as by what they are free to be or do; for example, being healthy, being able to read and write, knowing how to participate in the life of the community as well as being able to see how mobility can determine their future. In order to place young people’s aspirations of mobility in this perspective, we draw on the concept of “motility” (Kaufmann 2002, Kaufmann, Viry and Widmer 2010).

In order to give an example of the usefulness of this perspective, in this article we address the role of mobility in the imagined future of today's youth. Our study (part of a larger research project on youth)<sup>16</sup> draws on the analysis of 340 essays written by 18 and 19-year-old students from the largest town in Sardinia.<sup>17</sup> They were asked to imagine being 90 years of age and telling the story of their lives. As we shall see, what emerged from their imagined biographies is how mobility seems to be a significant factor in young people's aspirations. Nevertheless, their view of future mobility tells us a much more ambivalent story about mobility per se, as a concrete possibility in young people's lives.

We believe that a measured interpretation of such ambivalence goes well beyond the single and limited case we are dealing with here, and should serve as a meaningful example to identify the cultural obstacles (in terms of socially constructed knowledge, skills and value attitudes) that restrain young people's access to mobility today. In short, it relates directly to one of the main objectives of European youth policies.

### **MOBILITY IN YOUTH POLICIES: A BRIEF ACCOUNT**

Since the end of the 1980s, when the European Union started to promote youth exchanges through specific funding programmes such as "Erasmus" and "Youth for Europe";<sup>18</sup> youth mobility has been a permanent fixture on the European Union's agenda. During the 1990s, a series of resolutions adopted by the Council of Europe dealt with promoting the geographical mobility of young people (European Youth Card Association). In this phase, youth mobility gradually came to be seen as an asset in European youth policy, culminating in 2001 with the European Commission's White Paper "New impetus for European youth". The main purpose of this White Paper was to propose a new framework for co-operation among the various people involved in the area of youth policy in order to better involve young people in decisions that concern them. It was also intended as a response to young people's strong disaffection with the traditional forms of participation in public life and, in order to facilitate European countries in taking action to help young people in Europe, the White Paper proposed a new framework for co-operation between EU countries. In 2006, the European Quality Charter for Mobility established the quality reference document for education and training stays abroad: it was addressed to all member states and aimed to provide guidance on mobility agreements on learning or for other purposes, such as professional development, for both young and adult participants. Subsequently, the Youth in Action programme (2007-2013) has stressed the importance of involving young people in society as active citizens

16. For more information about the research project see: <http://people.unica.it/ifuture/>.

17. Sardinia is one of the Italian regions traditionally deprived in terms of economic and educational opportunities: youth unemployment in 2012 was 47.3% (compared to 35.3% for the whole of Italy, and well above the EU average of 22.8%). Youth disadvantage is consistent also in terms of educational achievements. For instance Tertiary educational attainment for the age group 30-34 is 17.6% in Sardinia, 21.7% in Italy while the EU average is 35.8%.

18. For a complete report on the history of European youth policies see Elisa Briga, "Youth Mobility" in *Youth knowledge*, No. 15, EKCYIP insights, Philip Boetzelen (ed.), Council of Europe and the European Commission, 2012.

in order to strengthen their sense of belonging to Europe. In 2008, the “Conclusions of the Council” on youth mobility highlighted the fact that the mobility of young people is essential to promoting a sense of belonging to Europe, enhancing social and work-related integration, and ensuring a competitive European economy. Both the European Union and the Council of Europe agree on the fact that youth mobility is a priority issue in the field of youth policy and collaborate to enhance it. Indeed, one of the main initiatives of the Agenda/Europe 2020 is the Commission’s “Youth on the Move”, whose priorities include improving the geographical mobility of young people throughout Europe.

According to the European programmes and documents on youth policies, being mobile is a skill that young people have to learn if they are to improve the general conditions of their lives and aspire to a better future for themselves and for Europe as a whole. Mobility is in fact viewed as a “key instrument to prepare young people to live in the society of the future, be open to new ideas and deal with the unfamiliar, and it aims to extend opportunities for learning mobility to all young people in Europe by 2020, by mobilizing resources and removing obstacles to pursuing a learning experience abroad” (Briga 2012: 77).

European policies on youth mobility stress the idea of young people as crucial actors “invested with the responsibility of determining the future directions of our societies” (Eriksson 2012: 22). However, if compared with EU policy objectives, data on mobility reveal a slightly different picture. Long-term trends do indicate that young people in Europe have become increasingly mobile inasmuch as they now increasingly cross national borders to study, work in paid employment or the voluntary sector, or travel for pleasure. However, after 2008, the current economic crisis has produced a levelling out or an actual decrease in youth mobility in many countries. According to the EU Youth Report 2012, statistics on mobility today show that only a limited number of young people have experienced a period abroad (more than one month) in order to work.<sup>19</sup> On the whole, the vast majority of young people reported that they have never ventured abroad for learning or training purposes. Indeed, only 13.5% of them have ever studied in another country.

Even though one of the main purposes stated in EU policies is to remove obstacles to youth mobility, the results are not as promising as might be expected. In addition, the objective of including disadvantaged categories has by no means been reached. Resistance seems to be particularly high among young Italians, at least according to official EU data.

If we look at data on mobility reported in the EU Youth Report 2012, only 12% of young Italian adults said they had spent a period abroad – or were staying abroad at the time of the survey – for education purposes. Unlike average figures for the EU (somewhat higher for learning mobility periods abroad) the figure for sojourns abroad for at least one month for reasons other than for education/training or vacation/tourism was notably low (with an average of 12% Italy is the second lowest among the European countries).

19. See EU Youth Report 2012, p. 35. Data presented are the results/findings of the Eurobarometer survey “Youth on the Move” 2011.

Moreover, the length of sojourns is generally brief, given that the proportion of young Italian adults with a higher education qualification who had stayed abroad for at least three months for education or training purposes is one of the lowest in Europe. Italy is thus one of the countries where it is least likely that European students will decide to study within the framework of an EU-funded mobility programme. Unsurprisingly, the majority of young adults in Italy (55%) said they were not willing – or have little desire – to work in another European country (Italy is the second most “unwilling” country among the EU).

Any in-depth analysis of the Italian case requires greater scrutiny. On the one hand, it seems that the lack of youth policies at the national level weakens the efficacy of the European ones; on the other hand, young people seem unable to exploit the opportunities that EU programmes offer them. Although the reasons underlying such resistance are not fully understood, it is worth noting that according to the Eurobarometer survey 2011, the lack of financial means or the cost of a stay being too expensive are not the prime reasons why respondents did not go abroad (20%); the main reason is a lack of interest (28%).

## **MOBILITIES AND MOTILITIES**

As we have seen, mobility is an essential component in EU policies, yet it is also a multifaceted concept that is worth analysing in order to better understand. Not only should we examine different forms of mobility (holiday, learning, work and voluntary work, short and long-term, physical and virtual), but also probe the diverse meanings of mobility and the way these are reflected in both public discourse and personal narratives. For instance, close examination of the core content of the EU discourse on youth and mobility reveals that there are at least three separate meanings ascribed to the term.

First, mobility is portrayed as freedom of movement. In this sense mobility is a right, as clearly expressed in the Green Paper promoting the learning mobility of young people: “The right to be mobile across national borders is one of the fundamental freedoms which the EU bestows on its citizens” (European Commission 2008a).

Furthermore, as stated in the White Paper “European transport policy for 2010”, “personal mobility, which increased from 17 km a day in 1970 to 35 km in 1998, is now more or less seen as an acquired right” (European Commission 2001: 11).

The link between mobility, freedom and rights has long been recognised and is now well established (Sager T. 2006: 467). In this meaning, mobility expresses the idea that forms the basis of the creation of a European economic, political and social space; it should be remembered that the core of European Union economic and social policy can be encapsulated under the idea of the “five freedoms” – free movement of goods, capital, services, persons and knowledge.

At the same time, mobility is present in policy narratives as an experience needed to improve both the opportunities and outlook of EU citizens. Experiencing mobility is considered to be a key instrument in building European citizenship.

Learning mobility, i.e. transnational mobility for the purpose of acquiring new skills, is one of the fundamental ways in which individuals, particularly young

people, can strengthen their future employability as well as their personal development. Studies confirm that learning mobility adds to human capital, as students access new knowledge and develop new linguistic skills and intercultural competences.

– Commission’s Green Paper on learning mobility for young people 2008: 2

Exploiting the opportunities that mobility provides is seen as an essential contribution to many EU policy objectives and there is a growing amount of literature that endeavours to discuss and assess the effect that experiencing mobility has on personal development (boosting people’s skills and employability) as well as on building a sense of EU citizenship and helping to form young people as future leaders and citizens with a greater respect for diversity (King and Raghuram 2013, Kuhn 2012, Sigalas 2010).

A third dimension, which is particularly relevant in the case of youth policies, is mobility as an ability in itself. According to Olsson et al. (2011) mobility as an ability is pivotal in defining young people’s privileged positions in the European project. “Mobility is thus identified as the ability to lift him or herself over and above provincial and local contexts” (Olsson U. et al. 2011). To be mobile is one of the attributes characterising the “ideal” European citizenship, and “in these goals the floating signifier ‘youth’ is coded as being or becoming an active border crosser, participatory, full of initiative, enterprising, creative, feeling solidarity, and as being boundlessly equipped with an understanding of the cultural diversity and the common values assumed to existing Europe” (Olsson U. et al. 2011).

Looking at the complexity of meanings of mobility leads us to emphasise that mobility cannot be seen as an identifiable and clear-cut behaviour (to be mobile or not). In a cultural perspective, mobility has to be seen as a form of embodied cultural capital (Holdsworth 2006) expressing values, aspirations and life goals and requiring practical and cognitive resources.

Recently, within the field of mobility studies, the concept of motility has been developed to deal precisely with this dimension of mobility (mobility as potential movement).<sup>20</sup>

Motility can be defined as “how an individual or group takes possession of the realm of possibilities for mobility and builds on it to develop personal projects” (Flamm and Kaufmann 2006: 168). Three interdependent factors determine a person’s motility and define what has been called “motility capital”: access, competence and skills, and cognitive appropriation. Access refers to the ease with which individuals can take advantage of mobility (in line with a growing use of the term “access” that transcends its original spatial connotations, referring to public access to resources and opportunities); competence refers to mobility skills and abilities required (physical ability), acquired skills (e.g. driving licence) and organisational skills (e.g. synchronising activities and planning); and cognitive appropriation refers to the ways in which mobility agents evaluate mobility options and is concerned with strategies, values, representations and habits. The concept of motility is distinct from mobility

20. The extension of the biological notion of motility to the potential mobility of humans was proposed by Kaufmann (2002). For a recent review of the concept see Kellerman (2012).



practices, since these last ones represent the achievement of the ability to choose mobility. In this sense mobility has been seen as an opportunity.

Reassessing the EU's commitment to increasing mobility, we can say that if it is necessary to remove obstacles to mobility as behaviour (accessibility), more attention should perhaps be paid to the more complex set of cultural elements that enable young people in the EU to see mobility as a possibility. In this direction, more specific questions need to be addressed, such as: what kind of knowledge and organisational capacity is needed? What kinds of strategies of mobility are used? What kind of values, representations and habits affect mobility?

### **INSIGHTS FROM A CASE STUDY: YOUNG PEOPLE'S NARRATIVES OF IMAGINED MOBILITIES**

In order to address these questions, we will now discuss the findings of research<sup>21</sup> into young people and the future. Looking at the way mobility is envisaged in imagined biographies helps us to look into motility and the set of cultural elements shaping it. According to some literature that explores young people's temporalities and the way they plan/view their future in a context of increasing uncertainty (Leccardi 2009; Melucci 1996) the main focus is to explore the intersection/interconnection between the ability itself to plan and ideas concerning the future. This relation between planning the future and its representations is often critical and can generate varying outcomes: one of these is the process of "presentification", which refers to the tendency for an ability to build a future project to be replaced by a constant adaptation to the present in order to promptly turn chances into opportunities. Focusing on Appadurai's concept of the "capacity to aspire" (2004) our research project has tried to conceptualise young people's efforts at imagining their future in terms of their ability to "realistically" project their present opportunities while being able to employ socially relevant narratives to frame it.

From a methodological point of view, the research project draws on an already established research procedure (Elliott 2010; Lyon and Crow 2012; Lyon, Morgan and Crow, 2012) and focuses on the analysis – both qualitative and quantitative – of approximately 250 essays written by 18 and 19-year-old students in the largest town in Sardinia (Cagliari). The students were asked to imagine they were 90 and to tell the story of their lives. Essays were collected during autumn 2012 in five high schools in Cagliari, from the fourth-year high school students.<sup>22</sup> The choice of schools involved was designed to obtain a heterogeneous, representative sample of students from different social classes, living in both urban and peripheral areas.

From a sociological point of view, using biographical narratives is a useful way to explore and understand people's experiences and how much importance they ascribe to the events in their lives (Demazière and Dubar 2000; Jedlowski 2000; Maines, Pierce and Laslett 2008). In the case of these students' essays on imagined biographies, what emerges is the higher or lower ability in projecting and constructing "possible futures".

21. For further information see: <http://people.unica.it/ifuture/>.

22. In Italy high school lasts five years, from 14/15 to 18/19 years old. The first two years are compulsory.

According to Michael Bamberg, “When narrators tell a story, they give ‘narrative form’ to experience. They position characters in space and time and, in a very broad sense, give order to and make sense of what happened – or what is imagined to have happened”.<sup>23</sup> In the same way, students who participate in the “iFuture” research project reorganise their life experiences in order to recount an imagined future: while they are imagining they are 90 and writing the story of their life, they are collecting all the “images” and knowledge of the world they have in order to give a sense to their imagined biography. From the analysis of the essays, one striking element is that geographical mobility is an important part of young people’s imagined biography. Almost 60% of the students include mobility in their future life.

The three main motivations for students moving abroad were for holidays, to study and to find work. We shall look briefly at the first two types of mobility but then focus on work since it better indicates students’ ability to imagine and organise a project in the future.

The theme of holidays is present in almost all the essays and in different moments of life. A common feature of this type of mobility is that it is always described as a dream journey, often shared with friends, boy/girlfriends or family:

I decided to travel, a long trip in order to admire all the wonderful European cities!

– Student, female

I allow myself a beautiful holiday in Paris with my boyfriend.

– Student, female

Another often repeated preoccupation among students is the fact they have to improve their English-speaking skills in order to find a job, either in Italy or in a foreign country. Yet, despite perfectly rational accounts of wanting to “go abroad in order to improve my English”, there are few examples of concrete projects to improve mobility. On the contrary, their stays abroad are described as isolated episodes, something that often has nothing to do with the rest of their life experiences:

That summer was one of the best of my life: I decided to go to London with the young and gutsy aunt Asja. I was more interested in improving my English, she in her passion for Great Britain [...] After our stay in London we decided to come back to Cagliari (in Sardinia). In October I went to Genoa with my friends to sit an exam in order to enter the Naval Academy.

– Student, female

Next to this snapshot form of mobility, which characterised students’ imagined biographies,<sup>24</sup> mobility is perceived as part of a life experience entailing a decision

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23. Bamberg M. (2012), “Narrative Analysis”, in H. Cooper (Editor-in-chief), *APA handbook of research methods in psychology* (3 volumes), APA Press, Washington, DC, p. 77.

24. A common feature of students’ essays has to do with the narrative structure: almost all of the 250 essays show a fragmented narration that seems to reveal a writing attitude typical of social media, for example Twitter or Facebook. Students are used to writing and reading short pieces of information that refer to the moment they write. In this way it seems they have lost the sense of past, present and future as a historical continuum.

to migrate that will hopefully lead to the achievement of professional and personal ambitions. While students seem to be aware that geographical mobility is one of the prerequisites for finding a job, very little space is given to how they think it might be a useful device for advancing their careers.

Interestingly, two basic categories of mobility projects emerge from the essays. The first one is a more realistic account of mobility, largely based on the migration experience as lived by students' families; their stories seem to retrace the history of Italian migration as an inescapable destiny. They describe their mobility patterns as a continuum in the history of their families, where mobility is cited as a good example to follow, as an already experimented model that can be repeated:

During that summer I remember I went to London to visit my sister. Just for fun, she came with me to a job interview in an important hotel and I got it. ... I was encouraged to go abroad by my family since all my cousins had a family and a successful career outside Italy. ... With the money earned working in the hotel I left my mother to go to Germany. There I stayed with a cousin of mine until I had found a job ...

– Student, female

The second pattern of imagined mobility is characterised by the extensive use of references to the media world: students are inspired by images of and make frequent references to characters belonging to TV series, films, video games and books in order to describe both chosen destinations and migration patterns. In these narratives of media-influenced mobilities young people imagine possible life events within fictional situations borrowed from the media:

I decided to have a break and to leave Italy with a friend of mine. We went to the USA, precisely to Las Vegas, a city that has always struck me for its elegance and brilliance. I began to gamble in one of the most beautiful casinos, the Palms,<sup>25</sup> where I won a lot of money. Nevertheless, I left the casino because I wanted to visit the beautiful landscapes of Nevada. ... I had to board the Grimaldi Lines Grand Gabon as a sailor. ... I flew to London in Britain. Once I had landed there I called my parents to say hello, then I boarded my second flight to New York. ... In New York I boarded my third flight to Baltimore in Maryland where someone from the shipping company was waiting for me. They drove me to a Hotel in Jacksonville.<sup>26</sup> It was night and that city of the USA was beautiful all well lit with skyscrapers that made me feel happy.

– Student, male

Looking at these narratives, what is the role of mobility in students' imagined biographies?

Mobility is a dominant narrative in contemporary society. The idea that people, goods and ideas are on the move more than ever, while infrastructures allow connections between different places and between people and places has led to the so-called mobility turn. This has been defined as "a different way of thinking through the

25. The Palm Casino is a reference to the reality show series "The Jersey Shore".

26. Jacksonville is the name of the city where part of the Twilight Series takes place.

character of economic, social and political relationships. Such a turn is spreading in and through the social sciences, mobilising analyses that have been historically static, fixed and concerned with predominantly a-spatial 'social structures'" (Urry 2007:6). And mobility as we have discussed in the previous paragraph is at the core of EU policies.

At first glance, students seem familiar with and are well integrated into this new mobile society, given that their imagined biographies are "mobile biographies". Most of the time, mobility is portrayed as a positive feature of their imagined lives, being viewed as one of the key devices that facilitate the expandability (the degree to which future possibilities are seen as expanding or contracting) of young people's imagined futures (Mishes 2009). For many students, the prospect of perceiving the future as increasing and opening up (the start of a new career, a love story) is closely linked to mobility. On the other hand, going back home has negative associations with a moment of closure and decline (family in need, illness, divorce or an economic downturn).

At the same time, imagined mobility very rarely takes the form of a concrete project of mobility, something which is carefully planned to achieve a particular end. It remains a sort of magical device that can bring about a change in young people's lives. Mobility is simply a way to disconnect from a present experience and a situation that is generally difficult to escape from, rather than being an informed and reflective attempt at connecting to a different reality.

As a gift, my parents paid for me to have a holiday in Paris. From that moment my life started. My intention was to stay there for a short period but as soon as I landed I went to a café to have a coffee and I found an interesting job offer on a bulletin board in the café.

– Student, female

Mobility as a magical device seems to offer the way out and be the only means to bypass uncertainty; it is a common trait in youths' biographies that somehow seems to substitute concrete biographical projects in young people's narratives of the future.

A deeper analysis of the role of geographical mobility as perceived in young people's essays reveals how imagined mobility is viewed as a spaceless, easy and weightless experience. Whether discussing the prospect of leaving the country in order to find a job or going on holiday with friends, everything is lumped together as one unproblematic, "taken for granted" experience. The space in which mobility occurs resembles space on the Internet, a global and virtual space where there are no references to territorial borders or to the specificities of locales. In this abstract idea of space there are no geographical distances: in students' narratives, going to New York or to London is the same thing.

## **EMPOWERING YOUTH: IMAGINED MOBILITY AND CAPACITY TO ASPIRE**

Although reading young people's narratives of an imagined future cannot predict what they will actually do in the future, it can tell us what kind of images/representations of mobility they have, what kind of acquired knowledge they show about what

it means to be mobile today (about destinations, obstacles and what to expect) as well as what kind of strategies they think about and which sources might nurture their aspirations of mobility.

While the young respondents in our research have taken on board the idea that mobility is the future, it remains an imagined mobility that rarely takes on the form of a project of mobility. It appears to be mostly a dream perceived as the only means to open the door of opportunity in young people's lives.

Although it may be true that dreaming about mobility can be a positive factor that gives hope and inspiration to young people, in the absence of more specific skills and the knowledge to transform dreams of mobility into a project it can easily turn into passivity and defeat. Being mobile and experiencing mobility implies the existence of opportunities (Erasmus for instance) but also involves the capacity to see mobility as a "realistic" possibility and to give this possibility a tangible meaning in a real-life project.

In light of this scenario, we would like to offer a few concluding remarks.

First, despite the fact that what we might call the rhetoric of mobility is a positive manifestation of the idea of mobility, it does not necessarily empower young people, especially if it has become a sort of benchmark measuring the value of personal projects and is overwhelmingly influenced by media discourse. According to Appadurai, the "capacity to aspire (and thus the aspiration to mobility) conceived as a navigational capacity which is nurtured by the possibility of real-world conjectures and refutations compounds the ambivalent compliance of many subaltern populations with the cultural regimes that surround them (2004: 251)". In other words, an abstract and universal model of mobility risks missing the target of really empowering and not merely fostering mobility in Europe.

Second, empowering mobility needs to take into account how cultures actually enact mobility and thus reframe mobility aspirations as a cultural category (grounded in different social and cultural contexts) rather than an individual trait. Discourses and practices of mobility, for instance, are markedly different in different countries.<sup>27</sup> It seems axiomatic that policy makers must be aware of all these cultural differences in approaching the creation of a culture of mobility through capacity building.

Third, if we look at the way young people describe their future and envisage mobilities, there is almost no trace of support from educational institutions, in terms of providing awareness of mobility opportunities or the empowerment benefits of mobilities. Even in the cases of students pursuing career paths in mobile professions (such as tourism or the navy), it is the background of their family's migration experience on the one hand or media narratives on the other that prevail over other forms of socialisation. This can be a specific feature of the Italian case, in which the effectiveness of the education system in helping young people to plan their futures seems in fact to be distinctly low. In fact, according to the Eurobarometer survey *Youth on the Move*, only a very limited number of young people in Italy described the guidance and counselling received during school education on further education and training

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27. See Holdsworth C. (2006).

options open to them (20%) or on future employment opportunities (16%) as “good” or “very good”. In both cases, Italy has the second lowest approval rate.

Finally, the influence of media narratives and of what has been called the celebrity culture are factors that have to be taken into account as elements shaping young people’s aspirations to mobility. If these elements constitute a powerful substratum of youth imagination across Europe, a naïve use of these elements is more likely to be dominant where the possibility to experiment with more realistic opportunities is more limited.

Herein lies the need for integrating practical skills and cognitive awareness. These are both needed in order to turn dreams of mobility into realistic projects.

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## Chapter 6

# What lies behind school failure, youth gangs and disconnections with the host society for the second generation? The case of young people of Latin American origin in Spain

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*Maria Ron Balsera*

### **INTRODUCTION**

The integration of migrants is a common concern for most European countries. Immigration policies tend to portray migrants, especially those arriving from poor countries, as a problem. These policies aim to tackle migration by restricting the entry of newcomers, which reinforces geographical barriers and builds a European fortress. This limits the possibilities for family reunification and many family members are often left behind. But despite this, European stability and relative economic prosperity prove to have a stronger pulling effect than the dissuasive migration policies. In 2012 the foreign population in Europe reached 20.1 million, representing 4.1% of the total European population, and the figure for the foreign-born population was 33 million in the 27 countries forming the European Union (Eurostat). In 2011 Spain was the country with the highest number of immigrants – 507 742, ahead of the United Kingdom with 350 703, Germany with 249 045 and France with 213 367 (Eurostat).



The challenge of integrating the increasing number of newcomers is even more critical in the case of the children of migrants. This second generation faces different barriers from the ones experienced by their parents, since children of migrants are more familiar with the host country language and culture. Although born or at least socialised in the host country, their migrant background often leads to lower access to opportunities and resources than those offered to the native population. However, migrants are usually extremely diverse and factors such as their country of origin, religion, language ability, ethnic group and family economic status play a crucial role in determining the successful integration of migrants and their children (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). Migrants and their descendants arriving from poorer countries encounter greater barriers than the native population in areas such as education, the labour market, politics and the justice system.

In many European countries the recent economic crisis has resulted in a soaring youth unemployment rate, higher levels of poverty, youth discontentment and disconnection with social and political institutions. Migrants, being a historically vulnerable group, have seen their situation worsen far more than natives. The growing social inequalities, the deterioration of working conditions, the weakening of social protection mechanisms and the increasing anti-immigration attitudes are shifting the political discussions of integration towards alienating young people with a migrant background.

This article focuses on the situation of migrants arriving from poorer countries, those outside the European Union, without considering rich countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia, etc. Delving into the literature on migration, it focuses on assimilation, and reflects on some of the findings from the author's PhD research. During this research, biographical interviews were conducted with 15 selected young boys and girls with a Latin American origin in Spain. A third of the participants were high school students, another third were completing a short vocational course after having dropped out of secondary education and the last third were serving sentences in young offenders' institutions. The preliminary findings are similar to the disconnections and integration failures that other researchers have found with children of migrants in most European countries and allow us to reflect on the barriers to a successful integration. It also sheds light on the reasons why a small number of children of migrants end up joining gangs and committing criminal activities.

## **INTEGRATION, ASSIMILATION AND MULTICULTURALISM**

For many decades, academics and politicians, among others, have been discussing the best ways to incorporate migrants and their children into society. With conflicting arguments, assimilation and multiculturalism are the two main perspectives guiding migration and cultural policies in host countries.

Assimilation involves migrants changing as a result of the contact they have with the native population in order to fit into the host society. In the first half of the 20th century, classical assimilationism considered that immigrants should gradually lose their original culture. Following this argument, old cultural traits, native language and forming ethnic enclaves were considered sources of disadvantage. In many countries migrants' culture, language and customs were perceived as inferior and needed to

be forgotten or unlearned (Park 1928; Stonequist 1937; Warner and Srole 1945: 285; Gordon 1964); fortunately this xenophobic perspective is beginning to change.

More recently, some thinkers suggested a new concept of assimilation that describes the adaptations that migrants make when they interact with the native population in their host country. Unlike classical assimilationism, it focuses on what actually happens rather than trying to prescribe what ought to happen for migrants to fit in. In fact, these thinkers (Gans 1992) do not believe that the children of migrants and their descendants will steadily lose their culture, language and customs and eventually become indistinguishable from the native population. The second, third and fourth generations of migrants may well have lost their heritage and only speak the host country's language and even form part of the middle class, becoming almost indistinguishable from the native population. However, these descendants do not always experience upward mobility through education and social class improvement. In fact, many suffer a decline, or experience downward social mobility, becoming more excluded than their parents and grandparents were. This decline could be due to dropping out of school before completing compulsory education, getting unstable or low-skilled jobs or even becoming unemployed.

To explain these different patterns of adaptation and social mobility for migrant descendants, Portes and Zhou (1993) propose the notion of "segmented assimilation". They describe how some groups with a migrant background succeed in becoming economically and culturally integrated into middle-class norms having lost their original customs. Some manage to retain their language and customs, but are still accepted and integrated into the host society's middle class. Some others keep their language and customs but are not accepted by the native population, eventually forming separate ethnic communities. And finally, others lose their parents' and grandparents' culture and are socially marginalised, becoming disconnected from both the native culture and the migrant culture. These individuals sometimes become homeless and many become involved in groups with criminal activities. The reasons behind these four patterns of adaptation and social mobility have to do with individual factors, such as education, aspirations, language abilities, place of birth, age upon arrival and length of residence, together with structural factors, such as racial status, family socio-economic status and place of residence (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997).

In this way, integration does not imply that people with a migrant background should lose their ancestors' culture, it considers that individuals always make some adaptations in order to take advantage of the opportunities offered in the host country. These changes are often unconscious and may happen by simply watching TV, following the new fashions, using the new language in school, work and other social interactions, etc. Nevertheless, the host society also needs to transform in order to incorporate the diversity that accompanies migration. In fact, integration refers to equality between migrants and nationals when it comes to access to opportunities and resources without the need for migrants to leave their culture behind (Alba 2005).

At the other end of the integration spectrum we find multiculturalism. Its proponents criticise policies that aim to fade minorities' ethnic and cultural traits in favour of the host's culture. Multiculturalism rejects the idea of culture being stable and

homogenous. It argues that culture reshapes all the time to dispose of what does not work and include new changes such as migration. Taylor (1994) argues for a type of multiculturalism that recognises diversity and group identities, protecting the rights and well-being of citizens that do not conform to the majority's culture. In the same sense Kymlicka (1995) argues for "group-differentiated rights", which implies that some group minorities are exempt from obeying laws that are contrary to their cultural or religious beliefs.

One way or another, multiculturalism defends the rights of minorities and migrants to practise their culture, such as religion, language, food and customs. The critics of multiculturalism often point out that respecting migrants' traditions could lead to a violation of individual rights, such as in the case of female genital mutilation for young girls, or arranged marriages without the consent of the couple getting married.

Different European countries have adopted different ways of integrating migrants. For instance, the French model is closer to assimilation, since it intends to unify the cultures of the natives with the ethnic minorities. However, the British and Dutch models follow a more multicultural approach to the integration of migrants. Although proposing different solutions, both assimilation and multiculturalism are concerned with the disadvantages migrants face in comparison to the native population. Failures of integration may lead to downward integration or social exclusion. The following sections refer to the situation of children of migrants in Europe, focusing particularly on Spain. They describe the individual and social barriers that children of migrants face in order to be successful in education and how education failure together with family problems and a racist response from the host society may lead them to join ethnically based, violent youth groups.

## **YOUNG PEOPLE WITH A MIGRANT BACKGROUND IN EUROPE**

According to Eurostat statistics there were 25 million first generation migrants in the EU27 countries. This number represented 12.2% of the total population in these countries (Eurostat 2011: 122). Individuals belonging to the second, third and fourth generations of migrants are more difficult to identify since they tend not to be differentiated in the national statistics. However, the Eurostat 2011 study considers that there are around 6 million (2.9% of the total EU27 population) native-born persons aged 25-54 who have one parent born abroad, and more than 4 million (2.1% of the total EU27 population) native-born persons who have both parents born abroad. They are not spread uniformly across Europe. People with a migrant background are more numerous in countries with a historically high level of immigration such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany, whereas new migrant-receiving countries such as Spain and Italy have a much lower proportion of children of migrants.

The statistics show a grim picture for migrants from outside Europe entering one of the EU27 countries. The unemployment rate for nationals aged 15-39 within the EU27 countries was 13.1% in 2012, which rose to 14.8% for migrants from other EU27 countries and jumped considerably to 17.8% for migrants from outside the EU27. Spain has one of the highest unemployment rates of the EU27 countries and the figures tell a similarly bleak story for migrants. The unemployment rates are

28.4%, 32.0% and 36.6% for nationals, migrants from within EU27 and migrants from outside EU27 respectively (Eurostat). And even when employed, migrants tend to receive lower salaries than nationals (IOE 2012). There are also some jobs traditionally assigned to migrants such as food and accommodation services; manufacturing and construction in the case of male migrants and household chores in the case of female migrants (IOE 2007, 2012). These types of job generally require a lower level of education and qualification than the migrants have achieved in their native country. They also involve worse working conditions than other jobs typically given to nationals, showing clear labour market disadvantages.

Although the Europe 2020 strategy emphasises social inclusion, poverty and social exclusion are increasing with the economic crisis. In 2008 31% of migrants aged 25-54 were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This figure was even higher, 35%, for migrants arriving from outside the EU27 countries. Likewise, although having dependent children in the household does not translate into a higher risk of poverty among nationals, it does in the case of migrants (Eurostat 2011:63).

The family situation of migrants has a bigger impact on their children's well-being than it does on those of nationals. If we consider educational achievements, persons with a migrant background are more likely to leave education and training before getting an upper secondary qualification. Although the early school-leaving rates decrease from first to second generation, they are still relatively high.<sup>28</sup> Perhaps counter-intuitively, persons with a mixed background (one native parent and one foreign) and persons with an entirely foreign background outperform their native classmates in terms of educational attainment.<sup>29</sup> However, this could be because the very lowest achievers from a foreign or mixed background have already dropped out of the education system. So although migrants and their descendants have a higher risk of leaving school early (before getting an upper secondary qualification), those who stay are more likely to study a further education degree than the nationals. These statistics demonstrate the positive effect of schooling on inclusion of young people with a migrant background, especially for the second and third generations.

Spain stands out from other European countries for its soaring early school-leaving rates:<sup>30</sup> 40% for first generation migrants, 45% for persons with a foreign background, 29% for persons with a mixed background and 28% for natives (Eurostat 2011:127). These figures point at concerning disconnections between young people and education institutions, especially in the case of young people with a migrant background.

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28. In 2008 these were 26% in the case of the first generation, 17% for persons with foreign heritage and 14% for nationals and mixed background together (Eurostat 2011: 125).

29. In 2008 the percentage of people with low educational attainment was 35% for first generation migrants, 23% for persons with a foreign background, 20% for persons with a mixed background and 24% for natives (Eurostat 2011: 125).

30. The rate of early school leavers is defined as the proportion of the population aged 18-24 with only lower secondary education or less and no longer in education or training (European Commission IP-13-324, 2013)

## **CONNECTIONS AND DISCONNECTIONS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE WITH A MIGRANT BACKGROUND IN SPAIN**

Unlike host countries such as the United Kingdom, France or Germany, which have experienced immigration for a relatively long time, Spain started to receive high numbers of immigrants in the 1990s. At that point, Spain began to change from a country which loses natives through emigration to becoming a net recipient of migrants. However, the recent economic crisis seems to be changing this again and more and more young people, either with a migrant background or native, are migrating to richer countries to find better employment opportunities.

The restrictive 1985 Migration Law responded to the pressures from other European countries that feared Spain would become the main entry point to Europe from Africa and Latin America after the relaxation of national borders enabled by the Schengen agreements in 1985 (Tornos and Aparicio 2002). Although at that time the number of immigrants in Spain was very low, the negative image of migrants as a burden on social services and as the cause of higher unemployment were common in the political world as well as in the media. The Organic Law 7/1985 made it necessary to have some sort of employment for migrants to pass through the Spanish borders. These restrictions resulted in some immigrants becoming “illegal”, which then contributed to further migrant discrimination, exclusion and marginalisation (Tornos and Aparicio 2002; Calavita 1998).

Since then, the Spanish immigration laws O.L. 4/2000 and O.L. 2/2009 have emphasised immigrant integration as being a transversal issue in all the immigration policies, through education, employment, social inclusion and active citizenship (Oberaxe 2011: 117-119). In theory this integration should be a dynamic multicultural two-way process, where the host society needs to adapt to include new cultures and identities. In reality, however, the burden of integration falls on the immigrants who are expected to assimilate into the mainstream Spanish culture (Solanes 2009: 315).

### **Educational barriers**

Students of a migrant background tend to complete fewer years of secondary education than their native peers (Eurostat 2011, Szalai 2010, 2011). The already mentioned 45% early school-leaving rate for persons with a foreign background (Eurostat 2011:127) in Spain is, among other factors, related to cultural shock. Similar to what happens to children of migrants in other European countries, the Spanish reality hardly ever lives up to the expectations they had before they started the migration journey. For example, the houses are smaller than they are used to, the culture feels strange, the schools are different and they have difficulties expressing themselves in the language of the host country.

Lack of language abilities along with religious differences, especially for Muslim migrants, have been linked to social isolation and a lack of integration in other European countries, not just in Spain. Latin America is the main source of migration to Spain; even when Spanish is the main official language and Catholicism the most popular religion in both countries, some young people from a Latin American background struggle to succeed in education and the labour market. The percentage

of young people from Latin America between 18 and 24 who are not in education, employment or training has increased from 19.6% in 2007 to 30.0% in 2011 (IOE 2011:78).<sup>31</sup> So if it is not language or religion that hinders their integration, then what does? There are many idiomatic and cultural differences that are often ignored by education policies and schools who focus their support on migrant students whose first language is not Spanish.

Other factors that contribute to low school attainment for some students from Latin America seem to relate to educational differences in the country of origin and Spain. The incorporation into the Spanish education system, sometimes after completing primary school in their host country, and the everyday cultural differences make progression to post-compulsory education such as university more difficult. However, these barriers should not overcast European society's perception of migrant learners and, particularly, teachers' expectations of their migrant students. It is important to emphasise that the high percentages of early school leaving among students with a migrant background should not lead to blaming the country of origin or the students' attitude. They should instead move institutions to pay extra attention to the causes of this problem and try to remove, or at least overcome, the barriers attached to migrants attempting late incorporation into the European education system.

Migration also changes family relations. Children of migrants often stay in their country of birth until their parents save enough money to bring them to the host country. This separation tends to produce negative consequences in their school performance, at first in their native country but also when they arrive in their new host country. And the developments that took place during this absence from their parents change the parental relationship and often alter the patterns of authority resulting in a more difficult home life (Buelga 2010).

Another factor affecting migrants is the difficult working conditions they experience in Spain, with a 36.53% unemployment rate at the end of 2012<sup>32</sup> (INE 2013:5) forcing them to accept low salaries and long working hours. These long working hours often shorten the time that parents can spend with their children. According to the 2007 survey more than one third of young migrants in Spain spend more than 6 hours alone per day (INE 2007).

The economic value of education is also worse for migrants. Adult migrants seem to arrive with higher levels of education than the average native Spaniard (IOE 2007). However, their human capital is not absorbed into the Spanish labour market, where many migrants are placed in unskilled and unstable positions, such as construction for male migrants and domestic service for female migrants. This mismatch between their parents' qualifications and their employment often lowers the second generation's aspirations.

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31. The number of young people between 18 and 24 not in education, employment or training (NEET) – known as “Ninis” in Spain – increased from 12.1% to 25% for native Spaniards and from 24.9% to 36.2% for migrants. Among the migrant youth the most worrying figures are those for African NEET migrants: 40.6% in 2007 and 52.4% in 2011 (IOE 2012:78).

32. The unemployment rate for nationals was 24.23% (INE 2013: 5).

The economic crisis has led to the deterioration of living and working conditions for migrants. In Spain in 2010 more than half of the working migrants did not earn the equivalent minimum salary in a year. The poverty rate for migrants is much higher than that of Spanish nationals; it has reached 31% with, disturbingly, 10.8% experiencing extreme poverty (IOE 2012).<sup>33</sup> The crisis has resulted in a worsening of their image and provoked anti-immigration attitudes – suspicion, fear and rejection. From 2007 to 2010 the percentage of people who thought that illegal immigrants should be deported increased from 12% to 20%, those who would like to deport immigrants who have committed any type of crime also increased from 68% to 73%, and the support for deporting unemployed immigrants increased from 39% to 43% (IOE 2012).

Young people with a migrant background often report that anti-immigration attitudes leave them feeling inferior, regarded with suspicion, or treated as though they were second-class citizens. Some complain they are victimised by the police because of their ethnicity. This ethnic profiling has been denounced by several civil society associations. These types of clashes with the police are extremely negative for social integration, since they diminish the trust in public institutions and lower migrants' confidence and social capital (Putnam 2007). For social integration to be successful, it is necessary that public institutions act in an equal and fair manner regardless of the ethnic or migrant background (Kumlin and Rothstein 2010).

The stereotypes and prejudices against foreigners are reinforced by a sensationalistic media and are exploited by politicians for their own gains. These xenophobic attitudes from the native population pose a serious barrier to social integration. As a reaction to this rejection, some young people of migrant background feel more comfortable not only with other young peers from the same country of origin, but also with people from the same continent or any non-native as a whole. Migration seems to entail dynamic identity shifting, where social distance is narrowed among children of migrants from not only the same country, region or continent but from any other migrant background simply because they are all made to feel like outsiders (Putnam 2007; Alba and Nee 2003). As a result, strong connections are made among young people with a migrant background, often at the expense of integration, with natives and children of migrants becoming disconnected.

The presence of other persons with a migrant background in the classroom, school or neighbourhood facilitates socialisation and helps restore the pride of coming from a migrant background. However, this pride and the barriers to integration are exploited by subversive and often criminal groups. Youth gangs usually have an ethnic component such as Black Caribbean in Britain and North African in France (Szalai 2011:18). What has been called "Latin gangs" in Spain plays a crucial role in the lives of some young people of Latin American background, particularly those from Ecuador, Colombia and the Dominican Republic. However, it is necessary to emphasise that a very small percentage of young people with a Latin American background actually belongs to these gangs or commit crimes. The following section should not be used to criminalise a population who are already victims of anti-immigration attitudes.

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33. The poverty rate for nationals in 2010 was 19% and extreme poverty was 6.7% (IOE 2012).



It intends to describe the risks that disconnections with the host society may result in for children of migrants.

### **“Latin gangs”**

Different youth gangs fight over urban territory; they use clothes, graffiti, hand gestures and other symbols as signs of identity which can lead to violence if used in the wrong area. Violence between and within gangs is common and is often used in initiation rites, to gain respect, as control mechanisms, as punishment both inside the gang and among gangs and in order to establish the hierarchy (Buelga 2010).

Disconnections with the host society are behind the entry into these gangs. The need to belong, together with a perceived need for protection, is used by these groups to attract young people with a migrant background who feel vulnerable. They present an alternative to school that usually involves gatherings in the street and home parties during the day. And with poorer living conditions than natives, the street often becomes a social space where immigrants hang out with their friends.

Alcohol, drugs, the opportunity to meet people of the opposite sex and have fun with friends all seem to be commonly appealing for both native and migrant youth in general. But the addition of the restoration of ethnic pride and the imposed respect through fear and violence is more common in these gangs. For those members of gangs who are serving sentences in young offenders’ institutions there seems to be a predominance of dysfunctional families. Domestic abuse, alcoholism and broken families are unfortunately all too common experiences for these young offenders and they often fulfil the prophecy of victims who become victimisers.

Entry into these gangs is also linked to school absenteeism and dropout. They offer an alternative to the school routine, providing leisure and entertainment such as house parties, street gatherings, etc. They provide support for those who feel disconnected from school, making them feel part of a group. School failure, family problems and youth gangs form a vicious cycle for children of migrants. Therefore, policies aiming to tackle and prevent youth criminality need to pay attention to the educational barriers and family situation such as parents’ working conditions together with xenophobic attitudes from public institutions and private individuals.

### **A TRIPLE JOURNEY**

Children of migrants experience a triple journey (Feixa 2005). First, a geographical voyage: moving to the host country is a journey that many of them only complete after a separation from their parents who have worked hard to afford their plane tickets. Second, a cultural journey: the shock of encountering a reality that often differs drastically from their expectations, where not only the climate, houses, language, school and culture are different but where even their parents have changed, often for the worse (Buelga 2010). Third, the natural journey: from childhood to adulthood, with the typical changes, transgressions and search for identity associated with adolescence.

The life trajectories of young people with a migrant background reflect unequal opportunities and different degrees of successful integration. Although many children



of migrants do succeed in achieving a good educational degree and a respectable position in the labour market, the statistics show that they face more barriers than their native peers. A high proportion of these young people report the disconnection with the host country in terms of the small number of native friends they have made, the unequal treatment by public institutions such as the police force and the unfair access to the job market, among other reasons.

When language and religion are shared with the majority of the host society – such as most Latin American migrants in Spain – ethnicity still seems to be a distinctive marker that attracts xenophobic attitudes. Although often used in the migration literature (Portes and Zhou 1993), on their own ethnicity, language, nationality and age of arrival do not determine the second generation's upward or downward integration. Socio-economic factors, including family structure, working hours of parents and individual aspirations seem to be necessary explanatory factors. The most common characteristics of members of youth gangs include a lack of economic resources, belonging to mother-headed families compounded with long working hours, domestic violence, issues of masculinity and experience of anti-immigration attitudes (Ron Balsera, forthcoming; IOE 2007 and 2012; Buelga 2010).

The school is the main institution for facilitating successful integration of young people with a migrant background. However, these students often feel like outsiders, they struggle to make friends with natives and many of them drop out altogether. In the case of Spain, the major concentration of dropouts seems to take place in lower secondary school, particularly third and fourth years. Compensatory programmes such as adult education and short vocational training courses seem to be successful in rescuing some of those students who previously abandoned mainstream education. Nonetheless, the number of students with a migrant background in institutions offering these remedial courses is disproportionately high, which sometimes results in a stigma being attached to these courses.

The family is the first place for socialisation. Many children of migrants resent the scarcity of time they spend with their parents. This situation is characteristic of migrants who have moved for economic reasons and work in low-skilled jobs where workers' rights are often violated. Some researchers estimate that migrant mothers work as much as 10 to 16 hours per day in order to support their families (Arellano 2004; UGT 2001). Many migrant women are employed as domestic workers. Using the concept of "global care chains" (Hochschild, Hutton and Giddens 2000), one could conclude that these children who are left alone at home while their mothers work are the end of the chain. In contrast, some native Spanish families enjoy a surplus of care, having a mother, a nanny and a cleaner working for them at home. To fill this void of company and attention, many of these young people turn to gangs, which offer themselves as a second family. But as we have seen, they often lead to violence and criminality (Delpino Goicochea 2007; Feixa et al. 2006; Suárez-Orozco 2000).

European society's xenophobic attitudes make upward integration more difficult, pushing young people with migrant backgrounds to lower their career expectations and drop out of school. Some children of migrants find support in similar ethnic groups against both the subtle and explicit psychological and, in some cases, physical aggressions that they face in their daily lives. However, like every group of friends,

these street gangs improve the well-being and social cohesion of their members (Nolan 2009). In particular, most ethnic groups convert the migration stigma into pride. However, some of these groups carry out criminal activities and become criminal gangs. Brainwashing and violence are characteristic of these criminal groups' modus vivendi (Ron Balsera, forthcoming; Buelga 2010). The distance between these Latin gangs' values and their parents' or the Spanish middle class values, further deprive these adolescents from acquiring social capital. The result is what Portes defines as downward assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993).

## **CONCLUSION**

Migrants usually face greater risks than nationals. They are at higher risk of poverty and they typically experience lower pay, insecure jobs and discrimination (IOE 2007). Immigrants suffer from a segmented labour market unequally structured on the basis of gender, ethnicity, nationality and social class. The intersections of these axes of oppression become key explanatory elements for the trajectories of individual mobility. These trajectories affect their children's development and opportunities, often condemning them to lower levels of well-being. The scarce care and attention that parents' long working hours result in may translate into the children developing low self-esteem, dropping out of school and, in some cases, into criminal activities and eventually social exclusion.

The integration and well-being of children of migrants cannot be separated from that of their parents. Despite completing an important part of their socialisation process in Spain, young people of migrant background are often discriminated against and excluded from mainstream culture. As a result, they are caught between keeping their parents' migrant culture, assimilating to the host society's middle-class norms or developing a new hybrid identity (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993). Certain resistance mechanisms developed to create a sense of belonging may lead to connections with youth gangs and criminal activities.

Social policies need to focus on endowing individuals with adequate resources and real opportunities both inside and outside the education system. This would include the creation and maintenance of a suitable environment that promotes multicultural and intercultural understanding, where bonding and trust within groups and bridging these groups is encouraged along with a full participation of minorities in European society.

Although the current immigration laws and policies emphasise integration as being a dynamic two-way process, in reality, the burden of integration falls on immigrants who are expected to assimilate. Media and politics portray immigrants as a burden to social services and, sometimes, as criminals. They foster xenophobic images that leave children of migrants little room for successful integration. Likewise, the spread of practices such as police ethnic profiling lowers young people's trust in public institutions and hinders the sense of belonging to a diverse European society. These barriers to integration often lead to resistance mechanisms, such as in-group solidarity, but also to disconnection with the host society, segregation, and downward assimilation into youth gangs with criminal links.

Therefore, European social policies need to take into account migrant families' vulnerable positions, paying particular attention to inequalities related to ethnicity, social class, gender and age which may result in lower levels of well-being and, consequently, social exclusion. To promote the integration of children of migrants, the education system should be a safe and encouraging place where gender, ethnic and social class differences do not translate into unequal opportunities. Education institutions should ensure that natives and students with a migrant background socialise, connect, learn about one another and adapt to the wealth of diversity on offer in their society.

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## Chapter 7

# Youth initiatives in the context of extremism: the Chechnya case

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*Evgeniya Goryushina*

The context for youth initiatives in the Chechen Republic is directly related to an analysis of extremism and young people's involvement in armed gangs, as well as their social marginalisation. The central argument of this article is that the youth of Chechnya is highly fragmented and suffers from the risks of being "socially excluded" due to unemployment and poor access to education, as well as through their experience and the influence of extremist propaganda which offers an alternative social reality and realisation of identity via religious radicalism and participation in jihad. Mainly based on the descriptive features and empirical materials related to the current situation among youth in Chechnya, this article looks at the substantial disconnections from mainstream society among different society segments of young people in the Chechen Republic. There is hardly any literature available on these realities for Chechen youth, but the issues identified in this article are based on the research into Chechen extremism that has been conducted over the last five years.<sup>34</sup>

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34. The research was carried out within the following projects at the Southern Scientific Center of Russian Academy of Sciences: "The information security in the youth environment as a factor in countering extremism" (MK-1421.2012.6); "GIS-terrorism in the South of Russia" (2010-2011); and "Informational technologies of analysis and forecasting of protests, extremism and terrorism" (2012); and at the Università degli Studi di Roma, La Sapienza: "The modern Chechnya within EU-Russian relations" project under "Multidisciplinary capacity-building for an improved economic, political and university co-operation between the European Union and the Russian Federation" (MULTIC), programme of Erasmus Mundus (2013-2014).

## **DISCONNECTIONS FROM THE LABOUR MARKET, PRODUCING EMIGRATION AND CONNECTION WITH ARMED GANGS**

Young people in Chechnya are hindered in their efforts to start a rewarding professional career and more generally to achieve their long-term career goals. Obviously, this is related to access to education for young Chechens. The concentration of state and reputable private universities is in Moscow primarily (more than 64) in comparison with only three universities in Chechnya. This stark contrast often stimulates youth to relocate to the Russian capital or to major cities in the southern part of Russia. This established flow of students was compounded by what was widely seen in Moscow as an invasion of applicants from Chechnya and other Caucasian Republics to Moscow's high schools. This began in 2005, at the end of the active phase of the second Chechen war when officials decided that a certain loyalty to the students of the Southern Federal District (SFD) would contribute to preventing the recruitment of young people into terrorist gangs [1] [2].

Chechen students in fact come to the capital's high schools in two ways: under the budget funds programme and through a common basis of admission. Chechen students are usually enrolled in high school within the target quota and study for free within the national budget. It leads to understandable conflicts between ethnic Russian students who resent Chechens because they are privileged to receive certain benefits at the early stages of the learning process. According to A. Grazhdankin, a specialist at the autonomous non-profit organisation "Levada-Center", as a rule these youngsters are well-educated young people who understand the growing control of Russian authorities over their privacy, and it is impossible to influence the government. He also emphasises that:

... the business running and even the scientific activity in Russia due to the high level of corruption require young people to be involved in corruption for a further self-realization, and the constant feeling of risk existing that a private life may be destroyed because of conflict with the authorities at any moment [3].

These specificities of labour market entry conditions and personal circumstances are a major motivation for young people to move abroad. Recently, the number of migrants from the Chechen Republic has dramatically increased. In the first weeks of May 2013, 1 943 Chechens applied for refugee status in Poland, compared to just 616 in January 2013. By the beginning of 2014, Polish officials took more than 14 000 decisions on refugee status, and about 83% were Russian citizens of Chechen nationality [4]. The results of the survey conducted by the interregional public organisation Center of the Caucasus Initiative, explains the above-mentioned trend of increasing the number of refugees from Chechnya. According to this survey, 78% of young people in Chechnya see their future career not in Russia but abroad. It was carried out in September-October 2012 with 1 120 Chechen university students (856 men and 264 women) being interviewed [5].

Those who are unable to migrate abroad and who are forced to remain in the Republic often fail to find work or only employment that does not match their qualifications. They often start with and stay for some time in low-paid jobs, which can make sustaining a household financially difficult. According to data for 2012,

the Chechen Republic had an unemployment rate of 29.81%, while the national average for the Russian Federation was 5.46%. The minimum level of unemployment (0.81%) was in Moscow and the maximum (47.70%) in Ingushetia. In 2012, the total number of unemployed Chechens was 178 000 [6]. These figures visually demonstrate a significant gap between the developed “centre” of the Russian state and its “periphery”, with regard to the level of unemployment and social benefits. According to various unofficial sources, about 70% of the young population in Chechnya is unemployed. The lack of youth-oriented jobs leads to well-established trends whereby young people seek employment opportunities outside the Republic. This has produced a labour migration of young Chechens, if not beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, then to major regional centres, or sometimes to engage in alternative forms of survival; this is sometimes described as going “to the forest”, a shorthand for engagement in religious radicalisation and involvement in armed groups [7] [8].

This alternative form of youth survival can be analysed through perspectives on the age structure of extremist groups in the North Caucasus. For the period 2010-2011, the proportion of young people under 25 in armed groups was about 30% and approximately 50% of the membership was younger than 35. By the beginning of 2013, however, the age structure of armed gangs had changed in favour of an older generation. The presence of young people up to 25 decreased by 10-20% while the number of adults increased (50-60% aged 25-35 years and 20-35% over the age of 35 years) [9].

These figures indicate a relatively high percentage of participation of young people in the older armed group who found an alternative way to fight for their economic survival and ideological foundations that are, clearly, very different from civic values based on civil rights [10]. In this case, youth extremism is a form of social and political protest, deriving from exclusion from society and a discernible move away from traditional Caucasian civil society values. In the academic community and mass media such protest is considered as radical opposition [11], a struggle on the basis of religious radicalism that focuses on jihad against existing federal political power, as well as the Republican government. However, there is also a view that this is a reasonably compelling escape from the unemployment and the current challenges in the Republic. Nonetheless, various extremist organisations targeting youth in this way react negatively to the realisation of mainstream legitimate social and political development projects in the North Caucasus. In their view, any initiative of the Federal and Republican authorities, including health care, is presented in a form of action that damages the spiritual development of the population and is designed essentially to divert young people from jihad.

## **CONNECTIONS TO THE POLITICS OF RUSSIA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WEST**

In light of these trends and perspectives, it is necessary to consider the modern political implications throughout the North Caucasus region. Almost all local youth activities countering extremism are based on a close relationship with the government and the political sphere. Existing initiatives and youth projects in Chechnya are significantly



focused on sport, and are patriotic in nature, drawing on the symbolism attached to the identities of mainstream political leaders in both the Republic of Chechnya and the Russian Federation. Examples of this can be illustrated simply through the names of such initiatives and organisations – the patriotic youth movement “Ahmad” (the first president of Chechnya), or “Ramzan” (current president of the Republic), or “Putin” (the President of the Russian Federation). All of these movements, and others, are actively involved in the implementation of state youth policy, together with close ties to government agencies. Similarly, “The Union of Chechen Youth” operates in the Republic bringing together students. Almost all of these organisations aim to create a positive image of the Chechen youth in the media. However, evaluation of the actual activities of such organisations is complicated due to the unfilled sections of the organisations’ web sources on youth projects.

This intention to unite the young Chechen generation under the flag of the strong and authoritative leader (for instance, the current Head of the Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, ironically himself a former Chechen rebel and son of former President Akhmad Kadyrov, who was assassinated in 2004) [12] is, nevertheless, a significant alternative (or counter-force) to the growing influence of jihadist attitudes emanating from the Middle East through the current political transitions prevailing in those countries.

Actually, most Chechens do not in fact share al-Qaeda’s or any Islamist strategic vision. The majority of the Chechen population embraces moderate Sufi traditions and shuns the strict religious interpretation and expansionist political goals that Arab jihadists promote [13]. Nonetheless, several prominent extremist Chechen commanders have teamed up with powerful foreign extremists. While some Chechen commanders have been radicalised by years of war, many others have embraced the jihadist ideology largely for pragmatic reasons – to become the beneficiaries of funding from wealthy Persian Gulf patrons [14]. As a result, the current situation in the Middle East, and its spin-off effects in Chechnya, has forced many authorities in Russia to apply pressure on the Republic’s head to establish measures to decrease the influence of the jihadists [15]. For example, Ramzan Kadyrov has ordered Chechen officials, clerics and public figures to “constantly educate the youth about the real nature of Syrian events, to prevent possible recruitment of young people for participation in the war” [16] [17].

It has been confirmed by the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) that the promotion of extremism in the North Caucasus is provoked and accentuated by such foreign ideology [18]. Indeed, North Caucasus-based fighters have become increasingly visible online, as well as on the ground in Syria. Along with a growing number of foreign fighters from the Arab world as well as Europe, fighters joined a legion of al-Qaeda offshoots and Syria-based movements to fight against the regime of Bashar al-Assad [19].

This situation is exacerbated by the non-participation of Russia in the Mediterranean Dialogue (EuroMed), which is actively supported by the European Union, and where the priorities at the moment are concentrated on multi-sectoral aid to fragile states in North Africa and the Middle East (Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Libya, Tunisia, etc.). The non-participation of Russia in this platform of co-operation deprives Russian

youth of the opportunity to participate in the process of intercultural learning and inter-religious dialogue, as well as peace building based on the values of adequate conflict resolution within a multicultural context. In Russia, especially in the North Caucasus, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue between Christians and Muslims is very limited and heavily obstructed by a number of factors.

## **DISCONNECTIONS FROM TRADITION AND OLDER GENERATIONS**

Within this context, there is another important trend in the development of youth activities in the Chechen Republic which is more inclined towards co-operation in the sphere of spiritual and moral education with elements of Islam [20], where the youth organisations of the Chechen Republic are ordered to observe the customs and public behaviour of the young generation. The modern faith and religion in Chechnya are highly associated with understanding the authority of the Republic's leader and his politically conditioned influence [21].

The post-war generation of young people has grown up deliberately isolated from the real cultural environment of Caucasians; it has lost close cultural ties with the older generation, the pre-war Chechnya and the former way of life. For instance, in pre-war Grozny there was a huge Russian community (in 1989, 293 000, 23.1% of the population of the Republic; in 2002, it had fallen to 40 645, or 3.7% of the population) [23] [24]. Between 1989 and 2002, the capital prospered and ethnic tensions were barely observed. The demographic dynamics of the Russian population in Chechnya indicate a sharp decline in the number of ethnic Russians in the 1990s as a result of displacement which, arguably, assumed the character of ethnic cleansing from a Russian perspective. It strongly affected the subsequent inter-ethnic co-existence of Chechens and Russians.

There have been attempts to counteract these trends and effects. The recent creation of the special "Code of Conduct of the Chechen youth" [25] by the Ministry of the Chechen Republic for National Policy, Press and Information is particularly significant. The document is the integration of the Constitution of the Russian Federation articles, excerpts from the Koran, Hadith, folk tales and even tips on how to behave.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

In view of the circumstances of the young post-conflict/war generation in Chechnya – a combination of economic, cultural and social exclusion in the context of paradoxes, contradictions and tensions in relation to conflict, ethnicity and religion – measures to combat extremism in many forms need to be developed. The current Russian and European instruments being used seem to be patently insufficient. The many current disconnections facing youth in Chechnya – in the labour market and in relation to faith and generations – are all too evident and there is a need for more robust attention, in both research and policy, through greater dialogue and understanding with young people in the Republic. Only then are stronger connections for them between their cultural and ethnic roots and their economic and social futures likely to be forged.

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## Chapter 8

# Responding to youth crime: reconnecting the disconnected

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*Jonathan Evans*

### **INTRODUCTION**

This article considers the nature of young people's offending and reflects on how our respective societies should respond to such "criminal" behaviour. Notwithstanding the political, social and cultural diversity of Europe, it is argued here that there are universal principles which should underpin our response. These principles are informed by an explicit commitment to social solidarity, human rights and a belief that the much-maligned "state" has a critical role to play in ensuring young people remain connected with wider society.

The article opens with an initial discussion of the main arguments for treating children differently from adults. This includes consideration of recent neuroscientific research on the development of the adolescent brain.

It is argued that – irrespective of national, local or cultural context – human rights should provide the framework within which young people should be treated; not only within the domain of criminal justice, but also in relation to health, welfare and social justice. Indeed, it is one of the central arguments of this article that disconnection from social welfare rights can lead to a profoundly damaging and stigmatising connection with the criminal justice system. It is the view of this author that contact with the formal criminal justice system risks having a toxic effect on young people and should therefore be avoided wherever possible. However, it is also acknowledged that despite the genuinely noble impulses which undoubtedly animate welfare provision, the effects of contact with some forms of welfare are not always benign. A young person caught in the full glare of the welfare spotlight can sometimes be as at risk of harm as a client of the criminal justice system. The well-meaning practitioner's assessment can, for example, result in the application of a stigmatising diagnostic label that will subsequently inform an unhelpful risk assessment in the criminal justice system. In other cases therapeutic optimism can lead to harmful therapies. Connections between the domains of welfare and criminal justice can, therefore, be problematic, even when justified in the interests of "joined-up" services. Young people can, in some circumstances, become so entangled in the welfare and criminal justice systems that their long-term interests are probably best served by complete disconnection from both domains; although such benign neglect sometimes risks being experienced by young people as malign indifference (Drakeford and Williamson 1998).

It does not have to be this way, of course, but the risks posed to young people by such powerful systems and agencies have to be understood fully in order to lay the foundations for ethical and evidence-based practice with young people who break the law. Such practice, it is argued, should be based on recognition of the issue of maturity, high levels of diversion from the criminal justice system, non-stigmatising interventions that support desistance processes and the rebinding of frayed social bonds.

The article draws on an approach to youth justice currently being developed in Wales (UK) within the philosophy of progressive universalism (Davies and Williams 2009; Drakeford 2010; Williams 2011). Readers will, nevertheless, recognise in this approach ideas, values and models drawn from many other places. Indeed, there are references to other parts of Europe as well as other continents. This is not, however, a detailed comparative study. The diversity of policy and practice between nation states in Europe is acknowledged, as is the diversity within nation states. Indeed, it is a feature of youth justice across the globe that many diverse local initiatives and models of practice develop and flourish, often without the guidance or intervention of central government. This is perhaps indicative of the importance of local neighbourhoods, communities and institutions in taking responsibility for their young people. It is also possibly because practitioner-led interventions at ground level have long played a key part in the development of creative practice. Out of these diverse experiences of practice, however, it is believed that certain universal principles can be applied across diverse social, political and cultural terrains.

## **RESPONDING TO CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE WHO OFFEND**

There are persuasive reasons why offending by children should be considered differently from crime committed by adults. The condition and status of childhood differs markedly from adulthood in a number of respects.

First, there is the issue of maturity. Children and young people are still in the process of growing up; not only in biological terms, but also in respect of their developing intellectual, social, emotional and moral competencies. Child and adolescent development is a highly individualised process, of course. It is also mediated through the prism of social and cultural context. It is for these reasons that efforts to frame statutes which reflect young people's level of understanding or determine what constitutes age-appropriate behaviour are inevitably rather crude and fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that children do not have the same capacity to make fully informed or nuanced moral judgments in the same way as adults who have reached full maturity. While children are certainly not devoid of moral awareness, they may not always understand the wider practical and ethical implications of their behaviour (Coleman 2011). Recent research on brain development during adolescence suggests that it is not until the early twenties that the process of maturation in neural circuitry is complete (Keating 2004; Blakemore and Choudhury 2006; Steinberg 2007; Royal Society 2011; Mackintosh 2011; Delmage 2013; Lamb and Sym, 2013). Technological developments in functional magnetic resonance imaging enable us to know more about the process of synaptic pruning

that takes place in various parts of the adolescent brain as well as changes in the limbic system. The latest research suggests that the pre-frontal cortex, which is the main part of the brain responsible for cognitive functioning and impulse control, is one of the slowest to develop. Steinberg (2009) has highlighted the still developing capacity for consequential thinking. Changes in the limbic system (which processes information that relates to emotion), meanwhile, may account for the strong mood swings often associated with adolescence. Although it is important to emphasise the point that the research in this area is not entirely conclusive, it can be argued that the precautionary principle should be applied when making assessments of the degree to which young people should be held culpable for their offending. As the age of criminal responsibility varies enormously across Europe and the rest of the world (from 6 to 18 years), there is now a strong case for setting much clearer international standards at the upper age range. There is, moreover, sense in aligning the age of criminal responsibility with the age of majority (which is generally 16-18 years). People should perhaps be considered competent to enter the formal criminal justice system at around the same time they are permitted to vote for their legislators.

Second, the degree of independent agency young people can exercise is constrained by their position of relative powerlessness, especially when negotiating challenging social transitions. Young people simply do not possess the same degree of independent agency as adults. Children are less able to implement personal decisions because they generally lack the personal and material resources so to do. Indeed, in all of the main necessities of life they are dependent upon adults. For the most part, moreover, they have very little influence over those adults who are charged with the responsibility of supporting them (e.g. parents, caregivers, teachers or social workers).

Finally, early contact with the criminal justice system stigmatises young people and increases their risk of social exclusion (McAra and McVie 2010). Criminal justice practitioners are understandably concerned with assessing the risk that young people pose to themselves and others. It is, though, less common to analyse what risks are posed to young people by the agencies, organisations and systems that are tasked with managing them. The fact that practitioners can represent organisations which subscribe to a welfare philosophy does not in itself insulate a young person from risk of harm by such agencies. Although the criminal justice system should not be concerned solely with matters of punishment, criminal justice agencies are not always best placed to deliver welfare services. And yet the risks posed by the criminal justice system are clear. Contact with the formal criminal justice system can stigmatise and label a young person, introduce her/him to more robust and sophisticated offenders, reinforce the self-image of being a criminal and diminish future opportunities in the labour market. In short, a criminal record can accelerate a young person's journey into social exclusion. Custodial sentences in particular – even when given for ostensibly welfare reasons – attenuate family and community ties, corrode a sense of self-responsibility and impact negatively on mental health. Young people are also placed at risk of suicide, peer abuse and self-harm. Moreover, custody demonstrably increases the risk of reoffending – not least through a process of “contamination” (criminal skills acquisition from other inmates, the facilitation of new anti-social networks and socialisation into attitudes that are generally supportive



of offending) (Goldson 2006; Stephenson 2007; Bateman 2012). In summary, then, even when the avowed aims of criminal justice agencies are ostensibly rehabilitative and integrative, there is still a high risk of young people being disconnected from mainstream society.

## **HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL ENTITLEMENTS**

It is a central argument of this article that the services and systems with which children and young people have contact should be underpinned by human rights principles. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is, of course, fundamental. For children below the age of majority, moreover, so too is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC). Indeed, the UN Convention is used as a source of guidance by the European Court of Human Rights, along with other guidance from the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

The rights enshrined in the UNCRC can be divided into four main categories: survival rights (e.g. inherent right to life, food and health care); development rights (education, access to the arts and cultural rights); protection rights (e.g. protection from persecution and sexual exploitation and the right to a fair trial); and participation rights (right to freedom of expression access to information and freedom of peaceful assembly). It will be seen, therefore, that the convention not only confers individual rights (such as freedom), but also unconditional social rights (to education, for example). Access to such social rights is not dependent upon whether a young person has or has not broken the law. In Wales, for example, the youth policy "Extending Entitlement" (National Assembly for Wales 2000) is underpinned by an implicit human rights framework. Services are thus characterised as entitlements based on principles of universalism, citizenship and social inclusion (as opposed to being conditional and discretionary). The articles contained in the UNCRC apply to all children, whether they are offenders or not. More recently, the Welsh government enshrined the UNCRC in the Rights of the Child and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011. This means that the convention has the force of domestic law in all matters devolved to the Welsh Assembly.

Ideally, the UNCRC should be used in conjunction with key United Nations guidance for youth welfare and justice, namely: The Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules), 1985; The Directing Principles for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines), 1990; The Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty (Havana Rules), 1990; The Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (Tokyo Rules), 1990; and The Economic and Social Council Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System (Vienna Guidelines), 1997. Reference should also be made to the Council of Europe's European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures (2008), the indispensable companion Commentary to the European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures (2008) and Guidelines to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice (2010).

There should be profound policy implications for any nation state that is a signatory to the UNCRC and related international conventions: in terms of the way that young people are treated in public spaces, the age of criminal responsibility, diversion from

the formal criminal justice wherever possible, a strong emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegration back into the community, and the use of custody as a measure of last resort. Philosophically, though, it also represents a shift of the debate away from the technical question of “what works” in reducing children and young people’s propensity to offend to the deeper moral question of “what is the right way to deal with young people who break the law?” Thus, the best interests of the child are deemed to be a primary consideration (a paramount concern in the original French). A young person who commits a crime is thus a child first, offender second. Happily, the answer to the ethical question generally coincides with the answer to the technical question: doing the right thing is usually what works. In order to develop a meaningful, mature and balanced human rights culture, it is helpful if two supporting measures are taken.

First, there needs to be human rights education and awareness raising. This includes those who have contact with children and young people (social workers, probation officers, teachers, youth workers, police officers and magistrates). However, if children’s rights are to be properly enacted, it is also necessary to promote young people’s awareness of their rights in school, youth work and other settings. The Council of Europe has, for example, produced age-appropriate training materials for children in junior schools, secondary schools and non-formal education settings such as youth clubs (Brander et al. 2002). The advantage of early and interactive work on human rights with children is that it seeds the notion of not violating the rights of others. The idea of rights being balanced by responsibilities to other citizens is a lesson best learnt at a young age and practised in the school council and other consultative forums.

Second, given that children and young people’s competencies are still in the process of development, it is important that they have access to effective advocacy services. This helps to ensure that young people are able to articulate their wishes and concerns across the range of issues that affect them (including health care, education, social protection, social services and legal issues). The appointment of children’s ombudspersons and commissioners are additional measures that can help safeguard young people’s rights.

## **THE NATURE OF YOUTHFUL TRANSGRESSION**

While it is important not to represent adolescence as an inherently troublesome condition, self-report studies indicate that rule-breaking, boundary-testing, experimentation, challenging behaviour and transgressions of the law are not unusual among teenage children. Indeed, it has been argued that it is “a more or less normal adolescent phenomenon [...] a by-product of adolescence” (Zimring 2005: 63). The social context inevitably has a bearing on the seriousness of the offences committed by young people and the likelihood of their coming to the attention of law-enforcement and welfare agencies. Children growing up in low-income, high-crime neighbourhoods where gangs, guns and knives are commonplace are obviously at greater risk of being a perpetrator or victim of serious crime. They are also more likely to be apprehended. For the most part, though, young people initially commit non-serious, non-violent offences (Bateman 2012) and mostly grow out of

such behaviours (Rutherford 1992; Roe and Ash 2008), often before coming to the attention of statutory social and criminal justice services (Rutherford 2006). It is therefore important to avoid the pitfall of “abnormalising” behaviour that is actually fairly common among young people across all social classes. As has already been suggested, addressing such behaviour within the formal context of the formal justice system risks reinforcing offending and extending criminal careers.

The children and young people who do enter our criminal justice systems tend to be drawn from poor and marginalised backgrounds (Yates 2010), often with personal histories of abuse, neglect and institutional care. One British study of children in custody (Jacobson et al. 2010), for example, found that half of the sample were from homes assessed as being deprived (compared with 13% of the general population), almost 40% had experienced abuse and more than a quarter were in public care at the point of imprisonment. It also found that the experience of bereavement, in terms of the death of a parent or a sibling, was three times higher than in the general population. When young people offend we must therefore ensure that we are not simply punishing those who are already victims. It is incumbent on all nation states to analyse closely the profiles of those entering the criminal justice system and explore the relationship between welfare and justice agencies.

## **DESISTANCE**

Asking why young people stop offending rather than asking why they start in the first place may therefore be a question that elicits a more helpful set of answers for policy makers and practitioners. The desistance literature can broadly be divided under three main theoretical headings: individual, structural and integrative. Individual theories include a set of explanations based on maturational processes being allowed to take their course (Glueck and Glueck 1940; Rutherford 1986). This can include, for example, the rational reassessment of priorities following the onset of more advanced cognitive, emotional and moral development (Cornish and Clarke 1986; Barry 2006). A structural account, meanwhile, includes access to material opportunities such as continuing education, employment and constructive leisure, but also the corresponding social bonds of stable family life, pro-social friendship networks and fulfilling personal relationships with spouses, partners and work colleagues (Hirschi 1996; Rutter 1996; Sampson and Laub 1993 and 1995; Shover 1996). Integrative theories attempt to combine both individual and structural perspectives (McNeill 2006; Maruna and Immarigeon 2008). Crucially, though, the research conducted from an integrated perspective also draws heavily upon the accounts of those who have actually given up offending (Williamson 2004; MacDonald and Marsh 2005; MacDonald 2006; and MacDonald and Shildrick 2007). What emerges clearly from such research is the importance to individuals of being able to shuffle off the self-image of “offender” and assume the identity of a pro-social citizen. The process of positive identity reinforcement afforded by the establishment of a positive set of social bonds appears to be a crucial element in the desistance process. In the literature this is sometimes described in terms of ex-offenders moving from a condemnation script (young people accepting their label as an offender) to a redemption script (whereby they embrace a more positive, pro-social identity) (Maruna 2001).

## **YOUTH TRANSITIONS**

The language of risk factors is widely used in criminal justice, health and social policy circles, but equally important is the notion of risk processes. One such process is that of youth transitions (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007). In Western societies the status transition from dependent childhood to independent adulthood has in recent decades tended to become more extended, complex and risk-filled; although it is perhaps important to make a distinction between more socially atomised societies and those characterised by resilient extended family networks located within communities bound by an enduring sense of social solidarity (which can reduce some of the associated risks). Nevertheless, given that those parts of Europe that are most often associated with family and community solidarity are currently experiencing particularly acute economic hardship (Goldson 2013), commonly shared assumptions about those societies should be revisited. Whereas it was once a reasonable expectation to leave school and move directly into full-time employment, this is now a less common experience in most European societies. Consequently, many young people continue in education for longer periods and – because they are not able to fund their independence – remain in the family home for extended periods. In many cases they move back and forth between independence and the family home after a period in higher education.

In northern Europe in particular there have been significant changes in family structure that include higher divorce rates and the growth of lone parent and reconstituted families. It is not making a moral point to say that such diversity in family structure can, at certain times in certain circumstances, lower family income and heighten instability for some young people. Such families still have a crucial role to play in sponsoring their children's transition to independent adult status, of course, but the wider community's responsibility to provide appropriate support and advice for young people also becomes even more important. There are many reasons why a young person risks failing to accomplish a successful transition: specific family issues (e.g. bereavement, disability or ill health of a family member, poor parenting and abuse); disengagement from formal education; the high cost of accommodation; substance misuse; mental ill health; macroeconomic difficulties (that tend to impact disproportionately on the youth labour market) (Evans and Shen 2010); and, of course, contact with the criminal justice system.

In light of the above analysis it can be argued that an integrated child and family/youth policy should be developed in order to ensure that all young people, irrespective of social background or personal circumstances, should have access to services that will enable them to realise their potential and thus achieve a successful transition to independent adult status (Helve and Evans 2013). The Council of Europe recommends that youth policies should be opportunity-focused rather than problem-oriented. Services and packages of opportunity should thus include coverage of such domains as education, health, social protection, careers advice, accommodation and leisure (Williamson 2002 and 2006). Practitioners and policy analysts, meanwhile, should identify potential points of risk where young people may become detached and disconnected from meaningful provision. This can occur within systems (e.g. the transition from junior to secondary school) or between systems (e.g. the relationship between public care and criminal justice systems).

## **YOUTH TRANSITIONS, POVERTY AND CRIME**

The impact of neighbourhood poverty sometimes receives less attention than it should in both academic and policy circles. This is despite the fact that the Pittsburgh study (Wikstrom and Loeber 1997; Wikstrom 1998) found that residence in a low-income, high-crime neighbourhood can overwhelm the best endeavours of “good” parents. As children enter their teenage years, so the neighbourhood claims them. The salience of socio-economic deprivation and neighbourhood in predicting young people’s entry into the juvenile justice system of England and Wales has also been reported by Bateman (2012). By disassembling the dynamic social context of crime into isolated or selectively reconfigured sets of risk factors (Farrington 2007) there is a tendency to pathologise individuals and their “deviant” families. By excluding neighbourhood, a key indicator of socio-economic status, the relationship between youth, crime and social inequality is airbrushed from the account.

In order to rebalance our risk analysis, it is worth highlighting the findings of the Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions and Crime (McAra and McVie 2007a, 2007b and 2010). Here the analysis includes the risks posed by social processes and systems. Four key findings emerge from the Edinburgh data. First, persistent serious offending is associated with victimisation (such as abuse and neglect), acute vulnerability and social adversity. Second, early identification of “at-risk” children is not an exact science; indeed, the early application of such diagnostic assessments risks labelling and stigmatising them (thus increasing the actual risk of offending and criminalisation). Third, pathways into and out of offending are facilitated or impeded by “critical moments” and “key decisions” at crucial points in young people’s lives. Practitioners and gatekeepers therefore have a vitally important part to play in the subsequent trajectories of young people: whether to arrest or problem-solve, exclude from school or reintegrate, caution or prosecute, breach a court order or facilitate compliance. The work of Williamson (2004), MacDonald and Marsh (2005), MacDonald (2006) and MacDonald and Shildrick (2007) provides rich ethnographic accounts of the ways in which young people, too, make difficult and often heroic choices in profoundly difficult circumstances. Finally, the Edinburgh study shows how diversionary strategies, such as cautions and non-criminalising interventions, enhance the desistance process. This latter finding would also appear to be supported by the work of Gatti et al. (2009) in Canada where early intervention by the formal youth justice system was found to be counter-productive.

## **DIVERSION FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM**

On the point of diversion it is reasonable to ask to where young people should be diverted. In the UK during the 1980s diversionary strategies succeeded in reducing the number of young people in custody, but in many cases their very real and pressing needs remained unmet (Haines and Drakeford 1998). It is the argument in this article that, in the phrase coined by the Independent Commission on Youth Crime and Antisocial Behaviour (2010), offending behaviour should lead to “meaningful consequences”: in terms of changing young people’s conduct and meeting their welfare needs. How then, can this be achieved without drawing them into systems

that label, stigmatise and criminalise? It should be acknowledged that negotiating this particularly risky terrain is challenging. Nevertheless, there are some measures that can be taken.

Domain integrity management is an important principle to apply when managing offending by the young. Problematic behaviours presented by young people are best dealt with within the domain in which they occur. This might be in the family (through helping parents to intervene effectively with their children), the school or the residential children's unit. In the latter case, in the UK's "looked after" system young people are at high risk of entering the criminal justice system as a result of comparatively trivial incidents that, had they occurred in their homes, would have resulted in their being dealt with firmly, but informally (Taylor 2006; Evans 2010). Clearly there is scope for informal restorative practices in schools and children's homes in such cases. Another aspect of domain integrity management involves filtering out those young people who, because of their vulnerabilities and high needs, should not enter the criminal justice system (e.g. some children with learning disabilities, severe mental health problems and victims of serious abuse or neglect).

The dark side of domain integrity management is that it can lead to the development of a "shadow youth justice system", particularly in the domains of mental health and social welfare. This has arguably happened in Finland where many young people are detained on health and welfare grounds in secure units (Pitts and Kuula 2005). The fact that children's welfare is the paramount consideration in this case does not itself insulate young people from the damaging effects of incarceration. For the young person behind the closed door of a mental health or welfare institution, the turn of the key will probably still be experienced as custody. It is therefore important to have regard to the fact that the UNCRC applies to children in such facilities. In these settings it is essential to develop models of rights-based welfare that incorporate the application of principles of due process. Young people also require the support of effective advocacy services.

Where young people have become disconnected from families, communities and education/training/employment, efforts should be made to reconnect them where this is appropriate. Once again the importance of developing a fully integrated, "wrap-around" child and youth policy needs to be underlined. This process of reconnection may need to be overseen by an appropriate practitioner or mentor, particularly in cases where the young person is vulnerable.

Problematic behaviour and offending do, of course, need to be addressed. Where appropriate (i.e. where there is a sufficient level of understanding present), young people need to take responsibility for what they have done and, as far as possible, make amends. Genuinely restorative practices (Jacobson and Gibbs 2009; van Wormer and Walker 2013) are to be encouraged as they enable supportive communities (be this a neighbourhood, school or youth club) to facilitate constructive meetings between perpetrators and victims, negotiate appropriate reparation and reintegrate young people back into society. While restorative practices can certainly provide a radical, community-based informal model of justice, it is important to sound a note of caution. There are concerns surrounding the question of due process: the right to trial by a fair and independent tribunal and the right to proper legal representation. In

nation states where children are criminally responsible at comparatively young ages these are acutely important issues. Indeed, Haines (2000) has argued persuasively that some forms of restorative justice are in direct contravention of European and international conventions. The vulnerable position in which young children can be placed by entering restorative processes therefore needs to be considered in relation to issues of maturity, resilience and access to advocacy. This does not preclude the use of restorative justice, but it does highlight the importance of developing practices that acknowledge young people below the age of majority are children first, offenders second.

In some cases, practitioner-led interventions may be required (e.g. from the education, health, social and youth services). In other cases it may require mentoring from volunteers or – as has been suggested by Mackenzie (2008) – Circles of Support and Accountability (COSA), an intervention more commonly associated with adult sex offenders but one which could work very well in a society with strong traditions of voluntary service. This approach may be particularly suitable in circumstances where a young person's ties with family are frayed or even severed. What is important is that young people receive a swift response to their offending in terms of addressing their behaviour, make amends to the victim (where possible), reconnect with the family (where appropriate) and restore or initiate contact with essential services. These are the essential elements for reintegration into the wider community.

## **YOUNG ADULTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM**

Thus far, this article has focused mainly on the position of young people below the age of majority and the argument that children should enjoy protected status when they break the law. Given what has already been written about the problems facing young people as they move from dependent childhood to notional independent adult status, it is important to acknowledge that the transition from child to adult services and systems often represents an additional challenge because of the dramatic shift in ethos. This disjunction is often particularly acute when comparing juvenile and adult criminal justice systems.

In addition to the fact that the problems of childhood often persist into early adulthood, the young person is confronted with a legal discourse that places the full weight of criminal responsibility on the individual. Given the foregoing discussion on adolescent brain development and the challenges of increasingly difficult social transitions, the argument for a gentle upward gradient towards full criminal responsibility has some merit, especially in the case of vulnerable young adults with complex needs (care leavers and those with additional learning needs, mental health problems, accommodation difficulties and substance misuse issues). In the UK the Leaving Care Act 2000 extended the welfare principle of child welfare into early adulthood for care leavers through the introduction of statutory Pathway Plans. This was an explicit recognition of the particular difficulties experienced by care leavers in their transition to independent adulthood. Ideally, those welfare principles should enter the courtroom when young adult care leavers find themselves at odds with the law. Whether this happens in practice is unclear. In Germany, Spain, Austria, Lithuania and Australia some measure of flexibility is available in cases where the



maturity and circumstances of the young adult are such that juvenile jurisdiction can be considered (Dunkel 2004; Transition to Adulthood 2008). Such practices need to be explored further, perhaps with a view to establishing transitional courts.

At some point, of course, young adults must take responsibility for their actions and enter the criminal justice system. As far as possible, community-based sentences are preferred to custody because they enable the underlying reasons for offending to be tackled while at the same time enabling the retention or strengthening of family and community ties; ties that are so often effectively broken while serving prison sentences. According to Raynor (2010: 74), research on the effectiveness of correctional services and rehabilitation “consistently shows that effective help has more positive effect on offenders’ behaviour than measures designed primarily to punish and deter [...]”. This “help” generally takes the form of “changing minds and changing circumstances”: the former deploying cognitive-behavioural interventions, other problem-solving and social skills approaches; and the latter through addressing core material issues and problematic behaviours that constrain the range of life choices available (e.g. low income, poor education, unstable accommodation and substance misuse problems).

The case against penal custody has already been made, but some young adults will necessarily be sentenced in order to protect the public from serious harm. It should, however, be used as a last resort for violent crimes. Although the negative features of custodial life can never be eliminated, some of the key elements involved in developing a constructive, seamless service are characterised by Raynor (2004) in the following terms: assessment and planning from the earliest stages (i.e. as soon as a person enters custody); custodial programmes that focus on developing skills that will be relevant in the community; community programmes that build on the work done in the custodial phase; and an overarching case management system that provides both direct and ongoing supervision as well as brokering access to essential services. According to Maguire (2007) these essential services might include: accommodation; education, training and employment; mental and physical health (including access to counselling and substance misuse services); advice and advocacy in respect of finances, benefits and debt; guidance and support in respect of family and personal relationships; and working on promoting pro-social attitudes, beliefs and behaviour.

The post-release supervision process entails ensuring that ex-prisoners are connected to the services they require, supported in the process of establishing pro-social relationships within the community and encouraged to sustain positive habits of mind and behaviour. As far as young adults are concerned there are additional considerations that relate to their maturity, relative powerlessness and vulnerability. There is, in short, a duty of care. Accordingly, there is a responsibility to ensure that young people are duly connected to the services to which they are entitled through the relevant youth policy. Young adults, especially those with more difficult backgrounds, cannot be expected to access services and negotiate challenging transitions without close guidance and support. Youth policy literature underlines the importance of “trusted adults” (SEU 2005) in the lives of young people: adults who are available when weighty decisions need to be made. These adults are trusted because they are knowledgeable (or at least know where to go in order to obtain information),



honest, reliable and committed to promoting the best interests of the young person. Williamson (2005) uses the phrase “critical people at critical moments” because sometimes this role involves not only support and encouragement, but also telling the young person a few uncomfortable home truths. Nevertheless, despite this, they still “stick with” the young person concerned. For many young people this trusted adult will be a parent, member of the extended family, teacher, youth worker or respected peer. Some less fortunate young people, including many of those leaving custody, may not have such a person in their immediate social milieu. One Report (SEU 2005) addressed the issue in respect of 16-25-year-olds who fell into this category (ex-offenders, care leavers, those with mental health and/or substance misuse problems) and concluded that it was important to identify trusted adults, mentors or guides. This vital role involves “Building and maintaining a trusting relationship; and advising and encouraging young adults, through small but significant steps, towards positive outcomes” (SEU 2005: 72). In the case of young adults leaving custody, this role cannot be left to chance.

## **CONCLUSION – IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE**

What, then, are the main policy and practice implications of the foregoing analysis?

In view of the fact that children and young people are still in the process of maturing and depend on adults for the key necessities of life, children below the age of majority should be dealt with outside of the formal criminal justice system. Children below this age should have their offending behaviour and welfare needs addressed through non-criminalising interventions that, ideally, should be drawn from universal mainstream services. Where appropriate, informal restorative justice practices should be used in order to meet victims’ needs, make amends and promote personal responsibility. When offending is persistent and dangerous to the public, children may need to be kept in secure accommodation, but this should not take the form of penal custody. That said, the risks of detention in facilities managed by health and welfare agencies should be offset by applying the principles of rights-based welfare and ensuring access to effective advocacy services.

The focus of criminal justice interventions with young adults should be community-based rehabilitative interventions supervised by the probation service (or other appropriate offender management agencies). Penal custody should be a last resort for violent offences. In those cases where young adults are sentenced to custodial sentences, the regimes should be constructive (in terms of providing education, training, counselling, cognitive-behavioural interventions and victim awareness programmes). Ideally, the post-release experience should provide a seamless service that facilitates reintegration. Again, as far as possible, links to mainstream services should be forged.

It is essential that all children and young people are regarded as citizens with rights and entitlements to services. By implication young people also have responsibilities, although these should always be commensurate with their maturity and social circumstances. Most criminal justice systems operate on the basis that the young person should take full responsibility for their actions. The argument presented here is that

we must always ask first whether the adults in a young person's life have discharged their responsibilities, whether these are parents, teachers or social workers. If not, then our first task must be to reconnect the young person to supports and services that can help them navigate whatever difficulties they are experiencing. This is why an integrated child and youth policy is central to the vision depicted here. Children who offend must always be perceived as children first. Young adults who offend may have to take more responsibility for their actions, but society's collective duty of care to young adults should not be overlooked.

Three important assumptions underpin the arguments contained in this article. First, that young people are not the sole responsibility of their parents and families. Indeed, parenting – in the widest sense of the term – is not a private concern, but a public and collective responsibility. Second, that the state has a crucial role to play as the guarantor of human rights and services. Third, universal services – rather than those that are means-tested or discretionary – are more likely to deliver non-stigmatising and intergenerational forms of support that promote social solidarity between citizens. They are, in other words, more likely to strengthen social bonds and help reconnect with those citizens most at risk of marginalisation. The somewhat over-quoted East African saying that it takes a village to raise a child is, nevertheless, no less true for being oft repeated. There is a clear implication though that we must also ensure the village is in good condition. Goldson's (2013) lucid and trenchant analysis of the policy choices facing Europe underlines the importance of reasserting young people's human rights and strengthening the bonds of social solidarity across generations and nation states.

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## Chapter 9

# Children at risk: the effects of socio-economic background and family dissolution on children's school engagement, and the mediating role of family connections

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*Nele Havermans, Sarah Botterman, Koen Matthijs*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Although educational attainment levels have risen in Europe throughout the post-war period, inequalities that are attributed to mechanisms such as socio-economic background and family dissolution remain and have even increased the educational gap (European Trade Union Institute 2012). The socio-economic background is one of the most important determinants of educational disparities: children in deprived families are more likely to have worse educational outcomes and consequently have lower chances in life (McLanahan 2009). Family dissolution can be considered an additional mechanism that increases the risk of transmitting social inequalities from parents to children. Within the past few decades, there has been a profound shift in family structures in Europe (Kalmijn 2007). Research has already demonstrated the heightened risk for children with divorced parents of lower educational outcomes (Amato 2001).

Flanders has one of the most unequal educational systems in Europe (OECD 2010). Flemish children of a low socio-economic background are less successful in reading and mathematics and they also feel less engaged in school (De Meyer et al. 2005). There is growing evidence that Flemish children with divorced parents are also less likely to attain a degree of higher education and to be engaged in school (Havermans et al. 2013a; 2013b). These types of inequalities have also been found in other European countries (Gorard and Smith 2004). European policy makers consider equal educational opportunities as one of the main instruments for promoting social inclusion and reducing youth unemployment and early school leaving (e.g. European Commission 2009; 2010).



Obstacles to social inclusion are interconnected and situated at different levels. They can exist at the institutional (discrimination, lack of infrastructure), family (socio-economic background, family structure and dynamics), community (prejudice, marginalisation), or individual level (withdrawal). In this study, the focus is on obstacles at the family level. Given the negative effects of family dissolution and a low socio-economic background on educational outcomes, the question is whether these relationships are mediated by worsened connections between family members and ill-functioning family dynamics.


This research question is approached from the perspectives of youth research, practice and policy (“the magic triangle” of the youth field). In the first section of this article, we summarise the main findings of a study on family influences on children’s educational outcomes with a special focus on non-cognitive educational outcomes. Results of analyses on a representative sample of Flemish secondary school pupils are presented. Next, we discuss how youth work and policy deal with the link between family disconnections and social inclusion.

**THE INFLUENCE OF FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS ON CHILDREN’S EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN FLANDERS (BELGIUM)**

In this quantitative study, we focus on the effects of socio-economic family background and family dissolution on family connections and on school engagement, all investigated from the perspective of the child. We refer to the respondents as “children”, because this is their status within the family context (the main focus of the analyses). The sample used in the analyses, however, consists of adolescents between 11 and 21 years old. So, although we refer to the respondents as children in the following paragraphs, the results of this study touch the family and school life of youth in Flanders. Given the applied nature of this journal, we briefly discuss previous literature on this topic and the main conclusions of the analyses. The main conclusions are linked to youth policy and practice in a transnational manner.

**Presentation of the conceptual and analytical model**

Figure 1. Conceptual and analytical model



The conceptual and analytical model is presented in Figure 1. Conceptually, we focus on family characteristics of family socio-economic background and family dissolution (A), family connections (B) and school engagement of children (C). Analytically, we focus on the relationships between family characteristics and school engagement (I), family characteristics and family connections (II), family connections and school engagement (III), and family characteristics and school engagement, mediated through family connections (IV).

### Conceptual model

Some children are believed to be more at risk than others when it comes to their educational chances. We consider two family background characteristics that put children at risk of negative (educational) outcomes: the socio-economic family background and family dissolution (A). These structural family characteristics strongly influence the development of children. These contextual risk factors have negative effects on a number of children's outcomes; among others, educational outcomes, socio-emotional well-being and health outcomes. We focus on the effects on family connections (B) and school engagement (C).

We define family connections as the effectiveness and quality of contact between family members. According to the family system perspective, there are three subsystems within a family: the partner, the parental and the sibling subsystem. Family connections not only refer to the relationships between parents and children, but also to the relationships between parents and between siblings. We focus on the marital and parent-child subsystems. The quality of these relationships has an important impact on child functioning and development (Hakvoort et al. 2010). Furthermore, the effectiveness of relationships between parents and their children can be looked at via the parenting style. This is the balance between the supervision parents have over their children and the autonomy parents give to their children. The authoritative parenting style is generally cited as the most beneficial style for child development. This style combines high levels of autonomy with high levels of supervision (Baumrind 1966).

We study school engagement, a non-cognitive educational outcome. Non-cognitive educational outcomes are not part of cognitive educational outcomes that measure knowledge in formal examinations and tests. They relate to attitudinal and personal qualities and behaviour at school. There has been a growing recognition of the importance of these non-cognitive outcomes for both current and future outcomes, such as employability (Johnson et al. 2001). The concept of school engagement does not only cover behavioural aspects, such as school attendance, homework and participation in class, but also more emotional aspects, such as interest in school and motivation to study (Dee and West 2011). School engagement is strongly linked to school dropout, entrance into post-secondary education and labour market participation in adult life (Finn 2006).

### Analytical framework

First, we examine the effects of socio-economic family background and family dissolution on school engagement (I). Children within financially healthy families are expected to display higher levels of school engagement, as their financially secured family provides them with more resources to perform well in school (Brown 2010). Conversely, family economic hardship causes stress that can decrease children's

school engagement (Mistry et al. 2009). The educational level of parents strongly influences the cognitive environment created within the family (Raviva et al. 2004). Higher educated parents tend to stimulate their children more to do well at school, as they generally understand the potential gains of education better than lower-educated parents (Astone and McLanahan 1991). Also, they are more able to help their children with schoolwork as they possess more intellectual capital (Conger and Donnellan 2007). Family dissolution is related to lower levels of well-being and engagement. The stress surrounding the divorce process can decrease children's concentration and motivation at school (Amato 2001).

Second, we analyse the effects of socio-economic family background and family dissolution on family connections (II). The dynamics in family relationships have an important impact on the functioning and development of children (Hakvoort et al. 2010). Families with a low socio-economic position tend to have more disconnected family relations. High conflict relationships occur more in couples with financial problems or with a low educational level (Conger et al. 2010; Van den Troost et al. 2006). Family dissolution and divorce do not often end the existing conflicts between parents. Divorced couples are still at risk of conflict with their ex-partner, because they still need to make decisions together regarding, among others, the custody arrangement, alimony and child rearing in general (Dronkers 1999; Musick and Meier 2010). Parent-child relationships are also affected by family dissolution and socio-economic family characteristics. Economic deprivation and divorce are strongly related to less engaged and ineffective parenting styles (Kiernan and Huerta 2008; Martinez and Forgatch 2002) and worse parent-child relationships (Conger et al. 2010; Kalmijn 2012). Conversely, children of higher educated parents often have a better relationship with their parents than children of low-educated parents (Chen and Kaplan 2001).

Third, we study the effect of family connections on school engagement (III). First of all, parents' involvement in children's educational life can increase children's motivation and participation at school (Gonzalez-DeHass et al. 2005; Kearney 2008). An authoritative parenting style that combines being responsive with being demanding is also related to better educational outcomes. Parents with a more authoritative parenting style guide their children more, and their supervision and control leads to more engagement at school (Baumrind 1966; Steinberg et al. 1992). Parental conflict decreases children's concentration and motivation at school, because children have more stress when their parents argue at home (Dronkers 1999; Hakvoort et al. 2010).

Finally, we analyse the indirect effects of the socio-economic family background and family dissolution on school engagement, through family connections (IV). As the direct effects of socio-economic family background and family dissolution on both family connections and school engagement are assumed to be negative, the indirect effects of these inequality transmitters are also expected to be negative. Family disconnections are expected to (partially) explain the negative effect of weak family characteristics on school engagement.

## Results


The conceptual model is tested on the Leuven Adolescents and Family Studies dataset (LAFS, [www.soc.kuleuven.be/lago](http://www.soc.kuleuven.be/lago)). The data were collected between 2008

and 2011 by the Family and Population Studies research team of the University of Leuven ([www.soc.kuleuven.be/fapos](http://www.soc.kuleuven.be/fapos)). Comprising 7 035 pupils within 49 secondary schools, this dataset covers more than 1% of the total school population in Flanders. The distribution of gender, year and track strongly resembles the total school population (Vanassche et al. 2012). The respondents in the sample are between the ages of 11 and 21, with an average age of 15. In the analyses, we control for gender, age and Belgian nationality. Significant results ( $p < .05$ ) are reported in the figures with dashed (negative effects) and full (positive effects) arrows. Information on the operationalisation of the variables, analytical techniques and results are presented in the Appendix.


The results of this study show that school engagement is not influenced by the indicators of socio-economic family background when we control for family connections (see Figure 2a). Only family dissolution significantly decreases children's school engagement. In Figure 2b, all family connection indicators affect school engagement. Children with a good relationship with their mother and their father also have a high level of school engagement. Being exposed to parental conflict decreases children's school engagement. An authoritative parenting style of the mother and father has positive effects on school engagement.

**Figure 2. Direct paths to school engagement**

*2a. Path I: Direct effects of socio-economic family background and family dissolution on school engagement (controlled for family connections and control variables)*




*2b. Path III: Direct effects of family connections on school engagement (controlled for socio-economic family background, family dissolution and control variables)*



In Figure 3 every significant effect of the socio-economic family background and family dissolution on family connections is presented. With regard to the socio-economic family background, perceived financial problems particularly affect negatively the relationships with the mother and father and increase the incidence of parental conflict. Also the authoritative parenting style is less likely to be employed by parents who face financial problems at home. The educational level of the mother and father has fewer effects on family connections. Children of highly educated fathers report a significantly better relationship with their father. Highly educated fathers also adopt more often an authoritative parenting style and their (ex-)partner (i.e. mother of the child) will also employ more often an authoritative parenting style. The educational

level of mothers does not influence any of the family connections indicators. Finally, family dissolution affects every family connection indicator. It decreases the quality of the relationships between children and their parents and increases the prevalence of parental conflict. Parenting style is also affected by parental divorce, as divorced parents will more often employ a non-authoritative parenting style.

**Figure 3. Path II: Direct effects on family connections**




The previous results show that: 1) socio-economic family background and family dissolution influence family connections; 2) controlling for family connections, there is no effect of family background on children’s school engagement; and 3) controlling for family background, family connections are significantly related to children’s school engagement.

Next, it is calculated whether the effect of family background is indirect and mediated through family connections. In Figure 4a, the indirect effects of family dissolution on school engagement are presented. In addition to its direct negative effect, parental divorce has a significant negative indirect effect on children’s school engagement. This effect is mediated by every family connections indicator. In figures 4b and 4c the indirect effects of the socio-economic family background indicators are presented. Perceived financial problems at home have a significant negative indirect effect, which is mediated by all family connections indicators. The educational level of the father has a positive indirect effect on children’s school engagement. This indirect effect runs through a better relationship that higher educated fathers have with their children and also through an authoritative parenting style of both parents.


To summarise, the influence of family background (measured by socio-economic background and family dissolution) on children’s school engagement can largely be explained by disconnections at the family level. As a consequence, policy and practice aiming at the social inclusion of youth should take the family into account. Not only do the socio-economic background and family structure bear importance for children’s educational outcomes but, most importantly, relations between parents, and between parents and children, hold a key for improving the educational chances of children from a disadvantaged background. These findings are related to youth policy and practice at a transnational level in the following paragraphs.

**Figure 4. Path IV: Indirect effects of socio-economic family background and family dissolution on school engagement**


*4a. Indirect effects of family dissolution on school engagement*



*4b. Indirect effects of perceived financial problems on school engagement*



*4c. Indirect effects of parental educational level on school engagement*



Two limitations of this study should be mentioned. First of all, one should be aware that the variables are only measured among children, and not their parents or teachers. This consequently means that the results on family connections and school engagement only refer to the perspective of the child. Taking on a parent (or teacher) perspective can potentially challenge the results of this study. This is valuable direction for future research. A second limitation is related to the first one. Given that the children were questioned and not the parents, it was impossible to include a more precise measure of family income than the perceived financial problems measure. A different measure of the financial resources in the family (such as family income) may possibly lead to a different view on the direct and indirect effects of the financial situation in the family.

### **The Flemish context: generalisability of the results**

The results are specific to the context of Flanders (Belgium). Flanders is a prosperous region in Europe. It has an employment rate of 72% (EU average: 69%) and 45% of 30 to 34-year-olds in Flanders have finished tertiary education (EU average: 36%). According to PISA data, levels of educational inequality in Flanders are high, whereas levels of school engagement are low (OECD 2010). Furthermore, the divorce rate in Belgium is one of the highest in Europe (Eurostat 2010). With regard to youth policy, youth work and social inclusion of Flemish youth, more information can be found on this webpage: <http://pjp-eu.coe.int/web/youth-partnership/belgium-flemish-community->.

There is very little European research that compares determinants of school engagement between countries. Willms (2003) compares school belonging and participation levels across countries in the PISA 2000 study. His report shows that the impact of family background (measured by socio-economic status and family dissolution) on school engagement is significant for almost all countries. Parent involvement, which is closely related to the parent-child relationship (Simpkins et al. 2006) and parenting style (Lee et al. 2006), influence educational outcomes significantly in almost all OECD countries (Borgonovi and Montt 2012). Although these are indications that the results in the Flemish study are not country-specific and may be transferred to other European countries (and regions), more cross-national research is necessary to get a good grasp of the generalisability of the results of the Flemish study.

### **YOUTH WORK AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION: BLIND SPOT ON THE FAMILY?**

The EU Youth Strategy (2010-2018) explicitly mentions the role of youth work initiatives to prevent social exclusion of youth. The informal learning in youth work initiatives can have a beneficial impact on children's school performance (Fredricks and Eccles 2006) and the social inclusion of low-skilled youngsters (Verschelden et al. 2011). Participating in youth work initiatives can help this latter group to acquire new skills or become motivated to return to school (European Commission 2010). A number of initiatives have been undertaken at the European level to promote transnational co-operation and exchange, such as the Youth in Action programme and the European Youth Pact (European Commission 2010).

If there is one message to take away from the Flemish case study presented above, it is that family connections explain partly the negative educational outcomes of children from a low socio-economic background or from a dissolved family. Traditionally, family connections have been a blind spot for youth workers. Although some youth work initiatives have been oriented at children from a disadvantaged background, these generally tend to avoid the dynamics within these families (Robinson et al. 2011).<sup>35</sup> Based on some very limited research, it can be claimed that participation in youth work initiatives can improve the relationships between children and parents (Larson et al. 2006) or help children deal with parental conflict or divorce (Pedro-Carroll 2005). There is need for more research on this topic to ascertain conditions and dimensions of youth work that can affect family connections in a positive manner. The European level plays a central role in streamlining research on this topic and bringing together examples of good practice in order to further explore the relationships between youth practice and family connections.

### **YOUTH POLICY: GROWING CO-OPERATION WITH FAMILY POLICY?**

Policies that promote child well-being and educational equality should be directed at alleviating the influence of risk-inducing family variables. In order to reach this goal, a close co-operation between youth and family policies is necessary. Within this respect, the common policy of family affairs (Council of Europe 2006) is noteworthy to mention. In this policy, the crucial role of the family for child development is stressed. Member states are motivated to recognise the importance of parental responsibilities and the need to provide parents with enough support to help them fulfil their responsibilities. Within this common framework, national (and regional) governments are stimulated to support initiatives directed at improving parent-child interactions by, among other things, giving parenting support and improving the work-family life balance for parents.

Based on the results of the Flemish case study, protecting the family environment and supporting parents can be useful tools to combat social exclusion of youth and the intergenerational transmission of poverty. A comprehensive approach against the influence of unfavourable family characteristics on children's educational outcomes is recommended. This can consist of a combination of financial transfers with the provision of parental support to struggling families. The combination of these two policy initiatives has already proved successful (Shulruf et al. 2009) and may help governments to reach families with a low socio-economic background.

With respect to the initiatives that have been undertaken at the transnational level, socio-political and socio-cultural differences continue to exist between countries regarding family support. First of all, there are differences in the way the state intervenes in family life. In Scandinavian countries such as Norway and Sweden, parental support is compulsory and is usually situated in universal (early childhood) services. Other countries, such as Belgium (Flanders) and the Netherlands, recognise the

35. This discussion does not touch the topic of youth counselling within which attention is given to helping children deal with problematic family dynamics.



importance of making parenting support easily accessible, but these services are not compulsory. In general, there is a tension between the private matter of child rearing and the ideas of how children should be raised in the best way possible (Hopman, De Winter and Koops 2012). There is a need for cross-country research on the efficacy and efficiency of parenting support aimed at identifying good practices. Also with respect to transferring financial means to families in poverty, there are some differences between countries. These differences are, among other things, situated in the division of responsibilities between family and state and the manner in which financial means (such as taxes or income) are transferred (Saraceno and Keck 2010). The different contexts in Europe provide both a challenge (bringing together different perspectives) and an opportunity (learning from each other) in the creation of a transnational network of family support.

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## **APPENDIX**

### **A1. Operationalisation of the variables**

School engagement is measured by 12 factors (Brutsaert 1991). Children answer whether they agree or disagree regarding attitudes and behaviour in school, giving scores between 0 (totally disagree) and 4 (totally agree). The sum scale of these 12 factors runs from 0 to 48 (mean = 23.22; SD = 7.94; Cronbach's alpha = 0.86).

The socio-economic family background is measured by the educational level of the parents and the financial situation at home. The educational level of the mother and father is measured by two dummy variables, each indicating whether the parent has a degree of tertiary education (score 1) or not (score 0). Forty-three percent of the children have two parents with a degree of tertiary education, 32% have two parents with no degree of tertiary education. The perceived financial situation at home is measured by a dummy variable. Children are asked how often they feel their parents have a hard time getting by financially. Almost 81% of the children indicated that there were never or seldom financial problems at home (score 0). Nineteen percent of the children indicated that there were sometimes or always financial problems at home (score 1). Family dissolution is included as a dummy variable, with score 0 relating to an intact family and score 1 pointing to a non-intact family that has experienced a divorce. Twenty-seven percent of the children are living in a non-intact family.

The family connections are measured by the child-parent relationships, the parental conflict and the authoritative parenting styles of parents. Note that these measures are based entirely on survey responses of children and are therefore to be interpreted

with caution. The relationships between children and their mother and father are measured by nine factors (Furhman and Burmester 1985). The total sum scores run from 0 to 36. On average, children have a slightly better relationship with their mother (mean = 22.21; SD = 6.88; Cronbach's alpha = 0.90) than with their father (mean = 19.94; SD = 7.62; Cronbach's alpha = 0.91). Parental conflict is measured by three factors. The total sum scale runs from 0 to 12 (mean = 3.26; SD = 2.56; Cronbach's alpha = 0.80). The authoritative parenting styles of mother and father are calculated using five factors that measure responsiveness and five factors that measure autonomy. Parents who score more than the average on both the responsiveness and autonomy scale have an authoritative parenting style. A dummy variable of authoritative parenting style shows that more than 40% of the mothers and 36% of the fathers have an authoritative parenting style.

The control variables that are included are gender (1 = boy, 0 = girl), age (mean = 15.23; SD = 3.41) and nationality (1 = Belgian, 0 = non-Belgian). 46% of the children are boys and 7% of children do not have the Belgian nationality.

## A2. Methods

Path analyses are conducted, in which causal relations between variables are specified. The indirect effects and standard errors are calculated using the delta method. The analyses are performed in Mplus 5.21 and Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimations are produced to deal with missing values.

## A3. Results

**Table A1. Direct effects on school engagement (Path I and III)**

	School engagement
Perceived financial problems	0.009
Highly educated mother	0.022
Highly educated father	-0.014
Family dissolution	-0.027*
Relation with mother	0.199***
Relation with father	0.076***
Parental conflict	-0.036*
Authoritative mother	0.065**
Authoritative father	0.054**
Boy	-0.098***
Age	-0.054***
Belgian	-0.056***
N	

Note: Entries are standardised estimates ( $\beta$ ).  
Significance: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001.

**Table A2. Direct effects on family connections (path II)**

	Relation with mother	Relation with father	Parental conflict	Authoritative mother	Authoritative father
Perceived financial problems	-0.075***	-0.134***	0.248***	-0.062***	-0.061***
Highly educated mother	-0.004	0.006	0.000	0.014	0.017
Highly educated father	0.014	0.036*	-0.030	0.067***	0.069***
Family dissolution	-0.043**	-0.210***	0.111***	-0.047**	-0.099***
N					

Note: Entries are standardised estimates ( $\beta$ ).  
Significance: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table A3. Indirect effects on school engagement (path IV)**

	School engagement
Family dissolution via relation with mother	-0.009**
Family dissolution via relation with father	-0.016***
Family dissolution via parental conflict	-0.004*
Family dissolution via authoritative mother	-0.003*
Family dissolution via authoritative father	-0.005*
Total indirect effect	-0.037***
Perceived financial problems via relation with mother	-0.015***
Perceived financial problems via relation with father	-0.010***
Perceived financial problems via parental conflict	-0.009*
Perceived financial problems via authoritative mother	-0.004*
Perceived financial problems via authoritative father	-0.003*
Total indirect effect	-0.041***
Highly educated mother via relation with mother	-0.001
Highly educated mother via relation with father	0.000
Highly educated mother via parental conflict	0.000
Highly educated mother via authoritative mother	0.001
Highly educated mother via authoritative father	0.001
Total indirect effect	0.001
Highly educated father via relation with mother	0.003

	School engagement
Highly educated father via relation with father	0.003*
Highly educated father via parental conflict	0.001
Highly educated father via authoritative mother	0.004*
Highly educated father via authoritative father	0.004*
Total indirect effect	0.015**

Note: Entries are standardised estimates ( $\beta$ ).  
Significance: \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

## Chapter 10

# Internet addiction disorder among adolescents and young adults: the picture in Europe and prevention strategies

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*Katerina Flora*

### **INTRODUCTION**

This article deals with Internet addiction, the spread of this phenomenon in European countries, its possible causes as well as ways of preventing it. Nowadays, young people in the Western world, including those living in European societies, have access to a wealth of information sources through the Internet, which they use as a key means of keeping themselves up to date, entertained and in touch with their social lives. More specifically, in Greece the Internet appears to have almost completely replaced other forms of pastime, such as interactive playing outdoors, in the neighbourhood or/and at home. Young people are becoming more and more attached to the Internet as a means of communicating, learning and seeking new challenges, while at the same time they are becoming more introverted and more suspicious of face-to-face communication with others, which they often consider too demanding and even unnecessary. In their daily activities with computers they also live a virtual life alongside their real one. As this virtual reality constitutes an integral part of their everyday life, young people often fail to recognise the differences between actual and virtual reality. At the same time, however, the Internet represents an escape from everyday life, a means of discovering many and different new “lives”, and it is exactly this that creates the danger of “addiction” in the sense of compulsive Internet usage.



The focus of the problematisation discussed here lies with the opinion that Internet addiction may be described as a new distinct diagnostic category, but should be examined in the context of addictive behaviour, its symptoms, causes and consequences. According to our basic assumption, there are significant similarities among the various types of addiction irrespective of the object of addiction, which may be a psychotropic substance, a game of chance or the Internet. Some of the common alarming symptoms and warning signs are: the preoccupation of the mind with the object of the addiction, e.g. the Internet; the attempt to conceal the extent of involvement with the object of addiction or/and the subsequent lies about the extent of involvement; withdrawing from other pleasurable activities; social isolation; defensive attitudes and angry outbursts; psychological isolation; engagement in the activity as a way to escape from reality; and the continuous involvement despite the negative consequences.

The assumption that the various types of addiction have a common or similar psychological background, namely that the addicts have a similar psychological profile, has been supported by recent research (Dowling and Brown 2010). For example, both Internet and gambling addiction are associated with a high level of stress, loneliness and low social support. These findings suggest that the various types of addiction may be separate from each other and often be occasional manifestations of the same underlying vulnerable characteristics.

This similarity of the psychological profiles affects the treatment of these problems. First of all, the clinical psychologists taking part in the treatment should recognise the various manifestations of this phenomenon. Second, it should be noted that the most effective treatments for addictive behaviour are the synthetic approaches, including both the treatment of specific symptoms (e.g. of gambling or Internet use) and treatments used in the case of addictive behaviours in general. The success of the cognitive-behavioural approach for addictions such as gambling suggests that this approach may be effective for Internet addiction too. Finally, co-morbidity with psychological problems such as depression, anxiety, stress and loneliness may affect the choice of treatment as well as its effectiveness.

It should be noted that the causal relationship between problematic addictive behaviour and psychological problems cannot be inferred by the research conducted so far. There is some evidence suggesting that the psychological problems are likely to precede the development of the addiction, but this temporal relationship needs to be further explored. In conclusion, the findings to date show that the different types of addiction (e.g. gambling or the Internet) may be separate disorders with a common underlying causality or common consequences. Finally, another aspect has to do with the support addicts should be provided with in order to improve their psychological functionality.

## **INTERNET ADDICTION: THE GENERAL PICTURE IN EUROPE**

The European Union-funded research project "Research on Internet Addictive Behaviours among European adolescents" (Tsitsika, Tzavela and Mavromati 2012) aims to augment the knowledge base of the Internet addictive behaviour risk among adolescents in Europe. A total of 13 284 adolescents aged 14-17 (a representative sample from each country) was surveyed. Additionally, 124 qualitative in-depth

interviews were conducted. The study took place in Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, Iceland, Poland, Romania and Spain.

The basic findings of the study that describes Internet addiction among adolescents in Europe nowadays show the following (Tsitsika et al. 2012):

*About Internet Addictive Behaviour (IAB):* 1.2% of the total sample presents with IAB, while 12.7% are at risk of developing IAB (13.9% have Dysfunctional Internet Behaviour (DIB)). Spain, Romania, and Poland show a higher prevalence of DIB, while Germany and Iceland the lowest in the study. Boys, older adolescents and those whose parents have lower educational levels are more likely to exhibit DIB. The group with DIB has lower psychosocial well-being. Gambling, social networking and gaming are strongly associated with DIB, while watching videos/movies was not related to DIB and doing homework/research was negatively associated with DIB, indicating that the more adolescents use the Internet for homework/research the less they show signs of DIB.

*With regard to high-risk behaviour:* the research showed that one dangerous form of behaviour is communication with strangers. Specifically, 63% of the total sample communicate with strangers online; 9.3% of those communicating with strangers online state that this experience was perceived as harmful for them (5.4% of total sample); and 45.7% of those communicating with strangers online have gone on to meet someone face-to-face that they first met on the Internet (28.4% of total sample). The risk of grooming is higher in Romania, Germany and Poland, and lowest in Greece.

*Exposure to sexual images:* the percentage of the total sample exposed to sexual images is 58.8% and 32.8% of these state that this experience was harmful (18.4% of total sample). More boys than girls have been exposed to sexual images.

*Cyber bullying:* 21.9% of the total samples have experienced bullying online; 53.5% of those bullied state that this experience was harmful (11.2% of total sample). More girls than boys experience bullying. Romania and Greece have the highest percentages, while Iceland and Spain the lowest.

It is remarkable that although a significant number of adolescents may be exposed to Internet risks, a much lower number experiences harm. This indicates the importance of education and prevention among young people: educate young people to deal with risks, so that they do not experience harm.

*With regard to Internet activities:* social networking comes first and is followed by gambling and gaming. Specifically, 92% of the total sample are members of at least one social networking site (SNS). Some 39.4% of adolescents spend at least two hours on SNS on a normal school day. Using SNS for more than two hours daily is associated with DIB. More girls than boys use SNS, while having more than 500 online friends is associated with DIB.

*Gambling:* 5.9% of the total sample gamble online, while 10.6% gamble in real life. Romania and Greece have the highest gambling percentages (online and in real life, and adolescents who gamble have three times the risk of exhibiting DIB).

*Gaming:* 61.8% of the total sample are gamers, and adolescents who play games have twice as high a risk of exhibiting DIB. Gaming more than 2.6 hours a day is associated with DIB. Boys are more likely to abuse or become addicted to gaming.

In the same research, the qualitative components (Dreier et al. 2012) indicated the important role of the Internet in adolescence and specifically that adolescents are especially attracted to the Internet because of their developmental characteristics and their thirst and curiosity for:

- ▶ getting answers to a wide range of questions;
- ▶ attaining fast and the most up-to-date information;
- ▶ keeping in touch with existing and new contacts;
- ▶ having fun.

The Internet eases (facilitates) everyday life in adolescence. However, some teenagers need to feel boosted (empowerment). Empowerment comes through positive online encounters (being liked, gaining excellence in games, feeling equal and filling empty time). In addition, empowerment may fill a void when it comes to adolescents with deficient offline social skills.

It is important to mention that adolescents with underdeveloped offline skills may experience a high degree of empowerment through the Internet and thus are more vulnerable to the development of Dysfunctional Internet Behaviour.

With regard to the adolescents' behaviour of being "always online", the research showed that adolescents, following their personal online journeys of exploration (digital pathways), develop various strategies in order to handle the phenomenon of being always online; for example, "adaptive strategies" (efforts to balance online and offline engagements like self-monitoring, prioritising, exploring offline alternatives), and "maladaptive strategies" (efforts to maintain increased online engagement like bypassing parental control, normalisation, legitimising use). The properties that determine the strategies are self-regulation and readiness for change (motivation in changing behaviours that cause objective difficulties).

Continuous Internet use and the development of high-risk behaviour were researched further, which resulted in the classification of four types of continuous use:

A) "Stuck Online": displays excessive Internet use, neglects main areas of daily routine (school, friends, duties), has specific online activities, has negative effects of over-use (sleep disturbance, distress if unable to go online) and has difficulty to reduce Internet use, even if acknowledging the negative impact. However, this type may have a thirst for life and offline experiences, but because of deficient social skills he/she feels disappointed, bullied or excluded and thus "trapped" online:

Well, I used to go out more, being outside, going swimming, or stuff like that. I haven't been swimming for about two years. I haven't been out with my friends in the evening for over four months now, such things you neglect.

– Boy, 16 years

B) "Juggling it all": these people may have a thirst for life and offline experiences, and also a good level of social competence. Online activities may have a strong connection to offline activities (e.g. an adolescent with a lot of friends may use Facebook a lot):

Because I am busy and I spend a lot of time on the Internet, it's hard to manage everything. But I get everything done.

– Girl, 15 years

C) "Coming full cycle": a person in this category has an excessive online pattern, progressive and adaptive change and self-correction, with that self-correction possibly coming through: saturation ("Got sick of it"); acknowledging negative consequences (physical problems, aches, academic downfall, parental conflicts etc.); or motivation (romantic relationship, etc.):

I started visiting social networks like Facebook, saying "ah, here there are many people, I meet new people, that's nice", staying [online] for more and more time, making comments, uploading stuff and creating a new life in there. Like a virtual reality. Um...I think that happened. After a while though, you come full cycle, you start saying "what am I doing now?"; you get tired of it, you shut it down, you go out and you start cutting down on the time you spend on it. Just like that; it comes full cycle.

– Girl, 17 years

D) "Killing boredom": those in this category perceive the offline environment as "boring" and lack alternative activities of interest. Online engagement provides a comfortable time filler and Internet use is an automatic reaction to boredom:

Well, I really don't care. I just kill time. I feel so bored.

– Boy, 17 years

As the writers emphasise, the "Model of Four" may serve as a tool for categorising users with DIB and offer an initial prognosis.

Types A and D seem to have a poorer prognosis and co-morbidity (anxiety, depression, attention disorders, etc.). In these cases, DIB may be the tip of the iceberg – the expression of an underlying psychosocial difficulty that requires intervention.

Types A and D most probably will not self-correct and may need professional help.

Types B and C seem to be functional users and loss of control is mainly connected with developmental adolescent patterns.

Types B and C most probably will self-correct and may not need any intervention at all. Type C, however, may lose quite a significant time interval during the "cycle" and some kind of help may be needed.

It is remarkable that the four types of individual that demonstrate continuous and a lower or higher level of problematic Internet use outline characteristically the so-called negative side of the use of this medium, which is associated with alienation, a lack of real personal contact and the parallel development of a fake and virtual sociability. So, on the one hand, the Internet offers indeed the opportunity both for instant and faster communication with people and for instant and faster information about current events around the world. On the other hand, it is a fact that this kind of communication prevents face-to-face communication and contact among young people nowadays. The social media represents a characteristic example, where users are linked to many people they know while at the same time belonging to various collective communities created on the Internet. However, the satisfaction of this need for sociability and socialisation in a virtual way inhibits the pursuit of establishing closer personal and social relations.

In contrast to this argument, there is the view of the Internet as an inevitable part of today's social reality, so much so that Internet users often wonder how it was possible to communicate before the invention of this communication means. It is a fact that people have the need to communicate for practical, psychological and social reasons. How this communication is achieved is a function of the resources available to each era. Taking communication as a valuable commodity, the Internet has multiplied the possibilities for communication in various ways, resulting in the potential connection of all people who have access to it. This is a huge advantage with many dimensions in our daily lives, as we can now be connected with previously inaccessible places and persons through simple moves. Bearing always in mind the Internet is an integral part of social reality, it can be pointed out that such behaviour associated with the abuse of the Internet would not be considered so problematic if it were not associated with estrangement from the most direct and therefore more powerful forms of communication that have always been available to people and which constitute key elements of socialisation and personality development. Such communication immediacy, along with the qualitative elements that enrich human communication such as touch, gaze, or gestures, are absent from communication through the Internet, and this absence is "impoverishing" people in terms of their communication.

### **INTERNET ADDICTION: RECENT RESEARCH FINDINGS**

The findings of recent research on the prevalence of pathological Internet use (PIU) and maladaptive Internet use (MIU), conducted by Durkee et al. (2012) on a sample of about 12 000 adolescents from 11 European countries, showed that the overall prevalence of PIU was 4.4%; it was higher among males than females (5.2% versus 3.8%) and differed between countries ( $\chi^2(2) = 309.98$ ; d.f. = 20;  $P < 0.001$ ). PIU correlated significantly with mean hours online and male gender. The highest-ranked online activities were watching videos, frequenting chat rooms and social networking; significantly higher rates of playing single-user games were found in males and social networking in females. Living in metropolitan areas was associated with PIU. Students not living with a biological parent, low parental involvement and parental unemployment showed the highest relative risks of both MIU and PIU. One of the most important findings was the fact that there are cultural differences (which need to be researched further) and that the prevalence of pathological Internet use varies by country and gender, with adolescents lacking emotional and psychological support at highest risk.

One aspect of problematic Internet use is online gaming. Online gaming addicts range from adolescents to mature adults. Research on a representative sample of 580 adolescents aged 14-18 in Germany investigated the possibility that playing digital games is associated with forms of addictive behaviour. The findings show that 3.7% (95% CI: 3.1, 4.3) of the respondents could be considered problematic users. The percentage of problematic gamers among adolescents is above average (7.6%, 95% CI: 5.6, 10.1). A high score in the measure used to assess online gaming addiction is associated with aggression, low sociability and self-efficacy, and a lower satisfaction with life. Additionally, these scores correspond with intensive use and preferences for certain gaming genres across all age groups. The conclusions underline that gaming

addiction is not currently a widespread phenomenon among adolescents and adults in Germany. The high scores in the scale for the assessment of gaming addiction are associated with intensive use, as well as certain problematic aspects of individuals' personalities and social lives (Festl, Scharkow and Quandt 2013).

The concept and nature of what is called "Internet addiction" are discussed in the article of Starcevic (2013) that examines some of the most important issues surrounding Internet addiction and proposes an alternative conceptualisation for it. The Internet is used by hundreds of millions of people worldwide, with its numerous benefits only leading to an increase in the number of users. But there is a dark side to the Internet, and one of the negative consequences of the vast potential of the Internet has been its excessive and uncontrollable use, often referred to as Internet addiction. As a concept, Internet addiction faces two types of challenge. The first one is about it being an addiction. The second one refers to the Internet as a medium to which a person is presumably addicted. Addiction does not appear as a diagnosis in the diagnostic and classification systems such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Disorders (DSM) – IV. The diagnostic concept most closely related to addiction has been dependence, which has been linked with psychotropic substance use. It was pathological gambling as a behavioural addiction that served as the model for the concept of Internet addiction. However, this was inappropriate because of the differences between the two that were either neglected or overlooked. Furthermore, behavioural addiction itself is a problematic construct, as it implies that any behaviour that is rewarding can be addictive (Starcevic 2013).

Pathological Internet use is a behavioural addiction whose prevalence seems to increase. Several authors have reported a significant co-morbidity of PIU and mental and psychosomatic disorders. In recent years, psychotherapists were increasingly confronted with PIU among inpatients on psychotherapeutic wards. There is still a lack of clarity about the psychodynamic function of PIU and online gaming which causes users to engage excessively in gaming and to neglect their everyday relationships and work duties.

As a contribution to a better understanding of the psychodynamics of online gaming, the paper of Langenbach and Schutte (2012) presents two cases of adult inpatients that were treated on a psychotherapeutic ward for severe depressive episodes. In the course of treatment, a distinctive online addiction became apparent as a relevant area of problems. Traumatic experiences in both patients' childhoods had an important weight both in the genesis of the acute mental disorder and the online addiction. The authors propose to consider the relevance of traumatic experiences and of patients' coping behaviour with such experiences in a significant group of patients with online addiction (Langenbach and Schutte 2012).

There are some quite interesting studies and findings that investigate the potential relation of the involvement with the Internet to people who belong to the broader spectrum of autism. One of these studies (Finkenauer, Pollmann, Begeer and Kerkhof 2012) investigates the possibility that individuals with autism spectrum disorders or autistic traits benefit from the Internet and computer-mediated interactions, but there is concern about their Internet use becoming compulsive. This study investigated the link between autistic traits and Internet use in a two-wave longitudinal

study with a non-clinical community sample (n = 390). Compared to people with less autistic traits, people with more autistic traits did not report a higher frequency of Internet use, but they were more prone to compulsive Internet use. For women, more autistic traits predicted an increase in compulsive Internet use over time. These results suggest that, despite its appeal for people with autistic traits, the Internet carries the risk of compulsive use. (Finkenauer, Pollmann, Begeer and Kerkhof 2012)

### **TREATING INTERNET ADDICTION: THE GREEK EXPERIENCE**

The belief of the first therapeutic programme in Greece for the treatment of Internet addiction, which is section of the broader agency for addiction treatment "18 Ano" (Over 18) (2013), is that, since the beginning of the progressive increase of the accessibility of the Internet, which becomes possible at an even younger age, the data concerning the younger generations of adults in the country are going to change dramatically. This fact inevitably renders the current generation of adults more vulnerable to Internet addiction compared to the past generations of adults and, correspondingly, the future generations of adults compared to the present adult generation. The increase of vulnerability to Internet overuse, in combination with an ageing population, demands the application of specialised structures for dealing with the phenomenon, the ever-growing dimensions of which have not been described for Greek adults yet. It should be underlined that Internet overuse is not a "childhood or adolescent disease" although it certainly appears as such, most likely due to the higher level of familiarisation not of the young, but of the younger generations with the Internet.

In conjunction with the above-mentioned, it should be underlined that the character of the Internet is likely to change soon, multiplying its potentials as well as the risk of development of addictive behaviour. More specifically, the Internet will develop into a network, since both television and telephone will be included within the framework of the Internet's functions. The transformation has already begun with the commercialisation of mobile phones that allow permanent connection to Internet applications.

It should be noted that quite a large number of the people who are addicted to Internet use also meet the requirements of addiction disorders related to psychotropic substances use and other impulse control disorders, such as pathological gambling. It is argued indeed that those users with a profile that includes the above-mentioned disorders have already made the first step towards Internet overuse. As a result, Internet addicts are admitted to a unit for psychotherapeutic evaluation and treatment.

The recognition that both drug addiction and problematic Internet use belong to the therapeutic section of addictive behaviour, and the assessment of clinical experience gained thus far-led to the organisation of a specialised admission centre in Athens, which focuses on the treatment of such cases.

More specifically, its services address adults who are both addicted and not addicted to substances and who have (or had) in their record any type of disorder associated with Internet use. The services provided are: individual and group psychotherapy, art and body expression groups, and alternative psycho-educational groups.

## **PREVENTION OF INTERNET ADDICTION: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT IT?**

A meta-analysis of recent research about the prevention of Internet addiction showed that the characteristics of the family are primarily associated with the development of Internet addiction among adolescents (Yen et al. 2007; Wieland 2005; Hurr 2006). This is why some mental health professionals suggest that family should be the focus of prevention strategies. Many researchers suggest a family-centred approach to prevention, similar to the one used in interventions for the prevention of drug addiction (Yen et al. 2007). This kind of approach entails parental education and its aim is to help parents improve their communication skills with their children, promote healthy interaction within the family, help parents acquire skills on how to deal effectively with certain situations and help the family reduce maladaptive family behaviours (Yen et al. 2007).

Oravec (2000) suggests that mental health counsellors help family members to decide the extent to which they want the Internet and the computer to be part of their family life before the purchase and installation of these technological media.

Another prevention method has to do with the encouragement of adolescents to participate in real life and not in cyberspace activities (Hurr 2006). The planning of these strategies has utilised research on the personality types of Internet addicts. The first studies showed that Internet addicts tend to be individuals with high exploration irritability (and low reward dependence) (Ko et al. 2007; Ko et al. 2006). This is why adolescents with this profile should take part in offline activities, creative, exploratory and healthy activities so that they match the needs of their personality (Ko et al. 2007). The researchers suggest also that teenagers should be allowed to use the Internet only during specific hours of the week so that the development of Internet addiction is prevented (Ko et al. 2007).

Although many suggestions for prevention have been made, which result from research on Internet addiction, none of these prevention strategies has been sufficiently controlled on an experimental level. In conclusion, a more general comment has to do with the lack of literature and studies about the prevention of Internet addiction. Whereas in recent years a great deal of research has been conducted on this phenomenon, suggestions for its prevention, which may be associated with an overall dealing with this problem, are few.

## **PREVENTION OF INTERNET ADDICTION: OUR SUGGESTIONS**

### **Theoretical framework**

Prevention programmes in schools focus on the social and scholarly skills of the children, such as the improvement of the relationship with their peers, self-control and dealing with difficult situations. The ideal application framework is the integration of these programmes into the curriculum, because factors such as school failure are often associated with the development of substance-related addictive behaviour. These programmes reinforce the bonds of the students to school and decrease the



possibility of dropping out of school. The last generation of programmes contains interventions that affect the school environment as a whole.

The idea that the way both teachers and students perceive and experience the school community has gained ground over the last years. The application of programmes over the past 15 years, such as “Caring School Communities” in many primary schools in the USA, is a characteristic example. The findings show that the sense of the school community may improve for both teachers and students, that it is associated with a wide range of positive results and that the possible benefits from the re-establishment of the school community are much bigger for schools with a low socio-economical level. More generally, the concept of school as a community seems to provide a strong framework for revising school practice and applying pedagogical changes.

The education of pedagogues as prevention agents is associated with the social development of students within the school community. Beyond the improvement of educational practice, a basic goal is to render the school itself an environment that meets every aspect of the needs of the teachers and the students.

More specifically, with regard to the target group of the prevention programmes, namely the “tweenagers” and the teenagers, some indicative characteristics are mentioned: they have shaped behaviour in relation to the Internet and the age group 15-19 represents the age category with the biggest tendency towards Internet use (40% mild use, 7% severe overuse) (Sunwoo and Rando 2002). What is more, this group is more likely to neglect other activities because of problematic Internet use. The age is the only factor typically associated with Internet addiction (Widyanto and McMurrin 2004). The development of addiction at a young age may suggest an increased possibility for successful therapy, since the younger the person is the easier he/she adapts to a new behaviour or he/she has an increased possibility of remaining addicted in adulthood (Block 2008).

### **Example: pilot programme in Greece**

Introduction: Internet addiction appeared during the last decade in Greek society as a new type of addictive behaviour among children, adolescents and adults. Problematic Internet use tends to begin at an even younger age, since it is widely observed among students of primary education level (Siomos, Mouzas and Angelopoulos 2008). Secondary education students seem to have already shaped their behaviour so that the problem can be described as an observable phenomenon with specific characteristics. Therefore, in this age group, prevention is on the one hand mostly informative and aims at a more appropriate Internet use and on the other hand it is an attempt to promote the individual and collective processes that contribute to the prevention of the development of any type of addictive behaviour. This new addiction type may, in our opinion, be investigated in the context of the common causal traits with the other more widespread addiction types, such as psychotropic substance-related addiction.

Aim: the aim of the research is to study the relationship between children at secondary education level and the Internet in terms of family, education and general social aspects, as well as the cases of bullying that appear not only in the school environment but on

the Internet too (cyberbullying). The sample consists of first and second-grade secondary education students. The selection of the sample is determined by randomised stratified sampling. The students respond to questionnaires about their relationship with the Internet based on the IAT scale developed by Young (1998), which was adapted for school-age children. The students respond to another questionnaire too (developed by Psalti et al.), about their school life and focusing especially on bullying.

Results: the research is still in progress. However, the statistical analysis of the pilot data shows that increased Internet use by students is associated with aggression and the lack of socialisation.

Conclusions: the results of the study will be primarily discussed in view of the reliable information of the students, the teachers and the parents so as to assess the existing relationship with the Internet, to prevent and to promptly tackle the behaviour problems that might come up due to inappropriate Internet use, within the context of the programme of Schools of Collaborative Learning and Prevention, a pilot programme of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, under the scientific responsibility of Mika Haritos Fatouros.

## **CONCLUSIVE COMMENTS**

The Internet represents a technological breakthrough, a new way of communication and a new era with different characteristics regarding the transfer and speed of information. The advantages of Internet use are numerous, both on a professional and social level. The fact that, after 25 years of existence of this medium, mental health scientists have today reached a point where they can observe pathological behaviour associated with its maladaptive use may suggest that this medium has certain "addictive" attributes (e.g. immediacy, easiness of information accessibility, range of stimuli). It may suggest that its use fulfils certain needs of modern people such as communication, information and entertainment but above all that it allows the development of addictive behaviour similar to that observed years before the invention of the Internet. This article deals with problematic Internet use not in order to demonise the medium and its use, but to highlight the spread of a phenomenon with a negative impact on human psychological behaviour in today's Europe.

Irrespective of the terminology used to describe the phenomenon – Internet Addiction, Internet Addiction Disorder, Pathological Internet Use, Internet Overuse, Compulsive Internet Use – all the terms describe more or less the same concept, namely that an individual may be so engaged in Internet use that he/she neglects other important aspects of his/her life. Whether it exists as a distinct diagnostic category or not, Internet addiction may, in our opinion, be studied more effectively in the context of addictive behaviour in general and that of the need that urges individuals to develop addictive behaviour with negative consequences on both an individual and social level. Griffiths (2000) has argued that many of these excessive users are not "Internet addicts" but just use the Internet excessively as a medium to fuel other prior addictions. In this sense the causal factor of Internet addiction is complex and ranges from prior mental disorders to a dominant lifestyle model and the establishment of relations mediated through the technological medium. This change in the way interpersonal relations are created and sustained signals a

readjustment of everyday life's needs and values where prevail alienation and on the surface communication. Despite its positive traits, such a strong technological medium cannot substitute the deeper need for interpersonal contact, a need that becomes gradually less and less recognisable as it is concealed by the new and unfamiliar artificial needs of human nature.

The investigation into the causes of Internet addiction could be facilitated by emphasising the question of why a young individual chooses virtual over face-to-face communication. It is important to understand the way this need is created during early school years and ends up becoming established as a basic communication model even during adult life. The assumption of a prior basic psychopathology that might predispose an individual to problematic Internet use does not seem to be so strong in such a widespread phenomenon with such dimensions. The answer should rather be sought in the modern social circumstances and lifestyle that dictates, for example, the ease and speed of establishing relations. Even worse, the new way of day-to-day survival imposes an excessive individuality and a preoccupation with individual activities (e.g. computer games, online series), where the presence of the other person exists only on an imaginary level, if it exists at all.

In this context, prevention has a broader character and does not aim only at preventing the symptoms of Internet addiction or at improving the corresponding skills but at promoting, in our case, the values of collectivity, equivalence, solidarity and responsibility within the school community, as well as at boosting the positive characteristics of the students.

In order for prevention to be effective, one needs to take into consideration both the previous experience in prevention strategies and the cultural differences between various countries. Thus, the above-mentioned suggestion for boosting collectivity and responsibility takes into consideration the fact that the prevention strategies aiming at informing young people or helping them acquire social skills have not yet borne fruit. This means that one should maybe turn to more experiential strategies, to strategies primarily associated with the reasons why such problems come up. So, for example, if alienation caused by the modern lifestyle is one of the causes of addiction, the focus must be on fostering those values that prevent the development of alienation, namely collective consciousness, participation in collective processes, etc.

Research on problematic Internet use among young people and mostly adolescents in Europe may give a clearer picture of the current situation, of the effective and non-effective measures and suggested interventions. For example, a great deal of research shows that the intensity of the demonstration of Internet addictive behaviour depends on individual psychological (individual peculiarities of adolescent age) and micro-social (psychological difficulties and complications generated by the close social environment) factors, which do not appear separately from each other, but are interconnected and interdependent. The main types of teenage behaviour on the Internet are: compulsive, compensatory, emotion-dependent, communicative and cyber-sexual (Zaytsev and Vakulich 2008). When it is known that certain behaviour is associated with the development of problematic Internet use, certain prevention strategies could be developed, aiming at, among other things, preventing the development of these psychological traits.

And alongside all this, one should not ignore the need to provide counselling support to children and adolescent users or prospective users of the Internet. A comprehensive approach to the level of prevention would consider ways of improving the use of the Internet in favour of a more conscious and less mechanistic form. In this way, counselling would not only be intended as a way to provide information but also as a way to explore the needs and shortcomings of the young, as well as to their consequent psychological empowerment, so that the use of the Internet would facilitate and enrich the development of a healthy personality instead of covering its gaps.

The need for a more functional use of the Internet is imperative if one believes that the result of a compulsive connection with the Internet is often disconnection from other forms of support, information, orientation and entertainment, all of which constitute a rather healthier way of communicating with others in general. Central to the development of addiction to the Internet is the illusion of communicating and connecting with others, while, in essence, people can become disconnected from real human relationships, as is indeed shown by the high correlation of compulsive Internet use with symptoms of depression and anxiety.

Finally, it has been observed that there are differences in the development and prevalence of the phenomenon among different European countries. The fact, for example, that Spain, Romania and Greece have higher percentages of negative characteristics may be attributed to the cultural context and the degree of tolerance of certain behaviour. It may, however, also mean that the prevention policy in these countries is either insufficient or ineffective and should therefore be more carefully planned and applied. On the other hand, experience from other countries, such as the USA with the programme Caring School Communities, may prove useful when taking into consideration the special cultural characteristics of each country.

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## Chapter 11

# Working in co-working spaces: the social and economic engagement of European youth

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*Marko Orel*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Jurij Lozic is a young Slovenian in his late twenties. He discovered fixed-gear cycling during his studies on industrial design in Ljubljana and soon found himself fascinated by these unique bicycles. In 2008 he attended a six-month exchange programme in Milan, Italy. While living there, he made his first fixed-gear bicycle and quickly identified an unfulfilled need for a light, simple and removable bicycle mudguard. With some market research, he soon realised that there was no such thing on the market and decided to design one himself. An original idea was born. While developing his new product, he got in touch with a local polypropylene manufacturer and made his first removable, rollable bicycle fender, simply called Musguard. Jurij realised the potential of his product, but did not have the resources to execute his idea on a larger scale.

Several years went by and Jurij, now a fresh graduate, was ready to choose his career path. The reality, however, was that he was only one of many with a similar ambition. Slovenian specialist design services were not employing at that time and, faced with the vicious unemployment circle, Jurij decided to try out as a freelance designer. In late 2012, he joined the casual working events – so-called Jellies – organised by the local co-working initiative in Ljubljana's cultural centre, where he met various young professionals from different work fields: event managers, IT developers and musicians. They met once or twice per week, since they did not have permanent space; Ljubljana's cultural centre offered them a place to work only when they had not organised concerts and other cultural events. As a result of successful collaborations and newly established networks between freelancers, the aforementioned local co-working initiative was trying to raise funds to establish a permanent workspace – the first co-working space in Ljubljana. In short, co-working space is a workspace, often with cafe-like, library or gallery elements incorporated into it, where members work and form a community that shares values and creates synergy through collaboration.

Jurij soon discovered that people working in a shared work environment bounce ideas off their fellow co-workers, grab coffee together and share introductions or recommendations for their business ideas. At that time, he was reminded of his fender and presented the idea to his fellow co-workers. Amazed by the simple and clever product design, they pooled their strengths and started mapping the European market. Well aware of the economic situation in Slovenia, where high-risk investments have virtually stopped, they searched for another path to get their hands on a much-needed initial investment and finally decided to use small amounts of capital from a large number of individuals to finance the small-scale production and distribution of Musguard. This approach, inspired by the crowdsourcing philosophy, is also called crowdfunding.

Typically, campaign funding and its respective transactions are conducted online, through specialised crowdfunding Internet platforms – Jurij and his colleagues decided to use Kickstarter, a platform for funding creative projects, as the product's initial launch medium. The team began working on a marketing strategy, with promotional material in the form of video, music and text. Finally, in May 2013, the Kickstarter campaign was approved and successfully launched. In less than a month, the project raised over 40 000 euros, which meant that Jurij was finally able to realise his idea. A story of success? Definitely. But without the community, which shared its knowledge, experience and social connections, Musguard would probably still be stashed in Jurij's drawer.

## **WHEN CRISIS STRIKES**

The European debt crisis, which began sometime in 2008, had extensive negative effects on the European population, particularly on young people across the European Union. Recent research conducted by Eurostat (2013) shows that, in mid-2013, youth unemployment rates (persons aged between 15 and 24, both university graduates and youth without qualifications) were higher than unemployment rates for all other age groups. Even more concerning are the figures which show youth unemployment rates in individual European countries. There are only three countries in the European Union – Germany, Austria and the Netherlands – with a youth unemployment rate below 10%. On the other hand we have countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Slovakia and Ireland with youth unemployment rates above 30%. If we look closer at the Eurostat figures, we find that the highest unemployed rates are among people with primary education or lower. Yet higher education does not guarantee a decent job. The latest statistics show that nearly one in ten young graduates was believed to be unemployed six months after graduating and that Europe is failing in the fight against youth unemployment (Spiegel 2013).

This tells us that a degree from a well-respected university with above average marks is not necessarily enough to ensure employment after graduation. In many cases, it does not only take months, but years for graduates to get their hands on their first employment opportunity. Many young people raised their voices and started actively thinking about how to increase their employability. If one cannot get full-time (or even in many cases part-time) employment, why should not he or she think about creating one? How can Europe contribute to this subject and tackle soaring youth unemployment? Europe and the world as we know it are rapidly changing and we

are entering into a new phase of society. Employability issues, along with many other factors, such as the effects of the digital social revolution, are disorienting us, but also helping us push individualism aside and again find the basis for every society – sociability, one of our core virtues, which plays a major role in almost every aspect of our lives, as both cause and effect (Shirky 2008: 14). This is where the social economy makes its mark. In the last few years the public and private sectors embraced a wide range of rapidly increasing community activities. We can talk about the social economy when, in short, we combine different communities with their views on their social and economic needs.

A report on the social economy, prepared in 2007 by CIRIEC (International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, Social and Cooperative Economy), and including the most recent update in late 2012, outlines the role of the social economy with the following words:

Social economy has not only asserted its ability to make an effective contribution to solving the new social problems, it has also strengthened its position as a necessary institution for stable and sustainable economic growth, fairer income and wealth distribution, matching service to needs, increasing the value of economic activities serving social needs, correcting labour market imbalances and, in short, deepening and strengthening economic democracy.

– CIRIEC 2012, 16

This report embodies a comparative and conceptual study of the situation regarding the social economy in the European Union and somehow reflects its evolving policy around the subject. But why is it that, since the start of the new millennium, economic systems within Europe have become more knowledge intensive, but social inequality, both within and across countries, is increasing? (Archibugi and Lundvall 2002)

Europe 2020, a ten-year strategy proposed by the European Commission in 2010, set several priorities to help push the European Union out of the crisis and recognised entrepreneurship and self-employment as key factors for achieving smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Entrepreneurship as the key factor for creating jobs is also addressed by initiatives like “Agenda for New Skills and Jobs, Youth on the Move – Initiatives on Education and Employment and European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion”. These initiatives aim to show young European people – university graduates and those with lower qualifications – as well as the general public and national policy makers that entrepreneurship is one of the avenues for unemployed youth to create their own work place. As the Europe 2020 strategy suggests: “Job creation through the establishment and consolidation of new businesses plays a key role in achieving the Europe 2020 objectives: a significant number of new jobs in the European Union are created by newly established firms and almost 85% of these jobs are created within micro-firms.” (European Commission 2010, 4)

The Union, however, is far from exploiting its full potential in this matter. One of the major obstacles to business creation used to be the lack of access to investments, which has been exacerbated by the recent economic crisis. Intensively linking different professional profiles could simplify the creation of innovative start-up companies, incubate fresh ideas and push the European economy towards its unachieved potential.



## THE RETURN OF COMMUNITY

At the end of May 2013, France and Germany were the first two EU member countries to announce their plans to establish a “New Deal” for Europe’s young jobseekers – a programme that would aim to tackle the continent’s youth unemployment rate. The plan is sophisticated and complex, yet its basis is to follow the already-tested model used by the United States’ government during the Great Depression in the 1930s. In the coming years, France and Germany plan to use six billion euros in loans pledged by the European Union to help fund apprenticeships, provide credit to small and medium-sized businesses and encourage mobility between member countries (Euronews 2013). The Europe 2020 strategy has finally been recognised as one of the avenues for unemployed youth to get into a job or self-employment by creating small businesses.

But how can these companies be established? On one hand we have numerous young professionals who have plenty of knowledge in a certain field. On the other, we have a globalised, technologically civilised society, where technology has made the world impersonal and distant. In the last two decades, the world as we know it has become more individualised than ever. But our never-ending quest for progression and expansion can help us realise that modernisation and technology – in terms of communitarianism – has many positive aspects as well.

Jackson (2013, 3) offers us a well-written recap on the current situation:

We are living in an information society, on the cusp of the knowledge economy where our know-how is as much an economic resource as our labour, the first generation of digital natives are entering the workplace, the global job market is in the news every day and half of all college graduates cannot find work. We hold in our hands these amazing new tools for sharing and communication; the mobile Internet and the cloud. Recent years have seen the rise of collaborative consumption due to the efficiency of peer-to-peer exchanges in our networked world. Most significantly, by 2015, the world’s mobile worker population will reach 1.3 billion, representing 37.2% of the total workforce according to a report from IDC in January 2012.

A solution may lie in re-establishing the community (both locally and worldwide) and increasing collaboration between individuals. Let us remember Jurij’s success story and his collaboration with fellow young professionals when launching his business idea. Jurij was (and still is) a talented industrial designer, but he lacked knowledge on creating marketing strategies, building web pages and launching crowdfunding campaigns. Sure, one can say that he could simply outsource different professionals, but would he make it without sufficient financial support? When Jurij found his new colleagues at one of the Jelly events, not only did he dig into the pool of young talent, but he also found something else – a community of young professionals, whose ideas are based on sharing knowledge, expertise and other resources. They are taking the social economy to another level and mixing it with the innovative knowledge-based economy, simply by organising themselves and basing their efforts on a system of values and beliefs, which return us to society’s roots – to the community.

Shirky (2008, 14-15) describes community very simply:

[Community] is not just the product of its individual members; it is also the product of its constituent groups. The aggregate relations among individuals and groups, among individuals within groups, and among groups form a network of astonishing complexity. We have always relied on group effort for survival; even before the invention of agriculture, hunting and gathering required coordinated work and division of labour.

European youth is trying to survive. Many have already recognised that they are better off within a group and are looking for others who think alike, not only within the national borders of their country, but far beyond – on the transnational level. How could the European Union speed up the process of spontaneous networking between different young professionals and encourage them to establish small businesses? A solution may be at hand.

### **A CHOICE NOT TO WORK ALONE**

In the past two years, co-working has experienced a boom and become a global phenomenon. In essence, co-working represents a deliberate choice not to work alone. It is a modern way of working for entrepreneurs, self-employed individuals and other professionals, who are encouraged by today's socio-economic factors to permanently or periodically share working space with others from either related or completely different work areas. Co-working is more than just a common, sharable physical space – it is a philosophy that encourages spontaneous networking between professionals of various profiles and interests (e.g. engineers, journalists, graphic designers, project managers, etc.). The co-working environment has a direct influence on social and operative interactions among the individuals involved and emphasises the psychological and social importance of such interactions. According to Botsman and Rogers (2011, 169): "Co-workers describe what their shared workspaces mean to them not in pragmatic terms but with emotional expressions such as hubs of interactions or fraternities of mutual interests. The spaces themselves vary in terms of perks and culture, but they are all based on combining the best elements of a coffee shop (social, energetic, creative) and the best elements of workspace (productive, functional)." Thus, this type of environment encourages innovation and represents a promising solution to reviving the economy and creating a better society.

Because in a co-working space "members pass each other during the day, conversations get going, and miraculously idea-fusion happens with everyone benefitting from the shared thinking and brainstorming" (DeGuzman and Tang 2011, 9), we can say that this type of environment generates society with a mind-set based on a crowdsourcing philosophy. Crowdsourcing values drive down market value of once high-priced professional products and services, allowing young professionals to compete in the market, mainly with high-end innovative services and products. Thus, one of the key things in every co-working space is social engagement in a community of like-minded people.

Co-working spaces in the European Union are widely used by young people who are working independently and who believe in mutual collaboration, exchange of ideas,

skills and information. They share the idea that individuals who share workspace enjoy greater productivity, are faced with increased creativity in their work process and have a higher success rate in the market with either their products or services.

Some of the co-working spaces with most developed communities in Europe are located in Berlin, London, Paris and Prague and have several hundred members from all around the world. We are witnessing more and more transnational collaborations, which are direct results of networking between young entrepreneurs, the self-employed and professionals who work or have worked in different co-working spaces. As we enter a new phase of society, European youth needs to adapt to the current economic situation and stop searching for a dream job – they need to create one. Co-working follows the motto “for the people by the people” and offers all the resources needed to do so.

## CONCLUSION

Co-working is a modern way of working for entrepreneurs, self-employed individuals and other professionals who share working space and establish networks, which serve as the basis for new start-up companies. Since the European debt crisis, many young people are faced with high unemployment rates. Therefore, many young individuals from different backgrounds started to form small communities, based on the same mind-set of sharing and helping each other while realising their business ideas.

Since a lot of these young professionals are self-employed and are using new technologies in their work process, they are extremely flexible and are able to work from different locations. Because of that, there is a need for physical space with an applied model, which encourages spontaneous networking between professionals of various work profiles.

By establishing more co-working locations across the European Union, especially in the capital cities of its member states, European youth will have the environment to get actively engaged in collaboration with young professionals from various work fields and pursue the positive outcomes of the social and innovative knowledge-based economy.

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## Chapter 12

# Interview with MEP Doris Pack<sup>36</sup>

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**If you were a young person today in Europe, what elements would make you feel “disconnected”? And what realities would make you feel “connected”?**

I can only tell from my perspective and I always felt “connected” to Europe. I grew up in Saarland, a small region at the frontier between Germany, France and Luxembourg, which was under French occupation during my childhood, and later under a French-oriented government. So I grew up between two worlds and I was really impressed when I noticed that there was a conciliatory attitude on the part of a neighbouring country upon which we had waged war before. My father had early on insisted upon establishing strong relations with France, French people and culture. So the French-German relationship has always been a positive experience for me.

As for the young people today in Europe, I think there are so many connection points, Europe is all around us, it’s everywhere in our daily life, we have peace, we can travel and live wherever we want, we have the same money, etc. We ARE Europe!

**In the first volume of Perspectives on youth we were focusing on the future of youth policy and young people in 2020. What do you think will be the major challenges then?**

The challenges young people will have to cope with after the year 2020 can’t be foreseen right now. It’s important to throw all our energy into the coming years until 2020 and to implement well the decisions recently taken, in order to get them out of the situation of crisis and to disprove the reputation of “a lost generation”. If we manage to achieve that, I certainly hope that young people won’t need to face problems of this scale and if they do, I hope they will be well prepared for that.

**After 24 years as a member of the European Parliament, you will be retiring. What do you think has changed over this period of time for young people in Europe, for better or for worse?**

The life of young people has reached a global dimension. Already at a very young age there is the possibility to develop further in multiple ways, whether it is having an international experience during school, later during university or even after entering the world of work. The well-established programmes are now all brought together under the title Erasmus+: Comenius for school education; Erasmus for higher education; Leonardo de Vinci for professional training; Grundtvig for adult learning; as well as the Erasmus Mundus for co-operation with third countries.

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36. Interview conducted in April 2014, before the May 2014 European Parliament elections.

With the rise of the Internet and the growing number of member states in the European Union, the accessibility to education, information and cultural exchange has been decisively facilitated and promoted. However, this also bears some risks, for example a growing concurrence and competition in the labour market between individuals of all ages all over the member states, not just any longer on a national level. Nevertheless, the coming generations will adapt and find their place in a wider and more open Europe.

**How connected do you think young people in Europe are with the idea of Europe? How has the European Parliament contributed to young people feeling more connected to Europe?**

I think there are many young people who are really committed and passionate about the idea of Europe. You can see that already when taking a look at the impressive number of participants in the youth and education programmes, which, I would say, represent a big contribution in this context. But we shall continue our efforts in order to reach more and more people.

**Is the connection (or disconnection) of young people reflected in their participation in the European parliamentary elections? What do you expect to see differently in the 2014 elections?**

I think the way young people feel connected or not to Europe will of course be reflected in their participation in the elections. If they do not feel connected, they might vote for some Eurosceptic party or not vote at all. Euroscepticism and populism are spreading and they are dangerous. We really should worry and make a big effort to remind young people especially of the benefits of and the need for a united Europe. In some way, we are the victims of our achievements. Peace, freedom, a connected economy, co-operation... It seems like many people are taking those big achievements for granted. We must continue working on it in order to keep those achievements and to develop them further.

## Chapter 13

# Interview with Peter Matjašič, President of the European Youth Forum

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**Being a young person in Europe today and being the President of the organisation representing young people in Europe, what elements do you think make young people in the continent feel “disconnected”? And what realities make them feel “connected”?**

We live in a very complex world of interconnectedness and interdependence between individuals, groups, societies, policies, technologies and freedoms. Talking about feeling disconnected or connected is very difficult in general terms as it always depends on each individual and his/her own reality. Young people in particular are literally wired to the world so the factor of being connected is real and strong. The question is rather dis/connected from/to what? One can be connected to friends via social networks from another part of the globe and be completely disconnected from the community in which one resides. A young person might feel more at home and real in the virtual space than in the physical space surrounding him/her and these are new realities we must learn to respect and understand. If we think about the world of politics and decision making that influence our daily lives then I'd say that the problem lies not in the lack of interest from young people but rather the lack of recognition, respect and support for youth and youth organisations to be fully integrated in decision making and policy making processes in areas that affect them. On the one hand young people get consulted more than in the past but the real inclusion and respect for their views is as far from reality as ever.



**In the first volume of *Perspectives on youth* we were focusing on the future of youth policy and young people in 2020. What do you think will be the major challenges then?**

I think some basic things never change. Youth policy will continue fighting for its place among other policies and seek a much-needed balance between its independence and its cross-sectoral nature when it comes to catering for the needs of young people and advancing their rights. Young people will continue to care about things that most affect their lives: quality education, meaningful participation in democratic life and society, transition between education and labour market, quality jobs and generally about opportunities to be mobile, to start a family, to become autonomous. Moreover, the demographic structure of the continent will be a driving force in economic and political choices. Without a pact between generations, this will seriously affect the autonomy and well-being of young people and the planet that future generations must inherit. The youth sector of civil society will face increasing challenges to gain support for its mission to build a more inclusive Europe and to ensure that the voice and concerns of young people are not only heard, but also acted upon in policies and programmes.

**How connected do you think young people in Europe are with the idea of Europe? How has the European Youth Forum contributed to young people feeling more connected to Europe?**

I believe that today's youth in Europe take European integration for granted and as a given – and this is not a bad thing! Most young people in the current European Union grew up in times of peace and prosperity. They enjoy the freedoms and rights provided to them by the EU, particularly when it comes to learning mobility opportunities through programmes such as Erasmus or other important non-formal education possibilities such as youth exchanges, European Voluntary Service and youth training via the Youth in Action programme. The idea of Europe is something emotional rather than rational for most. It is based on the (positive and/or negative) experiences of living in Europe. For most young people it is perfectly normal to travel around the continent, have friends from different countries, speak at least one foreign language, and enjoy eating all types of food. Turkish kebab is for them as European as Spanish paella, Swedish meatballs, Belgian fries or Italian pasta. The Youth Forum has contributed to bringing down walls and prejudices between Europe's youth by offering their youth representatives a platform to meet and exchange. A place where young Azerbaijanis feel as European as young Portuguese, where young Norwegians share their concerns about youth policy with their Cypriot colleagues. The Youth Forum is truly a meeting point of cultures and in each meeting we live the motto "united in diversity". It helps build bridges between individuals, groups and countries and makes young people realise that despite sometimes very significant differences in their daily realities they all aspire to the same goals: better education, better job opportunities, more investment in youth, more respect for their views and more meaningful engagement in decision making on issues that matter to them!

**Is the connection (or disconnection) of young people reflected in their participation in European Parliament elections?**

Total voter turnout has declined at all seven elections since 1979, dropping to just 43% in 2009. Of that, youth turnout has been among the largest decliners, sliding

to 29% in 2009 from around 33% in 2004. This could be explained by the theory – supported by the findings of an LSE (London School of Economics and Political Science) study on Youth Participation in Democratic Life from January 2013 – that there is a true democratic demand from young people, but one which they think is not well matched by the current political offer. The same LSE study found that a clear majority of youth respondents claims to be interested in politics. Young people are not bored with politics, they are fed up with feeling that those who “do” politics do not care about them. This is a crucial finding and one that shows that in all likelihood, the downward trend of youth participation could indeed be reversed. The League of Young Voters project – initiated by the Youth Forum together with VoteWatch Europe and IDEA International – tackles exactly this point. It is a politically neutral initiative that aims to amplify young people’s concerns and expectations in the run-up to European elections. It is not just an initiative to get young people to vote – it is a movement that brings together all young people who want to choose what decisions Europe and its politicians will make on issues that concern them.

**What is the contribution of the European Youth Forum’s campaign Love the Future in this direction?**

Our LoveYouthFuture (LYF) campaign is the Youth Forum’s contribution to the European parliamentary elections in 2014. While the aforementioned League of Young Voters is a project implemented with other partners encouraging voter turnout among young people, the LYF campaign presents our key policy demands towards the next European Parliament and European Commission. Young people are more crucial to Europe’s future, now more than ever. That is why the Youth Forum has created a list of 11 pledges outlining how the EU can love its young people, both now and in the future, and asks MEP candidates to make their pledge to youth. Among these pledges is the idea of an ombudsperson for young people to defend their rights, and to end age discrimination through the adoption of the Anti-Discrimination Directive. Another pledge promotes the free movement of young people in Europe by working to reduce limitations and barriers to youth mobility through strengthened and more accessible mobility programmes and also by promoting visa liberalisation for young people. In times of crisis and skyrocketing youth unemployment, the pledge to support the implementation of an ambitious Europe-wide Youth Guarantee which fights youth unemployment and a pledge to promote policies towards an equal and inclusive labour market providing quality jobs for young people are needed more than ever if we want to avoid the risk of a “lost generation”. Moreover, our member organisations are committed to working on promoting the voice of young people during the elections and encouraging them to get out and vote.



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# Abstracts/Résumés/ Zusammenfassungen

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## **"SNIFFIN'GLUE" – SCANNING SOME HORIZONS FOR YOUTH POLICY IN 2020**

Howard Williamson

### **Abstract**

"Sniffin' Glue" was a UK punk rock fanzine during the last great depression that faced young people in many parts of Europe at the end of the 1970s and into the early 1980s. Youth unemployment rocketed. Politicians temporarily panicked. Young people felt betrayed. A policy vacuum existed. There were similarities, and of course also many differences, to the current situation. The concept of "sniffing glue" – in terms of having access to structures, processes and programmes that bring about social inclusion and intercultural and cross-generational solidarity – seem to be apposite for this paper.

The prolongation and increasing complexity and diversity of youth transitions has now been the subject of academic analysis and commentary for over a generation. With few exceptions, this has become repetitive and rather uniform. The current crisis may, however, transform perspectives and analysis as youth unemployment throughout Europe becomes a definitive element in transitions for a majority of young people. How will young people respond to this, and how should public institutions and political decisions respond?

Drawing from the proceedings of a conference organised in October 2013 by the Partnership between the European Commission and the Council of Europe in the field of youth, this paper considers the changing context of experiences and opportunities to which young people may (at least theoretically) have access (or a chance of "sniffing") – and the frameworks that produce social cohesion and the best possible life chances for European youth (the "glue").

The contemporary situation of young people in Europe demands transformative strategies and action – across demographic, democratic, ecological, technological and values-based terrain. Such responses to current circumstances have to be anchored across a range of concrete policy domains: learning, work, health, inclusion, citizenship and participation, identity and lifestyles, diversity and solidarity, mobility, housing and family, and crime and justice. The paper concludes by identifying some of the common themes and transversal issues that need to underpin development and implementation across these policy areas.

## Résumé

*Sniffin' Glue* était un fanzine britannique punk/rock en vogue durant la dernière grande dépression qu'ont subie les jeunes de nombreux pays d'Europe à la fin des années 1970 et au début des années 1980. Le chômage des jeunes est alors monté en flèche. La classe politique a temporairement paniqué. Les jeunes se sont sentis trahis. Un vide politique s'est installé. Cette époque présente des similitudes, et de nombreuses différences, avec la nôtre. Le concept « sniffer de la colle » – en termes d'accès aux structures, processus et programmes en faveur de l'insertion sociale et de la solidarité interculturelle et intergénérationnelle – paraît ici pertinent.

Depuis plus d'une génération, l'allongement, ainsi que la complexité et la diversité croissantes de la transition des jeunes vers la vie active et l'âge adulte font l'objet d'analyses et de commentaires scientifiques. A de rares exceptions près, ce phénomène est devenu répétitif et relativement uniforme. Le chômage des jeunes à travers toute l'Europe devenant une composante déterminante de la transition de la plupart des jeunes, la crise actuelle pourrait modifier les perspectives et analyses en la matière. Comment les jeunes y réagiront-ils et comment les institutions publiques et les décisions politiques devraient-elles en tenir compte ?

S'appuyant sur le déroulement d'une conférence organisée en octobre 2013 par le biais du partenariat entre la Commission européenne et le Conseil de l'Europe dans le domaine de la jeunesse, cet article étudie le contexte changeant des expériences et possibilités auxquelles les jeunes pourraient (du moins en théorie) avoir accès (ou une occasion de « sniffer »), ainsi que les cadres favorisant une cohésion sociale et offrant les meilleures chances de réussite dans la vie pour la jeunesse européenne (la « colle »).

La situation actuelle des jeunes en Europe appelle des stratégies et des actions transformatrices – sur les terrains démographique, démocratique, écologique, technologique et éthique. Les mesures à prendre dans les circonstances actuelles doivent être ancrées dans plusieurs domaines politiques concrets: apprentissage, travail, santé, insertion, citoyenneté et participation, identité et styles de vie, diversité et solidarité, mobilité, logement et famille, délinquance et justice. L'article se conclut par le recensement de certains thèmes communs et questions transversales qui doivent étayer l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de mesures dans l'ensemble de ces domaines.

## Zusammenfassung

„Sniffin' Glue“ war in der letzten großen Rezession Ende der 1970er bis Anfang der 1980er Jahre, mit der junge Menschen in vielen Teilen Europas konfrontiert wurden, ein britisches Punkrock-Fanmagazin. Die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit stieg rasant an. Politiker gerieten vorübergehend in Panik. Die jungen Menschen fühlten sich betrogen. Es gab ein politisches Vakuum. Es gab Ähnlichkeiten und natürlich auch viele Unterschiede zur heutigen Situation. Das Konzept von „Sniffing Glue“ - im Hinblick auf den Zugang zu Strukturen, Prozessen und programmen, die zur sozialen Integration und zur interkulturellen und generationsübergreifenden Solidarität führen - scheint für diesen Artikel angemessen zu sein.

Die längere Dauer und steigende Komplexität und Vielfalt der Übergänge der Jugendlichen in das Erwachsenenleben sind seit über einer Generation Thema

wissenschaftlicher Analysen und Kommentare. Mit wenigen Ausnahmen sind diese repetitiv und ziemlich einheitlich. Die gegenwärtige „Krise“ kann jedoch die Perspektiven und Analysen verändern, da die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit für die Mehrheit junger Menschen in ganz Europa ein bestimmendes Element des Übergangs geworden ist. Wie reagieren junge Menschen darauf und welche Antworten liefern politische Institutionen und politische Entscheidungsträger?

Bezugnehmend auf die Erkenntnisse einer Konferenz, die im Oktober 2013 von der Partnerschaft zwischen Europäischer Kommission und dem Europarat im Bereich Jugendpolitik organisiert wurde, befasst sich dieser Artikel mit dem sich wandelnden Kontext der Erfahrungen und Möglichkeiten, zu denen junge Menschen (zumindest theoretisch) Zugang haben (oder die Chance haben, daran zu „schnüffeln“ (sniffing) – und mit dem Rahmen, der den sozialen Zusammenhalt und die bestmöglichen Lebenschancen für die europäische Jugend (den „Klebstoff“ (glue)) schafft.

Die gegenwärtige Situation junger Menschen in Europa erfordert transformative Strategien und ein entschlossenes Handeln – sowohl in demografischer, demokratischer, ökologischer, technologischer als auch in wertebasierter Hinsicht. Die Antworten auf gegenwärtige Umstände müssen in einer Reihe von konkreten Politikbereichen verankert werden: Bildung, Beschäftigung, Gesundheit, Integration, Bürgerschaft und Teilhabe, Identität und Lebensstile, Vielfalt und Solidarität, Mobilität, Wohnen und Familie und Straftaten und Justiz. Der Artikel schließt mit einer Auflistung einiger der wichtigsten Themen und bereichsübergreifenden Fragen, die der Entwicklung und Umsetzung in diesen Politikbereichen zugrunde liegen müssen.

## **WILL THE ARAB YOUTH REAP THE HARVEST OF THE “SPRING” ANY DAY SOON?**

Abdeslam Badre

### **Abstract**

During the peak period of the “Arab Spring”, there was so much talk about the need to reconnect Arab youth to the mainstream socio-political and economic institutions, owing to the growing awareness that young people could either be an important resource for future prosperity or a threat to political stability. Today, and after three years of the uprisings, it is worth asking whether or not those revolutions have delivered their promises to the Arab youth. Equally important is the question of whether or not the newly elected Arab leaderships are working out long-term strategic policies for youth inclusion and connection to the various fabrics of society. This paper sets out to answer these two questions by reflecting on the present conditions for Arab youth from a politico-economic perspective.

**Keywords:** Arab Spring youth, disconnection, social inclusion, Arab youth frustration

### **Résumé**

Au plus fort du « printemps arabe », la nécessité de reconnecter la jeunesse arabe aux grandes institutions économiques et sociopolitiques a été abondamment



débatte, eu égard à la prise de conscience croissante que les jeunes pouvaient soit représenter une source importante de prospérité future, soit une menace pour la stabilité politique. Aujourd'hui, trois ans après les soulèvements, il convient de se demander si cette révolution a ou non tenu ses promesses envers la jeunesse. Il importe également de savoir si les dirigeants nouvellement élus ont décidé d'élaborer des politiques stratégiques à long terme en faveur de l'insertion de la jeunesse et de ses liens avec les diverses structures du tissu social. Cet article vise à répondre à ces deux questions par une réflexion menée sur la situation actuelle de la jeunesse arabe d'un point de vue politico-économique.

**Mots clés:** jeunesse du « printemps arabe », déconnexion, insertion sociale, frustration de la jeunesse arabe

### **Zusammenfassung**

In der Hochzeit des „Arabischen Frühlings“ gab es sehr viel Gerede über die Notwendigkeit, die arabische Jugend wieder mit den soziopolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Institutionen zu verbinden, basierend auf der wachsenden Erkenntnis, dass die jungen Menschen entweder eine wichtige Quelle für einen zukünftigen Wohlstand oder eine Bedrohung der politischen Stabilität sein könnten. Heute, drei Jahre nach den Aufständen, lohnt sich die Frage, ob diese Revolutionen die Versprechungen an die arabische Jugend erfüllt haben. Gleichmaßen wichtig ist die Frage, ob die neu gewählten arabischen Führer langfristige Strategien für die Eingliederung der Jugend und deren Einbindung in die vielfältigen Strukturen der Gesellschaft erarbeiten oder nicht. Dieser Artikel möchte diese zwei Fragen beantworten, indem er sich aus politischer und wirtschaftlicher Perspektive mit der gegenwärtigen Situation der arabischen Jugend befasst.

**Schlüsselbegriffe:** Jugend im Arabischen Frühling, Abspaltung, soziale Eingliederung, Frust der arabischen Jugend

## **YOUTH AND POLITICS: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF CITIZENSHIP IN ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES**

Anne Muxel

### **Abstract**

The attitude of young people towards politics is constantly debated, often giving rise to pessimistic predictions about the future health of Western democracies. The steady increase in electoral abstentionism and the decline in identification with political parties are regarded as being symptomatic of disillusionment with political representation, which, though present in all age groups of society, is particularly acute among the younger generations. How do things really stand? Do they have the same political culture and references as earlier generations? They politicised using new models and forms of expression which have redefined contemporary citizenship.

## Résumé

Le débat permanent sur l'attitude des jeunes envers la politique donne souvent lieu à des prédictions pessimistes sur la santé future des démocraties occidentales. L'augmentation régulière de l'abstentionnisme électoral et la perte d'identification avec les partis politiques sont considérées comme symptomatiques d'une désillusion à l'égard d'une représentation politique qui, bien que partagée par toutes les tranches d'âge, est particulièrement vive au sein des jeunes générations. Où en est-on réellement ? Les jeunes ont-ils la même culture et les mêmes références politiques que les générations précédentes ? Ils se sont politisés sur la base de nouveaux modèles et formes d'expression qui ont redéfini la citoyenneté contemporaine.

## Zusammenfassung

Die Haltung junger Menschen zur Politik wird beständig diskutiert, und häufig wird dies zum Anlass genommen, pessimistische Vorhersagen über die zukünftige Stabilität westlicher Demokratien zu äußern. Die steigende Wahlmüdigkeit und Abnahme der Identifizierung mit politischen Parteien werden als Symptome der Desillusionierung mit der politischen Repräsentation betrachtet, die, obwohl sie in allen Altersgruppen der Gesellschaft zu sehen ist, besonders akut bei jüngeren Generationen ist. Wie sehen die Dinge tatsächlich aus? Haben junge Menschen die gleiche politische Kultur und die gleichen Bezüge wie ältere Generationen? Sie haben sich politisiert und verwenden neue Modelle und Ausdrucksformen, die das aktuelle Verständnis von Bürgerschaft neu definieren.

## **SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF POLITICAL (NON-) PARTICIPATION AMONG SLOVENIAN YOUTH**

Metka Kuhar and Tanja Oblak Črnič

### Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyse political participation trends among Slovenian youth that take place within an intense process of retreat to privacy. In the analysis of the recent trends in political and social participation of youth in Slovenia we refer to various secondary data, and data on Slovenia is compared with other European countries. The data show that the interest in politics and current affairs of their own country and city/region is lower among young people in Slovenia than the average among young people in the EU15 nations. Leading politicians and political parties were already in the year 2000 the least trusted institutions among young people, right behind the EU and the president of the country. In addition, less confidence in politics and a greater sense of powerlessness in relation to established institutionalised politics continue even in a negative perception of one's own power to affect social change in general. Parents and friends, on the other hand, have a high degree of confidence, confirming the importance of the private relationships. However, data for Slovenia show that political and, in particular,

the wider social engagement among young people (unlike conventional politics), has not entirely died away. It rather retreated from the classical institutions and engagement towards tailored, predominantly electronically transmitted practices, which are predominantly of a socio-cultural and political nature, and directly related to the lifestyles of young people.

**Keywords:** young people, parents, education, political and social participation, political efficacy

## Résumé

Le but de cet article est d'analyser les tendances de la participation politique des jeunes Slovènes, qui s'inscrivent dans le cadre d'un intense processus de repli sur la vie privée. L'analyse de la situation actuelle en matière de participation sociale et politique des jeunes en Slovénie mentionne diverses informations secondaires, et les données sur la Slovénie sont mises en parallèle avec celles d'autres pays d'Europe. Ces données montrent que l'intérêt des jeunes Slovènes pour la politique et l'actualité de leurs pays et ville ou région est plus faible que chez la moyenne des jeunes de l'Union européenne des Quinze. Dès 2000, les principaux dirigeants et partis politiques représentaient les institutions inspirant le moins confiance aux jeunes, juste après l'Union européenne et le président du pays. En outre, une moindre confiance dans la politique et un sentiment d'impuissance accru face à une politique établie institutionnalisée persistent, malgré le scepticisme quant au pouvoir de chacun d'influer sur le changement de la société. En revanche, les parents et amis inspirent une grande confiance, ce qui confirme l'importance des relations privées. Les données relatives à la Slovénie montrent cependant que (contrairement à la politique conventionnelle), chez les jeunes, l'engagement politique et social n'a pas totalement disparu. Il serait plus juste de dire qu'ils se sont éloignés des institutions et d'un engagement classique pour adopter des pratiques taillées sur mesure, principalement transmises par voie électronique, de nature essentiellement politique et socioculturelle, et directement liées à leur style de vie.

**Mots clés:** jeunes, parents, éducation, participation politique et sociale, efficacité politique

## Zusammenfassung

Ziel dieses Artikels ist, die Trends der politischen Jugendpartizipation bei slowenischen Jugendlichen zu analysieren, die einen intensiven *Rückzugsprozess in das Private* erkennen lassen. Bei der Analyse der neusten Trends in der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Partizipation der Jugend in Slowenien beziehen wir uns auf die verschiedenen Sekundärdaten. Außerdem werden die Daten über Slowenien mit anderen europäischen Staaten verglichen. Die Daten zeigen, dass das Interesse an Politik und aktuellen Angelegenheiten in ihrem eigenen Land und ihrer eigenen Stadt/Region bei jungen Menschen geringer ist als beim Durchschnittsjugendlichen in den EU15. Führende Politiker und politische Parteien waren bereits im Jahr 2000 die Institutionen, denen die Jugendlichen am wenigsten vertrauten, direkt hinter

der EU und dem Präsidenten des Landes. Darüber hinaus setzten sich das geringere Vertrauen in die Politik und ein stärkeres Ohnmachtsgefühl in Bezug auf die etablierte institutionalisierte Politik auch in der negativen Wahrnehmung des eigenen Einflusses auf einen allgemeinen sozialen Wandel fort.

Eltern und Freunde genießen hingegen ein größeres Vertrauen, was die Bedeutung privater Beziehungen bestätigt. Die Daten für Slowenien zeigen jedoch, dass das politische und insbesondere das soziale Engagement der Jugendlichen (anders als in der konventionellen Politik) nicht vollkommen verschwunden sind. Es hat sich vielmehr von den klassischen Institutionen und Formen des Engagements abgelöst und maßgeschneiderten, vorwiegend elektronisch übertragbaren Praktiken zugewendet, die vorrangig sozioökonomischer und politischer Natur und direkt mit den Lebensstilen junger Menschen verbunden sind.

**Schlüsselbegriffe:** junge Menschen, Eltern, Bildung, politische und gesellschaftliche Partizipation, politische Wirksamkeit

## **CONNECTING TO THE FUTURE: THE ROLE OF SPATIAL MOBILITIES IN YOUNG PEOPLE'S IMAGINED BIOGRAPHIES**

Simona Isabella and Guiliana Mandich

### **Abstract**

Following an already established research approach (Elliott 2010; Lyon and Crow 2012; Lyon, Morgan and Crow 2012), this article (part of a larger research project on youth: <http://people.unica.it/ifuture/>) draws on the analysis of 250 essays written by 18 and 19-year-old students in the largest city in Sardinia, who were asked to imagine to be 90 and tell the story of their life.

One striking element in these essays is the space devoted to accounts of spatial mobility. Indeed, mobility is present at different levels of the students' imagined biographies: on one side it is described as a dreamt travel experience, often shared with friends. On the other side, mobility is part of a life experience based on migration, which will hopefully realise professional and personal ambitions. Interestingly, this second form of mobility contemplates cases in which realistic accounts of mobilities are based on the students' families' migration experience, as well as narratives of mobilities in which both places of destination and migration patterns are strongly influenced by media imagination (particularly TV fiction). The analysis of the empirical data, drawing on the flourishing literature on mobilities (Elliott and Urry 2010) and motilities (Kaufmann, Viry and Widmer 2010), intends to critically discuss the role of geographical mobility in young people's culture mainly along two main lines:

1) Connections to and disconnections from their country of birth seem to constitute a continuum in students' imagined biographies. From this perspective, mobility somehow replaces biographical projects in young people's narratives of the future, since it is portrayed as a sort of magical device allowing them to bypass uncertainty, a common trait in youth biographies.

2) At the same time, if we look at the cultural elements young people use to describe the future – envisaged mobilities – there is almost no trace of support from educational institutions, in terms of providing awareness around mobility opportunities or empowerment of motilities. Even for those students following paths oriented to mobile professions (such as tourism or naval careers), family migrant backgrounds on the one hand or media narratives on the other prevail over other forms of socialisation.

In between such naïve views and lack of educational guidance, there is a need for integrating the empowerment of motility as the basis for mobility in youth policies across all Europe.

**Keywords:** future, youth, mobility, capabilities, Italy

## Résumé

A la suite de l'étude déjà réalisée (Elliott, 2010; Lyon et Crow, 2012; Lyon, Morgan et Crow, 2012), cet article (rédigé dans le cadre d'un projet de recherche plus vaste sur la jeunesse <http://people.unica.it/ifuture/>) s'appuie sur l'analyse de 250 essais rédigés dans la plus grande ville de Sardaigne (Cagliari) par des étudiants de 18 à 19 ans à qui on avait demandé de s'imaginer à l'âge de 90 ans et de raconter l'histoire de leur vie.

L'un des éléments frappants de ces essais est la place consacrée à la mobilité géographique. En effet, la mobilité est présente à divers niveaux des biographies imaginées par les étudiants. D'une part, elle est décrite comme une expérience de voyage rêvée et souvent partagée avec des amis ; d'autre part, elle s'inscrit dans un vécu migratoire qui permettra – espérons-le – la réalisation d'ambitions personnelles et professionnelles. Cette seconde forme de mobilité envisage des situations fondées sur l'expérience de la migration des familles des étudiants, ainsi que des descriptions de mobilités médiatisées dans lesquelles les lieux de destination comme les schémas migratoires sont fortement influencés par l'imaginaire des médias (en particulier dans les fictions télévisées). L'analyse des données empiriques, s'inspirant de la littérature florissante sur les « mobilités » (Elliott et Urry, 2010) et « motilités » (Kaufmann, Viry et Widmer, 2010), porte un regard critique sur le rôle de la mobilité géographique dans la culture des jeunes, essentiellement autour de deux grands axes:

1. Les connexions à, et la déconnexion de leur pays de naissance paraissent constituer un continuum dans les biographies imaginées par les étudiants. De ce point de vue, la mobilité étant décrite comme une sorte de tour de magie leur permettant de faire taire leurs incertitudes – un trait commun aux biographies de jeunes –, elle remplace d'une certaine manière les projets biographiques dans les récits d'anticipation des jeunes.

2. En même temps, si nous considérons les éléments culturels qu'utilisent les jeunes pour décrire l'avenir et les mobilités envisagées, il n'est fait quasiment aucune mention d'un soutien des institutions éducatives, que ce soit à la sensibilisation aux possibilités de mobilité ou à l'accès aux motilités. Même pour les étudiants qui s'orientent vers des professions mobiles (les métiers du tourisme ou de la marine, par exemple), l'histoire migratoire de la famille, d'une part, ou les récits des médias d'autre part, prévalent sur d'autres formes de socialisation.

Entre ces visions naïves et l'absence d'orientation pédagogique se dessine la nécessité d'intégrer l'accès à la motilité, à la base de la mobilité, dans les politiques de jeunesse à travers toute l'Europe.

**Mots clés:** avenir, jeunesse, mobilité, capacités, Italie

### **Zusammenfassung**

Dieser Artikel, der einem bereits etablierten Forschungsansatz folgt (Elliott 2010; Lyon und Crow, 2012; Lyon, Morgan, Crow, 2012) und Teil eines größeren Forschungsprojekts über Jugend ist (<http://people.unica.it/ifuture/>), bezieht sich auf die Auswertung von 250 Aufsätzen, die von 18-19-jährigen Studenten in der größten Stadt Sardinien geschrieben wurden, die gebeten worden waren, sich als 90-jährige vorzustellen und ihre Lebensgeschichte zu erzählen.

Ein beeindruckendes Element in diesen Aufsätzen ist der Raum, der der physischen Mobilität gewidmet wird. Tatsächlich kommt Mobilität auf verschiedenen Ebenen in den imaginären Lebensläufen der Studenten vor: Einerseits wird sie als erträumte Reiseerlebnisse beschrieben, die mit Freunden geteilt wird. Andererseits ist Mobilität Teil der Lebenserfahrung auf Grundlage der Migration, die hoffentlich berufliche und persönliche Träume Realität werden lässt. Interessanterweise befasst sich die zweite Form der Mobilität mit Fällen, in denen realistische Beschreibungen von Mobilität auf der Migrationserfahrung der Familien der Studenten basieren, sowie mit Erzählungen der *in den Medien beschriebenen* Mobilität, in denen sowohl die Bestimmungsorte als auch die Migrationsmuster stark von den Medien beeinflusst werden (insbesondere fiktionale Fernsehprogramme). Die Analyse der empirischen Daten, auf der Grundlage der umfangreichen Literatur über Mobilität (Elliott und Urry 2010) und Motilität (Kaufmann, Viry und Widmer 2010), soll in Bezug auf zwei Schwerpunkte in kritischer Weise die Rolle der geografischen Mobilität in der Kultur junger Menschen diskutieren:

1) Verbundenheit mit und Trennung von ihren Geburtsländern scheint in den imaginären Lebensläufen der Studenten eine Konstante zu sein. Bei dieser Perspektive ersetzt Mobilität in gewisser Weise biografische Projekte in den Zukunftserzählungen der jungen Menschen, da sie als eine Art Magie betrachtet wird, um Unsicherheiten zu umgehen, ein allen gemeinsames Merkmal der Biografien der jungen Menschen.

2) Gleichzeitig gibt es im Hinblick auf das Bereitstellen von Bewusstsein für Mobilitätschancen oder die Nutzung von Motilität nahezu keine Unterstützung durch Bildungseinrichtungen, wenn wir uns die kulturellen Elemente anschauen, die junge Menschen für das Beschreiben einer zukünftigen Mobilität einsetzen. Selbst für jene Studenten, die eine Richtung eingeschlagen haben, die sich an mobilen Berufen ausrichtet (wie z. B. Tourismus oder Berufe in der Schifffahrt), herrschen einerseits der Migrationshintergrund der Familie oder andererseits von den Medien geprägte Erzählungen im Vergleich zu anderen Sozialisationsformen vor.

Angesichts dieser naiven Ansichten und dem Fehlen bildungspolitischer Leitlinien besteht die Notwendigkeit, in ganz Europa die Nutzung der *Motilität* auf Grundlage der Mobilität in der Jugendpolitik zu verankern.

**Schlüsselbegriffe:** Zukunft, Jugend, Mobilität, Möglichkeiten, Italien

## **WHAT LIES BEHIND SCHOOL FAILURE, YOUTH GANGS AND DISCONNECTIONS WITH THE HOST SOCIETY FOR THE SECOND GENERATION? THE CASE OF YOUNG PEOPLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ORIGIN IN SPAIN**

Maria Ron Balsera

### **Abstract**

This paper studies the factors that lead young people with a migrant background towards school failure, participation in gangs and social disconnection. Young people with a migrant background (which this study focuses on) are children whose parents have migrated; many of these children have consequently been born and raised in the host country. It pays attention to the impact of the parents' labour conditions on their children's well-being and social integration. Concentrating on the structure of society, it reflects on the advantages and disadvantages given to different social groups, which result in unequal access to opportunities and resources within the host country. These disadvantages produce economic, educational and general well-being inequalities for people from a migrant background. However, gender, social class and age differences are also necessary to understanding the barriers that block integration of ethnic minorities, even when born in the country. Comparing the Spanish case to the wider European context, this paper analyses the reasons behind early school leaving, youth gangs and other forms of disconnections for children of migrants in Spain.

**Keywords:** Migration, youth, school failure, youth gangs, Spain

### **Résumé**

Cet article étudie les facteurs qui conduisent les jeunes issus de l'immigration à l'échec scolaire, à la participation à des gangs et à la rupture sociale. Ces jeunes, auxquels est consacrée cette étude, sont des enfants dont les parents ont émigré ; par conséquent, beaucoup d'entre eux sont nés et ont grandi dans le pays d'accueil. L'étude se penche sur les répercussions des conditions de travail des parents sur le bien-être et l'intégration sociale de leurs enfants. Axée sur la structure de la société, elle porte sur les avantages et inconvénients de l'appartenance à différents groupes sociaux, qui résultent d'une inégalité d'accès aux possibilités et ressources offertes par le pays d'accueil. Ces inconvénients se traduisent pour les personnes d'origine immigrée par des inégalités sur les plans économique et éducatif, et plus généralement sur celui du bien-être. Cependant, il est nécessaire de prendre en compte le sexe, la classe sociale et les différences d'âge pour comprendre les obstacles qui s'opposent à l'intégration des minorités ethniques, même celles nées dans le pays. Comparant le cas de l'Espagne à celui du reste de l'Europe, cet article analyse les raisons de l'abandon scolaire prématuré, de l'appartenance à des gangs de jeunes et d'autres formes de rupture chez les enfants de migrants en Espagne.

**Mots clés :** migration, jeunes, échec scolaire, gangs de jeunes, Espagne

## Zusammenfassung

Dieser Artikel untersucht die Faktoren, die bei jungen Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund zu Schulabbruch, Zugehörigkeit zu Gangs und sozialer Entfremdung führen. Junge Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund, auf die sich diese Untersuchung konzentriert, sind Kinder, deren Eltern eingewandert sind; viele dieser Kinder wurden demzufolge in dem Gastland geboren und wuchsen dort auf. Der Artikel widmet sich dem Einfluss der Arbeitsbedingungen der Eltern auf das Wohlergehen und die soziale Integration ihrer Kinder. Er untersucht, mit Schwerpunkt Gesellschaftsstruktur, die Vor- und Nachteile, die verschiedene soziale Gruppen erleben und die zu Chancenungleichheit und einem unterschiedlichen Zugang zu Ressourcen in dem Gastland führen. Diese Nachteile ziehen Ungleichheiten in wirtschaftlicher und bildungspolitischer Hinsicht und im allgemeinen Wohlergehen von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund nach sich. Allerdings muss man auch die Unterschiede der sozialen Klasse und des Alters berücksichtigen, um die Hürden zu verstehen, die die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten blockieren, selbst wenn sie im Land geboren wurden. In einem Vergleich der spanischen Situation mit der europäischen Lage analysiert dieser Artikel die Gründe für einen Schulabbruch, Jugendgangs und andere Formen der Entfremdung bei Migrantenkinder in Spanien.

**Schlüsselbegriffe:** Migration, Jugend, Schulabbruch, Jugendgangs, Spanien

## YOUTH INITIATIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF EXTREMISM: THE CHECHNYA CASE

Evgeniya Goryushina

### Abstract

This article reveals some features concerning the disconnections of Chechen youth in civil society and education, which are not always apparent in the broader European context. The main illustrations of such disconnections in the lives of young Chechens – extremism, involvement in armed gangs, unemployment and fragmented cultural ties – are considered.

**Keywords:** youth, exclusion, extremism, co-operation, Russia

### Résumé

Cet article expose certaines caractéristiques relatives à la rupture de la jeunesse tchéchène avec la société civile et l'éducation, qui ne sont pas toujours apparentes dans le reste de l'Europe. Y sont étudiées les principales formes de cette rupture dans la vie des jeunes Tchétchènes – extrémisme, enrôlement dans des gangs armés, chômage et liens sociaux fragmentés.

**Mots clés :** jeunesse, exclusion, extrémisme, coopération, Russie



## Zusammenfassung

Dieser Artikel deckt einige Merkmale im Hinblick auf die Entfremdung der tschetschenischen Jugend von der Zivilgesellschaft und der Bildung auf, die im weiteren europäischen Kontext nicht immer erkennbar sind. Es werden die wichtigsten Formen der Entfremdung im Leben junger Tschetschenen untersucht, i.e. Extremismus, Beteiligung an bewaffneten Banden, Arbeitslosigkeit und fragmentierte kulturelle Bindungen.

**Schlüsselbegriffe:** Jugend, Ausgrenzung, Extremismus, Kooperation, Russland

## RESPONDING TO YOUTH CRIME: RECONNECTING THE DISCONNECTED

Jonathan Evans

### Abstract

Notwithstanding the political, social and cultural diversity of Europe, it is argued here that there are universal principles which should underpin our response to young people's offending. These principles are informed by an explicit commitment to social solidarity, human rights and a belief that the state has a critical role to play in ensuring young people remain connected with wider society. It is argued that – irrespective of national, local or cultural context – human rights should provide the framework within which young people should be treated; not only within the domain of criminal justice, but also in relation to health, welfare and social justice. Indeed, it is one of the central arguments of this article that disconnection from social welfare rights can lead to a profoundly damaging and stigmatising connection with the criminal justice system.

In accordance with the UNCRC (1989) and international conventions in the field of juvenile justice, young people below the age of majority should be dealt with outside of the formal criminal justice system. Moreover, the vulnerability of many young adults should also be recognised and accommodated by a set of transitional arrangements. Three main arguments are used to support this stance. First, young people are still in the process of developing; not only in biological terms, but also in respect of their cognitive, emotional and social competencies. Second, the degree of independent agency young people can exercise is constrained by their position of relative powerlessness, especially when negotiating challenging social transitions. And finally, early contact with the criminal justice system stigmatises young people and increases their risk of social exclusion.

Ideally, young people should therefore be diverted from the criminal justice system into non-criminalising interventions that challenge offending behaviour, transform lives and provide additional support where needs are identified.

**Keywords:** offending, youth, justice, rights, state

### Résumé

En dépit de la diversité culturelle, sociale et politique de l'Europe, nous soutenons ici qu'il existe des principes universels qui devraient sous-tendre notre riposte face

à la délinquance des jeunes. Ces principes reposent sur un engagement explicite en faveur de la solidarité sociale et des droits de l'homme, et sur la conviction que l'État a un rôle capital à jouer pour veiller à ce que les jeunes restent connectés à la société au sens large. On prétend que – quel que soit le contexte culturel, local ou national – la manière dont sont traités les jeunes doit être conforme aux droits de l'homme, non seulement dans le domaine de la justice pénale, mais aussi de la santé, de l'aide et de la justice sociales. En effet, l'un des principaux arguments de cet article est que la déconnexion d'avec les droits à la protection sociale peut amener les jeunes à nouer des relations profondément nocives et stigmatisantes avec la justice pénale.

Conformément à la Convention des Nations Unies relatives aux droits de l'enfant (CNUDE) (1989) et aux conventions internationales en matière de délinquance juvénile, les cas des jeunes mineurs doivent être traités en dehors du système officiel de justice pénale. Il convient en outre de reconnaître la vulnérabilité de nombreux jeunes adultes et de la ménager par un ensemble de mesures transitoires. Trois principaux arguments viennent étayer ce point de vue. Premièrement, les jeunes sont encore en plein développement, non seulement en termes biologiques, mais également pour ce qui est de leurs compétences cognitives, affectives et sociales. Deuxièmement, le degré d'indépendance des jeunes est restreint par leur position de relative impuissance, notamment lorsqu'ils font face à des transitions sociales éprouvantes. Enfin, un contact précoce avec le système de justice pénale ostracise les jeunes et accroît leur risque d'exclusion sociale.

Idéalement, les jeunes devraient donc être l'objet d'interventions « non incriminantes », opérées à l'écart du système de justice pénale, décourageant les comportements délictueux, transformant les vies et offrant une aide supplémentaire une fois les besoins identifiés.

**Mots clés:** délinquance, jeunesse, justice, droits, Etat

## **Zusammenfassung**

Ungeachtet der politischen, sozialen und kulturellen Vielfalt in Europa wird in diesem Artikel argumentiert, dass es universelle Grundsätze gibt, die unserer Antwort auf Straftaten junger Menschen zugrunde liegen sollten. Diesen Grundsätzen liegt eine explizite Verpflichtung auf die soziale Solidarität, die Menschenrechte und die Überzeugung zugrunde, dass der Staat eine ausschlaggebende Rolle spielt, die Verbundenheit der Jugend mit der Gesellschaft sicherzustellen. Es wird ausgeführt, dass, ungeachtet des nationalen, lokalen oder kulturellen Kontextes, die Menschenrechte den Rahmen für den Umgang mit jungen Menschen bilden sollten; nicht nur im Bereich der Strafgerichtsbarkeit, sondern auch in Bezug auf Gesundheit, Sozialfürsorge und soziale Gerechtigkeit. Tatsächlich ist es eines der zentralen Argumente dieses Artikels, dass die Entfremdung von den Sozialrechten zu einer äußerst schädigenden und stigmatisierenden Verbindung mit dem Strafgerichtsbarkeit führen können.

Laut UNCRC (1989) und internationaler Übereinkommen im Bereich der Jugendjustiz sollten minderjährige Jugendliche nicht im Rahmen der offiziellen Strafgerichtsbarkeit behandelt werden. Darüber hinaus sollte die Verletzlichkeit vieler

junger Erwachsener anerkannt und in Übergangsvereinbarungen berücksichtigt werden. Es werden zur Untermauerung dieser Ansicht drei Hauptargumente angeführt. Erstens befinden sich junge Menschen immer noch in der Entwicklung; nicht nur körperlich, sondern auch im Hinblick auf ihre kognitiven, emotionalen und sozialen Fähigkeiten. Zweitens wird der Umfang der Unabhängigkeit, in der junge Menschen agieren können, durch ihre Position der relativen Machtlosigkeit beschnitten, besonders im Umgang mit schwierigen sozialen Übergängen. Drittens stigmatisiert der frühe Kontakt mit der Strafjustiz junge Menschen und erhöht deren Risiko der sozialen Ausgrenzung.

Idealerweise sollten daher junge Menschen aus der Strafjustiz herausgenommen und nicht-kriminalisierenden Eingriffen unterzogen werden, wenn es um Straftaten geht; dem Leben sollte eine neue Richtung gegeben und es sollte zusätzliche Unterstützung angeboten werden, wenn ein Bedarf ermittelt wurde.

**Schlüsselbegriffe:** Straftaten, Jugend, Justiz, Rechte, Staat

## **CHILDREN AT RISK: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND FAMILY DISSOLUTION ON CHILDREN'S SCHOOL ENGAGEMENT, AND THE MEDIATING ROLE OF FAMILY CONNECTIONS**

Nele Havermans, Sarah Botterman and Koen Matthijs

### **Abstract**

Notwithstanding the general increase in educational levels in Europe in the post-war period, educational inequalities are persistent. The impact of socio-economic background on educational opportunities is widely recognised. Family dissolution can be considered as an additional force behind educational inequalities in Europe. In this contribution, we focus on the influence of socio-economic background and family dissolution on the educational outcome of school engagement of youth. Next to the direct effects of these family background characteristics on school engagement, we test their indirect effects via the mediator of family connections. Family connections relate to the relationships between family members. A study using the Flemish (Belgian) project "Leuven Adolescents and Family Study" data is presented. The results demonstrate that disconnected family relations play an important role in explaining the lower school engagement of children at risk. Initiatives in youth policy and practices that promote social inclusion have to be aware of the importance of these family connections.

**Keywords:** School engagement, social inequality, family dissolution, family connections

### **Résumé**

Malgré l'augmentation générale du niveau d'instruction qu'a connue l'Europe d'après guerre, des inégalités persistent dans le domaine de l'éducation. L'influence du milieu socio-économique sur les perspectives éducatives est largement reconnue.

L'éclatement de la famille peut être considéré comme un facteur supplémentaire d'inégalités éducatives en Europe. Cet article est consacré aux influences du milieu socio-économique et de l'éclatement de la famille sur les résultats des jeunes à l'école. Parallèlement aux effets directs des antécédents familiaux sur l'investissement scolaire, nous testons leurs effets indirects, via la médiation des liens familiaux. Ceux-ci ont trait aux relations entre les membres de la famille. Une étude reprenant les données du projet flamand (belge) « Etude sur les adolescents et les familles de Louvain » est présentée. Ses résultats démontrent que des liens familiaux distendus expliquent en grande partie un moindre investissement scolaire des enfants à risque. Les mesures prises en matière de pratique et de politique de jeunesse favorisant l'intégration sociale doivent tenir compte de l'importance de ces liens familiaux.

**Mots clés :** engagement scolaire, inégalités sociales, éclatement de la famille, liens familiaux

### **Zusammenfassung**

Ungeachtet des allgemeinen Anstiegs der Bildungsabschlüsse in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg gibt es immer noch Bildungsunterschiede. Der Einfluss des sozioökonomischen Hintergrunds auf die Bildungschancen wird weitestgehend anerkannt. Der Zerfall der Familie kann als zusätzlicher Faktor betrachtet werden, der zu den Bildungsunterschieden in Europa beiträgt. In diesem Artikel konzentrieren wir uns auf den Einfluss des sozioökonomischen Hintergrunds und des Zerfalls der Familie auf den Schulbesuch und die Bildungsabschlüsse der Jugend. Neben den unmittelbaren Auswirkungen dieses familiären Hintergrunds auf die schulische Laufbahn prüfen wir die indirekten Auswirkungen anhand der vermittelnden Rolle der familiären Bindungen. Familiäre Bindungen meinen die Beziehungen zwischen Familienangehörigen. Es wird eine Studie vorgelegt, der die Daten des flämischen (belgischen) Projekts *Leuven Adolescents and Family Study* zugrunde liegen. Die Ergebnisse belegen, dass fehlende familiäre Beziehungen eine wichtige Rolle spielen, wenn man das geringere schulische Engagement gefährdeter Kinder erklären will. Initiativen der Jugendpolitik und der Jugendarbeit, die die soziale Integration fördern, müssen die Bedeutung dieser familiären Bindungen berücksichtigen.

**Schlüsselbegriffe:** Schulische Laufbahn, soziale Ungleichheit, Zerfall der Familie, familiäre Beziehungen

## **INTERNET ADDICTION DISORDER AMONG ADOLESCENTS AND YOUNG ADULTS: THE PICTURE IN EUROPE AND PREVENTION STRATEGIES**

Katerina Flora

### **Abstract**

Internet addiction disorder appeared in Greek society as a new type of addictive behaviour among children, adolescents and adults during the last decade. However,

this phenomenon is widely spread in the majority of the European countries and there are already various research data available that give quite a clear picture of the Internet use and overuse in 21st-century Europe. What is called "Internet addiction disorder" in the terminology of psychiatry may also be described in other terms such as "Internet addictive behaviour" (IAB), "pathological Internet use" (PIU) or "maladaptive Internet use" (MIU). The key symptoms of this condition are the constant preoccupation with the Internet, excessive Internet use, withdrawing from other pleasurable activities or neglecting friends and family in order to spend time surfing on the Internet, while feeling depressed or anxious and including symptoms such as a lack of satisfaction, irritation or physical change. It is a fact that problematic Internet use nowadays begins at an even younger age, since it is widely observed among primary school pupils. Adolescents (e.g. lower high school students) seem to have shaped the behaviour associated with Internet use so that we are able to refer to an observable phenomenon with particular characteristics in this age group.

We believe that this new type of addiction could be studied in the context of the common aetiologic features, along with the other more common types of addiction, such as psychoactive substance abuse. As new forms of addiction are spreading all over Europe, it is interesting to read up, comparatively, on the scientific and social facts as well as to observe the convergences and divergences in the development and spread of this phenomenon.

As far the prevention of this phenomenon is concerned, various approaches have been suggested and applied so far, most of which focus either on the participation of the family or on providing the adolescent with the necessary strength through the acquisition of individual and social skills. Utilising previous attempts such as the idea of Caring School Communities in the USA, Greece implemented the pilot prevention programme "Schools of Co-operative Learning and Prevention", which is based on the idea of school as an active community in which teachers, parents and the broader community, namely the neighbourhood and the city, take part.

Specifically, the survey on a sample group of Greek students aims at analysing secondary education children's engagement with the Internet in light of family, educational and the general social parameters with regard to prevention. The sample consists of lower secondary school students of the first and second classes. The selection of the sample takes place by means of randomised embedded sampling.

The study is ongoing. However, the statistical analysis of the pilot data indicates that the increased use of the Internet by students is associated with a lack of sociability as well as with aggressiveness. The results of the study will be primarily discussed in light of the accurate awareness of pupils, teachers and parents in order to evaluate the existing engagement with the Internet, prevention of and the timely treatment of problems, all of which could be apparent in students' behaviour because of inappropriate Internet use. Additionally, there will be an attempt to compare the findings of the study with the findings of several other relevant surveys conducted in other European countries.

**Keywords:** Internet addiction, prevention, adolescents, cooperative learning

## Résumé

Le trouble de dépendance à l'internet est apparu cette dernière décennie dans la société grecque comme un nouveau type de comportement addictif chez les enfants, adolescents et adultes. Ce phénomène est néanmoins largement répandu dans la majorité des pays européens et nous disposons d'ores et déjà de diverses données de recherche nous fournissant un tableau très clair de l'utilisation et de la surutilisation de l'internet dans l'Europe du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Ce que l'on nomme « trouble de dépendance à l'internet » dans la terminologie psychiatrique peut également être appelé « utilisation addictive à l'internet », « utilisation pathologique de l'internet » ou encore « utilisation inadaptée de l'internet ». Les principaux symptômes de cette pathologie sont un intérêt constant pour l'internet, son usage excessif, l'abandon d'autres activités agréables et le désintérêt envers les amis ou la famille pour passer du temps à surfer sur l'internet, la sensation de déprime ou d'anxiété. D'autres symptômes tels que l'insatisfaction et l'irritation, ou des changements physiques, sont également observés. Il est avéré que l'utilisation problématique de l'internet commence à un âge précoce: elle est en effet largement constatée chez les élèves de l'école primaire. Les adolescents (les collégiens, par exemple), semblent avoir façonné le comportement associé à l'usage de l'internet de sorte que nous pouvons observer un phénomène doté de caractéristiques propres à ce groupe d'âge.

Ce nouveau genre d'addiction pourrait être étudié dans le cadre de schémas étiologiques communs, de même que d'autres types de dépendance plus fréquents, telle la consommation abusive de substances psychoactives. Alors que de nouvelles formes d'addiction se répandent dans toute l'Europe, il est intéressant, par comparaison, de prendre connaissance de faits scientifiques et sociaux, et d'observer les convergences et divergences du développement et de la propagation de ce phénomène.

Quant à la prévention dudit phénomène, diverses approches ont été suggérées et appliquées, la plupart visant à encourager la famille à participer à la prévention, ou à donner à l'adolescent la force nécessaire pour résister à l'addiction grâce à l'acquisition de compétences individuelles et sociales. S'inspirant de précédentes tentatives telles que l'idée des Caring School Communities (programme destiné à favoriser un développement positif des jeunes) aux Etats-Unis, la Grèce met en œuvre le programme pilote de prévention intitulé « Ecoles d'apprentissage et de prévention collectifs », fondé sur l'idée de l'école en tant que communauté active à laquelle prennent part les enseignants, les parents et la communauté dans son ensemble, à savoir le quartier et la ville.

L'enquête menée au sein d'un échantillon d'étudiants grecs cherche à analyser la dépendance des élèves de l'enseignement secondaire à l'internet, en fonction de paramètres familiaux, éducatifs et sociaux en matière de prévention. Cet échantillon se compose de collégiens de première et deuxième année. Leur sélection s'effectue par échantillonnage aléatoire.

L'étude se poursuit. L'analyse statistique des données pilotes indique dès à présent qu'un usage accru de l'internet par les élèves s'associe à un manque de sociabilité et

à de l'agressivité. Les résultats de cette étude seront dans un premier temps débattus à la lumière d'une plus grande sensibilisation des élèves, des enseignants et des parents, afin d'évaluer l'addiction à l'internet, et la prévention et le traitement en temps opportun des problèmes que pourrait laisser transparaître le comportement des élèves dû à un usage excessif de l'internet. On essaiera par ailleurs de comparer les conclusions de l'étude avec celles d'autres études pertinentes menées dans d'autres pays européens.

**Mots clés :** dépendance à l'internet, prévention, adolescents, apprentissage coopératif

### **Zusammenfassung**

In der griechischen Gesellschaft ist die Internetabhängigkeit im letzten Jahrzehnt zu einer neuen Erscheinung im Suchtverhalten junger Menschen, Heranwachsender und Erwachsener geworden. Dieses Phänomen ist jedoch in der Mehrzahl der europäischen Staaten weit verbreitet und es gibt bereits zahlreiche Forschungsdaten, die einen klaren Eindruck der Internetnutzung und der übermäßigen Nutzung im Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts vermitteln. Was in der Terminologie der Psychiatrie als „Internetabhängigkeit“ bezeichnet wird, kann auch mittels anderer Begriffe beschrieben werden, z. B. „Onlinesucht“, Pathologische Verwendung des Internets oder Internetsucht. Die wichtigsten Symptome dieses Zustands sind die konstante Beschäftigung mit dem Internet, die exzessive Internetnutzung, der Rückzug von anderen angenehmen Beschäftigungen oder die Vernachlässigung von Freunden und Familie, um im Internet zu surfen, während die Betroffenen gleichzeitig depressiv oder ängstlich sind. Außerdem können Symptome wie z. B. mangelnde Zufriedenheit und Reizbarkeit oder körperliche Veränderungen festgestellt werden. Es ist eine Tatsache, dass die problematische Internetnutzung heute immer früher beginnt, da man sie bereits bei Grundschulern beobachten kann. Jugendliche (z. B. die unteren Klassen der Sekundarstufe I) scheinen das mit dem Internet verbundene Verhalten geformt zu haben, so dass wir in der Lage sind, uns auf ein beobachtbares Phänomen mit konkreten Merkmalen bei dieser Altersgruppe zu beziehen.

Wir glauben, dass diese neue Suchtform im Kontext gemeinsamer ätiologischer Merkmale untersucht werden könnte, zusammen mit anderen häufiger vorkommenden Suchtformen, z. B. Drogenmissbrauch. Da sich neue Suchtformen in ganz Europa ausbreiten, ist es von Interesse, einen Vergleich der wissenschaftlichen und sozialen Fakten durchzuführen sowie die Übereinstimmungen und Unterschiede im Hinblick auf die Entwicklung und Ausbreitung dieses Phänomens zu beobachten.

Im Hinblick auf die Prävention dieses Phänomens wurden bereits verschiedene Ansätze vorgeschlagen und angewandt, von denen ein Großteil sich entweder auf die Mitwirkung der Familie bei der Prävention oder darauf konzentriert, den Heranwachsenden durch den Erwerb individueller und sozialer Fähigkeiten die erforderliche Stärke zu geben. Unter Einbeziehung vorausgegangener Versuche, wie z. B. der Idee der „Caring School Communities“ in den USA, findet in Griechenland die Umsetzung des Prävention-Pilotprojekts „Schulen des kooperativen Lernens und der Prävention“ statt, das auf der Idee von Schule als einer aktiven Gemeinschaft basiert, in der Lehrer, Eltern und die Gemeinde, namentlich die Nachbarschaft und die Stadt, mitwirken.

Insbesondere die Befragung einer Auswahlgruppe griechischer Schüler zielt darauf ab, den Umgang der Schüler der Sekundarstufe mit dem Internet in den Bereichen Familie, Bildung und allgemeine gesellschaftliche Parameter im Hinblick auf eine Prävention zu untersuchen. Die Auswahlgruppe besteht aus Schülern der unteren Sekundarstufe (5. und 6. Klasse). Die Auswahl findet über eine randomisierte eingebettete Probennahme statt.

Die Studie läuft noch. Die statistische Auswertung der Pilotdaten deutet jedoch darauf hin, dass die gestiegene Internetnutzung durch die Schüler mit einer fehlenden Geselligkeit sowie mit Aggressivität einhergeht. Die Ergebnisse der Studie werden vorrangig im Hinblick auf das genaue Wissen der Schüler, Lehrer und Eltern diskutiert, um die bestehende Nutzung des Internets, die Prävention und die frühzeitige Behandlung von Problemen evaluieren zu können, die möglicherweise im Verhalten der Schüler aufgrund der unangemessenen Internetnutzung auftreten können. Darüber hinaus wird ein Versuch unternommen werden, die Erkenntnisse der Studie mit den Ergebnissen mehrerer anderer relevanter Erhebungen zu vergleichen, die in anderen europäischen Staaten durchgeführt wurden.

**Schlüsselbegriffe:** Internetabhängigkeit, Prävention, Heranwachsende, kooperatives Lernen

## **WORKING IN CO-WORKING SPACES: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT OF EUROPEAN YOUTH**

Marko Orel

### **Abstract**

The European debt crisis has had many negative effects on the population of Europe, particularly its qualified youth. Nowadays, being a graduate of a well-respected university with above average marks is not enough to ensure employment after graduation. Europe is seeking new ways to tackle youth unemployment problems. The social and third sector economies, within the public as well as the private sector, embrace a wide range of community activities and may represent a possible solution to help rejuvenate Europe's economic growth. As the report published by the International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, Social and Cooperative Economy (CIRIEC) in 2012 suggests, the social economy has not only asserted its ability to make an effective contribution to solving new problems, but it has also strengthened its position as a necessary institution for stable and sustainable economic growth. This shows us that a solution may lie in re-establishing innovation and knowledge-based communities. But the question arises: how can we connect young would-be entrepreneurs, both on a local and regional level? And more importantly: how can we connect and establish collaboration between youth from different professional backgrounds? We are living in an information society and now possess new tools for sharing and communication, which provide youth with a possibility to work on the move and use different spaces to replace traditional offices. We need to take a look at the variety of spaces where we work with others, their structures, functions and configurations and, most significantly, how these spaces



influence our work and personal development. Co-working, a global phenomenon, is a modern way of working for entrepreneurs, self-employed individuals and other professionals who share their working space to establish networks, which eventually lead to new opportunities and serve as the basis for new start-up companies. This article will thus examine the positive output of the co-working philosophy on European youth and their employment potential.

**Keywords:** Youth unemployment, community, co-working, crowdfunding, self-employment

## Résumé

La crise de la dette en Europe a beaucoup de répercussions négatives sur la population européenne, en particulier sur ses jeunes qualifiés. De nos jours, être diplômé d'une université réputée, avec des notes au-dessus de la moyenne ne suffit pas à garantir un emploi. L'Europe est à la recherche de nouvelles manières et possibilités de s'attaquer au problème du chômage des jeunes. Au sein des secteurs public comme privé, le « troisième secteur », ou économie sociale, recouvre une vaste gamme d'activités communautaires et pourrait être une solution pour aider à relancer la croissance économique en Europe. Comme le suggère le rapport publié par le Centre international de recherches et d'information sur l'économie publique, sociale et coopérative (CIRIEC) en 2012, l'économie sociale n'a pas seulement donné la preuve de sa capacité à contribuer efficacement à résoudre des problèmes nouveaux, mais a également renforcé sa position en tant qu'institution indispensable à la stabilité et à la pérennité de la croissance économique. La solution pourrait donc consister à redonner sa place à l'innovation et aux communautés fondées sur les connaissances. Une question se pose cependant : comment rapprocher les futurs jeunes entrepreneurs, que ce soit au niveau local ou régional ? Et, plus important : comment établir une collaboration entre des jeunes issus de différents milieux professionnels ? Nous vivons dans une société de l'information et possédons désormais de nouveaux outils de partage et de communication qui offrent aux jeunes la possibilité d'être mobiles dans leur travail et d'utiliser des espaces différents pour remplacer les bureaux traditionnels. Nous devons nous pencher sur la diversité des espaces où nous travaillons avec d'autres, ainsi que leurs structures, fonctions, configurations et, surtout, la manière dont ces espaces influent sur notre travail et notre épanouissement personnel. Le travail collaboratif, phénomène mondial, est un moyen moderne utilisé par les entrepreneurs, les travailleurs indépendants et autres professionnels qui partagent leur espace de travail pour constituer des réseaux, ce qui leur ouvre finalement de nouvelles occasions et sert de base aux nouvelles entreprises. Cet article analysera donc le résultat positif de la philosophie du travail collaboratif pour la jeunesse européenne et son potentiel d'emploi.

**Mots clés :** chômage des jeunes, collectivité, travail collaboratif, financement communautaire, activités non salariées

## Zusammenfassung

Die europäische Schuldenkrise hat viele negative Auswirkungen auf die Bevölkerung in Europa gehabt, insbesondere auf ihre qualifizierte Jugend. Heute reicht es nicht,

einen guten Abschluss einer renommierten Universität vorzuweisen, um sich einen Arbeitsplatz zu sichern. Europa sucht nach neuen Wegen und Möglichkeiten, das Problem der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in den Griff zu bekommen. Die Sozialwirtschaft und der Dritte Sektor innerhalb des öffentlichen und des privaten Sektors vereinen vielfältige Gemeinschaftstätigkeiten und können eine mögliche Lösung sein, um das Wirtschaftswachstum Europas neu zu beleben. Wie der Bericht des „International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, Social and Cooperative Economy“ (CIRIEC) 2012 nahe legt, hat die Sozialwirtschaft nicht nur ihre Fähigkeit unter Beweis gestellt, wirksam zur Lösung neuer Probleme beizutragen, sondern sie hat auch ihre Position als notwendige Institution für ein stabiles und nachhaltiges Wirtschaftswachstum gestärkt. Dies zeigt uns, dass die Lösung darin besteht, auf Innovation und Wissen basierte Gemeinschaften neu zu gründen. Es drängt sich aber die Frage auf, wie wir die angehenden Jungunternehmer auf regionaler und lokaler Ebene verbinden sollen? Und noch wichtiger, wie können wir die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Jugend mit unterschiedlichem beruflichem Hintergrund verbinden und etablieren? Wir leben in einer Informationsgesellschaft und verfügen heute über neue Instrumente des Austausches und der Kommunikation, die der Jugend die Möglichkeit geben, mobil tätig zu sein und unterschiedliche Räume zu nutzen, die das traditionelle Büro ersetzen. Wir müssen uns die Vielfalt der Räume betrachten, in denen wir mit anderen arbeiten, ihre Strukturen, Funktionen, Konfigurationen und, was am wichtigsten ist, wie diese Räume unsere Arbeit und unsere persönliche Entwicklung beeinflussen. Co-working, ein globales Phänomen, ist eine moderne Form des Arbeitens für Unternehmer, Selbständige und andere Berufstätige, die ihren Arbeitsbereich mit anderen teilen, um Netzwerke zu schaffen, die schließlich zu neuen Chancen führen und als Grundlage für neue Start-up-Unternehmen dienen. Dieser Artikel wird daher die positiven Folgen der Co-working-Philosophie auf die europäische Jugend und ihr Entwicklungspotenzial untersuchen.

**Schlüsselbegriffe:** Jugendarbeitslosigkeit, Gemeinschaft, Co-working, Crowdfunding, Selbständigkeit



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The theme of this issue of *Perspectives on youth* is "Connections and disconnections". Our authors have contributed articles on migration, employment mobility, new familial relations, the Internet and new media, young people's social and political engagement, their connections with their own countries, with Europe or the wider world, and intercultural contacts in general, and others besides.

They address the potential benefits but also the tensions and contradictions that are inherent in contemporary social, cultural, economic and technological changes. Such changes are creating opportunities for young people to connect in new and positive ways with other young people, with their families and communities and with social institutions, in ways that increasingly "cross borders" of various kinds. But it is also clear that these changes do not always take place in a smooth or mutually complementary way: expanded opportunities are not necessarily enhanced opportunities; increased participation in education has not translated into more and better employment prospects; societies and communities are increasingly diverse and yet some perceive this as a threat rather than an opportunity. A related question arises as to whether the policies that are designed both to shape and respond to young people's circumstances and the resulting practices are themselves appropriately connected or disconnected with each other.

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