Young people
from lower-income neighbourhoods

Guide to new approaches to policies

CONTENTS

Part Two – Analysing and moving beyond the stereotypes

PREFACE

This guide is the first in a series which the Council of Europe's Social Cohesion Development Division hopes to make available to public authorities and citizens as a means of encouraging reflection on policies to foster the social integration of society's vulnerable groups. Questions are often asked about the impact of these policies, especially in the light of repeated instances of hardship and violence which cast some doubt on society's ability to ensure the well-being of all of its members. For the Council of Europe, this ability is inextricably linked to social cohesion.

It was in the course of the Council of Europe's research on disadvantaged urban areas[1] that the idea for this guide came about, prompted by an awareness of the significant gap between the motivation and aims of policies and the way these are understood by the people for whom they have been drawn up. There are many reasons for this: inadequate intermediation, fragmentation of public services, scant dialogue between the associations on the ground and the authorities, etc. We sought to uncover the foundations on which these policies have been built, and very often it was clear that they had been drawn up as a response to social prejudices or the stigmatising way in which vulnerable situations had been interpreted.

What exactly is a prejudice? It is a half-truth resulting from the inflation of a failing (occasionally held to ridicule), a particular characteristic or a difference. A prejudice can become a barrier, a wall of incomprehension and, what is even worse, give rise to counterproductive policies. In this guide the Social Cohesion Development Division has sought to look closely at some of these prejudices or stereotypes concerning young people from lower-income or deprived urban neighbourhoods. At the moment, this problem of geographical segregation mainly affects western Europe, applying less to eastern European countries. In addition, prejudice is often linked to differences in origin, especially in the case of young people whose parents or grandparents migrated to the country in which they now reside.

The reason we adopted this approach is because it was clear that policies may sometimes not come up to the expectations of those to whom they are addressed, and instead result in a further entrenchment, in other words the social condemnation of certain behaviour, rather than seeking to find new means of integration and renewing links with society.

It is not easy to identify such prejudices, because we are all guilty of holding them. Subconsciously, we all harbour ideas placing people in certain categories or attributing certain behaviour to them. We have to be willing to free ourselves of such ideas in order to understand the reality of the situation in all its complexity. Ultimately, unless we can move beyond these prejudices, there can be no genuine integration, namely integration which acknowledges the dignity of everyone and accepts that there can be no unilateral process in the management of diversity-related conflicts.

This guide has been compiled with the contributions of Laurent Bonelli, researcher and lecturer in political science at the University of Paris-X (Nanterre); Frédéric Lapeyre, lecturer at the Catholic University of Louvain; Paul Soto Hardiman, consultant for Grupo Alba SLL; Michel Reeber, researcher in sociology, specialist on Islamic affairs at the CNRS and priest in the parish of Cronenbourg in Strasbourg; Gérard Gréneron, Police Chief Inspector and Secretary General of the European Council of Police Trade Unions; Mehdi Messadi, consultant in community relations and outreach worker, member of Urban Mediation in

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1. Council of Europe, Trends in Social Cohesion, Nos. 8 and 9, 2004.

I hope that this guide will help develop awareness of the impact of "the other person's view" on those facing social hardship. Social cohesion depends, amongst other things, on how everyone perceives everyone else, in other words, the ability to look differently and free oneself of unproductive prejudices in order to see diversity as an asset to society.

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Gilda Farrell
Head of the Social Cohesion Development Division

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General introduction

The social exclusion of young people living in lower-income neighbourhoods has been a latent problem for decades and one of which both the public at large and politicians have been aware to varying extents whenever it has made itself felt. It is an issue that could easily be brushed to one side were it not for the instances of violence that flare up from time to time, reminding us of the shortcomings of our democratic institutions in combating discrimination. One such example was the urban violence that erupted in October 2005 in France and in other European countries.

It is no secret that the majority of young people living in these neighbourhoods are of immigrant origin. Shaped – but not of their own choosing – by two cultures, they are supposed, like every other citizen born in Europe, to enjoy all the rights offered by our modern societies: education, a good job with career prospects, decent housing and living conditions, health care and other social services, the opportunity to start a family, become independent and play a part in the life of the community. The fact is that most of them are denied these rights in practice and they view their dual cultural background as an obstacle to the enjoyment of these rights and to building up social bonds and support networks. As a result of segregation – whether implicit or explicit – and the lack of any social recognition, a greater effort on their part is required in order to become, as our societies term it, "integrated".

It is a situation that occurs time and time again, particularly in the countries of Europe having experienced large-scale immigration for more than a generation (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, etc.), and raises two separate series of questions:
  – first, those relating to the more immediate aspects of dealing with the problem: how and why should we seek to combat these forms of youth exclusion, which cost our societies a great deal in terms of human resources?
  – second, those relating to a long-term strategy on how to prevent young people living in lower-income areas (primarily the children of the second and third generation of immigrants) from becoming the systematic victims of the mechanisms of exclusion which pose a threat to social cohesion. It is just not possible to build up cohesive societies in which a whole section of young people plays no valuable social role.

These two aspects are not, however, completely separate. Both aspects may be addressed in tandem, albeit with greater emphasis placed at times on measures to reduce immediate tension, and at others on the social strategy approach.

The first takes precedence when revolt breaks out. Priority is then placed on the need to preserve the "rule of law", by taking firm and punitive measures, as recently seen in France. At the same time, so-called "curative" measures are stepped up, such as bolstering social services and the voluntary sector in lower-income neighbourhoods, appeals to companies to take on young people, even if these are temporary or traineeship contracts, backed up by tax or other measures, etc. In most cases, however, such approaches are limited by two factors:
  – first, the cost arising from the resources they require and the reluctance, which may be minimal or significant, on the part of governments to put them into action;
  – second, they tend to be implemented as short-term responses whenever the problems become clearly perceptible; there then follows a recurring cycle of a problem, measures taken to deal with it, the limits of those measures, re-emergence of the problem, etc.

The strategic approach means that all political reflection and action must take the problem on board. Throughout Europe, pilot experiments have been taking place on how to deal with the matter, some of which have been highly successful, and this should become common policy. Rebuilding trust between young people and the rest of society is something that has to be done on a daily basis, in all areas of public life where there is a relationship between them and public and private structures. It is not enough merely, as has been done, to open up the police forces to the children of immigrants as a way of boosting trust; this is attaching importance just to one type of institutional relationship, in this case the law enforcement agencies. In contrast, it is in everyday life where sustainable trust has to be built up, for each and every young person. If our institutions and society focus solely on exceptional occurrences, how will it be possible to nurture the feeling of belonging which is so important if links with others are to be forged and if young people are to feel that they too have a part to play in global responsibility? Being an exception is of interest only if the perception of this is positive. However, being a negative exception is a somewhat heavy burden to bear.

Acting on its concerns over social polarisation, the Council of Europe has clearly stated its conviction that in order to achieve social cohesion, what is needed is a strategy and not a series of short-term measures focusing on specific groups. This Strategy for Social Cohesion calls on the joint responsibility of the various players (public authorities, the corporate sector, citizens, families and young people themselves). Nevertheless, if young people are to exercise individual responsibility within a community, there has to be a certain level of equality. Consequently, community responsibility needs to be organised more effectively. For example, the difficulties pointed to by the public authorities in making integration-through-employment policies work highlight the fact that in order to be effective, businesses themselves must be sensitive to the problem and share the responsibility for creating the right conditions for recruitment without discrimination. Similarly, education policies must broaden out to cover the relationship between schools and families and between schools and the business sector. This guide is part of that effort. It is intended as a means of moving beyond stereotypes which pass themselves off as gospel truth, thereby making it difficult to seek innovative solutions and new social dialogue practices.

It is divided into three parts:
- rethinking policies for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, in the light of the context of today and the lessons of the past;
- examining existing stereotypes and prejudices in order to find alternative approaches, putting forward a number of indicators to help gain greater insight into the situation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in order to devise and implement appropriate support policies;
- indicators and references.

Part One

Rethinking policies on young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, in the light of the context of today and the lessons of the past

Social cohesion

INTRODUCTION

This first part of the guide sets out to explain why and how policies for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods need to be rethought in the light of the current context and past experience. This requires us to approach the problem from several angles.

First of all, before moving onto any analysis, we need to clarify the meaning of the words and concepts being discussed, particularly what we mean by young people and youth, lower-income neighbourhoods (why this term and not another) and identify the misunderstandings potentially inherent in certain concepts such as violence and crime (Chapter 1).

We shall then look at the situation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in today's context, highlighting the increasingly alarming gap between the needs of young people (the age range of whom is constantly being extended) and society's ability to respond to these needs, in relation to society's four main integrating institutions – work, school, family and citizenship (participation in public life, Chapter 2).

Given this particularly manifest failing of society to provide an appropriate response in lower-income neighbourhoods, what is the reaction of the young people themselves? What do they now consider to be their reference points? What lies at the heart of the concerns of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is the search for identity, the need to find for themselves the forms of recognition and integration that society no longer offers them. In Chapter 3 we will be looking at the diversity, dispersal and at times fragility of this search for identity and recognition (through unlawful acts, defensive isolationism, religion, etc.) aggravating the social and cultural fragmentation and the deep-rooted estrangement from and rejection of the rest of society, making the re-creation of social cohesion so difficult.

Then, before we can lay the foundations of what could/should be a policy claiming to reverse these trends, we shall cast a critical eye on the policies of the past (Chapter 4) to assess how appropriate they were and try to learn a number of lessons for the principles to be incorporated into a new approach (Chapter 5).

CHAPTER 1 – CLARIFYING THE TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS

What do we mean by young people? By youth? By young people from lower-income neighbourhoods? What links are there – if any – between young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and crime? What do we mean by exclusion, inclusion and integration? What ideological assumptions lie behind these terms?

Before considering policies for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, we have to clarify these concepts, in order to avoid being caught up in an over-simplistic or poorly reasoned mindset.

1.1. Youth and young people

The public debates and policies aimed at strengthening social cohesion are often hampered by a great many terms which, by claiming to "name what is being discussed", essentialise and consolidate categories that do more to hinder the search for solutions than they do to help it. Each in turn is alluded to as an all-embracing description or as a public policy buzz word, tending to be perceived as essential frameworks of the debate. In order to avoid ending up in a theoretical, political and administrative impasse, it is therefore important to cast off such well-founded illusions.

The first task is to deconstruct "youth" as a unified and unifying category in public debate. As Pierre Bourdieu pointed out, "youth is just a word".[2] Talking about "young people" as if they were a social unit, a clearly defined group with common interests, and relating those interests to a specific biological age is therefore an error of analysis and judgment.

Until recently, youth was regarded as a fixed biological age sandwiched between childhood and adulthood. Precise definitions of the age range were usually associated with the acquisition of certain legal rights and responsibilities – such as compulsory education, paid work, the right to have sex, get married, drink, drive, vote, and the obligation to fight in wars. The most common age band, still used by both the UN and the European Commission for framing their youth policies, is 15-25. This kind of mechanistic definition is useful both for statistical analysis and for legal purposes. However, one only has to compare some of the common stereotypes of young people to realise that people's experience of passing through the 15-25 age band differ enormously. The options and opportunities facing all young people are changing rapidly but they tend to move along paths that are heavily shaped by class, culture and geography.

At one extreme there is the positive stereotype of young white, middle-class people, upwardly mobile and multilingual, advertisements for the positive aspects of the globalisation of trade and the formation of a globalised elite; and at the other, the negative, terrifying stereotype of bands of young people – often of foreign origin – forever excluded from productive exchanges, trapped in their environment with nothing better to do than hang round in stairwells and public places, hiding their intimidating behaviour behind their hoods.[3] These two stereotypes of young people have very little in common with each other, yet in some neighbourhoods the physical distance between the two worlds may be no more than a block.

In reality, most young people find themselves navigating in a vast grey area in between the two stereotypes. Their situations throughout Europe vary considerably. Many of the young Roma from a neighbourhood of

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2. Bourdieu, 1984.
3. Bauman, 1999.

Sofia, described in a recent Council of Europe study of young people in six European cities,[4] were working before the age of 10 and married by the age of 14. As a general rule, young people from poorer European countries are often involved in paid employment and/or get married earlier. Nevertheless, the same study pointed out that many of the young Spaniards living in the inner-city areas of Barcelona were unlikely to leave their parents' home until they got married (at age 25-30). Finally, in northern Europe young people of all classes tend to leave home at the end of adolescence (age 18-24), returning from time to time in between periods of work and/or study.

These differences lead the Council of Europe to say that, "youth is socially constructed rather than biologically determined". Youth is increasingly being seen as a prolonged and variable stage in the continuum of life. In fact most young people insist that their experiences are unique and maintain that there are as many youth realities as there are young people.

1.2. "Lower-income neighbourhoods"

"Suburbs", "run-down estates", "high-rise estates", "difficult neighbourhoods", "working-class neighbourhoods", "sink estates", "the inner cities", "red suburbs", there is no shortage of terms to refer to certain areas of community housing where there is a concentration of people with little economic and cultural capital. This suggests the vagueness of the actual reality we are trying to describe. It is therefore necessary to set out the main characteristics of the neighbourhoods and groups we are talking about.

Each of these different labels reflects specific processes and chronologies which are the result of objectivising preconditions that were part of the routine work of the people who developed them. Administrative categories such as *zones urbaines sensibles* (ZUS) and *quartiers en développement social* (DSQ) in France or programmes like the New Deal for Communities in the UK and the *Soziale Stadt* in Germany thus refer to specific public policies set up by particular governments in order to concentrate state resources in areas defined by a set of morphological criteria, that is a series of constructions designed for the delivery of specific policies targeting a "natural" (or not, as the case may be) area. Similarly, journalistic terms such as "sink estates" and "no-go areas" are being used, as the media pay more and more attention to urban disturbances, to describe the theatre in which they take place in language characteristic of journalistic narrative. "Red suburbs", "working-class neighbourhoods" and "immigrant neighbourhoods" reflect political affiliations and changes in them from the point of view of demands for recognition or of stigmatisation. Finally, the various academic disciplines concerned with cities have produced many classifications according to subject, the epistemological debates they engender and the distinctive issues they imply.

Far from being fixed, these terms move between the different production arenas with the contexts, helping to unify heterogeneous social situations under a label which ignores the conditions in which it was produced. They give rise to a sense of familiarity with a theme whose definition is in fact controversial and which owes its social representations to this work of definition. These categories concern geographic and social entities that vary enormously in size and location. They may be whole towns, outlying neighbourhoods or sometimes even a small inner-city estate, house anything from a few families to tens of thousands of people, and be situated in economic areas with widely differing profiles. These classifications also lead to a "labelling" of the neighbourhood in accordance with the population groups living there, making them sorts of "active minorities".

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4. Council of Europe, Trends in social cohesion, No. 9, 2004.

We will use the term "lower-income neighbourhoods".[5] Broader than "working class" or "proletariat", the "popular classes" of these lower-income neighbourhoods include groups that to varying degrees share a way of life, a set of attitudes and even a common ethos. The demarcation lines are blurred and a whole range of social strata are included from manual workers to other employees and even parts of the lower middle classes. While they vary widely in terms of status and conditions and have many competing faces, the members of the "popular classes" nonetheless share a vague feeling of being "on the losing side". Their contacts with the police, local government servants, social workers, schoolteachers, school social workers, judges, etc. encourage them to see this world of "others" as hostile and often unknown, but one that is powerful and holds almost discretionary power over their lives. Furthermore, the use in the media of phrases such as "neighbourhoods where even the police fear to tread" only reinforces the feeling among the residents that they have been institutionally abandoned. This us-and-them relationship is probably one of the most defining relationships of these groups and needs to be taken into account if policies to promote social cohesion are to be implemented.

The expression "lower-income neighbourhoods" also has the advantage over competing terms, such as deprived or disadvantaged neighbourhoods, in that it avoids too defeatist a view. Such an approach perhaps focuses on social relationships in terms of a lack of social cohesion, downplaying the forms of community solidarity and adaptation that abound in them. It also tends to unify widely differing situations (both within and between neighbourhoods) which helps to strengthen the stigmas attached to them.

Unlike the working class of the past that was a collective, mobilised player, the lower-income communities of today constitute a group no longer able – with the slightest chance of success – to assert itself in the symbolic struggles for the division of the world. This leaves the field open to political, media, institutional and at times academic portrayals strongly marked by social ethnocentrism, not to say social racism, which comes in various forms: defeatist or populist, and conservative or progressive (Grignon and Passeron, 1989).

	Defeatism	Populism
Progressive	The people as alienated	The people as a source of redemption
Conservative	The people as ignorant	The people as barbaric

As can be seen, the four figures in this table cover the spectrum of dominant descriptions of lower-income communities, whether in politics, the media, literature or academic writing. The defeatist version stresses the domination to which the popular classes are subject, while the populist version emphasises their normative and cultural autonomy. Each of these can be broken down into a progressive and a conservative version which focus on the moral argument. Each vision varies according to context and the positions in the social sphere occupied by those who hold them. While in the contrast between the people as "alienated" and "source of redemption" can be seen one of the classic contrasts in various leftist movements, the contrast between the people as "alienated" and "ignorant" ties up quite well with that between social workers and Christian charity.

However divergent they may be, each of these views contains some truth about the social world, so long as one is aware of what they owe to the social and institutional characteristics of those who hold them. There

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5. Translator's footnote: the French text uses the expression "quartiers populaires" as these neighbourhoods are, for the most part, inhabited by what might be termed the "popular classes". The French translators of Richard Hoggart's work *The uses of literacy* used the term "les classes populaires" in their translation of the subtitle "Aspects of working-class life". The main characteristics of these neighbourhoods are a concentration of lower-skilled workers, a high proportion of subsidised housing and high levels of unemployment, young people and immigrants.

is in fact no truth about the social world, just debates about what the "truth" is. It has to be said that lower-income groups are poorly represented in those debates.

There is therefore a pressing need to look at lower-income groups in such a way as to be able to understand both how much autonomy there is in their practices and normative system (cultural approach) and the relationships of domination in which these practices are caught up (ideological approach). It is only by doing this that we will be able to understand their lifestyles and the processes that underlie their aspirations.

Talking about "lower-income neighbourhoods" enables the inhabitants of the areas concerned to be situated in the social sphere (at the bottom of the social ladder), while at the same time taking account of the distinctive differences structuring their relationships and restoring their relative autonomy.

Nevertheless, it is still difficult to give an overall account of the structure of such neighbourhoods and the ways in which they are changing since they are so dependent on different processes and situations.

1.3. Violence and crime

Alongside the notions of integration and exclusion, questions of "crime" and "violence" constantly crop up throughout Europe in discussions about young people in lower-income neighbourhoods. It is therefore important to clarify the terms of the debate by explaining what exactly we are talking about.

The first thing to remember is that the crime referred to is above all petty crime – street crime to use the police term. In other words, a series of minor offences (rarely anything more serious), for the most part committed in public places, that involve destruction (street furniture, cars, public transport, etc.), aggression (physical or verbal against individuals or authority figures), fraud (mainly in public transport), theft (vehicles, from vehicles, shoplifting, etc.), handling stolen goods and petty drug dealing.

In the spectrum of general offending which goes from murder to tax fraud by way of environmental crime, labour law offences, money laundering, trafficking in human beings, etc., offending by young people accounts for only a very specific part of the whole. This is important because the impression is often given that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods have the monopoly on deviant behaviour. Each social group is more involved than others in certain types of offences that are visible and socially costly. For example, tax fraud in France cost €20 522 million in 1990, while simple theft cost only €518 million and armed robbery €90 million; in other words tax fraud was 40 and 227 times greater respectively.[6] The priorities of the police and judiciary result from political choices, illustrated by the diversity of the situation in the countries of Europe.

A second misapprehension is the idea that petty crime and violence are the preserve of young people in lower-income areas. Classic writings on the sociology of deviance have long shown that the treatment of minor offences is the result of social coding by law and order agencies[7] and that defendants receive different treatment according to social background. In fact, most of the offences that make up the statistics are not acts unambiguously expressive of criminal intent or a criminal nature but behaviours whose motivation may vary. The process by which they become offences is the result of complex mechanisms that include local standards (and how far the act strays from them), the representations attached to a particular social group (including the supposed educational and improvement guarantees) and the "background". Thus

6. Robert et al., 1994, p. 149.

7. Chamboredon, 1971.

a fight between adolescents is highly likely to have very different judicial outcomes if it is between country boys who have just come out of a village dance or a group of youngsters living in a "difficult" neighbourhood. The same act may be regarded as a "prank" or "mischief" requiring no more than a call to order or, on the contrary, a criminal offence (deliberate group violence, for example). Similarly, foreigners are given harsher penalties than nationals for the same offences, although if the specific offences affecting them (illegal residence) are disregarded, foreigners have no greater propensity to commit offences than nationals.[8]

This social marking, that leads law and order agencies to be particularly attentive to the actions of certain groups (and therefore immediately detect any law-breaking), is further reinforced by the mass deployment of police in lower-income neighbourhoods we have seen since the 1980s. This has a magnifying effect and gives the impression that these categories are over-offending, although it would be more accurate to speak of over-selection by criminal procedures. For example, in the Netherlands, the crime rate among ethnic minorities is between 1.5 and 3 times higher than for the rest of the population, but at the same time they are three times more likely to "come into contact" with the police. A similar situation may be found in France.

Everyone politically or professionally involved in issues of crime and violence should bear in mind the inseparably interactive and moral nature of their definition. Crime is not a social disease that can be treated by using medical, psychological, police or criminal-law instruments. On the contrary, its remarkable permanence in all societies in every age shows it to be consubstantial with the definition of any social order. As Emile Durkheim said in his day, "crime is normal because a society without it is utterly impossible. Crime … consists of an act that offends certain very strong collective feelings. In a society in which criminal acts are no longer committed, the sentiments they offend would have to be found without exception in all individual consciousnesses, and they must be found to exist with the same degree as sentiments contrary to them. Assuming that this condition could actually be realised, crime would not thereby disappear, it would only change its form, for the very cause which would thus dry up the sources of criminality would immediately open up new ones."[9]

The astonishing plasticity of acts and individuals termed delinquent or "deviant" suggests that there is nothing inherent in such acts or identities but that they result from a conflict of standards between groups unequally endowed with the resources needed to impose their own standards, so that a given behaviour can simultaneously be "normal" or "deviant", depending on where it takes place. Their presence in law is simply the manifestation of these power relationships at a given time.[10]

This process is marked by a profoundly moral dimension underlying the normative approach and is never as clear as in the case of the "antisocial" behaviour of certain sections of young people (especially males) in lower-income neighbourhoods. From the introduction of local security contracts in France to the Anti-Social Behaviour Orders in Great Britain, it is these "disturbing" attitudes – more than petty offending itself – which are at the heart of local security policies. Moreover, analyses of them are marked by overt social ethnocentrism that presents the standards of education and control of middle-class adolescents as universal. Views on the occupation of public space, "bad" behaviour on the street, sexual licence and precociousness, etc. are simply the immediate expression of such social prejudices, sometimes wrapped in academic packaging as in the case of "broken windows" or "anti-social acts".[11]

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8. CIMADE, 2004.

9. Durkheim, 1996 [1937], p. 67.

10. Becker, 1985 [1963].

11. "Scientific" analyses of the allegedly automatic "continuum" between the commission of acts of vandalism and organised forms of offending are nothing more than the reactivation of prejudices of the "If they'll do that, they'll do anything" variety. See for example, Wilson, J.Q. and Kelling, G., "Broken windows: The police and neighbourhood safety", *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1982, and Roché, S., *La délinquance des jeunes*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

Looking at reference standards is not simply a sociologists' fad to find social excuses for crime. On the contrary, it is central because it is precisely such conflicting standards that are likely to be of interest to social cohesion policies. Some standards (for example, vis-à-vis serious crime, rape, etc.) are unanimously shared by all social groups; others are not. As we have already seen, an offence of assault, for example, may reflect highly standardised behaviour on the part of an adolescent who, obeying a group code of honour, intervenes in a dispute to support his brother or avenge an insult. This is not necessarily acceptable, but it is naive to think that this sort of behaviour – in the complex local context – can be eradicated simply by taking punitive measures against the act itself. Hence the pointlessness of approaches that focus on "delinquents" or "violent" young people and seek to discover in them an "essence" of intrinsic properties that explain their attitudes and should make it possible to prevent them.

On the contrary, it is by comprehensively taking into account all the changes in relationships between social groups, their own mechanisms for regulating juvenile disorder and the possibilities available to young people in lower-income neighbourhoods that policies can be devised that are genuinely effective because they do not exacerbate existing tensions. It is probably only in this way that governments wanting reforms and institutions trying to improve their day-to-day work with such groups will be able to avoid giving in to the siren call for law and order whose automatic effect is to strengthen the very processes it seeks to combat. The challenge of this reversal of perspective is as great as the issue at stake.

1.4. Exclusion, inclusion and integration

Social relationships in lower-income areas are often seen from the point of view of the "disintegration of the social bond", "anomie" and "exclusion". All these terms need to be clarified since they often conceal misleading stereotypes.

First of all, it is wrong to present relationships in lower-income areas as non-existent or anomic. On the contrary, they are far closer than in many other social groups[12] (such neighbourhoods in the cities of southern Europe are renowned as being lively and vibrant, in which popular and Mediterranean culture is a strong feature, as for example in "El Raval" in Barcelona and in the "Quartieri Spagnoli" in Naples). These viewpoints are little more than the expression of prejudice and a certain misunderstanding of the subject. They are also now used increasingly less frequently, having given way to the notion of "exclusion" since the early 1990s.

The term "exclusion" appeared in France to refer to "social misfits" in the mid-1970s: "saying certain people are misfits, marginalised or asocial is simply to observe that in the industrial urbanised society of the late twentieth century, because of physical or mental infirmity, psychological behaviour or lack of training, they are unable to provide for themselves, require constant care, represent a danger to others or are segregated either by their own action or by the community".[13] The term becomes meaningful in a context in which certain sections of the population are becoming impoverished; it provides a generic term for these different – very different – phenomena.

Robert Castel has shown that "the huge amount that has been written about exclusion has described *ad nauseam* every facet of a disintegration of the social bond that is said to have resulted in individuals' losing their sense of social belonging and being left face-to-face with themselves and their uselessness. The 'excluded'

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12. Lepoutre, 1997.
13. Lenoir, 1974.

are collections (not communities) of individuals who have nothing in common except the same emptiness. They are described in purely negative terms as though they were free, completely desocialised electrons. Identifying under the same the long-term unemployed, for example, and young people in sink estates vainly looking for work is to ignore the fact that they have neither the same past, nor the same present nor the same future and that their paths in life are completely different".[14] The difference is by no means small if the intention is to develop social cohesion policies. As far as young people in lower-income neighbourhoods are concerned, the term "alienation" is preferable.

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14. Castel, 2003.

Chapter 2 – Understanding the context and trends – The growing gap between the needs of young people and society's ability to respond

The socioeconomic, cultural and political context in which lower-income neighbourhoods have developed has been considerably transformed since the last world war. The people living there are no longer the same and reference points have radically changed. Moreover, the age span of what comprises the category of young people is expanding, representing a real challenge for modern society.

However, the traditional integration models in lower-income neighbourhoods (work, school, family, politics) have become considerably weaker, and this has led to a growing gap between the needs of young people and the ability of the institutional and political authorities to satisfy them.

2.1. Structure of and changes in lower-income neighbourhoods

The way lower-income neighbourhoods are structured depends on the manner in which the industrial revolution operated, the local situation with respect to the flight from the land, destruction during the Second World War, how proactive government has been with respect to building social housing, the initiatives of certain industrialists, the scale of immigration flows[15] (themselves dependent on whether or not there was a colonial empire), how these groups integrate, etc. In other words, all the processes involved in the spatial concentration of the lower-income classes reflect very different histories and forms which make any attempt at generalisation risky. As for the ways in which they are changing, these are still intimately linked to the transformations affecting them both in terms of social and geographic mobility and socioeconomic conditions and the structure of the job market.

At European level, it can be seen that spatial segregation has been much reduced in some countries with a strong welfare state and a stronger tradition of "mixing" in public housing policies. The prime example here is the Scandinavian countries and, in the past, the countries of eastern Europe. From another point of view, the family has played an important role as a safety-net in most Mediterranean countries (especially through the role of women in the family). This has also enabled the most serious social problems within lower-income neighbourhoods to be contained.

Accordingly, there are two major models of how European lower-income neighbourhoods are structured and how they are changing.

The first is found in the inner cities: Barbès in Paris, Raval in Barcelona, Saint-Michel in Bordeaux, etc. These neighbourhoods are historical working-class bastions linked to the presence of industry and crafts in cities. The "popular classes" formed the majority in them until the 1980s, when increasing pressure on the housing market made them very attractive to often young sections of the population with more cultural and economic capital (teachers, journalists, artists, etc.) who moved into them in great numbers. The gradual decline in the popular classes as a result of ageing, small industries moving to the outskirts and

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15. The Netherlands, for example, was able to absorb immigration from Indonesia after the Second World War but finds it hard to integrate immigrants from the former Dutch colony of Surinam, from Aruba (still Dutch) and from countries such as Morocco and Turkey (see Council of Europe, 1998). France is in a similar position with Polish and Italian immigrants who were integrated and immigrants from the North African colonies.

huge price rises accelerated the social transformation of the neighbourhoods.[16] At a later stage they became attractive to senior executives and intermediate professions who are gradually supplanting the categories that originally changed them. This is what is known as "gentrification", a term used in the United States to describe the return by the white middle and upper classes to run-down inner-city areas previously occupied by poor Afro-Americans. The popular classes are therefore gradually being evicted from the inner cities. For example, the proportion of manual workers and other employees living in the Bastille neighbourhood in Paris fell from 80% in the 1970s to less than 40% in 1999. The proportion of middle management and senior executives in the Pentes de la Croix-Rousse neighbourhood of Lyon rose from less than 20% in 1975 to 65% in 1999. The lower-income classes only manage to remain for the time being in two ways: run-down housing and social housing, the former gradually disappearing as the result of renovation programmes, the latter seeing the average income of its occupants rise. This unwanted temporary cohabitation – often presented as a "social mix" – results in daily conflicts, the violence of which is in proportion to the social violence of such segregation processes. Similar situations can be seen in Amsterdam where in the Westerpark district, the policy adopted by the neighbourhood council has been to move out households earning less than €1 090 per month (120% of the minimum wage) and move in better-off families. Between 1998 and 2003, around 13% of Westerpark's residents left, while the percentage of higher-earners in the neighbourhood rose from 21% to 30%.[17]

The second major type of lower-income neighbourhood is large outlying peri-urban estates. These estates were intended to be a rational, planned response to the housing question and, more generally, urban development. Built between 1945 and 1970, they were designed to replace the slums, of which there were many at that time, to improve the condition of low-income families and move workers nearer their factories.[18] While hindsight tends to make this period seem a golden age that it probably was not, it was nonetheless a period of social progress for many working-class families who at last had decent facilities (running water, electricity, etc.) and for whom the future at last seemed less bleak.

The gradual departure of the more prosperous households who had bought their own homes, the arrival of immigrant families and the destabilisation of those who remained under the effects of economic recession profoundly changed the social character of such neighbourhoods.

The example of France in this connection is a good illustration. First, the liberal housing policies promoted in the 1970s enabled the better-off (mainly skilled workers) to leave the neighbourhoods and move to one of the many housing development sites springing up at that time. This movement, which was simply the latest stage in their upward social and residential mobility, was both a cause and a consequence of changes taking place on social housing estates. On the one hand, their departure was partly motivated by the arrival of immigrant families (mainly Algerian and Moroccan) who had been rehoused by the *préfectures*. Despite their poor housing conditions, these latter groups were generally kept out of social housing in the 1970s and 1980s. It was only a proactive policy on the part of *préfectures* that enabled them to gain access to such housing, accelerating the departure of skilled workers and the middle classes: the buildings that were freed up were then used to rehouse them.[19] On the other hand, the consequences – mainly economic – of buildings being vacated by these departures led those financing social housing (private or municipal) to open it

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16. Guilly and Noyé, 2004.

17. Treanor, 2003.

18. Flamand, 1989.

19. Masclet, 2003.

up to families they had previously turned down. The social composition of the communities in these neighbourhoods was thus transformed, precipitating further departures and increasing concentration.[20]

The case studies carried out for the Council of Europe[21] show that the situation is fairly similar in cities such as Derby in the United Kingdom, and the neighbourhood of Slotervaart/Overtoomseveld in Amsterdam. The tower blocks in these neighbourhoods were built in the post-war period to provide workers with more decent housing than the run-down dwellings in the city centre. Residents left these peri-urban neighbourhoods as their purchasing power increased, being replaced by people having to cope with many social and financial difficulties. The situation is more disparate as regards the presence of immigrants since 41% of the population of Slotervaart/Overtoomseveld is made up of minorities and immigrants, whereas the population of Derwent in Derby has only 3% of immigrant origin.

These two major categories of "lower-income neighbourhoods" are to be found throughout Europe, although there are different concentrations and different models. In the UK, for example, a large proportion of council housing was in the inner cities and was destroyed by bombing during the Second World War. The destruction of housing in the inner cities led to a substantial increase in "enclaves" near cities that bear some resemblance to French suburbs. In addition to this, in the 1980s the UK was the first country to restructure the welfare state and did so more radically than any other. A large proportion of social housing was privatised while, at the same time, other social housing became a dumping ground for the least privileged social groups. This process did much to foster the polarisation of different urban areas. In countries like Spain and the UK, and to a lesser extent in France, a degree of "intermediate gradation" is to be found in the centre/periphery dichotomy. Even so, if one takes specific local situations into account, the two major processes described above are valid and could constitute an important cognitive basis for public action.

2.2. Trends among young people

"Youth" must therefore be viewed as a more open-ended transition between childhood and adulthood that is subject to different influences and decisive factors according to social group and the individual. There is a consensus that this transition is becoming both longer and more complex for all young people. For example, the age at which young people leave home and/or become independent of their parents is increasing in all countries. In Spain, they may not leave until their mid-30s (77% of all young people (15-34 year olds) live with their parents and 84% (of 15-29 year olds) are financially dependent).[22] In Romania, the situation is even more striking since in 1998, 83% of all young people still lived with their parents (60% among 25-29 year olds); almost half of married couples did not live on their own, while only 6% of young single people did so.[23] In France 48% of young people from immigrant backgrounds in the 20-34 age group living in social housing – twice the national average – still live with their parents.

According to Lynne Chisholm, young people in northern Europe today are experiencing a relative loss of autonomy compared with previous generations that had greater opportunities for financial and household independence. In southern Europe, traditional patterns of living at home are being reinforced while in central and eastern Europe traditional patterns of early marriage are changing. She reports that in some

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20. In 1996 almost one social housing unit in three was occupied by a household of immigrant origin (one in two for immigrants from North Africa), as opposed to less than one in six for households as a whole. Boëldieu, J. and Thave, S., "Le logement des immigrés en 1996", *INSEE Première*, No. 730, August 2000.

21. Soto, in Council of Europe, Trends in social cohesion, No. 9, 2004.

22. Council of Europe, 1999, p. 11.

23. Council of Europe, 2000, p. 38.

regions over 50% of people in their late 20s still live with their parents. Across Europe the transition to independence is becoming longer, more complex and less secure.

While this longer transition period affects all young people in Europe, it is having particularly radical effects on the young people in lower-income neighbourhoods. There are many reasons for this but only three will be discussed here.

Firstly, on the labour market, the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs open to young people with few or no skills have become significantly less secure. Temporary contracts and traineeships have replaced open-ended contracts and stable jobs. The uncertainty about the future these types of unstable jobs involve is seriously holding back the independence of young people from low-income backgrounds. Secondly, mass access to education throughout Europe has resulted in a corresponding extension of the period of "social weightlessness" (when the constraints of childhood and family have been thrown off but those of employment and marriage have not yet been assumed) of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods, while qualifications devalued by their proliferation no longer enable those who have them to find the jobs they would have aspired to in the previous state of the academic market. Lastly, the combination of the casualisation of the labour market and the intensification of educational investment has seriously destabilised lower-income families. On the one hand, they are subject to new forms of economic insecurity and the spectre of mass unemployment that particularly affects them; on the other, their children have to engage in academic competition for which they are particularly ill-equipped (especially as a result of their low level of cultural capital). Lower-income families can therefore do little to help their children win their independence.

The breathtaking pace of change caused by globalisation is completely transforming attitudes to age and learning. Youth should be a period in which a large amount of knowledge and skills are acquired very intensively. However, it is now no longer possible to spend one's youth knowing what one will do in adulthood. Adults themselves have to learn new things and adapt to change throughout their lives. This is leading to a fundamental change in intergenerational relationships. Adults can now no longer simply teach young people how to deal with life because many of the changes they themselves will be facing will be equally unfamiliar to them. In policy terms this has led to the idea that young people require a minimum core package of opportunities, experience and skills in order to help them manage, learn and benefit from change rather than simply adapt to it. Moreover, these must cover all aspects of an individual's life (social, community, etc.) and not just a narrow set of work-based skills. Once again, the case studies have shown that these conditions are rarely fulfilled in lower-income neighbourhoods.

2.3. Weakening of traditional integration models in lower-income neighbourhoods

Employment, school, family and politics can be described as the four major integrating institutions of our societies. The forms of socialisation they operate, the representations of the world they provide and the concrete worlds they generate have an enormous influence on the ways in which identities are structured. These four institutions have, however, undergone profound changes in the past thirty years, particularly in the way young people from lower-income neighbourhoods relate to them. These complex processes will now be described.

a. Reorganisation of the unskilled labour market

All policies, from combating "juvenile delinquency" to "the integration of young people", come down to the central issue of profound changes in the unskilled labour market and its "integrating" capacity.

In western Europe the economic recession of the mid-1970s had serious effects on the industrial jobs (particularly unskilled jobs) occupied by the majority of the inhabitants of lower-income neighbourhoods: companies did everything they could to automate production and manufactured goods requiring large amounts of unskilled labour were supplanted by imports from the countries of the South. The number of unskilled workers fell, particularly in industrial production.[24] Working-class continuity therefore came up against a mechanistic effect: it became increasingly difficult to integrate in a world which had substantially declined.

At the same time, industrial jobs underwent profound structural change with the ever greater use of temporary workers and fixed-term contracts. The reasons for this varied: employers wanting to adapt staffing levels to order books, reduce production costs or have more control over their labour force. "Just-in-time" production, designed to avoid storage costs, implies being able to count on the availability of a significant proportion of the labour force recruited for short periods.

These economic concerns are inseparable from another aspect of the new management techniques that were spreading in factories at that time: limiting the systems of guarantees and rights, including those set out in collective agreements, to as small a proportion of the workforce as possible. This was the justification for "flexibility" and the pursuit of productivity, which implied that worker resistance had to be brought to heel, thereby having a significant impact on the way workers could organise themselves. By making the renewal of temporary employment contracts directly dependent on productivity and a worker's "attitude" within the factory, such techniques have eliminated much of the resistance, whether passive (cigarette breaks, lunch breaks on the production line, etc.) or active (union demands, organisation and action).

They have also driven a wedge of incomprehension between the older workers with permanent jobs attached to such resistance and younger temporary workers who understand blocking and obstructive strategies all the less because they are carried out by those least threatened on the labour market. Such opposition is also to be found in the literature on political economics regarding labour protection versus unemployment benefit, between the "insiders" (the employees who have a certain level of job security) and the "outsiders" who have none.[25] On the other side, to the permanent workers, the temporary workers trained in a matter of hours represent a decline in their own status and a depreciation of their skills. They are indeed living proof that the older permanent workers can be replaced at a moment's notice by untrained employees whose only advantage is that they are young and physically fit.[26]

The many conflicts between older workers and younger temporary workers are therefore drastically changing traditional "shop-floor culture". Not only is the labour force less united against the "others" (charge hands, foremen, timekeepers, managers, etc.) than in earlier times, but the very transmission of its values at and in work is being undermined by the rapid turnover in staff. The memory and techniques of struggle are being lost as much as the "tricks of the trade", in other words all the elements that help to build up working-class pride.

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24. Chardon, 2001.

25. Saint-Paul, 2002.

26. Beaud and Pialoux, 1999.

While the integration on the labour market of unskilled young people is more difficult because of the reduction in the industrial labour force and the transformation of the legal status they can hope to achieve, it has also been profoundly affected by major changes in the unskilled labour market, and as Castel asks, "how will all these rigid specialisations, which relate to precise tasks and date back to a previous era in labour division, fit into the Europe of tomorrow?"[27]

The new under-qualified jobs are today emerging primarily in the service sector and are better suited to the female outlook than to the traditional "virility" of the working classes. However, it would be wrong to think that this "feminisation" of low-skilled work has meant no active trade unionism: while there has been a decline in trade unionism in Europe, women are very much represented in the various unions, particularly in France, Scandinavia and the countries of eastern Europe, where women make up close to half of all members, and sometimes more. In Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and Ireland, the proportion of women among trade union members is between 30% and 40%.[28]

The traditional male working-class membership therefore lost ground in parallel with the transformations of the economy, hitting the industrial sector hard. Even though organised trade union resistance continues thanks to greater female membership, class resistance as such has well and truly declined.

In a world governed by interaction with the middle classes, the absence of a group structured around such working-class values providing collective protection against harassment and humiliation is particularly painful. Their way of speaking (volume and vocabulary) and moving (swaggering) and their clothing (very different from "office wear") are all markers that lead their superiors and colleagues to disparage them when they are not frightened of them. This silent humiliation which finds daily expression in a lack of trust and comments or insidious looks often results in their giving up their jobs, dismissals or not having their fixed-term contracts renewed.

Insufficient importance is given to the impact of the disappearance of possible and probable worker solidarity for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and the role it has played in channelling and standardising their "deviant" behaviour. By including many of the standards and values of such adolescents and at the same time setting clear limits on what was and was not acceptable, the shop floor functioned for decades as a standardising institution. This was all the more the case as it provided possibilities of projecting oneself into the future. The predictability that went with having a permanent job was an important component of the disciplinary control of which the factory was a part. Starting a family, making "plans", purchases, holidays and housing, all of this helped to reduce the periods of social uncertainty favourable to disorder.

One of the paradoxical effects of the destabilisation of the workforce that has resulted from new labour management methods is that they have reintroduced forms of indiscipline that were present at the beginning of the industrial revolution. Uncertainty about the future locks individuals in the present and in a daily resourcefulness that adapts to whatever opportunities present themselves, whether legal or not. As Pierre Bourdieu has shown in relation to sub-proletarian Algerians, "because they cannot provide the minimum of security and certainty about the present and the immediate future that a permanent job and a regular salary give, unemployment, intermittent employment and work simply as an occupation prevent any effort to rationalise economic conduct with reference to a future goal and lock individuals in anxiety about the future, in other words a fascination with the immediate".[29]

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27. Castel, 2003.
28. Waddington, 2005.
29. Bourdieu, 2002 (1962).

The combination of such intermittent work (especially intermittent when unemployment rates are very high) with the social disqualification attached to it and the impoverishment of neighbourhoods does much to explain the illegal economies that are developing in many of them.

b. Mass access to education

All European countries regard education as the linchpin of individuals' social integration. Although educational methods and philosophies vary, mass access to education has become a reality everywhere. Entire social groups now have access to extended education from which they were previously excluded.

Nevertheless, this phenomenon, often referred to as "educational democratisation", has unfortunately done much to destabilise the popular classes. The increasing number of secondary-school subject streams and the fact that secondary education has become widespread have led to a kind of blurring that has helped to foster unrealistic aspirations. The previous, very hierarchical state of the education system meant that limitations were internalised very early on by making failure accepted as fair or inevitable. There was a clear separation between vocational education and general education, between the pupils they attracted, and the future prospects for each stream.

One of the effects of mass access to education and the rise in the general level of qualifications has been the gradual discrediting of vocational and technical high schools and technical courses generally. But by putting children who belonged to classes for whom secondary education was once inaccessible in the situation of high school pupils, even in less academic courses, the education system is encouraging them and their families to expect that it will still enable them to access the social positions that it offered back when such was out of their reach. School is not only a place where one learns things; it is also an institution that awards qualifications and thus confers aspirations. In Germany, for example, young foreigners are mainly directed towards the *Hauptschulen* (the proportion of foreign pupils in the total pupil population was 11.2% in 1991 whereas foreign pupils accounted for 20% of all those attending the *Hauptschulen*). Social origin determines the type of school to which pupils tend to be sent: 7.6% of 13-14 year olds in *Hauptschulen* have parents who are salaried workers and have passed the *Abitur*, as opposed to 67.1% in the *Gymnasien*; the situation is the exact opposite for the children of manual workers. A further possible explanation for this is that very few parents who themselves had attended the *Realschulen* or *Gymnasien* decide to send their children to the *Hauptschulen*.[30]

Alongside the increase in the numbers of pupils there has been a transformation of educational standards of excellence. The corollary of the longer period of education has been the devaluation of the most common certificates and more intensive investment in education by groups whose reproduction was mainly or exclusively ensured through schooling. In France, for example, the doubling of the number of workers with a CAP[31] between 1962 and 1975 was accompanied by a very significant increase in the proportion of such workers with unskilled jobs: 30% in 1962, 41% in 1975. Similarly, 60% of the post-war generation

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30. The German education system traditionally has three streams, for which the choice is made at a very early age (11 years old). The first stream is the *Hauptschule*, the shortest of the three, lasting five years and offering a general curriculum leading subsequently to vocational and technical studies; the second, an intermediate stream lasting six years is the *Realschule*. It offers a more complete and extensive general education than the first. The *Realschule* leads to more administrative-type studies (office employees or public services). Pupils attending either of these schools, despite having received a general education, tend to move on to vocational training at a *Duale Schule,* which offers sandwich training between companies and the *Berufsschule*. The third stream offers a general in-depth curriculum leading to the *Gymnasium* where pupils are prepared for the *Abitur* (certificate awarded at the end of this education cycle). In general, this curriculum prepares pupils for university studies. There is a fourth option, the *Gesamtschule*, in which the choice of stream is made at a later stage. See "The educational system in Germany: case study findings", Chapter 3, available at: http://www.ed.gov/publs/GermanCaseStudy/chapter3c.html.

31. Vocational training certificate.

now aged between 50 and 60 who had the *baccalauréat* became executives or occupied intermediate professions. Today, only 20% of people with the *baccalauréat* are lucky enough to do so at a time when there are more and more of them (62% of those born in 1975 as against 32% of those born in 1965). This fall in the social yield of academic qualifications has considerably clouded the probable future of children from lower-income backgrounds. In some countries, however, such as Italy, vocational training is not looked down upon, although this still does not solve the problem of youth unemployment.

Even so, while the meritocratic position held by schools is in many respects simply a "line", it is nevertheless disrupting the reproduction cycle of lower-income communities. Workers' children will be all the less inclined to think of themselves as workers if their time at school has opened up other possibilities, even if they are illusory. By temporarily removing these children from productive activities and cutting them off from the world of work, schools are breaking the natural social reproduction process of the working classes based on the early adaptation to a subordinate role and tending to make them reject manual work and the condition of workers.[32]

This gives rise to a dual differential between background and aspirations, and between aspirations and probable future, leading to tension between the blurred relationship between the future of children from the lower-income classes and their continued schooling, and the virtual certainty that their lack of cultural capital will inevitably result in failure at school.

The gap between their direct or indirect practical experience of the effects of failure or relegation to a less highly-rated track at school and the talk of "democratisation" has done much to undermine teachers' authority. This promotional illusion, in other words, the attitude that places hopes of social promotion on schools, is making school detestable to those who expect from it precisely what it is unable to provide (or only a third-rate version of it): a job, a place in society and a social identity. The relative autonomy of the education system does not mean that it can eradicate inequalities – all it can do is express them in educational terms.[33] While education systems in Europe are very different, virtually everywhere there has been an increase in the number of those who pass their exams. Unfortunately for the school's role as social elevator, the number of posts for these young, newly qualified people has not increased accordingly.

A rather striking example of a further failure of education can be seen in countries such as Romania where the majority of graduates are unable to find a job because what they have been taught is outmoded in relation to current needs. This is a real challenge to be addressed for the integration of young people, especially those from lower-income neighbourhoods, who are for the most part steered towards the least valued educational streams.

An education system which continues to offer only the illusion of social progress for these population groups could ultimately result in more commonplace instances of uproar, abuse, provocation, the reliance on alternative (particularly religious) knowledge systems, and even verbal and, in rare cases, physical violence.[34] In several countries, many adolescents tend to see school simply as an instrument of social reproduction and regard the subjects taught as a legitimate order that assigns to them the least valued positions in advance.

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32. Beaud and Pialoux, 1999.

33. Poupeau, 2004.

34. Physical violence almost exclusively affects pupils. In 1998-99 teaching and administrative staff accounted for 1.3% of the victims of physical aggression. This corresponded to about 40 people out of a total of 500 000 employed in secondary education. Figures given by Mucchielli, 2001, pp. 73ff.

c. The traditional family in crisis

The upheavals in the modern family – divorce, single-parent families, reconstituted families, long-term couples who do not live together, homosexual couples – are a matter of sometimes serious concern to many of those working in the educational and family policy fields. During the 1990s – in France for example – mayors of every political complexion, members of parliament and even ministers evoked the "abdication of parental responsibility" to try to explain the cause of juvenile delinquency in lower-income neighbourhoods. On several occasions, as was seen in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the question of taking children into care or even abolishing family allowances altogether has been raised.[35]

Firstly, the universality of the notion of the family as the unit of biological and social reproduction is the result of a long process of social construction, lying at the very heart of the conflicts between Church and State and at the development of modern states, resulting in the imposition of a "political model" of the family. State intervention was not limited to establishing regulations – civil law, labour law – and celebrating by officially rewarding "model families", it also intervened to change family practices themselves, particularly their economy, by developing a range of highly diversified institutions covering certain aspects of family life and the relationships forged within it.[36]

Accordingly, "family life" is far from being a private affair. Nonetheless, it would be dangerous to generalise, given the tremendous divergences between family models in Europe. However, two major trends can be seen: one in northern Europe and the other in southern Europe. With regard to the latter, the Spanish context typifies a situation where the family is a pillar of society irrespective of social class. In southern Europe the concept of family is not centred on the nuclear family; rather it is more extensive, covering several generations. In northern Europe, particularly in Germany, there is a tendency no longer to regard the nuclear family as a pillar of society. If we take the example of France, the nuclear family model based on marriage, the father as the breadwinner and the mother taking care of bringing up the children lasted only a few years (basically the 1950s) as a dominant statistical norm. As Irène Théry[37] points out, for example, "the 1960s watershed is real but can be misleading. The family of the 1950s was far from representative of the model of a 'traditional' family that could be used as a yardstick to measure the 'modernity' of the modern family. In many ways it was an exceptional period: the long-standing decline in fertility rates ended, marriage became the norm (whereas in the past working-class celibacy and cohabitation had been very common) and the number of working women fell and reached its lowest historical level in 1961. It was not until 1988 that it returned to what it had been in 1911. Such an exceptional situation only becomes meaningful in the long term". This "traditional" model is in fact the bourgeois model that has never really taken into account working-class or peasant life, for northern Europe at least.

In most north European countries the theme of breakdown of the family is one of the major archetypal fears of the elite in the face of the changes modern societies are undergoing. It is probably not by chance that it was at that time that the idea that crime could be explained by family breakdown began to take shape, formalised from the 1970s onwards in the expression "single-parent family". Concentrating as it did the anxieties revived by very real changes in the family (as a result of women going out to work, the increase in divorce, the development of crèches and nursery schools, the movement for equal rights for men and women, etc.), this expression was guaranteed a great future in the literature on the crisis in the family. As Irène Théry points out, "the terror engendered by the frequency of separations and the fear of a weakening

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35. Mucchielli, 2000.

36. Lenoir, 1991.

37. Théry, 1998.

of the links that ensure life replaced the earlier condemnation of deviance. The results seem to be very serious. Difficulties for mothers, desertion by or eviction of fathers, suffering of children. A triple impasse that causes genuine concern as well as fantastical fears, rumours of a war between the sexes, groundless criticisms, looking back nostalgically to a past that never was … let us remember the riots in Los Angeles in April 1992. The American authorities' first reaction was to blame the break-up of black families for the desocialisation of their children. When in 1993, atrocity of atrocities, the rarest of all crimes, two children killed another in Liverpool, the poor disunited family was immediately given as the number one factor in criminality. The temptation of the rampant return of the moral order is not as far away as we think when the private individual becomes the outlet of every collective failing".[38]

It is in this context that one understands how the crisis of reproduction in lower-income areas destabilised by both the socioeconomic changes of the last twenty years and a new commitment to an academic competition for which they are ill-equipped can be seen as a "crisis of the family", laxness and an abdication of responsibility by parents, at least in northern Europe. But artificially isolating this particular area of social relationships, refusing to take into account the particular nature of each situation (essentialising the family) and the social destructuring processes they are subject to (autonomisation of the family) and tracing a profoundly moral vision of what the family should be (the middle-class family as universal norm) makes it impossible to take any action to improve the lot of the "popular classes".

d. Political concerns (or unconcern), trade unionism and social struggles

The relationship between politics and lower-income neighbourhoods has never been simple, which meant that for years they suffered from a great political illegitimacy. The voting system based on property/wealth qualifications was justified by a philosophy according to which only the wealthy had the "capacities" (understood as both technical and above all moral) to attend to the nation's destiny. The debates on enlarging the franchise and later on introducing universal suffrage involved a great deal of talk about "the instability of the masses", "the fickleness of the working classes" and "lower-class emotions" that it was argued would be harmful to the smooth running of public affairs. Condorcet's idea (*Réflexions sur le commerce des blés*, 1776) that "the opinion of the lower classes is the opinion of the stupidest and poorest party" permeated many social elites for years, including the ones that instigated the extension of the suffrage.

The acquisition of political legitimacy by the popular classes was therefore inseparable from the mobilising work undertaken by political organisations which brought about the political existence of a group – the working class – which they claimed to represent. A social class does not exist outside that class' representational work. In other words, it does not exist outside the inseparably political and symbolic work that gives it shape by giving it a voice.[39]

Starting with the everyday life of the popular classes in buildings, neighbourhoods, factories, etc., these political organisations transmuted social facts (connected with everyday experience) into political facts. In a sense, they translated the simple concerns of the popular classes into the language of legitimate political discourse. This work was fostered both by the social and spatial proximity to the popular classes of the organisations' activists and the fact that they promoted officials from within their ranks. They were thus able to claim without too much difficulty a unity between representatives and those they represented that ensured them lasting success, particularly in many industrial strongholds,[40] and enabled them to access

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38. Théry, 1993.
39. Thompson, 1988 [1963].
40. Pudal, 1989.

certain power centres, both local (municipalities) and national (parliament). It was only through this work that the working classes ceased to be perceived simply as dangerous classes.

Mass unemployment and the individualisation and destabilisation of employment situations hit these organisations hard, generating preservation mechanisms that gradually cut them off from the popular classes or, rather, that led them to favour the most privileged (generally national workers with permanent jobs above young immigrants with no future on the job market) in lower-income areas experiencing unprecedented competition for access to scarce resources (jobs, social benefits, housing, etc.). It was in this way, for example, that the French Communist Party that had for decades been an integrating structure for generations of immigrants (Italians, Poles, Spaniards, etc.) cut itself off from young North African immigrants from the estates and in particular from the voluntary sector.[41] This break between communists and young people from such neighbourhoods did nothing to check the party's decline and was expressed by indifference or at times hostility. The rift between the popular classes and the parties of the left is not necessarily as clear cut in countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom, where there is still a close relationship between trade unions and parties. It should not be forgotten that the British Labour Party emerged from trade union movements and the German SPD has a political link with the German unions. Moreover, unlike the situation in France and Italy, the workers' struggle in the United Kingdom and Germany is more reformist and community-minded, that is the workers' representatives focus on reaching compromise with the employers within a branch negotiation framework.

Nonetheless, everywhere in Europe, with the exception of the Scandinavian countries, trade union membership has fallen, by a third in Germany, by almost a half in the United Kingdom, Italy and France, and by two thirds in the Czech Republic. The collapse of the representative structures of the popular classes was also a direct effect of the professionalisation under way in the political field that manifested itself in particular through the increased social homogeneity of politicians through specific careers, including in former workers' parties.

This decline and deepening social distancing also explains the increasing indifference to mainstream politics among the popular classes. Election results in French lower-income neighbourhoods reveal a growing lack of interest in elections. Abstention rates in such areas, significantly higher than local and national averages, are evidence of this. In a study of 32 neighbourhoods with city policy agreements, Henri Rey shows that the average abstention rate is 52.1% or 20 points higher than the average.[42] In some neighbourhoods in Seine Saint-Denis the abstention rate is over 70%, to which has to be added 20% to 30% of foreigners from outside the EU who do not have the vote and a fair number of people not on the electoral registers.

A second focus for the politicisation of the popular classes – particularly immigrant workers – was built around social and union disputes. They were the first victims of restructurings that deprived them of their jobs and also saw the fragile solidarity with French workers disintegrate when they started to compete with them when jobs were becoming scarce. The political socialisation of their children was to take avenues other than trade unionism or communist militancy. Without any status in the world of work (temporary workers for life, young people who have never worked), destabilised in the industrial world (fixed-term contracts, constantly moving from job to job, irregular hours), it is difficult for such young people to be involved in traditional trades unions. Very particular situations are required for them to be part of this world with its rules and codes. The same is true of mainstream politics. Cut off from the formerly workers' parties, they

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41. Masclet, 2003.

42. Rey, 2001.

show no greater interest in their competitors. The remote, abstract nature of the issues and the lack of well-known, recognised activists in their neighbourhoods make it impossible to overturn their collective feeling of a lack of political skills or influence and this is expressed in most cases by withdrawal, indifference and, at times, distrust.

Similarly, few second-generation adolescents are aware of the political struggles that have rocked their parents' countries in which their parents were interested. This also explains their lack of attraction to opposition groups in Europe and particularly radical groups.

In France, for example, a considerable proportion of the conflicts between young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and the authorities concern relations with the police and the judicial system. Whether the issue is differences over the uses of public places, violent confrontations (individual or collective) with the police or reactions to judicial decisions, this question is one of the major sources of mobilisation – and concern – of these populations.[43] They rarely find any outlet on the political scene. Sharing neither the language nor the analytical principles specific to professional politicians, it is difficult for them to have their demands, often expressed in emotional or instrumental terms, taken into account by institutions. This conflict situation may not be as intractable as the cycle of provocation-repression-provocation might lead one to believe, however.

The intellectual confrontations in the social sciences in general, and sociology in particular, between Marxists and non-Marxists that characterised the 1960s and 1970s had distorting effects on the analysis of the social question. The former saw the class struggle as "the driving-force of history" while the latter tended not to see social relationships in terms of conflict and to deny antagonisms in societies. One of the major consequences of these dominant views in the 1990s was to regard a whole series of demands as "sub-political", archaic or even "populist",[44] in other words, to deny the political meaning of such mobilisations of the democratic negotiating process.

On the contrary, we have to turn to history to understand that it was precisely such apparently insurmountable antagonisms that brought about the very construction of western democracies.[45] It was because after sometimes very violent struggles workers and employers sought solutions acceptable to both sides that employment law was developed. It was because workers' organisations and police forces entered into contact that demonstrations were codified and lost their violence. It was because leading citizens and working-class political groups negotiated that the latter agreed to take part in the parliamentary political process. In short, it was because individuals with diametrically opposed destinies and social interests sought points of agreement – or rather agreement on their disagreements – that they were able to take part in the same process. Each of them learned the representations and objective constraints of the other and included them in their own. They also acquired a common – or, at least, identifiable and predictable – language in which to explain their positions. It was these processes taken together that enabled our societies to be pacified.

Their rejection by dominant groups, on the other hand, simply exacerbated tensions and produced harmful forms of radicalisation. It is therefore important to listen, without demagogy or complacency, to the voices of the people most affected by a whole series of political and administrative choices that influence their daily lives. Some local authorities do not hesitate to do so.[46] It should no doubt be more institutionalised which would mean, in particular, changing current trends that tend towards exclusion (because of the criminal

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43. Abdallah, 2001.
44. Collovald, 2004.
45. Tilly, 1986.
46. Sanchez-Jankowski, 1991.

past of some leaders, for example) and coercion (no longer subsidising their associations, administrative prosecution, etc.). This idea implies being able to accept short time spans, a succession of different talking partners and demands that fall outside ordinary bureaucratic frameworks. It is, nevertheless, the precondition for learning to negotiate and establishing the forms of empathy that go with it and would contribute to the political and symbolic reconstruction of an identity, the scale of which we are far from appreciating.

CHAPTER 3 – ANALYSING THE REACTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE FROM LOWER-INCOME NEIGHBOURHOODS – (RE)CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY

What is the reaction of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to society's inability to satisfy their social integration needs? In a situation where society no longer offers any channels for integration, or merely illusory and ineffectual channels, young people will logically seek to (re)construct for themselves their own forms of recognition and social integration. This is seen in the search for new individual and group identities, which could be positive if it resulted in actual social reintegration. But this is likely to be impossible unless the economic and social reintegration channels are radically changed. This leaves us with a spiral towards an identity which breaks with the rest of society, taking root in marginality and rejection which, more often than not, plays a dominant role.

Young people in lower-income neighbourhoods are living through the changes just described and these are having a significant effect on the construction of their individual and collective identity. Individual identity is the result of schemes of perception, assessment and action that individuals permanently internalise, or rather incorporate, in the course of their daily confrontation with the social world. It is these structures that through a process of transposition enable them to confront routine situations as well as new situations. Collective identities, on the other hand, are forged by sharing values and representations of the world historically constituted in particular through confrontation with those of other social groups. They change both as a result of endogenous factors – the transformation of the group – and exogenous factors (transformations in the identity of competing groups and/or of the power relationship with those groups).

3.1. The peer group: forms of youth sociability

The visibility in public places of groups of young people has led many observers to examine these specific forms of youth sociability and their effects on the structuring of identity. This important question requires care to be taken to avoid a series of pitfalls that lead to the formation of stereotypes. It is important first to avoid looking to these groups for the explanation of forms of youth sociability in lower-income neighbourhoods. In other words, each group has to be looked at individually, studied in and for itself. Youth groupings are only meaningful in the context of all the lifestyles – conformist (that is, socially approved and statistically probable) and deviant – of which they are a part. This implies comparing the practices of youth forms of sociability studied with family, school and working practices and not taking the part for the whole – the practices, individuals and groups observed on a particular estate as those of the whole estate and the particular estate for all estates.

The considerable work Gérard Mauger[47] has done on lower-income groups in France has shown that they can broadly be divided into three distinct focal points. For the first, the social world is ordered in relation to the economic capital held, for the second in relation to the cultural capital and for the third in relation to the physical capital (perceived as physical strength). These three focal points – economic capital, cultural

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47. Mauger, 1994.

capital, physical capital – enable all the observations gathered on "conformist" and "deviant" lifestyles to be organised.[48]

During the 1970s and 1980s "deviant" lifestyles were organised around three typical figures: "the gang", "the underworld" and what he calls the "working-class Bohemian".

Gangs' forms of sociability and practices – from black bomber jackets to yobs – "the anti-school culture", jibes and "punch-ups" (among themselves, with other gangs, with the police), vandalism, thefts committed as a dare or out of desperation were not only common to a large proportion of young people from lower-income families in largely euphemistic forms but were also to be found – in identical form, but usually transposed – among adult workers. The unifying principle of the attributes, consumption patterns and practices characteristic of the "gang world" at that time is essentially none other than the "manly values" associated with the prestige of physical strength – strength to fight or strength to work – as the only characteristic that can be used to gain "respect" or build a "reputation" in the male world of young or adult workers. The gang world was therefore a place where manly conduct and gang culture are learned in preparation for the "shop-floor" culture. Belonging to the gang world was in fact almost always a temporary state: integration in the world of work involved a transformation of the martial uses of physical strength into productive uses, the conversion from street culture to factory culture that marriage both marked and brought about. It directed members of gangs towards jobs requiring physical strength, men's jobs, bastions of the traditional working class: the metallurgical and mining industries, building sites, etc.

Similarly, it was "economic value" that generated underworld culture. Money was to the underworld what strength was to the gang world. While it is true that physical strength as fighting strength and the related qualities of endurance and daring was a decisive type of capital in "the underworld" as it was in gangs (if only because its main recruitment pool was gang members who had "gone to the bad"), fighting strength was an end in itself for gangs, whereas in the underworld it was simply a means to an end. In the gang world manly excellence (characteristic of the male working-class ethos)[49] was both what was at stake in conflicts and the criterion of their arbitration. In the underworld it was only a resource in the struggle for superiority of which wealth was the measure and the goal. Emphasis and ostentation in the underworld were less in the physical *habitus*[50] than in the material and symbolic appropriation of the attributes of the working-class representation of opulence.

The third figure was structured by cultural goodwill. It was incarnated by individuals who tried to become part of the alternative society and initiate themselves in "the counter-culture".[51] Just as observing the attitudes and behaviour of the underworld reveals the working-class representation of wealth, looking at "working-class Bohemians" gives form to a type of cultural dissidence particular to a section of the working-class youth of the period: rejection of regular employment and consumption, emancipation from traditional morals and an anti-authority attitude, avowed artistic tastes and cultural practices, a predilection for esoteric subjects and soft or hard drugs (supposed to release creativity), etc. In short, a set of attributes, consumption patterns, tastes and practices that were a proletarianised version of the lifestyle of the intellectual, artistic Bohemian.

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48. The remarks that follow are closely based on Gérard Mauger, "Culture(s) de rue. Les bandes, le milieu et la bohème populaire", Report for the Interministerial Department for Urban Policy, October 2003. Our warm thanks to him.

49. Virtues.

50. *Habitus*: the gestures, thoughts and ways of being that have been acquired and incorporated to the point where their existence is forgotten. They are mental routines that have become unconscious and enable us to act "without thinking". *Habitus* also drives actions and thought: transposition to other fields and groups. The term refers to ways of being, thinking and acting common to several people of the same social origin that result from the unconscious incorporation of the standards and practices carried by the group to which they belong.

51. Mauger and Fossé, 1977.

This model of the range of lifestyles of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods made it possible to identify similarities and analyse the unequally possible or probable conversions among the different types. It showed the similarity between the three "deviant" lifestyles – the gang world, the underworld and working-class Bohemians – and the three "conformist" lifestyles – manliness, gentrification and intellectualisation – and made it possible to analyse the unequally probable conversion between "deviant" lifestyles and "conformist" lifestyles. Conversion was clearly more probable from the relevant deviant behaviour to the relevant conformist behaviour (that is, the one that valued the same type of capital): from the gang world to "men's work" in mining, the steel industry or construction, from working-class Bohemian to work in the sociocultural field and from the underworld to independent commercial professions (bar or night-club owner), etc. This model also made it possible to analyse the conflictual relationships between the three types, whether deviant or conformist (between yobs and hippies, for example), and very unequally probable conversions from one type to another: for example, from the gang world to the underworld via prison.[52]

The social and symbolic morphological transformations described earlier have greatly affected both conformist and deviant lifestyles. The three-figure structure of the popular classes is tending to be overlaid by a binary contrast between "established" and "marginal" people[53] in which "the established" – "upwardly mobile" workers and other employees – are distinguished by their double accumulation of economic capital and "communications capital" and the importance they attach to education, and the "marginal" (manual workers and other employees with insecure employment, many of them immigrants) only have the undermined values of manliness and, in some cases, their religious capital, to put forward.[54]

With respect to deviant lifestyles, the gang world, associated with physical capital and manly values, has been transformed: the concern to "save face" is as before expressed through warlike affirmation (use of physical strength as fighting strength and affirmation of manly values), at the same time as through the search for the attributes of financial success. What then takes shape is what might be called a "business world" that borrows from both the gang world and the underworld.

a. The business world

The ones who have the least academic capital and belief in their ability to acquire it, who have no academic qualifications, can only "save face" by membership of peer groups imbued with both the least disputed values of the culture of origin (such as the sexualisation of roles, affirmation of male domination and manly values) and the dominant values of contemporary society: appropriation of the material goods (clothing in particular) that enable them to "save face" and that are both more valued and far more accessible than academic qualifications.

Based on the similar condition and position of their members and common symbolic interests, a world in which the attributes collectively acquired through primary inculcation prevail (such as the male dominance expressed in domestic arrangements) and accepted material criteria of social classification (that is, the integration models promoted by the cultural production industry and in particular the clothing that makes it possible to "save appearances"), these groups of young people are the ones capable of producing an alternative to indignity: as competing "establishment" authorities they allow immediate recognition to be obtained outside the family circle and school. The peer group procures recognition by reference to the most indisputable and immediately credible principles of classification: manliness and the attributes of material success.

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52. Foucault, 1975.

53. Elias, 1997.

54. Mauger, 2001.

With no academic qualifications, no status on the job market (permanent trainees considered "unemployable") and, in some cases, stigmatised by their families for their failure at school and on the job market, the "bad company" they keep and the discredit they bring down on the family, gathered together in run-down suburban neighbourhoods, controlled by neither school nor parents, shielded from the discipline of work, "young for life" (that is, not fitted for a stable job or to become independent of the parental family and form a family of their own), with no social role, they are "left to their own devices" or, more precisely, to "street culture", all day every day for an increasingly long period, with little hope of seeing an end to it. With no future, condemned to the boredom of an eternal present, the only way they can avoid isolation is through the recognition of the peer group. This "respect" ("reputation") is acquired in the world of "street culture" through the ability to defend their honour, which is constantly being put to the test by the jibes and attacks of their fellows and by any authority that attempts to impose itself on them (first and foremost the police): the physical strength and courage on the one hand and a talent for repartee (a "way with words") on the other (hence the individual and collective confrontations between gangs and with the police) that perpetuate the practices of the "gang world".[55] Respect is also a function of the ability to procure the statutory attributes of "youth excellence" (expensive clothes, a car, pocket money, etc.): namely, resourcefulness and the social capital needed to gain a foothold in "business". Access to the illegal labour market (dealing, theft, receiving and selling stolen goods) is a means of economic and symbolic rehabilitation ("being someone") in relation to the peer group and/or their parents in a world in which "to have" is increasingly "to be". Belonging to a peer group involved in "business" is both a means and an end: it is a means of accessing economic capital (and financial independence from the family), a sphere of recognition, a springboard to symbolic rehabilitation that makes it possible to "be like other people".

b. The underworld

The transition from amateurism to professionalism implies consolidation of the attitudes that shape a delinquent *habitus*: rejection of manual work that has rejected them, consumption patterns ("luxury tastes") that consolidate the rejection of regular employment, aspiring to free enterprise (in the absence of academic capital, professional independence is a realistic social promotion project but implies early acquisition of economic capital), adaptation to an illegal future.[56] Professionalisation also implies risk reduction (the need to "last"): hence changed attitudes to consumption (discretion is contrasted with ostentation as is the wish to save with the wish to show off through extravagance) and the delegation of the most dangerous tasks to "petty dealers" learning the "profession" and moving up the hierarchy of illegal work.

The professional practice of "business" takes place by learning a set of economic practices that can be studied as such: acquiring and extending a clientele and developing its loyalty (by mobilising community spirit and the social capital associated with belonging to the community that depends on the nature of the product being sold: legal, such as cars; illegal, such as cannabis; dangerous, such as heroine; or inoffensive, such as cannabis), the division of labour and recruiting methods (delegation of chores to petty criminals, mobilisation of the social networks of the young people recruited, developing the loyalty of "apprentices" and keeping outsiders dependent), the connections between the illegal and legal economies (with respect to car dealing), controlling the competition (by setting up real or implied interdependence systems and the ability to take reprisals), laundering techniques (in which the family seems to play a central role).

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55. Lepoutre, 1997.

56. Guenfoud, 2003.

This illegal accumulation of economic capital is indissociable from strategies to accumulate symbolic capital: for everyone it is a matter of "being someone" and therefore being perceived and recognised as such. Recognition in the illegal world (by competitors, employees and customers) goes to the "good dealer": a specific form of excellence that depends on loyalty to suppliers and customers, harshness when it comes to reprisals (in order to be feared) and economic success. Recognition in the legal world (beginning with their own families) implies conforming to traditional family roles (being "a good son", showing generosity if not abnegation – "business is for the family" – and "making a good marriage") and imposing their view of their deals as a legitimate activity. Because this undertaking to legitimise "business" calls into question a fundamental ethos of working-class culture – work – it has to be passed off as genuine work by denying its illegal nature (hence the importance given to struggles in which the labelling of the "business" is at issue), by placing it in the same category as activities with a positive image in the family, such as shop-keeping and self-employed work (a reinvented version of the black market), and taking advantage of the economic success, in other words upward mobility, it enables.

c. Working-class Bohemians

Generally speaking, the intellectual focal point among a section of young people from deprived estates has two registers: "hip hop culture" and "the revival of Islam" (neither of which is watertight, however).

Imported from US ghettos, "hip hop culture" has been embraced by "young people from deprived estates" for at least three reasons. Firstly, because it appeals to the linguistic (rap) and physical (break-dancing) qualities considered specific to ghetto minorities so that that they can work to appropriate them. Secondly, because "rappers" (in their various forms) have successfully made themselves the spokespersons of "young people from the housing estates". Lastly, and perhaps above all, because hip hop culture has been "taken over" or rather made respectable by mainstream culture (rap by show business, break-dancing by modern dance and graffiti by contemporary art galleries), it seems to offer the possibility, if not of gaining access to media wealth and glory, at least a means of symbolic rehabilitation, not only among "young people from housing estates", but also in the wider social context (therefore increasing self-esteem and prestige) of the new artistic Bohemians.

A section of young Muslims with qualifications, faced with the gap between their social position – technicians, intermediate professions – and everyday racism that takes as its target anyone whose parents or grandparents were born abroad, are becoming veritable "purveyors of identity" by constructing a definition of "the Arab" contrasted with both "the poor who do not know how to behave" or "control their children" and who have trouble with the police, and "second-hand Arabs" who have responsible jobs but no longer speak Arabic, have a Franco-French spouse and are suspected of wanting to imitate "the locals". They therefore withdraw into their own community, proselytise to bring "back" to the language, religion and tradition the people who have become "lost", and sometimes try to outdo each other in "religious purity". If generally speaking what Islam has to offer finds a response among some "young people from housing estates", the reasons are probably to be found in the symbolic increased prestige it nurtures in two ways (like the "black is beautiful" rehabilitation strategy): firstly, it lends prestige to a characteristic generally stigmatised by everyday racism – "Arab" – by making it an elective characteristic – "Arab therefore Muslim"; and, secondly it lends prestige to a handicap – the impoverishment connected with the lack of academic and vocational qualifications – by making it an elective neo-asceticism. Lastly, the "void" left by the devaluation of "the Communist Party/CGT culture" (and its "missed opportunity" with young, second-generation immigrants) has probably helped the response to the renewed religious preaching: it substitutes a promise of rehabilita-

tion in the beyond for the symbolic rehabilitation of the popular classes (based on the prestige attached to the labour force, working-class messianism and the promise of "a better tomorrow").

3.2. The neighbourhood: refuge or ghetto?

Opinions on young people's attachment to their neighbourhoods and estates are ambiguous and ambivalent. Neighbourhoods are sometimes seen as stigmatised, run-down and degrading places, sometimes as a refuge from the "outside world" to be defended against intruders.

There is therefore one view that deplores what is described as a tendency to turn difficult neighbourhoods into ethnic enclaves or "ghettoisation". It condemns a certain introspection, arguing that such neighbourhoods and social relationships are becoming ethnicity-based. The concentration of minorities or a minority in certain areas is seen as an intentional process planned by these social groups. From this viewpoint, the young people of such neighbourhoods are responsible for such introspection and their behaviour in occupying places and in their forms of sociability leads to a rejection of others and a wish to cut themselves off from the outside world.

The flagrant contradiction between one view that condemns the invasion of public places by these young people and another that talks of ghettoisation should be highlighted here. These young people are rejected when they occupy public places and when they try to play their part alongside others. They are suspected of making cities less pleasant and creating problems in them. Yet at the same time they are reproached for confining themselves to their "ghettos". Recent sociological studies[57] have shown that people are attached to their neighbourhoods but also that young people from these neighbourhoods have a great propensity for mobility in urban space. They are therefore not captives of a living area presented as a "ghetto" but, on the contrary, the main users of cities, city centres in particular. The idea of "ghettoisation" has to be seen as the result of the emergence of the new urban question associated with difficult neighbourhoods, which is itself simply the spatial materialisation of segregational processes. It is the continuity between the components of the urban fabric that is being called into question here. In this context, the tension has become extreme between "difficult" urban areas and populations living nearby and the rest of the urban social fabric in general. We are seeing a process in which the prosperous majority is distancing itself from the places where a poor minority is concentrated and trying to reduce as much as possible the places in which it will come into contact with them. There is therefore a need to examine the social processes that have led to this image of socially disqualified neighbourhoods to a great extent turned in upon themselves. Is it the young people in these neighbourhoods who are refusing to make contact with young people from other backgrounds where living conditions are so much better? Is it the young people in difficult neighbourhoods who are turning inwards or the better-off who are less inclined to establish social relationships? The answers to these questions will reveal that responsibility is shared and less clear-cut. It would seem that people do not know these neighbourhoods or the people who live in them. For this reason the neighbourhoods remain difficult, at least to understand.

Being attached to a particular area is in fact a key factor in the construction of identity. Young people's identification with their neighbourhood is a linchpin in the construction of their forms of sociability. Thus reference to the area, neighbourhood or estate is a sort of identification with an emotional dimension that can foster the construction of a defensive neighbourhood representation and memory. It is a sort of territorialisation that enables space to be appropriated and reference points to be established. Young people

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57. Schnapper, 2001.

can find values and refuges in the places to which they belong. This is a factor that can lead to a process of positive construction. Identifying with the neighbourhood is indeed not in itself negative. Territory is such a relevant factor in the construction of young people's identity that François Dubet and Didier Lapeyronnie present it "as a fundamental identification linked with young people's shared experience and the labelling they are subject to". Nevertheless, the stigmatisation, rejection and hostility the outside world may display with regard to young people by referring to the territorial area to which they belong may set a reactive and defensive process in motion.

The great mobility of young people has to be taken into account in the critique of the received ideas about ghettoisation that reproach them for confining themselves or withdrawing into their "micro-society". An explicit wish and attitudes expressive of a quest for emancipation and mobility have been observed in such young people. An important lesson is to be learned from the mobility of those who have had more professional and social success and moved out of "difficult" neighbourhoods. It has been shown that young people from estates tend to accentuate their spatial mobility and try to "get out of the neighbourhood" but are unable to do so.[58] The words of one youngster from an estate sum up the impasse young people are in, that they aspire to emancipation and mobility, but come up against so many obstacles. This young man explained that, "It's hard to live on an estate, but it's even harder to leave one".[59]

The attempts some youngsters make to leave are doomed to failure because they have problems accessing the different worlds regulated by mechanisms different from those in the neighbourhoods. These failed attempts reinforce and increase the estate's value in their eyes so that it becomes the place where they belong and the place of solidarity par excellence. Their view is therefore ambivalent or, rather, they have a binary representation: of the city as a place of anonymity and exclusion and the estate as a place of solidarity and togetherness.[60]

Young people's increasing mobility towards the city demonstrates this wish for decompartmentalisation and desegregation. There is a tendency to accentuate individual mobility in order to gain independence, particularly among young women: all are examples of the search for a different form of sociability. David Lepoutre[61] has shown that in the Paris region young people are attracted to urban centres and that their numbers are increasing in major shopping centres. He sees their attraction to central areas as a response to social needs. Young people still of school age go into Paris regularly, motivated by a desire to distance themselves and for freedom. Young people's mobility can to a great extent be linked to their wish to gain access to the leisure facilities and consumer goods to be found in cities. When they are there they come up against the scepticism or rejection of society and some of them cultivate the fear they believe they have aroused.

The sociologist Christian Bachmann[62] has pointed out that high-rise estates "are above all a homeland, strange as that may seem: a whole generation was born on concrete, just as in the past people were born in the Auvergne, Brittany or Algeria". They are therefore strong, legitimate roots. The role of social cohesion policies should probably be to accept this point of view and resolutely combat the many negative factors that contribute to their stigmatisation and social and spatial relegation. Giving young people public transport facilities, seeing that the neighbourhoods are better served by public transport, making them more attractive and equipping them with places and facilities that will attract people who do not live in

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58. Bordet, 1998.
59. Daoud, 1993.
60. Bordet, 1998.
61. Lepoutre, 1997.
62. Bachmann, 1992.

them, improving their public image, seeing that they are better known, etc., all of these are avenues worth exploring. Some successful experiments of this sort (in Brussels, Schaerbeek, Saint-Gilles and Ixelles) clearly deserve to be imitated elsewhere.

3.3. Assertion of religious identities

Is the rise of strong religious identities generating behaviours that are accentuating social divisions or, on the contrary, is it a source of better regulation of a sense of community in neighbourhoods? In fact, it can be observed that the new forms of religious belonging are leading to behaviours whose regulation is presenting a problem. The question is therefore whether a strong religious identity qualifies or disqualifies young people from those neighbourhoods in terms of integration, socialisation and personal development processes.

The growing phenomenon of religious violence since the late 1990s needs to be brought back to its true proportions. We should begin by noting that such violent acts take place in every social environment and are to be seen in both large cities and rural areas.

The phenomenon has taken root in neighbourhoods owing to well-known interactions between groups from different cultures. Three factors have played their part in this. First of all, the fallout from international events. The conflicts that divide the peoples and nations of the Near and Middle East and the waves of deadly attacks over the last ten years have led to the radicalisation of many young people in these neighbourhoods. There is a great temptation to import these conflicts to the places in which they live. The scale of this reaction needs to be precisely measured before any great significance is attached to it, however.

Then there is the recent phenomenon of mass preaching by new religious movements. It is on the margins of such movements that groups have formed that have gone over to proselytising and sectarianism. Most of them are fundamentalist evangelical Christian groups and radical Islamist groups with a leaning towards *salafi jihad*. The fundamentalist branch of Christian evangelicalism originated in the United States. *Salafi jihad* brings together Islamic groups committed to violent action. Their leaders are extremist Muslims backed by opponents of the Saudi regime. It is important not to confuse proselytising with the usual practices of religious awakening. Full-blown proselytising is a form of religious deviance and a flagrant violation of freedom of conscience, while, originally, the religious awakening movement did not aim to conquer, but rather to regulate all the aggressive impulses in its adepts.

The last factor is the continuing lack of financial security in neighbourhoods which is destabilising young people. In reaction, they are trying to develop a structure for themselves through strong forms of identity. They easily fall in with the extremist religious groups that every day scour lower-income neighbourhoods where the supply and demand sides of radical religious behaviour easily meet up with each other.

Young people who are awakened to religious values do not necessarily plunge into deviant forms of behaviour. On the other hand, adopting such values is for them the ideal opportunity to reappropriate an identity. This takes place through a questioning of the ambient values, whether those of the society as such or of the gang and networks to which they belong. It also takes place through a phase of intense emulation or competition. The search for a religious identity encourages young people to measure themselves against each other. In fact, this initiatory process seldom takes place individually. There is a network effect at work.

Whether they are Christians, Muslims, Buddhists or Hindus, young people in the neighbourhoods who enter a process of appropriating or reappropriating a system of religious values usually follow the same

paths. The most significant transformation consists in a return to the traditional values of study, work, the family, respect and mutual assistance. There have been surveys of young Christians and Muslims involved in religious movements or organisations. They show that the rate of academic success and the successful search for work is higher than among other young people. They also show that when these young people begin to attend places of worship regularly they turn away from dangerous behaviours connected with drugs and alcohol; many of them practise a sport and they distance themselves from the deviant behaviour and practices that lead to delinquency.

The process of reappropriating religious standards and values enables young people to gain access to a form of social success that their family backgrounds had not enabled them to envisage. Other processes for integrating standards and values are equally able to foster social integration, however, and to generate identical transformations. This is in particular true of intensive involvement in competitive sport and is also seen in membership of an association, trade union or political movement.

The search for a strong religious identity may sometimes also lead young people to adopt deviant behaviour. It is here that a list of the possible abuses needs to be made. Such abuses result when the standards and values, rites and prescriptions, roles and statuses specific to a religion are exploited. The "religious" dimension becomes a factor that legitimises rupture, withdrawal or aggression.

When the "religious" dimension is exploited, there are three types of abuse: communitarianism, the ethnicisation of the religious field and the ideologisation of the relationship with the religious. Communitarianism begins when the adepts of a religious group take a position against the ambient society. It is manifest when the same group rejects the standards and values of society and gives its customary religious law precedence over civil law. The ethnicisation of religious belonging is a recent phenomenon. Groups of Africans, West Indians and Tamils run Pentecostal-inspired "mini-churches" in the suburbs of most major cities in France. The same phenomenon is to be observed among Catholic groups or in Islam. The multiplication of such groupings on the basis of ethnicity is imperilling the harmonies that foster intercultural practices. Finally, the ideologisation of the relationship with the religious is tangible whenever the members of a religious movement are transformed into pressure groups or opposition groups.

It is the combination of these three abuses that lies at the source of religious violence. Such violence is multiplying in lower-income neighbourhoods and on their periphery. The authors of such acts are usually young. They belong to fundamentalist "para-religious organisations". They are organised in underground networks of expeditionary cells. They physically or verbally attack the members of other religious communities. It is from the ranks of their small groups that the young people who desecrate Jewish, Christian or Muslim tombstones are recruited. It is they who set fire to cultural centres, schools and the premises of associations and other religions. Adherence to extreme right-wing ideologies, incitement to racism and acts of religious violence always go together in such networks. The spiral that leads to religious fanaticism and its abuses can be avoided through education in tolerance and intercultural and inter-faith values. Strict vigilance is also required because the groups that practise excessive proselytising and encourage religious polemics are the preferred breeding-ground of extremist groups.

Chapter 4 – Taking stock of policies

An analysis of the context in which young people from lower-income neighbourhoods live shows that there is a gap between their needs and society's ability to offer them the prospect of social integration. This leads them to develop their own identities on the margins of and/or in opposition to society; ultimately this places them even more firmly in a situation of exclusion. In this chapter, we shall look at how the policies implemented by the public authorities have helped reduce – or in contrast accentuate – this phenomenon.

This chapter examines three "phases" in policies focusing on the integration of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. The first shows how the objectives of general sectoral policies fail to tie in with the expectations of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. Leading on from this, we then look at the introduction and features of specific sectoral polices for young people from lower-income neighbour-hoods, showing how their essentially remedial nature (that is, taken in response to an unresolved problem), has shifted from coercive and punitive positions – seeking to eliminate the problem rather than attacking the cause – towards preventive approaches, seeking to address the root of the problems and sometimes involving young people themselves in this process. Lastly, we look at the "third generation" policies which emerged when the intrinsic limits of the sectoral nature of specific policies became apparent. While these policies offer a new approach to addressing the issue of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods, they are for the time being still in the experimental stage.

4.1. Inadequacy of general sectoral policies

The following table shows some of the divergences between the objectives or priorities of sectoral policies (urban development, security, social, employment, education and even youth policies themselves) and the wishes or aspirations of young people from deprived neighbourhoods.

Table 1 – Examples of shortfalls between sectoral policy priorities and the expectations of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods

Sectoral policies	Policy priorities	Expectations
Urban planning policies	Attractive urban environment Visible improvements in social problems (for example, eliminating trouble spots, antisocial behaviour, urban degradation)	Access to decent housing Overcoming the lack of family and peer support Personal and housing independence, pathways made up of small attainable steps
Security policies	Combating antisocial behaviour, petty crime, theft, juvenile delinquency	Combating domestic violence, drugs, racial violence, violence by police, being stereotyped as troublemakers
Employment policies	The reduction of unemployment A reduction in social transfer payments to the unemployed	A secure, reasonably paid, rewarding job, with encouragement for skill improvement
Education policies	Improving the academic success rate Developing skills required by employers	Learning that is useful in day-to-day life, developing life skills
Leisure policies	Avoiding occupation of public areas	Self-expression, access to IT, developing skills in music, sport, etc.
Sectoral policies in general	Information on the effectiveness of programmes Getting people and communities to take more responsibility for their problems Strengthening the legitimacy of democratic institutions	Tangible solutions to personal problems Genuine empowerment Autonomy Dignity, respect, to be listened to, the right to be different

4.2. Emergence and limits of remedial policies: from coercive to preventive approaches

Once it was realised that general sectoral policies were inadequate to meet the needs of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, steps were taken to frame policies focusing specifically on this group. Set up, at least initially, to deal with a problem that general policies were unable to solve – sometimes making matters only worse – they are essentially part of a remedial approach (in response to a given problem), becoming on occasion coercive in nature, especially when prompted by a desire to fix the problem quickly, motivated by the exasperation voiced by public opinion.

One consequence has been that approaches have flourished in recent years viewing young people in lower-income neighbourhoods as a "problem". This is the basis of the attempt to combat "anti-social" and "uncivil" behaviour. In the UK, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) enable young people to be banned from

certain places and activities, such as a neighbourhood or park, using public transport or mobile phones, although they have not committed any offence, because their behaviour is "likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress" to neighbours. Any contravention of such an order is punished more severely than an actual offence (for example, eighteen months' imprisonment for entering a shop while subject to an ASBO, one month for shoplifting).[63]

The same presumption that young people are the problem can be seen in many European countries; in some cases the threat of withdrawing welfare benefits is used in order to get the families of young people who engage in anti-social behaviour to take greater responsibility.

Not all remedial policies are coercive, however. Some seek to identify the source of the problems and even encourage young people to contribute to coming up with more appropriate responses.

This diversity can be seen in examples of remedial policies and strategies in two sectors:
– first, the policy of combating juvenile delinquency (a remedial security policy);
– second, employment policy for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods: the shift from passive policies, limited essentially to job offers, to active policies to provide assistance to these young people in actually obtaining a job.

4.2.1. Strategies and policies to combat juvenile delinquency

a. Punitive approaches to juvenile delinquency

In many countries of Europe, there is a trend, reinforced by the popular press, to make scapegoats of immigrants, ethnic minorities and young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

Such stereotypes are subscribed to by an alarming number of people. For example, a survey carried out by *Le Monde* in 2003[64] showed that almost one in four French people (22%) were in favour of the manifesto of the National Front Party and 59% thought there were "too many immigrants". In the United Kingdom, 75% of adults would apparently be in favour of a mandatory curfew at night for adolescents,[65] as was imposed in France following the riots of October 2005. Most of the supporters of this idea are to be found among the members of families in the poorest neighbourhoods that are the main direct victims of crime, violence and antisocial behaviour.

Here, the "zero tolerance" policy as implemented in New York has had a profound influence on people in Europe. Despite its high social cost (in particular the huge increase in the prison population) and evidence of the significant effects on the results of certain economic factors – such as the fall in unemployment, the increase in actual income and demographic changes – the experiment has certainly struck a chord. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act requires local authorities and the police to set up community security partnerships in order to improve co-operation between police officers and other bodies – such as the housing services – in the fight against antisocial behaviour. The 1999 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act speeds up court procedures and introduces a series of measures focusing on juvenile delinquents. Mandatory sentences have also been introduced for reoffending burglars.

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63. See the *Statewatch Observatory* on the use of ASBOs in the UK at: http://www.statewatch.org/asbo/ASBOwatch.html.
64. Quoted by *El País* of 11 December 2003.
65. http://www.mori.com/polls/1997/nfm02.shtml.

In a recent book,[66] Frank Field, former UK Minister for Social Reform, makes an even more explicit relationship between rights and responsibilities, putting forward a very controversial proposal: linking social welfare benefits to compliance with contracts imposing acceptable behaviour.

In France, which has some 1 100 problematic neighbourhoods, where crime and violence are part of daily life, the Interior Ministry has been running an unprecedented "zero tolerance" campaign, with greater police powers of arrest and seizure, new and tougher sentences, reducing to 13 the age at which a young person can be sent to a remand centre and the definition of new offences, such as the congregation of young people in stairwells, etc.

At the same time, most of those involved recognise the limits inherent in these punitive policies. Experience has shown that there is no linear relationship between the increased cost of applying punitive measures and a reduction in crime and violence. In point of fact, despite certain exceptions and variations, most European countries have found the opposite since the Second World War: a significant long-term increase in the number of police officers coupled with an increase in the prison population and violent crime.

Here too, the United Kingdom provides a typical example: in the last ten years, the number of prisoners has risen by 60% reaching a total of 74 000 while the overall level of crime has doubled. The cost of this huge prison population is estimated at some €4.5 billion per year, and more than one million offences (one fifth of the total) are committed by former prisoners, costing some €16.5 billion per year (a minimum estimate of the real cost given that the detection rate is extremely low). In 1990, a government White Paper stated that "prison is an expensive way to make bad people worse".[67]

Because of the limits inherent in these policies, most governments have been following a two-pronged approach: "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime".[68] Prevention and punishment must go hand in hand. The question is determining the weighting to be given to each one.

b. Emergence of preventive approaches to juvenile delinquency

There have been considerable changes over the years in preventive approaches to juvenile crime and violence which in the immediate post-war period were incorporated into the "welfare state model" of assistance and developmental support in the "best interest of the child"; this led to the introduction of the broad interventionist systems seen in most countries, particularly in northern Europe.

This model was challenged in the late 1960s by anti-psychiatry and children's rights movements focusing on the vision and cultural interest of young people. In the 1980s a more punitive individualistic model emerged, focusing on individual juvenile responsibility. These trends have been reflected in changes in the formal regulations of juvenile justice (Italy 1988, Germany 1990, Belgium 1994, the Netherlands 1995).[69] Today, most countries in reality continue to juggle the welfare/justice model and sometimes, without much great success, combine deterrence and prevention strategies in their treatment of youth violence.

A key starting point for many of the multidisciplinary and inter-sectoral strategies relating to youth violence and inclusion is the incorporation of a public health approach to crime prevention. These approaches

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66. Field, 2003.
67. *The Economist*, 18 October 2003.
68. Tony Blair's election manifesto, 1997.
69. Walgrave and Mehlbye, 1998.

focus on a concept of health which encompasses physical, mental and social well-being[70] with an explicit interest in identifying effective integrated strategies for prevention. According to this model:
- the primary level focuses on societal factors in an attempt to reduce the opportunities and motives for crime or insecurity;
- the secondary level focuses on specific at-risk communities or individuals;
- the tertiary level focuses on people who have already offended in an attempt to stop them reoffending.

Few attempts have been made to link these different levels in a unified integrated approach. One such attempt at a conceptual approach is the MLIVEA[71] framework (see table below) developed by Susanne Jordan at the Public Health Policy Research Unit, Berlin. This attempts to structure the multiple causes of youth violence identified by the WHO, focusing on the inter-relationships of the levels and the factors that lead to violence, and pointing to the need for a multifaceted, integrated and dynamic approach which can work on all these levels at the same time.

Table 2 – The MLIVEA framework, an example of the preventive model integrating the various levels

Level	Action
Macro Social cultural background Socioeconomic conditions Urbanisation	Economic and social policy for equity to combat deprivation
Local Home School Neighbourhood Workplace	Community initiatives: employment, health, education, social and cultural support
Individual Risk behaviour Experience of violence Alcohol and drug use	Strengthening resiliency, social development and skills
Violent act Self-directed violence Violence against property and people Group violence	Crime prevention, security and community safety: integrated police action
Health effect Mortality Well-being Costs for society	Emergency and rehabilitation care Counselling of targets and victims

c. National management of preventive approaches to juvenile delinquency

Most countries have set up national structures to guide and manage crime prevention approaches and are evolving towards international co-ordination. The European Urban Charter now refers to the right of

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70. WHO, 1998.

71. Jordan, 2001.

European citizens to a "secure and safe town as far as possible, [free of] crime, delinquency and aggression" building on Article 29 of the Amsterdam Treaty.

However, the degree to which the societal causes of juvenile violence are linked with strategies for social inclusion depends to a large extent on the players responsible for managing the strategies and the level of cross-disciplinary and departmental involvement in policy design and application. In countries where the police and forces of law and order are the prime movers of crime prevention strategies, such as Italy and Ireland, the focus is primarily on tertiary prevention.

Most northern European countries tend to have a separate national crime prevention board or department which is separate from, although linked to, the police systems and is supported at ministerial level. Often crime prevention responsibilities are shared between several departments.

Table 3 – National crime prevention approaches

Country	Agency responsible	Key actions
England and Wales	Home Office Crime Prevention Unit, co-ordinated with the Police Research Group, Department of the Environment, Welsh Office, Department of Education and Employment	Safer cities programme managed through three national agencies and local partnerships: police, local authorities (LAs), business Youth inclusion programmes Active Citizenship and Youth Action Plus Crime Concern charity
Belgium	Permanent Secretariat for Prevention Policy (VSPP), Ministry of the Interior	Local security/prevention contracts (police/LAs) Civic wardens Fan coaching Community negotiators Neighbourhood contact committees
Sweden	National Crime Prevention Council	Local crime prevention plans drawn up by LAs and police, community organisations
Netherlands	Crime Prevention Department, Ministry of Justice Responsibilities shared with other departments: welfare, health and culture	Local crime prevention committees incorporating youth, town planning, education and transport City guards Truancy projects Delft neighbourhood project Major cities policy
Spain	Co-ordination between national, regional and local authorities	Separated responsibilities: deterrence – police, social prevention – social and cultural affairs Local crime prevention depends on regional authority Barcelona: Consell de Seguretat Urbana
Denmark	First country to establish National Crime Prevention Council Ministry of Justice	Multi-agency, integrated approach implemented at local level Quality of Life in Local Areas project Egebjerggard experiment Regional crime prevention branches

Country	Agency responsible	Key actions
Germany	No national council Interministerial groups working on violence prevention Crime prevention councils in most federal states. Crime prevention section in National Crime Control Department	National programmes: Action Programme against Aggression and Violence; Challenging Violence; and Berlin´s Kick into Sport project
Ireland	Responsibility of national police force, Community Relations Section	Partnerships between police, voluntary organisations and private sector Special councils running neighbourhood watch Community-driven estate regeneration: Mayfield, Cork
Scotland	Scottish Crime Prevention Council, involving LAs, private sector, voluntary sector and police	Safer Cities programme ceased in 1996 Community Safety Unit – Lothian Regional Council Neighbourhood watch Community involvement Crime prevention panels
France	National Council for the Prevention of Crime chaired by the Prime Minister Regional councils chaired by chief administrator Municipal councils at city level.	OPAH* MOUS** Droit de Cité DIV*** Violence prevention in schools Municipal council examples

* OPAH (Opération programmée d'amélioration de l'habitat);
** MOUS (Maîtrise d'œuvre urbaine et sociale);
*** DIV (Délégation interministérielle de la ville).

d. Youth crime prevention at neighbourhood level

There is no comprehensive evaluation at European level of the distinctive content and impact of the various crime prevention schemes in member states. What can be seen is that whilst most countries emphasise an integrated crime prevention approach focusing on the different causes of youth crime and promote a neighbourhood approach at local level, there is a marked tendency to focus on opportunity reduction and "designing out crime", with the community involvement seen primarily as a deterrent and means of surveillance.

Crime Concern, a UK charity responsible for promoting multi-agency crime prevention strategies, pointed out recently[72] that many of the specific crime prevention partnerships have found it difficult to deliver for the following reasons:

– partnerships are too often an end in themselves: committees do not prevent crime;
– individual agencies often do not operate constructively for the good of the multi-agency approach;
– there is a lack of a focused programme of action, identifying problems and designing specific solutions; and
– most programmes concentrate primarily on preventing crime rather than criminality.

72. "Working in partnership, opportunities and challenges": workshop led by Jon Bright, Director of Field Operations, Crime Concern Conference, 2001.

An initial analysis of projects promoted by these agencies highlight a relatively reduced number of social crime and community development approaches; most focus on neighbourhood crime prevention by:

- reducing opportunities for crime through better security, more surveillance, improvements to design and layout of public buildings and spaces;
- improving community safety: good estate management, caretaking, community wardens, neighbourhood watch schemes, city guards;
- preventive policing: local beats, local prevention panels involving parents, schools.

However, approaches to prevent crime, particularly among young people, require a broader approach focusing on prime influences: family, school and community, linking social and economic opportunities and ensuring the empowerment and rebuilt social capital of young people themselves.

How these projects work on the ground and what distinguishes the partnerships focused on crime prevention from other neighbourhood partnerships is: the degree to which crime is prioritised over other social and economic causes of youth exclusion; the type and role of the organisations involved in them and, above all, the degree of importance attached to youth empowerment.

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, in its recently published manual *Urban crime prevention: a guide for local authorities*,[73] focuses on the need to promote long-term preventative measures through a local partnership approach involving the police, media, schools, the business community, local authorities and the local community. The guide emphasises the need to move on from traditional methods of juvenile crime prevention, away from a punitive approach towards one where formal recognition is given to the "pivotal role of young people within neighbourhoods and the need to actively seek their involvement and co-operation, accepting that they form part of the solution to their problems and must be treated as partners".

4.2.2. Employment policies and strategies for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods

The difficulties young people from lower-income neighbourhoods encounter in finding a job have prompted those responsible for sectoral policies to develop specific approaches to encourage social integration through employment. These have made it possible to go beyond the passive "job offer" approach by including the young people themselves. A number of examples are given below.[74]

Comprehensive pathway approaches

The comprehensive pathway approach refers to individualised routes to employment based on an integrated series of services such as: guidance, counselling, mentoring, training and pre-training, certification, work experience and job placement.

The New Deal Gateway Programme developed by the UK Government provides an example of the approach promoted by many European countries. It aims to provide 18-24 year olds who have been unemployed for more than six months with an opportunity to find sustainable employment.

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73. Council of Europe, 2002.

74. Fuller details of these projects can be found in Soto, P., in Council of Europe, Trends in social cohesion, No. 8, Council of Europe Publishing, 2004.

It follows an individual pathway approach: (i) the gateway: initial four-month programme which supports participants into work through job search, careers advice and guidance; (ii) a choice of four options, three of which involve education or training and a subsidised job with an employer or in the voluntary sector. The fourth option involves a return to full-time education or training for a year; and (iii) the follow-through strategy offers support once the participant is on a placement or in a job and helps maintain them in employment or restart the system. Each young person is supported by an employment service personal adviser who remains their point of contact throughout the programme. When needed they are offered a range of additional measures: job search techniques, confidence building, taster courses. They also have access to a mentoring service and personal support from specialist agencies.

Mentor support for youth ownership of employment processes

Many projects prioritise the use of mentors in the pathway process rather than traditional advice or guidance workers. Mentors enter into a personal contract with the young person and see their primary role as supporting them in their bid to take responsibility and control over their own search for employment.

An example is offered by the project Towards a Second Chance School set up in Cork, Ireland. Each young person was allocated a pathway mentor who met to review the young person's work placement and career plan. Each month the young person completed a review of practical, personal, and employability skills that had been learned in order to set his/her own goals for the next month. An external evaluator met with the young people every six months to assess progress and agree any changes in the programme with the young person. Ongoing self-evaluation and feedback sessions reinforced attitudinal changes and empowered the young people in analysing the learning process, outcomes and formulating new targets. Joint evaluation sessions with parents were also incorporated.

Peer training models

Empowerment involves seeing young people not only as beneficiaries but as key resources. Some projects actively promote the preparation of peer trainers and advisers as a way of providing positive role models for other young people. In this way the project capitalises on youth skills and promotes bonding social capital between young people and the community.

An example of this is the Surf-in Internet Café in Kiel, Germany. This is a pre-training, work-induction project initially targeting young women without qualifications. It aimed to make learning interesting by using IT as a learning medium. Technical training in computer skills and programming was provided over two years and complemented by work experience, leadership techniques and personal skill development. The young women were involved in co-defining and managing the project. Women from the project then set up a new project and were responsible for peer education and mediation, building on their peer leadership skills to train other young women. They also provided coaching, counselling and guidance and carried out information activities with primary and secondary schoolchildren.

Promoting youth group empowerment

Some projects emphasised the need to link individual and group empowerment. In this way young people start to interact collectively with the labour market and economic decision makers and create a powerful peer role model for youth action. The Labour Institute of Greece (General Workers Confederation) set up Diktyo, a project which supported the active involvement of young people facing educational difficulties

in identifying training and employment needs and in solutions to the barriers to integration in the labour market. As a team the young people made contact with key players in the local economy and regional decision makers to sell their ideas. In the region of Thessaly the Youthstart beneficiaries succeeded in demonstrating the need for training and job creation in new growth areas such as the environment. Their lobbying led to the provision of an open green area in the municipality and the implementation of an action plan for the acquisition of new skills for nature conservation. This experience gave them confidence to develop peer information activities for other young people and promoted an increase in youth involvement in community development.

Strategies for effective partnerships and inter-agency working

A key success element in comprehensive pathway approaches is ensuring effective co-ordination between agencies vertically and horizontally. With many youth employment-focused projects the main partnership sought after is a vertical co-ordination between schools, training institutions and companies in order to increase the viability of training content and increase youth integration.

This can be illustrated by the Practex (Luxembourg) project which focused on promoting a co-operative partnership between school and industry with the aim of adapting youth training more closely to national labour market needs. The partnership promoted co-operation between thirty companies and emphasised hands-on training in the building sector. The training alternated between school and seven enterprises matching theoretical training with practical on-the-job experience. The project focused on the content of the training and provided mentoring and guidance. Within the companies, supervisors were assigned to individual participants. At the end the young people gained a vocational qualification. Key success points were a strong vertical partnership between schools and companies and clearly established functions and roles.

Other projects focused on horizontal linking with the need to co-ordinate and harmonise activities between different services often offering similar services in order to provide a full range of support services to young people, and to gain community recognition for young people's needs.

The Molenwer aan het Spaarne project set up in Harlem, in the Netherlands, aimed to develop structured co-operation agreements between different providers of services for young people in order to deliver an individual pathway and contract model. This included statutory and voluntary agencies, employers, further education and training centres. The project also aimed to integrate young people into this partnership approach, encouraging teamwork and involvement in monitoring and evaluation processes. The impact was evaluated highly by the social recognition of the outcomes as the project was deemed to have created a more positive attitude in the surrounding community towards unemployed young people.

Integrating strategies for social and economic inclusion

Many youth employment projects primarily focus on at-risk youth in deprived areas who have dropped out of the traditional school and/or employment systems. These groups give priority to the integration of economic and social goals as a means to inclusion.

An integrated approach operates at two levels: a holistic treatment of the young people themselves, linking personal, social and economic development and building up linking work with the key players who affect young people's lives: parents, public services and private companies. An example of this approach can be seen in the project Social Skills which offers an alternative to the social exclusion of young people. This project is run by the Abrera Town Council, Barcelona, Spain. The programme aims to support the integra-

tion of socially and occupationally excluded youth who have dropped out of school. It provides a pathway approach in three stages: (i) training in social and life skills; (ii) work experience in commerce and small service companies; and (iii) professional and labour guidance.

The training is done through informal methods: games, dramatisation, open-air activities, theatre, etc. It focuses on the need to develop social and relationship skills, working on themes of communication, self-control, family relationships, drugs, friendships, racism, etc. Key work is carried out with the families of the young people to involve them in the approach.

The companies involved in the work experience phase are trained in evaluation methods and meet the project educator once a week for monitoring sessions. The whole process is interlinked with integrated job guidance in both individual and group sessions. At the end of the programme the youths receive €90 with a certificate attesting to their participation. The project sees the re-establishment of the young person's relationship to the outside world covering educational and emotional spheres as the key element. In 1998, 77% of the participants joined education or the labour market at the end of the programme.

4.3. The emergence of "third generation policies": the search for comprehensive preventive approaches

a. Origin and development of comprehensive preventive approaches

The threat posed by the concentration of socially excluded groups in certain neighbourhoods of many European cities has led the European Union and many national governments in Europe to search for new ways of integrating excluded urban communities as a whole. These approaches differ from the preceding approaches in that they do not start from a single-issue basis (violence or employment) but aim to tackle the question of social inclusion from all angles.

Quite logically, these models have a territorial dimension, with the focus on tackling the issue of lower-income neighbourhoods and the young people who live there, at urban, regional or national level. They follow on from the territorial approaches to urban renewal over the last twenty-five years which placed the emphasis less on physical infrastructure and more on a welfare-based approach concerned with the underlying economic potential and performance of the excluded areas, with efforts to promote labour market strategies and engage the private sector. The aim was to emphasise the need to engage the local community in its own renewal strategies and to put social inclusion at the heart of the strategies.

Such integrated urban strategies have thrown up a series of problems such as:
- how to achieve a genuine inter-sectoral and interdepartmental approach on the ground;
- how to mobilise and concentrate resources on particularly deprived areas when national governments are pressured to extend benefits more widely;
- how to reconcile local partnerships with regional and city interests;
- how to make the community a central player in the partnerships and thereby build a sense of empowerment and social capital.[75]

European institutions and national governments have responded in different ways to these problems. In parallel, there has been a myriad of local experiments which have thrown up lessons and tips for policy.

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75. Parkinson, 1998.

In 1998, the European Commission issued a communication on Sustainable Urban Development in the European Union: a Framework for Action. In this document, it was argued that there was a need for better co-ordinated and targeted community action, placing the emphasis on employment strategies as part of an overall integrated territorial approach tackling social and economic inclusion. It also laid down a series of common guidelines for all area-based urban renewal initiatives, which correspond very closely to the key principles mentioned in the introduction of this report.

The guidelines for area-based urban regeneration in the European Commission communication include:
- a strong partnership to define challenges, strategy, priorities and resource allocation and to implement, monitor and evaluate the strategy. Partnerships should include economic and social partners;
- linkage of the strategic plan for the area in question to the economic, social and physical network of the wider urban area (vertical integration), including between-neighbourhood partnerships and agents responsible for the social and economic strategy of the wider conurbation;
- integration of the economic, social, security, environment and transport aspects including access to jobs and training opportunities from areas of concentrated exclusion (horizontal integration);
- local capacity building and empowerment of excluded groups;
- a multi-annual and contractual approach with agreed outputs and performance measures.[76]

One of the main advantages of neighbourhood approaches is that it is possible to look at community development from several angles: economic, social, environmental, spatial, etc. In practice, the criteria that make the difference are the following: to what extent are these initiatives and approaches interlinked? Who are the partners? What processes and methods are used?

The challenge to be addressed is therefore to link up the different strategies. This does not mean merely bringing closer together the institutions which influence the lives of young people (school, family, businesses), but also including the young people's perspective in all social and integration practices.

Niddrie House Community Development is a social housing development built in the early 1970s on the periphery of Edinburgh, Scotland, in an area suffering from high levels of poverty and crime. In 1988 the local housing department started to involve local residents in an urban renewal programme. However, the local residents action group formed the Niddrie House Planning and Rehabilitation Group (NHPRG) as they disagreed with the priorities of the housing department and they obtained a grant to appoint their own development team. Their plan stressed the need to link any physical regeneration with socioeconomic improvements and that local people should be involved in both determining what should be done and managing its implementation. A key concern was to involve young people in all activities.

Crime prevention was an explicit part of a more general quality-of-life programme. Defensible space theory was applied to courtyards, and layout and phone entry systems were introduced. A major emphasis was made on finding constructive outlets for young people who might otherwise drift into crime. A housing co-operative, a community centre, play areas and several community businesses employing young people were set up. The community businesses developed a community shop, security services and a housing maintenance service. The result was a sharp drop in the high crime rate and this has been sustained over the last ten years.

Another example is the Euro-Integration project in St Denis, France, which has transformed an initial training-based policy into a learning-orientated initiative for the whole area. The local council entrusted

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76. European Commission, Communication "Sustainable urban development in the European Union: a framework for action", 1999, p. 14.

the association Objective Employment to develop new systems of social and employment integration. The action is based on wide-scale partnership between professional, public and private members in the fields of education, social, cultural work and employment. Economic development is promoted by tapping into the indigenous capacity linked to historical, cultural and economic assets. The project offers young people and the long-term unemployed pathways to employment: training in professions related to urban tourism (stained glass, artistic textiles and engraving). It has also built upon existing links between agencies and created new forms of collaboration and solidarity with the local population. A youth network was created through which the progress of the various initiatives is continually monitored and evaluated. Key success points include an integrated approach linking employment and social integration; wide-ranging partnership between public, private and community sectors; creating employment from indigenous resources: human, spatial, social and cultural; and commitment to informal networking to keep young people involved.

b. Added value of comprehensive preventive approaches compared with remedial approaches

One of the main differences in comprehensive preventive approaches is that they allow the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods, and therefore the young people themselves, once again to have their say and have some decision-making power. They are therefore fundamental with regard to the objectives of the well-being of all, as formulated by the Council of Europe (see next chapter). The following are some of the aspects of this added value compared with conventional remedial approaches.

Non-stigmatising approaches

In remedial approaches, the policy rationale underlying programmes to solve the problems in lower-income neighbourhoods is often geared to a standardisation of situations in order to draw up benefit award "grids". The limits of such an approach become apparent when attempting to move beyond the target group in order to address the question of reducing exclusion factors. If we look at the impact of such remedial policies, it is clear that singling out the target group which is in receipt of benefits from other groups leads to a hierarchy of social groups and, consequently, stigmatisation.

This idea of hierarchy is seen in the concept of social "disqualification" developed by Serge Paugam.[77] He emphasises the "individual's experience" and points out the lack of esteem in which those who do not participate fully in society are held. Referring to the work of Georg Simmel who raises the issue of the very disparate nature of the "poor", reminding us that before becoming poor, individuals were defined by their social or occupational category (shopkeeper, artist, employee, etc.). Defining people as "poor" is therefore seen as a need to create a social class whose sole characteristic is a lack of financial resources, and with the aim of being able to grant public aid.

In devising the concept of social disqualification, Paugam based his approach on the relationship between society and those acknowledged as poor by society. His idea was to say that being in receipt of assistance is degrading because it highlights the person's inability to be independent. This becomes all the clearer when seen in conjunction with the theory of "labelling" advanced by Erving Goffman. The "assisted", disadvantaged population (or the population of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods) is "publicly designated as belonging to …", which in turn reinforces their disaffiliation.

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77. Paugam, 1997.

Comprehensive preventive policies offer a solution to this inconvenience, as young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are no longer treated as a target group, and instead become active players.

Recognition and development of the knowledge and experience of young people

Smaakmakers (Trendsetters) in the Netherlands, for example, is a youth organisation that works in co-ordination with local organisations for volunteer work throughout the country. They send in flying teams of youth trainers and advisers to teach managers of volunteer organisations in local neighbourhoods how to foster youth participation in their areas. Their main principle is that youth volunteer work stands little chance of succeeding if young people are not involved at the design stage of a project.[78] Key success points are: building youth empowerment and community links through neighbourhood volunteer work; valuing young people's experience and contribution; creating youth-directed management practices and service delivery design.

Encouraging active citizenship

Comprehensive preventive policies encourage active citizenship as they include in their very conception the participation and commitment of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. This is particularly important in many of the former Soviet countries, where the priority is placed on helping young people move away from passive dependence on the state and encouraging active, critical and responsible citizenship.

The Tolerance and Democracy project in Stara Zagora, Bulgaria, involves young people in simulations of elections and the running of municipal councils. The local council held training courses for young people, aged 14-19, on political life and citizenship. The first elections for a youth mayor were organised in 1996. The youth group then organised a series of activities: eco-patrols, young reporters covering the events in the media, and the organisation of youth meetings on key social, environmental and economic issues. The formation of the Youth Municipal Council (YMC) has enabled young people to intervene directly in public life through five standing committees: executive, social and school policy, health care and environment, culture and sports, and public relations and communications.

Its main goals are: direct involvement of young people in political decision making; to act as consultative group to the local authority on youth issues; to promote youth initiatives at local, regional and national level; to provide information; and to develop new projects and encourage positive attitudes towards responsible citizenship by young people. Key initiatives include: the participation of YMC representatives in municipal committees; the organisation of the Beautiful and Clean Zagora project; the development of an international youth project: Together in 2001- 2002; a Let's Think About Smoking campaign in schools and shops; promotion of local youth projects; a youth page in the local paper; an advert on local cable TV; and meetings with youth representatives from other local communities.

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78. Burmann et al., 2001.

CHAPTER 5 – FRAMING AND IMPLEMENTING MORE APPROPRIATE POLICIES

The policy trends described in the previous chapter, discussing three generations of policies (general sectoral policies, specific remedial policies and comprehensive preventive policies) show that there have been significant cumulative learning processes in approaching the question of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. In particular it can be seen that such young people who at the outset were overlooked in public policies, gradually became the focus of specific policies, coercive rather than preventive, and finally have been integrated into comprehensive preventive approaches.

Obviously, this learning process is not a linear one and depends on a variety of contexts – national, political, social, cultural, etc. Nonetheless there is a common thread which can serve as a reference point in reflecting on more appropriate policies.

The latest generation of policies (comprehensive preventive approaches) is still in the experimentation phase; not all the possible lessons have yet been learned and it has not yet produced a framework for reflection which can serve as a general reference for tackling the issue of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. That is the aim of this chapter, divided into three stages:

– setting out the principles at stake and identifying the advances made in applying these principles that are of most interest;
– a critical discussion on the limits and obstacles present and how these can be overcome;
– drawing up guidelines for framing more appropriate policies.

5.1. The principles of comprehensive preventive approaches and advances in their application

There are three main principles which are characteristic of comprehensive preventive approaches:

– integration: such approaches are different from sectoral approaches in that they are comprehensive and integrated. As a result, they are applicable whatever the geographical context;
– partnership: they rely on dialogue between all stakeholders in society: it should be pointed out that such dialogue is not limited to mere consultation but includes co-operation on the devising and implementation of joint action plans;
– empowerment of individuals, groups and the different partners.

These principles are fundamental in the case of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods as by their very nature they prepare the ground for a process of inclusion. The idea of partnership and dialogue and co-operation aimed at empowerment gives young people (and any other social group) the opportunity to express their own aspirations and state them as a starting point for discussions on policies, as opposed to a situation in which young people's needs are predefined in line with norms applied to all individuals. It remains to be seen how they are applied and how one can overcome the obstacles that inevitably occur in practice.

The following are a number of examples illustrating how these principles have been applied.

a. Integration

A key advantage of neighbourhood approaches is the potential to deal with community development across a range of spheres: economic, social, environmental, spatial, etc. This is illustrated by the social, economic and environmental revival of the peripheral neighbourhood of Otxarkoaga, Bilbao, Spain, which was developed under the Urban Pilot Projects, Phase II, between 1997 and 1999.

This was an integrated neighbourhood development project based in a peripheral social housing neighbourhood with a declining industrial base affected by high unemployment, school dropout, crime, drug abuse and other social problems, through integrated initiatives linking different areas of youth concern with the development of the neighbourhood.

Young people were centrally involved in the environmental and spatial improvement of the area whilst at the same time creating employment, firstly by cleaning up the estate and then by setting up a recycling centre. Another group was trained and then employed to work on the housing rehabilitation schemes on the estate. A further initiative was revitalising a shopping centre as a seedbed for youth enterprises. Youth groups were encouraged to participate in the development of ideas and priorities for the estate, setting up a youth centre and activities in the newly rehabilitated centre

In other cases, the integrated approach began with an initiative from young people themselves, who over time called on other players, as in the case of the La Bastide association.

The La Bastide association was started in 1989 in Beaubreuil, France, by teenage children of immigrants as a response to neighbourhood renewal and the feeling that it did not reach young people's concerns. They formed a spontaneous organisation initially to organise cultural, educational and sporting events. This soon developed into an intermediary service between young people, local residents and the council, helping them deal with complicated formal and administrative procedures and encouraging solidarity between different sectors and age groups in the community. The group was lucky enough to receive the backing of the deputy mayor who supported their expanded functions and request for funding and provided premises and support for new neighbourhood initiatives on employment, training and career guidance. An important element has been wider community involvement leading the group to focus on broader concerns: housing maintenance, local servicing, the elderly and childcare, and the isolation of young single people.[79]

b. Partnership

The broader integrated approach implies the need to involve a more disparate set of partners: not just school, employers, and public services but the whole range of community services, police, voluntary sector organisations and, most importantly, the community itself as an active member.

The New Deal for Communities (NDC) neighbourhood project in Middlesborough, UK, has taken an innovative partnership approach by developing a different range and breadth of partnership arrangements to deliver the best solutions for each area: the local health trust works with local residents and young people to develop specialist services and pilot new ways of tackling drug problems on the estates; the police are involved in a separate partnership working with the council, local residents and youth groups to develop a local response to crime prevention. Leisure provision brings together young people with other community groups, public services, schools and key private companies. The NDC management committee invests a lot of time in producing a joined-up agenda: ensuring links between the different partnerships whilst ensuring

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79. European Commission, 1997.

the direct involvement of the key parties concerned in each area. This approach relies on giving high priority to knowledge management systems and developing effective consultation skills. Youth leaders are given capacity training to learn effective intervention strategies. Ways of working are rethought, meeting practices and use of jargon are changed and informal fun events are promoted that encourage social contact between young people and the rest of the partners.

c. Empowerment

Empowerment lies at the very heart of involving young people, as individuals or groups, in the community. However, the traditional approach to youth inclusion focuses primarily on individual empowerment. In contrast, neighbourhood policies mean that this individual approach can be run in parallel with the empowerment of groups of young people, able to take action on broader social and economic initiatives. The following examples are set out in relation to the aims pursued:
   – encouraging youth creativity and originality by treating young people as fully-fledged partners and not as problematic social groups;
   – strengthening leadership ability;
   – getting young people to manage their own neighbourhood services;
   – encouraging group empowerment and generation of ideas for framing neighbourhood policies.

Supporting youth creativity and originality

The Quota Quartiere, Unione, Orizzonti, Tentazione ed Arte youth project was set up under the Urban I Programme in Palermo, Italy.[80] The project was developed to combat social exclusion by involving young people in their community in innovative community development and employment initiatives. The main activities involved the creation of a community theatre process during which young people produced a theatre show based on their investigation of their neighbourhood's history which was then performed by local residents. This involved a process of workshops in theatre, video and scene-writing and the building of a cultural/recreation centre. Youth community employment projects were also developed whereby abandoned properties were converted into youth centres which are now maintained and managed by the young people, reducing the risk of vandalism.

Capacity building for youth organisations

The Droit de cité programme was established in France in 1992 to develop youth work by young people for young people, targeted at disadvantaged young people not reached by normal youth services. It operates throughout France and has involved over 300 000 young people. It aims to develop co-operation and leadership amongst young people through cultural and sporting activities. As a grass-roots initiative it had particular success in integrating young people from ethnic minorities who were marginalised in deprived neighbourhoods.

Getting young people to manage their own services

The Whoz-next Youth Campaign in the Netherlands is a neighbourhood-based "youth in movement" foundation which encourages youngsters from 14 to 18 not only to participate in but also to help organise

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80. European Commission, *Urban success stories: building a better tomorrow in deprived urban neighbourhoods*, 2000.

and run sports activities. They are taught to negotiate with the local community. In Hengelo a group of youngsters campaigned for a football field, backed by the local neighbourhood, because of problems with the police moving them on from unofficial sites. They have now organised a football league with various teams using the site. A number of neighbourhoods make a budget available to a group of youngsters every year, who use this to set up and organise their own tournament.

Ensuring youth group empowerment and involvement in policy development

The diversity and complexity of partnership members bring with them other problems and challenges. Each group has its own prejudices, interests and ways of working. It is often particularly hard combining the organisational culture of groups such as the business sector and young informal groupings. Commitment to equal partnership implies a reappraisal of the forms and ways of working together to create effective partnership processes.

In some cases, partnership is reflected by means of a mentoring role to enable young people to become key players for the regeneration of their neighbourhoods, based on a confidence-building process involving themselves, their peers and their communities, as in Powsechnej Akademii Mlodziezy (PAM) – Universal Youth Academy in Chelm, Poland. It is an innovative neighbourhood-based youth programme that seeks to unleash youth creativity and promote effective community commitment. The starting point is the young people's ability to develop their own ideas, define problems and come up with solutions, rather than relying on a predetermined set of activities and leadership techniques. The programme helps 16-20 year olds design and implement their own socially useful project for their communities, which may or may not lead to enterprise creation. PAM provides preparatory workshops and networking support in a three-stage training programme: (i) confidence-building and self-knowledge workshops; (ii) a team-building phase: learning to activate their organisational abilities; and (iii) brainstorming initiative ideas.

In the second phase they look for funds and get the projects off the ground with team support. The PAM facilitators continue to offer support if requested, particularly through networking advice such as how to access funds or organisational assistance. All PAM creators participate in a nationwide network which provides mutual assistance to its members. "The good thing about PAM is its lack of structure, it's not an institution, it has no ideology, it just connects people." In the last five years more than 300 young people have created community projects ranging from art exhibitions, anti-alcohol concerts to outreach programmes for cancer patients and environmental initiatives. Many of these have created short-term employment for the duration of the project and some have led to enterprise creation. All have resulted in lasting social integration for young people in their communities. In Chelm, a group of friends who had got together to organise concerts for local young people went through the PAM workshop process, and turned their small youth council for cultural development into a broader community venture. It now produces a local television programme on youth issues and runs multiple youth activities, and summer camps for children.

5.2. Limits and obstacles to comprehensive preventive approaches

While the principles of a comprehensive preventive approach are easy to state and understand, implementing them comes up against many obstacles of a conceptual, institutional and/or political, cultural or ideological nature since these principles are so unlike traditional policies. In particular, it is often difficult to get some quarters to accept the principle of dialogue with young people, placing them on an equal footing in the formalisation of needs and objectives and the framing of policies. Added to this are difficulties in language, forms of dialogue and many preconceived ideas, all of which can lead to severe sticking points.

For example, a report by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation on the participation of young people in urban regeneration initiatives in the United Kingdom mentions the following problems:[81]

- inadequate account is taken of the differing priorities of adults and young people in the partnership;
- staff and other adults often did not realise that their actions, language and behaviour could alienate the young people;
- the presence of the police and young people in the same partnership created a number of difficulties.

Accordingly, it is not always easy to apply the youth participation principle. But this difficulty often conceals others, because youth participation can frequently be hampered by the conscious or unconscious limits placed on such participation. For example, do young people have any decision-making power regarding their neighbourhood? Are all questions discussed or do some remain taboo? Is a positive image promoted of young people from disadvantaged neighbourhoods in a genuine partnership or are they first and foremost seen as a source of problems?

We therefore need to address a number of substantive issues which not only may represent obstacles to participation and dialogue but also challenge the benefits that can be derived from a comprehensive preventive approach.

There are four main types of obstacles to a comprehensive preventive approach:

- conceptual obstacles;
- institutional and political obstacles;
- cultural obstacles;
- ideological obstacles.

a. Conceptual obstacles: from beneficiary to partner

Adopting a comprehensive approach to dealing with a problem implies incorporating aspects of the context which, in a conventional approach, are viewed as unalterable. A comprehensive approach can therefore rethink some of the rules of the game which are consciously or unconsciously removed from the debate in an approach mainly geared towards solving a problem.

This is all the more true if young people are viewed as partners and not merely as beneficiaries of social policies. Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods can then raise substantive problems, such as the question of equal access to financial resources, the means to live, and access to resources to mount projects, and to employment.

There is doubtless a tendency to consider that young people are unable to organise themselves and do not have the necessary links with society in order to take responsibility for their own destiny. The alienation referred to at the end of Chapter 1 does not mean that these links do not exist, but rather that the individual chooses not to be involved in meaningful structures:

"We seem to have new loose forms of social interaction which are no longer community-oriented, aimless roaming about leading nowhere, typified by the spectacle of idle youths hanging around. What they are lacking is not so much communication with others (they often have more extensive relationships than

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81. Fitzpatrick, S., Hastings, A. and Kintrea, K., 1998.

many members of the middle classes) but projects through which their interactions become meaningful and through which they can express themselves.[82]"

b. Institutional and political obstacles: moving beyond inclusion policies

Taking seriously the idea of encouraging young people to be part of meaningful structures is a major challenge for any policy – and particularly inclusion policies – seeking to strengthen social cohesion. Such policies have broken new ground in the history of social welfare, traditionally structured between cover through work for all those who could – and therefore had to – work and access to assistance for those who could not or who were exempt from working for legitimate reasons. They fall within this uncertain area where there is no guarantee of work even for those who would like to, and where the erratic nature of certain life paths are not solely due to individual factors of maladjustment. They therefore adopt a positive discrimination approach, targeting particular population groups or areas of the social sphere to which they apply specific strategies. The population groups or areas in question are selected because they are perceived to be suffering from an "integration deficit" (residents of run-down neighbourhoods, school dropouts, inadequately employed or unemployable young people, etc.). Inclusion policies can therefore be seen as remedial measures to help people cover the distance between them and full integration (decent living conditions, "normal" schooling, a stable job).

Despite the considerable efforts made for over twenty years, inclusion policies have done nothing to bring about a fundamental change to this situation: at present, certain groups are impossible to integrate. While such policies are clearly able to create forms of social interaction, or consolidate them where they exist, they are too insubstantial to sustain an integration project. Because they are based on the certainty that the origins of the problems of "difficult" neighbourhoods are to be found in the neighbourhoods themselves, or that the disadvantages experienced by certain population groups are measured by the extent to which they fall short of an ideal model (the middle classes, to whom every social and moral virtue is attributed), these approaches isolate individual issues which are only meaningful in relation to each other. They ignore the interactions that link groups (not excluded but occupying the least privileged positions in the system) to other social environments. In a context of unequal distribution of the various forms of capital (social, economic and, increasingly, cultural) it is these relationships of domination that constitute the central issue for social cohesion in our societies. In a context that presents a peaceful vision of social relations and denies the antagonisms in our societies, we have to be aware that it has probably been only at the cost of destabilising the lower-income sections that other groups have been able to maintain their own social and economic stability.

Without turning the debate to this level, inclusion policies can become an obstacle to comprehensive preventive approaches. At best they are like safety-nets, designed to soften the most extreme consequences of the destabilisation of the lifestyles of social groups having to cope with a deterioration in their economic and social situation. It is clearly the balance of relations between social groups and the institutional frameworks organising them (the law, in particular) that need to be rethought in order to respond in such a way as to ensure that the most deprived people are genuinely integrated into society.

The conceptual obstacles which lead to a refusal to discuss certain substantive issues may be reflected in institutional and political obstacles, which are clearly more difficult to overcome as the problem is then one of legitimacy: the legitimacy of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to become fully-fledged

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82. See for example Soto, P., in Council of Europe, *Trends in Social Cohesion*, No. 9, 2004, or Williamson, Budapest, 2005.

partners and not merely the beneficiaries of social policies, and therefore able to participate on an equal footing in the political debate on the strategies of direct concern to them.

c. Cultural obstacles: moving beyond the culturalist view in order to develop a genuine culture of dialogue

Making the transition from the concept of beneficiaries to young people as fully legitimate partners also comes up against significant cultural obstacles. A further dimension that therefore has to be circumvented in debates and policies on lower-income neighbourhoods and the young people who live in them is the culturalist angle.

Many people involved in urban policy making tend to isolate culture – whether "youth culture" or cultural issues connected with multi-ethnic societies – and use it to explain all the problems and successive failures of the social interventions undertaken in this area. The element of truth that makes a stereotype credible should not be ignored, but usually overgeneralisation turns partial observations into unacceptable stereotypes. The notion of "culture" is frequently used to carry a whole series of stereotypes about "problem" neighbourhoods and ethnic minorities.

For example, it is argued that what is problematic is the cultural world of young people in problem neighbourhoods or from ethnic minorities, in other words, their values and the symbolic representations that determine their relationship with the world and others. But seeing the conflict between agents as a conflict of cultures amounts to seeing culture as intrinsic and presenting the problem in terms of cultural confrontation. The suggestion is that there is a radical cultural conflict between different segments of society that is expressed by an inability to communicate and therefore to negotiate and reach compromises that will lead to co-operation and therefore common action based on respect for common rules. One of the major problems with this approach is that it argues that what is presented as the insurmountable conflict between the groups that conform to the rules of globalisation – in terms of employability, mobility, flexibility, etc. – and those excluded from it is based on culture. Cultural problems cannot be isolated from the socio-historic context in which they arise, however. They cannot be dissociated from the structural transformations which have been affecting European societies for more than twenty years, the European social model in particular. The notion of culture therefore has to be contextualised since it often refers to other realities and is frequently used to obscure problems linked to the issue of "living together" in societies affected by processes of fragmentation and social exclusion.

Culture is an ever changing historical construction indissociable from social practices that reflect constantly renewed conflicts between social classes. Using the word "culture" should never obscure the fact that what we are dealing with is an ongoing process of transformation of representations and standards. This essentialist approach to culture is problematic because it is marked by an ahistorical conception of the relationship between groups' cultures and practices and tends not to consider the ability of groups to change their value systems according to changes in their environment and the various situations they experience.

d. Ideological obstacles: moving beyond stereotypes

Ultimately, the roots of the conceptual, institutional, political and/or cultural obstacles are to be found in ideological obstacles which both support and shield them. These ideological obstacles are expressed in the form of stereotypes with varying degrees of validity, whose major drawback is that they are simplistic and can therefore lead to false conclusions because of a refusal or inability to analyse them critically.

For example, it is often said that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods "have little or no regard for accepted social norms", that they "make public areas unsafe", "prefer the easy money afforded by the informal economy", "do not contribute to local development", etc. as justification for not establishing a partnership with them; that at best they could be the beneficiaries of certain policies, and at worst their behaviour should be punished and that they should be segregated or locked away to avoid any deviant behaviour which could pose a threat to law and order.

While these obstacles are the easiest to overcome, at the same time they are the ones most entrenched in society, and are firmly rooted in public opinion. They also often form part of the political message of the populist parties, particularly the extreme right, which seek to use them as a means of gaining votes.

Ideological obstacles or stereotypes are, therefore, the ones on which we should first focus our attention, for at least three reasons:
  – they concern society as a whole and not only those directly or indirectly involved in policies;
  – they are the seedbed in which the other obstacles (conceptual, institutional and political, cultural) can thrive, or in any event the basis which allows them to persist;
  – they are more easily refutable through critical analysis.

For these reasons, Part Two of the guide analyses these stereotypes and looks at how we can move beyond them. This is essential in any effort to affirm comprehensive preventive approaches.

5.3. Drawing up general guidelines for framing and implementing more appropriate policies.

An analysis of the obstacles to what we have termed comprehensive preventive approaches to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods shows the inherent difficulties in such an approach in an institutional, political, cultural and ideological context, characterised by several decades of conventional sectoral policies.

Which is why such approaches need a logical reference framework for devising policies, going beyond a simple listing of principles and building on the necessary conceptual and political bases. This means putting much thought into the very paradigms which guide policies for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

a. Bringing about a paradigm shift

The framing of new policies for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods requires a paradigm shift. Here, reference is made to the two approaches to social cohesion described in the *Concerted development of social cohesion indicators – Methodological guide*[83] a negative approach, focusing on the negative phenomena deemed to be responsible for inadequate social cohesion, and the positive approach, focusing on "society's ability to provide all its members with access to a decent quality of life".

The political challenge lies in the shift from the first approach to the second. As the guide says: "More often than not, social inclusion strategies are geared only to remedial action aimed at integrating the excluded into the existing labour market or into the existing development frameworks, by creating jobs or

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83. Council of Europe, *Concerted development of social cohesion indicators – Methodological guide,* 2005.

bringing about a certain improvement in living conditions, without, however, adopting an overall preventive approach to social cohesion."

What interests us here is how to move on from integration policies which are devised simply to remedy the effects of the spatial segregation operating in lower-income neighbourhoods with its quality of life implications. For example, while job creation through specific programmes is important, it is even more important to frame policies which will put in place the right conditions for the economic stability of young people, offering the prospect of personal autonomy. The same is true for other sectors such as housing, regional/spatial planning and education.

There is a clear link between the concept of social disqualification and the negative approach to social cohesion; a deficit-based approach leads to a process of degradation of the individual through the exposure to society of their inadequate resources. There can be a shift towards proactive social cohesion approaches only if account is taken of the dimension of the dignity and recognition of the individual and collective capital of the young people living in lower-income neighbourhoods: this also requires consultation and co-operation between services and public authorities to ensure that an incomplete analysis of needs does not lead to inadequate responses to the complex situation of these young people.

b. Using the conceptual and policy bases suggested by the Council of Europe

The Council of Europe, as the primary pan-European reference body in the field of human and social rights, has highlighted the key components of a conceptual and policy reference framework.

In 2001, the Parliamentary Assembly, in Recommendation 1532 (2001)[84] stated that "there is a growing recognition that juvenile justice or criminal justice agencies will not of themselves resolve the problems posed or experienced by children and adolescents who offend … The Parliamentary Assembly believes that the response to youth violence needs to be based on prevention rather than repression or punishment, addressing at the earliest possible stage the situation of children facing disadvantage and risk".

The Assembly suggests that a dynamic social policy for children and adolescents in towns and cities be based on the following elements: partnership and participation of all sectors (local and national, public and private); a mainstreaming approach to address the full range of risks facing children and adolescents; participation of children and adolescents in decision-making processes and policy development; measures and programmes which support parents and families in their parenting role; promoting the role of formal and non-formal education; assisting children and adolescents in the transition from school to employment; enriching leisure pursuits; taking account of gender-based issues; and measures to improve the situation of street children.

More generally, the Council of Europe advocates the idea of social cohesion "as an essential complement to the promotion of human rights and dignity"[85] and in the first version of its Strategy for Social Cohesion called for a preventive approach to strengthen social cohesion "designed to reduce the risk of future social and political disruption". It urged action "to combat poverty and social exclusion [going] beyond treating the symptoms [and strengthening] those forces that help to create social solidarity and a sense of belonging", taking the view that some of those forces are within the legitimate ambit of government policy

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84. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 1532 (2001) on a dynamic social policy for children and adolescents in towns and cities.

85. See the final declaration of the Council of Europe's 2nd Summit of Heads of States and Government.

while others fall to the private sphere; "the challenge is to develop a greater sense of interdependence, of mutual responsibility and belonging, between the diverse individuals and groups who make up modern European societies".[86]

In the revised version of the Council of Europe's Strategy for Social Cohesion, approved by the Committee of Ministers in March 2004, this conceptual and policy approach is stated even more clearly. This time social cohesion is defined as "the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation",[87] which represents a double qualitative leap, in that:

– it places the preventive approach firmly among the objectives of social cohesion, which is to ensure the welfare of all by minimising disparities;

– it places this challenge facing society no longer at the level of governments and public authorities alone. This is the idea of "welfare society" as opposed to the "welfare state" and shared or joint responsibility, making it clear that "this new situation does not imply a withdrawal of the state but leads to its seeking more varied means of action involving new partners".[88]

Lastly, the above guide spells out these concepts and explains more fully what is involved in a comprehensive preventive approach:

– first, it relates the concept of well-being to an inclusive vision of the different dimensions of human rights and of individuals as fully-fledged members of society, offering a four dimensional framework (1. equity in access; 2. dignity and recognition of diversity; 3. autonomy and personal, family and occupational fulfilment; and 4. participation and commitment) serving as reference points in the construction of criteria and indicators of what it is proposed be termed "citizen well-being" for all;

– second, it states that the criteria of well-being and social cohesion cannot in general be defined by an external entity, even if it is the state itself or experts in the field, but rather that it is a matter for all concerned, and therefore must involve a concerted approach among all the stakeholders.

The above comments offer some pointers for addressing the issue of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, as for any social group excluded from society. By stating that the definition of the criteria and indicators of well-being are a matter for all concerned and by giving broad scope to the definition of this well-being (including not only questions of equity but also dignity, autonomy, personal, family and occupational fulfilment and citizen participation), the guide offers young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (and any other socially or culturally excluded population group) on an equal footing with other members of society an opportunity to express for themselves, without any prior restrictions, their own criteria of well-being.

In other terms it is a means of recreating the right conditions for (re-)opening the discussion on the very foundations of the concept of action in the public arena, by including in this debate the very people involved, thereby avoiding the imposition of measures formulated in line with a narrow or ethnocentric vision of well-being.

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86. Council of Europe's Strategy for Social Cohesion. First version (2000), paragraphs 3, 13 and 22.

87. Council of Europe's Strategy for Social Cohesion. Revised version (2004), paragraph 1.

88. Ibid., paragraph 17.

c. Conclusion: the conceptual and policy foundations of a comprehensive preventive approach

In conclusion, the conceptual and policy foundations of a comprehensive preventive approach could be defined as follows:

1. A comprehensive preventive approach:
 – is more partnership-based than integration-oriented in the strict sense of the term;
 – by its very nature is not directed towards a particular social group (the "target group"), but treats all individuals and social groups equally. At its very essence therefore lies the concept of oneness;
 – means that the very concept of "target groups" disappears in favour of "partners".

2. The joint responsibility of players for the well-being of all is the central idea. The concept of joint responsibility goes much further than shared responsibility since it implies that the players feel responsible for each other, even where specific responsibilities might be defined. Joint responsibility presupposes:
 – consultation and co-ordination between players, without exclusion, in order to define shared objectives and clarify each person's commitments vis-à-vis these objectives;
 – decompartmentalisation between economic and social responsibilities.

 Accordingly, joint responsibility involves the setting down of ethical criteria defined in a concerted way among the players. It also includes the principle of empowerment with a sharing and solidarity dimension.

3. The concepts of equity in access, human dignity and recognition of diversity, autonomy and personal, family and occupational fulfilment, and participation and commitment offer an open and inclusive framework for a debate on citizen well-being. They:
 – help avoid any narrow vision which would exclude certain individual and social aspirations whose rejection, whether conscious or unconscious from the debate, would give rise to new forms of exclusion or conflict;
 – give well-being an essential societal dimension, making the link between individual and community well-being.

4. Lastly, a comprehensive preventive approach prompts reflection on methods of dialogue and consultation. Dialogue on the well-being of all presupposes a transition from dialogue based on power relationships between various interests to dialogue taking account of the interests of all and the general interest in a relationship of fairness.[89]

Finally, implementing a comprehensive preventive approach presupposes a method and the will to do so. In Part Two we show how fundamental these methodological principles are in order to build the foundations of societies creating inclusion, incorporating diversity as a factor of enrichment (see Chapter 1 of Part Two) and helping to overcome the ideological obstacles and stereotypes that are dominant among public attitudes and citizens.

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89. More on this subject can be found in Council of Europe, *Concerted development of social cohesion indicators – Methodological guide*, 2005, pp. 68-69.

Analysing and moving beyond the stereotypes

Social cohesion

Introduction

What do we need to do most in order to reflect as a society on the situation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods? Without a doubt, we need to move beyond the stereotypes that exist regarding the behaviour of these young people. Such stereotypes are powerful ideological barriers which tend to become truths set in stone, thereby eliminating the flexibility which is so necessary in order to understand the source of a problem in society and identify and assess the changes taking place.

Part Two of this guide sets out to identify some of the most widespread stereotypes concerning young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in our European societies. This somewhat unique exercise, carried out by several experts and neighbourhood leaders, will help understand these half-truths prevalent in social and political thought, occasionally appearing as absolute assertions. The stereotypes are organised in a way intended to facilitate interpretation, as follows:

Evaluation:
- To what extent is the stereotype justified?
- Is it widespread?
- How does it gain ground?

Understanding the underlying causes:
- What do young people think about the stereotype?
- To what extent do they contribute to its dissemination?

Measuring the consequences:

Finding alternative approaches
- What are the possibilities for or obstacles to finding alternative approaches?
- To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?
- How can these alternative approaches come about?

Each of these questions is explained further by means of indicators designed to verify or refute the statements. Part Three of the guide offers a description of the indicators.

This is not an exhaustive exercise, far from it. Nonetheless, it serves as an introduction to issues which have to be understood in order to engage in dialogue. It is not possible to dialogue on the basis of stereotypes. Dialogue is possible only when the full human, social and political dimension is accorded to the other, different, "problem", party; when the "other side" becomes the focus of interest without preconceptions in a spirit of understanding offering the opportunity for change.

This chapter is aimed at encouraging: (i) the development of a methodology based on dialogue and (ii) reflection on how to determine the statistical and political "truths" which underpin social action.

Chapter 1 – General approach to the stereotypes in dialogue on social policies

1.1. Obstacles to dialogue on joint responsibility for the well-being of all

In order to achieve the general objective of developing joint responsibility for the well-being of all through dialogue, as set out in Part One of this guide, it is essential to focus on the conditions required for such dialogue to take place. There are a number of obstacles to be identified before such dialogue can bear fruit.

The obstacles in question are of various types:
- institutional and political obstacles;
- cultural obstacles, insofar as there is no tradition of consultation and dialogue, particularly between institutions and the various players (public institutions, companies, NGOs, citizens) on seeking to satisfy, in a way that is fair to all, the interests of the community and of the individual;
- ideological obstacles, based on prejudices of varying degrees of validity, whose major drawback is that they are simplistic and can therefore lead to false conclusions.

Here we shall attempt to understand this last type of obstacle by analysing the stereotypes in question. Stereotypes are a prejudice expressed in the form of a half-truth, or rather a simplified truth which sees only one aspect; this can lead to an impasse in dealing with a problem.

Quite apart from the fact that stereotypes are obstacles to joint responsibility, they are also particularly dangerous in that they can produce chain reactions which consolidate them still further and give rise to tension and conflict, undermining the very foundations of social cohesion.

We therefore need to give much thought to these stereotypes in order to understand and move beyond the mechanisms by which they are reproduced. This is what we shall attempt to do first of all, and then identify the key questions to be asked in analysing any stereotype, and come up with a general method which we shall develop further in addressing more specific stereotypes relating to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

1.2. General analysis of stereotypes

In most cases, stereotypes refer to a particular social group which is in some way different from the "norm" (for example, young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, the Roma/Gypsies, immigrants, people with disabilities, over-indebted households). This perceived difference gives rise to discrimination against these groups and ultimately means that their needs are not taken into account in seeking to secure the well-being of all.

The production and reproduction of stereotypes is the result of a series of cause and effect relationships which can be represented as follows:

1. "Non-standard" response of the group in question vis-à-vis its rights → 2. simplistic and negative judgment on the group's ability to exercise its rights (original stereotype) → 3. non-recognition of the group's rights → exclusion of the group → 4. vicious circle intensifying the group's non-standard response, resulting in a "chain of stereotypes" → 5. corrective, punitive and/or discriminatory action, at times confinement (ghettoisation, isolation of certain neighbourhoods, prisons, psychiatric hospitals).

The starting point for the stereotype and its consequences is therefore the group's non-standard response vis-à-vis its rights, namely the fact that the social group in question does not fit in with the usual criteria regarding the various dimensions and areas of rights and well-being. For example, the Roma/Gypsies are itinerant groups living in caravans which is incompatible with the customary standards of well-being as far as housing is concerned (surface area per resident, sanitary conditions, security considerations). The behaviour of young people shows little or no regard for accepted social norms.

This presents us straight away with an initial substantive problem, namely modern society's excessive focus on what is "standard". It is partly due to the growing pressure for greater security (against accidents, theft) and to the desire to have a better system for monitoring each person's rights, but it excludes any concept of rights not falling within these standards. For example, housing standards today are very stringent and it is difficult to reconcile them with an itinerant lifestyle. Any outdoor activity organised by young people must comply with strict security standards and be given prior authorisation; as a result, it is virtually impossible for an informal group to organise something along these lines, and such activities are left to the authorities or associations with the necessary experience and recognition that young people seeking new forms of expression are unable to obtain. So, while on the one hand this growing "standardisation" has come about for reasons that in themselves are justifiable, on the other, it is without a doubt a factor that restricts the cultural and creative diversity of society.

The second problem underlying a stereotype is the blurring between a non-standard response to rights, the inability to exercise such rights and the non-existence of rights. It is the same as saying that because a social group does not fit in with the norm regarding a particular right, that right is not relevant to the group and society therefore does not have to recognise that it has that right. This comes about as a result of the simplistic judgment made of the social group's non-standard response. In order to understand it better, we can show how the stereotype may be expressed generically using the four dimensions of the right to well-being developed by the Council of Europe.[90]

Table 4 – Stereotypes as expressed in relation to the different dimensions of the right to well-being

The four dimensions of the right to well-being	Equity in respect of rights	Dignity and recognition	Autonomy and personal, family and occupational fulfilment	Citizenship	Overall conclusion
General expression	"They exploit the system"	"They have no respect for anything and have no values themselves"	"They are lazy and are not prepared to make an effort"	"They are irresponsible and could not care less"	"They are not suited to the objectives of well-being"

These different expressions show how these simplistic judgments imply either that the group is not able to exercise a right, or indeed that it does not have a right:
   – they exploit the system, therefore the right should be withdrawn;
   – they have no respect for anything and have no values themselves, so the right to develop their own values and identity does not apply to them;

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90. Council of Europe, *Concerted development of social cohesion indicators – Methodological guide*, 2005, p. 49.

– they are lazy and not prepared to make an effort, therefore the right to personal, family and occupational fulfilment is meaningless to them;
– they are irresponsible and could not care less, so the right to participation and commitment is irrelevant.

The non-existence or non-recognition of a right, whether implicit or explicit, derives from a narrow view and in practice results in the exclusion of the social group from that right.

This exclusion from the right to one or more dimensions of well-being is serious because it negates an undeniable aspect of human nature, the search for the well-being for each individual or social group that is so fundamentally needed. Inevitably it brings with it a situation of incomprehension and confrontation where neither side listens to the other and a vicious circle, which merely reinforces the original stereotype, brings along others and gives rise to a conflict situation and corrective, punitive measures in response.

In this vicious circle it can be seen how stereotypes can snowball, creating "stereotype chains" in a variety of ways:
– by giving the original stereotype a more general form;
– by seeking to justify this more general form by other arguments;
– by drawing conclusions which could justify corrective punitive measures;
– by seeking to justify the necessity for such measures.

Figure 1 – General illustration of a stereotype chain

Whereas the original stereotype (1) generally starts out in a fairly concrete form, even though objectively biased, the more negative expression of the stereotype (2) is a more general and often simplistic statement about the inability to adapt and is much more a subjective, "black-and-white" judgment than one based on facts. It then looks to arguments in justification (3) which are themselves either general and simplistic judgments, or more debatable points whose deductive link with the stereotype is invalid because only one aspect of the problem is considered. Statements justifying corrective punitive or discriminatory measures (4) are also general "black-and-white" judgments but they go further as they point to the danger to the general interest (insecurity, cost to society). Lastly, arguments stressing the need for such measures (5) are often based on the fact that such measures are lacking.

It can be seen that stereotypes become more forceful as they move on from the statement of facts, in which subjectivity plays a major role and is rarely questioned, to the call for coercive and/or discriminatory action to be taken.

The following is a practical example of these stereotype chains for each of the dimensions of well-being relating to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

Table 5 – Stereotypes relating to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (LINs)

Objectives of well-being	Equity in the enjoyment of rights	Dignity and recognition	Autonomy and occupational development	Personal and family fulfilment	Citizenship
General expression of original stereotype	"They exploit the system"	"They have no respect for anything and have no values themselves"	"They are lazy and are not prepared to make an effort"	"They are not capable of shouldering personal and family responsibilities"	"They are irresponsible and could not care less"
1. Example of the stereotype as applied to young people		"Young people from LINs have little or no regard for accepted social norms"	"Young people from LINs prefer the easy money afforded by the informal economy to serious work"	"Young people from LINs are unable to shoulder responsibilities for themselves or others"	"Young people from LINs play no part in contributing to local development"
2. Generalised affirmation of the stereotype		"Young people from LINs are going through a serious identity crisis"	"Young people from LINs have it too easy. They are not prepared to adapt to the labour market"	"Young people from LINs drop out of school"	"Young people from LINs are not politically active"
3. Arguments in justification		"Young people from LINs take over public places"	"Young people from LINs are not interested in vocational training"	"Boy-girl relationships have become more tense in LINs"	"Young people from LINs do not vote and are not interested in voting"
4. Statements justifying corrective punitive and/or discriminatory measures		"Young people from LINs make public areas unsafe"	"Young people from LINs are misfits in a world that prizes mobility above all else"	"In health matters, young people from LINs engage in high-risk behaviour"	
5. Arguments stressing the need for such measures		"The police no longer enter the neighbourhoods"			"Participation (in their own organisations) is the answer"

There is a marked difference between the first column (equity in enjoyment of rights), with seemingly no stereotypes, and the other columns. Looking more closely at the way the stereotypes are expressed, there is a considerable lack of symmetry in the stereotypes: almost invariably they concern the perception of the demands of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (dignity and recognition, autonomy and personal, family and occupational fulfilment, and citizenship) whereas there are virtually no stereotypes concerning what is being offered by the relevant institutions, particularly in terms of securing rights. This shows the extent to which young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are seen as an elusive and inflexible "demand" problem rather than as a social group needing more relevant measures.

1.3. Moving beyond the stereotypes

a. An open debate on well-being should be the focus of our concerns

It is not possible to move beyond the stereotypes without knowing and understanding the cause and effect chain that they are a part of. The above analysis offers an initial pointer.

It will be seen that in order to move beyond these stereotypes, it is necessary first of all to analyse the foundations of the original stereotype, namely the simplistic judgment on the group's inability to exercise its rights.

The real issue to be addressed here is emphasising the concept of the right to well-being before setting out the norms which will define it. Above all, the right to well-being is everyone's right to determine for himself or herself his or her own well-being as a life objective.

In other words, there should be a democratic debate involving all citizens on the definition of well-being. Clearly, in discussions of this sort, there will be contradictions and, above all, many things that are impossible. But, the idea is to express well-being as an objective and not an immediate response.

Reflecting together with young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is essential if as a community, at neighbourhood, municipal or regional level, we are to look at what constitutes well-being taking all viewpoints into account, particularly those of young people which will often be different from those of the adults who are the ones making the political and other decisions. This is the only possible starting point for dismantling the stereotype chain at its basis.

b. Existing stereotypes as a starting point

Such an exercise is not, however, easy given that the stereotypes are so deeply entrenched and can constitute obstacles to any form of dialogue, especially if they have already given rise to discriminatory or coercive measures, or the desire to take such action.

We therefore need to analyse the link between stereotypes and action taken or intended.

Table 6 – Generic analysis of the link between stereotypes and discriminatory or coercive action

The four dimensions of the right to well-being	Equity in respect of rights	Dignity and recognition	Autonomy and personal, family and occupational fulfilment	Citizenship	Overall conclusion
General expression	"They exploit the system"	"They have no respect for anything and have no values themselves"	"They are lazy and are not prepared to make an effort"	"They are irresponsible and could not care less"	"They are not suited to the objectives of well-being"
Consequences in terms of discriminatory action	Limit the level of assistance given	It is not worth investing in such neighbourhoods	It is not worth investing in training	It is not worth dialoguing with them	It is not worth investing in them
Consequences in terms of reactive action: one must:	Increase controls	Have police measures	Keep them confined to unskilled jobs	Take steps to stop them leaving their neighbourhoods	Keep them apart from the rest of society

This table shows how much more powerful the stereotype becomes and therefore points to the method on which attention needs to be focused in order to move forward: are we still in the assertion phase based on specific points or has the stereotype taken on a general form and expressed in a more pernicious way? If such is the case, is it already calling for particular measures to be taken? If so, what sort – coercive and/or discriminatory?

c. Dismantling the stereotypes

– If we are at the stage of the original stereotype based on certain specific observations, this needs to be looked at closely; the facts should verified by using objective indicators and we need to ask what these facts really mean.

– If the stereotype is already expressed in a more general way, it is more difficult to change since resentment and irrationality tend to prevail in the judgment made. Dialogue then plays a key role in order to make it possible to examine the validity of the stereotype.

– If the stereotype implicitly calls for punitive or discriminatory measures, a much more practical analysis can be made, looking at the soundness of the measures and their possible consequences.

In all cases, it will be essential to:

– question the validity of the stereotype;

– analyse the underlying causes

The following are a few general reference points which may help in breaking down stereotypes.

Table 7 – Generic analysis of stereotype foundations and causes

The four dimensions of the right to well-being	Equity in respect of rights	Dignity and recognition	Autonomy and personal, family and occupational fulfilment	Citizenship	Overall conclusion
General expression	"They exploit the system"	"They have no respect for anything and have no values themselves"	"They are lazy and are not prepared to make an effort"	"They are irresponsible and could not care less"	"They are not suited to the objectives of well-being"
Analysis of validity	Who benefits from whom?	No values or other, repressed values?	No will or no prospects?	In all circumstances?	According to what definition of well-being?
Underlying causes of the stereotype	Lack of equity encourages "resourcefulness"	The lack of any possibility of asserting one's own identity gives rise either to a rejection of the imposed identity and its symbols, or a transfer to the most accessible recognition of this identity (generally, material: consumption)	Unequal opportunities at the outset (environment, social, cultural) and forms of discrimination make social progression difficult, if not impossible above a certain level	Non-identification with the common identity leads to a dual rejection	The specific situation of the target group will lead to discrimination if there is no critical analysis made on the basis of our parameters

d. Introducing a new perspective

In tandem with the work on dissecting the stereotype, it is essential to inject a new perspective, taking care to gauge properly the capacity of the players to do this and drawing up a strategy to this end.

1.4. A few fundamental methodological rules

Bringing the issue of well-being centre stage and dissecting the stereotypes in order to introduce a new perspective must of necessity take on board a number of fundamental methodological rules, such as described below.

a. Dialogue

Whatever the stereotype, the very essence of the method to be adopted resides in dialogue, starting with the young people themselves. It is only through dialogue that it is possible to understand the different well-being demands, tailor the institutional response and get to the bottom of the reasons for the stereotype.

In order to be successful, dialogue must include all interested parties, not only the young people themselves and the relevant institutions, but also the local population voicing these stereotypes. To this end, there has to be a variety of forums and means of dialogue, such as meetings and public debates, including the media (local radio stations and television channels), etc. It is also recommended that an effort be made to avoid making such opportunities for dialogue specific activities which might put people off by being too austere and formal. Rather they should be incorporated into the life of the community in general, perhaps in the course of festivities or cultural events.

b. Back to basics

In any stereotype, especially if it is already well established and has gained in strength, dialogue may prove difficult given the tense and sometimes conflictual nature of relations. In such situations there is a risk that dialogue will focus on the more immediate aspects of the tension, or that it will crystallise in negotiation, a power struggle, leading to either deadlock or a partial and temporary solution without really addressing the root causes of the problem. Accordingly, it is essential in the course of the dialogue to move away from the immediate concerns focusing on what currently exists and concentrate instead on the genuine aspirations of young people and the population in general and initiate a joint search for acceptable solutions.

c. An emphasis on joint action

Jointly devising and implementing action, even one-off types of action, can have a very powerful effect of dismantling stereotypes as it affords a practical opportunity to discover the aspirations and qualities of all sides; more specifically, the rest of the population can learn more about the young people and vice versa. Joint action can therefore be much more effective than countless speeches in overcoming stereotypes. Nonetheless, if the stereotype is deeply entrenched, it may prove impossible to embark upon joint action. In such cases, the focus should be on smaller-scale action: a cultural or similar event which can kindle an interest in embarking on larger joint initiatives.

d. A joint effort at decoding the stereotypes

In order to eradicate the stereotype at its root and prevent it from re-establishing itself, there has to be a joint decoding effort. For as long as it is not dismantled, it will remain beneath the surface, easily capable of re-emerging, particularly when some crisis occurs (outbreaks of violence, unwarranted and immoderate speech, etc.). Decoding the stereotype is essential in order to recreate lasting confidence and dialogue, that is to secure full confidence, a sense of community, shared values and feelings, and the ability to hold on to them whatever happens.

e. Finding an alternative

Rebuilding a sense of community will be possible only if new prospects are opened up for social inclusion, the elimination of all forms of discrimination, and the sharing of opportunities and resources which are the foundations for trust and the assertion of the values of respect for diversity, tolerance and solidarity in the long term.

Well-constructed dialogue should open up new avenues provided that it takes into account all dimensions of well-being (and not just material well-being).

f. Conclusion: developing an inclusive and substantive dialogue

In conclusion, it is essential to develop a dialogue which is:
   – inclusive as regards all players, that is which places everyone on an equal footing: the group in question (young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in this case) and other social stakeholders, in particular the public institutions;
   – inclusive as regards interests, that is which seeks to reach a consensus incorporating in a fair way the interests of each individual and the general interest rather than in a power relationship leading to compromise which may not necessarily be positively viewed and accepted;
   – substantive, that is which does not merely look at the question of the appropriateness or acceptability of young people's demands or what is being offered in response, but which is based on an open debate on the genuine well-being aspirations of all.

1.5. Decoding approach: questions and indicators

In order to decode the stereotypes and develop inclusive and sharing-based alternatives, we are putting forward an analysis method and a series of questions.

It works in the following way: first we have a list of questions with the type of information and indicators to be taken into account in the replies, and some methodological recommendations for constructing the indicators in line with how powerful the stereotype has become. Lastly, in order to illustrate the proposed approach, there is a series of examples of stereotype analysis sheets relating to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. Each sheet follows the above reasoning and is illustrated with indicators which are fully described in Part Three of this guide.

a. List of questions

In the light of the foregoing, our proposed method for analysing the stereotypes is based on four groups of questions, as follows:

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent
– How justified is this stereotype?
– Is the stereotype widespread?
– How does the stereotype gain ground?
B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue
– What are the specific aspirations of this group that are misunderstood and help explain how this stereotype came about?
– How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to exclusion?
– How may exclusion factors lead young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?
C. Measuring the consequences
– What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does, or may the stereotype give rise to?
– What factors facilitate this action and constitute an obstacle to building up a sense of community?
D. Finding alternative approaches
– Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches
– To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?
– How can these alternative approaches come about?

b. Purpose of the questions and drawing up of corresponding indicators

The questions are open questions to allow for debate among the players concerned. Indicators are proposed for each of the questions. The following table illustrates how the questions tie in with the stereotypes and the type of indicators likely to be used in response, and makes some recommendations on how they should be constructed.

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

	Question		Indicators in response to the question			
	To what type of stereotype does it apply?	Purpose of the question	Purpose of the indicator	Type	Recommendations for constructing and interpreting the indicators	Sources
How justified is this stereotype?	This applies equally to the five types, although in a different way	The question is asked in order to clarify the extent to which the stereotype reflects the actual situation, whether objectively verifiable or not. It is a necessary starting point for dismantling the stereotype	Indicators to verify the meaning of the stereotype: 1. by comparative analysis of the facts, events and situations (for the original stereotype, the arguments used in justification, and the justification for corrective measures); 2. by analysing the opinion of young people in the case of more subjective tendencies towards generalisation	1. Objective comparative frequency indicators; 2. subjective survey-based indicators among young people from LINs themselves	1.a. To obviate any ambiguity, avoid absolute indicators and develop an indicator comparing the situation of the group with a similar group in the general population (for example, young people from LINs compared with young people in general or young people from well-off families). 1.b. Indirect indicators (for example, number of complaints on a given matter) should wherever possible be supplemented by direct observations or at least be taken into account with reservation	
Is the stereotype widespread?	Question applying to all five types	The question includes both quantitative aspects (proportion of people subscribing to it) and qualitative aspects (how widespread it is)	Indicators illustrating opinion on the validity of the stereotype	Subjective indicators		Specific surveys
How does the stereotype gain ground?	Important question when it becomes clear that the stereotype is conveyed by certain specific channels, such as statistics or the media	Possible vehicles for the spread of the stereotype: 1. at source: poor or incomplete information. For example, ambiguous or misleading unambiguous indicators such as comparative violence rate of young people from LINs based on police reports; ambiguous because it includes the comparative rate of incidents reported to the police. 2. Role of the media	1. Unambiguous indicators highlighting the ambiguous nature of certain more common indicators such as comparative file processing rate. 2. Analysis of media content, differentiating content type (original stereotype or generalisation) and indicators showing content frequency	1. Comparative rates; 2. indicators on frequency of certain content types	1. Ensure that the chain of factors giving rise to ambiguity has been properly identified. For example, the comparative rate of acts of violence resulting in a police report depends on both the victim declaration rate and the rate for such declarations becoming police reports	Analyses by specific surveys

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

	Question		Indicators in response to the question			
	To what type of stereotype does it apply?	Purpose of the question	Purpose of the indicator	Type	Recommendations for constructing and interpreting the indicators	Sources
What are the specific aspirations of this group that are misunderstood and help explain how this stereotype came about?	It is mainly when there is a generalisation of the stereotype (2nd type) that such a question is asked	This is asked in order to update the group's specific aspirations for their well-being which do not generally fit into the social and legal norm	Differences in behaviour, culture, references			
How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to exclusion?	Question concerning mainly concrete expressions of the stereotype (original stereotype and arguments in justification (1st and 3rd types of stereotype)	This is to show the factors which lead to the group being excluded from fulfilling its aspirations, in particular the fact that the resources deployed to satisfy them are inadequate or inappropriate	1. Indicators showing access to resources (housing, formal work, meeting places, opportunities and participation in trade unions, politics, associations); 2. indicators showing whether or not the group's specific aspirations are taken into account in deciding on action to be taken			
To what extent do young people themselves contribute to the spread of this stereotype?	There are two sides to this question: 1. young people's perception of their discrimination (especially original stereotype); 2. the way this perception translates into behaviour	Social exclusion may have a knock-on effect among the excluded group. For example, young people tend to develop antisocial behaviour or self-discrimination (language, rituals) on which they place a high social value amongst themselves, thereby reinforcing stereotypes	1. Indicators on the feeling of exclusion, discouragement; 2.a. development of certain antisocial behaviour or self-discrimination; 2.b. social value place by young people on certain antisocial or self-stigmatising behaviour	1. Subjective indicators; 2.a. objective indicators of the comparative frequency of antisocial behaviour; 2.b. subjective indicators of the high value placed on certain anti-social behaviour		

C. Measuring the consequences

| Question | | Indicators in response to the question | | | |
To what type of stereotype does it apply?	Purpose of the question	Type	Purpose of the indicator	Recommendations for constructing and interpreting the indicators	Sources
What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does, or may the stereotype give rise to? This question applies especially to stereotypes regarding punitive and/or discriminatory measures	Punitive measures include action taken by the police or, worse, by certain groups formed for that purpose (neighbourhood vigilantes, etc.). Discriminatory action includes, for example, prohibiting young people from accessing certain places	Subjective indicators; objective qualitative indicators: whether such action is taken or not; objective quantitative indicators: frequency of punitive action	Indicators revealing opinions on the measures to be taken. Existence of legislation. Indicators on punitive measures		

D. Finding alternative approaches

| Question | | Indicators in response to the question | | | |
To what type of stereotype does it apply?	Purpose of the question	Type	Purpose of the indicator	Recommendations for constructing and interpreting the indicators	Sources
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches Applies to all stereotypes	This question is intended to identify what can promote or impede inclusive and substantive dialogue, in particular: differences in rules, values, forms of regulation and dialogue, and the mutual perception of the parties concerned		1. Indicators referring to existing rules and forms of regulation 2. Indicators relating to mutual perception		
To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?	This involves assessing the players' capacity for engaging in inclusive and substantive dialogue		Consultation and dialogue indicators		
How can these alternative approaches come about?	What is being looked for here is whether legislative, institutional or financial resources are being deployed to allow for the emergence of these alternative approaches		Indicators on resources that can be used to facilitate new approaches: legislation, institutions, public action		

2.1. Original stereotype: "Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods have little or no regard for accepted social norms"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

While the growing feeling of insecurity bears little relation to actual crime trends, the fact remains that in recent years there has been an increase in antisocial behaviour and lawlessness by young people, particularly young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. Physical damage, verbal attacks, disturbances in public places, threatening or aggressive behaviour are all problems which have a considerable impact on public opinion, reflect a weakening of the social system's accepted norms and a corresponding erosion of social cohesion.

Are young people actually more aggressive and what kind of violence is involved?

Relevant indicators:
- proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods implicated in crimes and offences in relation to young people in general/adults;
- relative prevalence of young people among persons implicated in crimes and offences;
- relative proportion of incidents reported to the relevant authorities but where no further action has been taken;
- relative proportion of antisocial behaviour by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the total number of youth-related incidents reported to the police.

Is this stereotype widespread?

When confronted by such phenomena, politicians, the authorities and the public at large tend to focus on just one aspect of the problem, primarily the violence that occurs rather than what has led to it. The stereotype becomes stronger the longer one fails to acknowledge that the offence in question is also a way of expressing disillusionment and the need to be noticed and recognised.

Relevant indicators:
- perception that young people in general/young people from lower-income neighbourhoods have of the "antisocial" nature of certain types of behaviour;
- relative perception of the deterioration of public areas attributed to the antisocial behaviour of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
- perception of the inhabitants of lower-income areas of the action needed to address the problem of insecurity.

How does the stereotype gain ground?

Judicial statistics can sometimes be misleading and result in the further spread of the stereotype. For example, the frequency of arrests or of court proceedings against young people from lower-income neighbourhoods compared with the general population does not necessarily reflect a difference in crime if there is a tendency to stigmatise young people from these neighbourhoods in the way they are dealt with by the police and the courts.

> Relevant indicators:
> – relative rate of judicial proceedings against young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – relative rate of repeat offending among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – victimisation rate of residents of lower-income neighbourhoods.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to exclusion?

> Relevant indicators:
> – relative unemployment rate of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – relative school underachievement rate;
> – relative difficulties in finding work-experience placements.

How may exclusion factors lead young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Lawlessness does not mean that there are no rules, but rather that legitimate regulation has been weakened; it is important to focus on the cumulative processes that can lead to a serious deficit in regulation. The new social issues that emerged in the early 1980s were a direct result of the breakdown of the unifying model of social control that prevailed during the thirty-year boom period following the Second World War, which ensured social cohesion through the promise of full employment and improvements in intra- and inter-generational living conditions. In societies undergoing structural processes that result in exclusion and financial insecurity for a significant proportion of the population, the preservation and monitoring of accepted norms is a pressing issue: for the losers in the current social transformations, what is the point of complying with these accepted norms? The issue of social control in a fragmented society is therefore particularly visible in lower-income neighbourhoods.

> Relevant indicators:
> – feeling of social exclusion among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – feeling among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods that they conform to social norms;
> – proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods displaying antisocial behaviour;
> – perception of antisocial behaviour as a means of asserting an individual or group identity.

C. Measuring the consequences

It is against this background that unlawful behaviour, which reflects both the loss of legitimacy of accepted norms and the failures of the authorities whose task it is to ensure compliance with them, is becoming more widespread. Increasingly, those norms are being breached systematically, and compliance is ensured only at the price of committing ever more resources, as shown by the massive investment by urban communities in equipping municipal police and installing anti-intruder and CCTV systems. Policies focusing on individual responsibility and finding scapegoats are multiplying. In this context, punitive strategies such as "zero tolerance" are increasing and gaining the support of a worrying number of people despite their high social cost. There have even been proposals to link social benefits to compliance with contracts imposing acceptable behaviour.

Relevant indicators:
– tightening of legislation on antisocial behaviour;
– more severe penalties for antisocial behaviour.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

In this process of undermining legitimate regulation, a distinction must nevertheless be made between (i) offences intended to destroy the legitimacy of accepted norms without offering any substitute for them, at least initially, and (ii) those that carry a form of counter-regulation. The process of undermining existing accepted norms is not necessarily anomic, therefore, and can, through conflict, negotiation and compromise, bring into play both control-based regulation and autonomous regulation that may result in a joint form of regulation generating new legitimate norms. In the first case, however, the offences in question undermine the very capacity for common action and the potential emergence of a unifying model.

Relevant indicators:
– existence of dialogue between local authorities and young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– existence of processes co-ordinating the action of the institutional players in fostering integration in urban areas.

To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?

It is crucial to accept the idea that lower-income neighbourhoods are therefore not places of social disorganisation and lawlessness, but living spaces where poverty and exclusion do not rule out the existence of a form of social control – possibly at variance with accepted norms – through which a collective player may be established, and action taken. Populations in insecure situations are also capable, therefore, of mobilising as a group in order to take action and rebuild a sense of community and the norms specific to their living environment, which help to make their living conditions more secure.

Within this analytical framework, socioeconomic action in lower-income neighbourhoods must take into account the existence of multiple sources of regulation and initiatives coming from multiple players. This other perspective on the reality of social interactions in "problem" neighbourhoods means that the autonomy of those concerned must once again become a central focus. Social players in "problem" neighbourhoods, as elsewhere, never allow themselves to become completely trapped in situations of dependency, despite the pressures of their environment. They demand the opportunity to develop local initiatives and to assert their ability

to devise their own rules of action or their desire to participate in the management of their living environment. They attempt to exercise their autonomy by gaining a degree of leeway or through negotiation.

Relevant indicators:
– existence of official social organisations in the lower-income neighbourhood in question;
– participation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in general social groupings;
– participation of young people in political dialogue on solutions to improve their situation.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

The key issue then becomes that of the emergence of a joint form of regulation based on a community approach that will foster social cohesion and creativity. It is convenient to present this as a fusion of two forms of regulation that coexist (and sometimes clash): a control-based form of regulation supported by institutions, and autonomous forms of regulation produced by the various players in such neighbourhoods. Yet such a fusion is far from automatic, since it is entirely possible that control-based regulation and autonomous regulation may never come into contact, or that such contact may result in a total clash. Fostering the emergence of a joint form of regulation means building a capacity for collective action that engenders collective learning and social cohesion. The aim is therefore to establish an institutional environment offering an appropriate framework for negotiation and the reaching of compromise. The necessary precondition is therefore the pursuit of social justice, which must help to legitimise new forms of social control and ensure that the various stakeholders co-operate.

In conclusion, while participation by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods takes place within a space that is greatly constrained by relations of domination and exclusion, the fact remains that these often conflictual spaces are also spaces of experimentation and innovation marked by numerous processes of adjustment, negotiation and social creativity, which sometimes appear to be "cobbled together", but can also give rise to new ways of living alongside one another.

Relevant indicators:
– prizes or forms of recognition for social/cultural projects undertaken by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– support for leadership training among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– policy of encouraging meetings between young people in the same town/city.

2.2. Generalisation of the original stereotype: "Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are going through a serious identity crisis"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

This stereotype implies that young people's lives are governed solely by the search for identity. It gives rise to a functionalist kind of view. The issue of identity is assigned a major role in the socialisation of young people. On its own, the search (or demand) for identity is assumed to account for the entire socialisation process. There is also a tendency to place the identity crisis faced by young people in the context of the

conflict observed among young people of migrant origin between the culture of their country of origin and that of their host country.

The identity crisis of so-called "dual affiliation" – in countries such as France, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom – as it emerges from the stereotype, was more typical of the generation of parents and grandparents of the young people of migrant origin now living in lower-income neighbourhoods. It was actually the migrants of the 1960s and their children who had to go through an agonising struggle between the culture inherited from their country of origin and that of their host country. In certain European countries, most young people now living in such neighbourhoods belong to the third generation of immigrants, and the fact that they are still the focus of integration policies is a denial of their sense of belonging to the country in which they were born. They have developed their own culture. Moreover, the identity strategies observed in lower-income neighbourhoods are not, or no longer, focused on the ambivalence of dual cultural affiliation, but rather on the recognition of the same rights as those enjoyed by the indigenous population as a result of their belonging to a nation state.

> Relevant indicators:
> – proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods born in the country of residence;
> – proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods having the nationality of the country of residence;
> – feeling of belonging;
> – mastery of the official language;
> – use of the language of the country of origin (other than the official language) in their neighbourhood;
> – use of the language of the country of origin (other than the official language) within the family.

Is this stereotype widespread?

> Relevant indicator:
> – perception of "youth sub-culture" by the population as a whole.

How does the stereotype gain ground?

The media can play a significant role in this regard.

> Relevant indicators:
> – portrayal of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the media;
> – image of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the media.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

What are the specific aspirations of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods that are misunderstood and therefore give rise to this stereotype?

In actual fact, since the 1990s the crisis of dual cultural affiliation has given way to a process of appropriation of an identity based on a generational culture, the culture of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. It is a culture linked to a particular moment, that of the current generation of young people. It takes elements from earlier generations (rock, etc.), and creates a multicultural melting-pot (hip hop, etc.).

References may be found to a sense of belonging to a group, in some cases of an ethnic nature. What prevails, however, is generational identity.

In order to gain a better understanding of how identification processes and the identity issues specific to young people from these neighbourhoods work, we shall discuss in turn the peer group form, the linguistic form, the territorial form and the ritual form.

Relevant indicators:
– existence of a clearly identifiable form of language;
– existence of a particular dress code;
– behavioural differences.

To what extent do young people themselves contribute to the spread of this stereotype?

a. "Peer group" identity

The identity of some groups of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is developed in relation to "peers". What kind of groupings are we talking about? The phenomenon of "gangs" as it existed in the 1960s and 1970s is no longer entirely relevant. Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods now face financial insecurity. In this climate of instability, the formation of structured gangs is no longer on the agenda. Groupings of young people are generally short-lived and shifting. They form and break up. They are informal groups of friends, who are generally underachievers. Indeed, it has been observed that academic capital plays a decisive role in the extent to which "young people from housing estates" adopt "normal" or "deviant" lifestyles (G. Mauger, 2003).

Expulsion from school, which engenders a particularly strong feeling of unworthiness, increases the probability that young people will seek alternative forms of recognition, particularly from their peer group. The group consequently attracts those who share the same social, cultural or vocational scars, protecting them from calls to order by various institutions (school, task forces for youth integration, etc.), other adolescents (those who have a job or do well at school) or girls (whose lengthier education makes them more sensitive to the seductive power of cultural and/or economic capital). An identity made up of common values and norms (relating to music, dress, language and culture), which values local (rather than community-based) solidarity centred on the neighbourhood, or even the stairwell, is cobbled together.

These shifting forms of sociability involve "hanging around" ("propping up the walls"), boredom (ever-present in rap songs), anecdotes told, distorted and exaggerated a hundred times and rumours, but also an awareness of injustice fuelled by racism, repeated police checks, fathers' humiliation and so on. They belong to a world that involves getting by from day to day, by means of temporary contracts (primarily in the building, packing and security sectors), undeclared labour and "business" (a term vague enough to encompass a set of actions ranging from bartering of goods and services to receiving or small-scale drug dealing), which precludes any rationalisation of their behaviour with a view to future goals and locks them into the fascination of the immediate.[91]

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91. Here we see the extent to which the discourse of integration officers, who see a vocational or life "plan" as being central to their work with these groups, is out of touch. Cf. Bourdieu, 2002, p. 205.

b. Linguistic forms of identity

The language of housing estates has not supplanted ordinary language. It is the everyday language of young people from these neighbourhoods. Such language has obvious local particularities (D. Lepoutre, 1997). However, most such speech is understood and shared by young people from other neighbourhoods and areas. It is a language that is at once highly expressive and very impoverished, in the sense that it uses few words: 350 to 400, according to linguist Alain Bentolla.[92] He estimates that between 12% and 15% of young people from housing estates use this kind of language exclusively.

Young people's speech evolves very rapidly. We are a long way from the backslang (*verlan*) of the 1990s. Their language is very colourful, SMS text-style language. It borrows terms from the languages of cultures of immigration. There is no shortage of colloquial expressions. Yet the paradox is such that colloquial expressions often coexist with expressions originating from a religious vocabulary, particularly that of Islam. Muslims greet one another with "as-salam 'alaykum", and then launch straight into slang vocabulary.

It is clear that young people from these neighbourhoods are experiencing a linguistic divide. The gap between the idiom of housing estates (350 words) and the speech of middle-class young people (2 500 words) is considerable. Like the "Black English" described by Labov (W. Labov, 1973), such language is a particularly strong, negative social marker in day-to-day interactions with the middle classes (at school or work).

c. Territorial forms of identity

Unlike groupings of middle-class young people, peer groups are not organised "thematically". Middle-class young people are very focused on leisure activities. Their groupings are shaped by affinities dictated by leisure activities: cinema, sport, bars, discotheques, nights out. Peer groups in lower-income neighbourhoods are formed in accordance with a criterion based on territoriality. They appropriate spaces, places that are reserved for them alone. For instance, they take over areas outside buildings, shop entrances and small squares. Their constant presence in these parts of public spaces is seen as disturbing.

d. Rites of passage

Whenever young people "move from words to deeds" for the first time in the most sensitive areas of their lives, it may be described as a rite of passage. More specifically, rites of passage consist of all the "first times" experienced by young men and women in their personal lives. A distinction should be made between these two levels of rites of passage.

"Moving from words to deeds" is becoming routine for many young people, particularly when it comes to high-risk behaviour. It may involve the use of addictive substances, various forms of petty crime or various degrees of violent behaviour. Prior to carrying out an act, however, there is a "first time" that has nothing to do with a rite. It is bound up, first and foremost, with a personal challenge one wishes to take up in order to test one's ability to take risks. Yet such acts may also be dictated by the authority of a group leader, or of an entire group that "incites" other young people to "go ahead and do it".

Rites of passage operate differently, and in different contexts. Rites of passage inevitably include a ritual. This ritual may come within the religious or denominational sphere, or be secular in nature. For

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92. Potet, "Vivre avec 400 mots. Le langage des jeunes des cités peut faire rire. Il renforce aussi leur exclusion" (Living with 400 words. The language of young people from the housing estates may seem funny, but it also reinforces their exclusion), 2005, p. 14.

instance, a full-scale ritual of "taking the veil" may be observed among young Muslim woman wearing an Islamic veil for the first time. The form of this ritual varies from one area to another, from one family to another, from one group to another. More generally, becoming an adolescent and, later, a young adult, involves rituals.

First sexual relations escape public ritualisation. In fact, young people's peer groups exercise very strict control at times, which is sometimes even stricter than that exercised by parents. "Moving in together" consequently represents a very significant stage. It is the point at which young people manage to free themselves from direct parental supervision and the supervision of their siblings and group of friends. Even though cohabitation by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is not associated with specific, visible rites, it represents an important stage, which is a transition towards greater independence.

In communities of migrant origin, rites of passage marking important moments in life have retained a traditional form. Elements of celebration taken from the cultures of migrants' countries of origin are becoming intermingled with the religious traditions and culture of lower-income neighbourhoods.

Most of the above considerations focus on the characteristics of young males from lower-income neighbourhoods. They are the ones whose behaviour and rites of passage attract public attention. Accordingly, the municipal authorities have placed an emphasis on policies for boys (especially sports and cultural facilities). The situation of girls (less visible in the eyes of the media and the politicians) needs to be more closely analysed. Although they are often the victims of both verbal and physical violence, paying the price of the ghettoisation of lower-income neighbourhoods, they are not "invisible" in their neighbourhoods themselves. The male dominance in the streets and at sports facilities is linked to reputation issues. Many girls admit that they have to make great efforts to protect themselves and their reputation.

Nonetheless, girls too develop "gang" strategies. Ghettoisation therefore makes relations between the sexes more aggressive. Girls often claim that boys change the image they portray of themselves dramatically – they are nice enough at home but go wild outside. They are the ones who display in full view of everyone the shared frustration of the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods.

Relevant indicators:
- identity symbols (male/female);
- age of leaving the parental home (males/females);
- age of setting up home (males/females);
- forced marriage;
- existence of identifiable peer groups;
- leisure facilities for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (males/females).

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

Relevant indicators:
- possibilities for building up a "social mix";
- perception of peer groups by the authorities.

To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?

Relevant indicators:
– balance in facilities for young males and females;
– support for initiatives by groups of young females in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– mechanisms for preferential access to employment.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

Is not the question how we can better distinguish between positive developments among young people from these neighbourhoods and what amounts to a sweeping generalisation? Is there not a discrepancy or a split, between young people's actual identity, the image they give of themselves in practice, and the way outsiders see them, which convey negative stereotypes? There are huge discrepancies between these three levels of representation. How can these discrepancies be reduced so that young people's true identity is consistent with what they show of themselves?

Relevant indicators:
– media action to enable young people (males and females) from lower-income neighbourhoods to assert their identity;
– programmes to assist immigrant mothers in developing the creative potential of their children;
– measures to overcome the legal or structural barriers to the full development of the potential of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

2.3. Arguments justifying the generalisation of the original stereotype: "Young people take over public places"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

By appropriating public spaces within neighbourhoods, such as squares, stairwells and hallways, young people assert their role as players. Some see this as an "attempt at domination" through the creation of a kind of local power base. Such practices, which are badly received by those around them, fuel conflicts with neighbours.

The lack of suitable spaces for this purpose prompts young people to take over public spaces such as neighbourhood corners, isolated or strategic places and, chiefly, stairwells, which afford a degree of protection from the weather, make them invisible and ensure freedom from control. Such attitudes have been described as "bunkerisation". For his part, Adil Jazouli, the sociologist who founded Banlieuescopie, has referred to "stairwell nationalism".

Relevant indicator:
– perception of the unrest caused by young people in their use of community areas in lower-income neighbourhoods.

Is this stereotype widespread?

Relevant indicator:
    – perception of young people hanging around in the street.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to exclusion?

With regard to the countries of northern Europe, it is important to try to understand the reasons behind the presence of young people in public areas and the meaning they give to this occupation of space. In order to explain this situation, consideration must be given to the housing issue. Large families today clearly face a real housing problem. Most of the subsidised housing available to low-income households fails to meet the needs of these families. Housing policy helps to make the family home a factor that prompts young people to escape elsewhere. A study carried out by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions[93] showed that in the 15 pre-enlargement countries of the European Union, almost one third of households experienced housing problems, either lack of space or low housing standards. For the new member states, this proportion rose to two thirds. The study also showed that the situation particularly affected the households of manual workers, with the hardest hit being non-skilled workers, with the exception of France, Denmark and Belgium where the self-employed seemed to be affected the most. In any event, in France for example, according to INSEE, the average social housing unit in 2002 had 3.2 rooms and a surface area of 68.5 square metres.

It is also important to ascertain the extent to which this situation can be attributed to the planning of urban areas and the hurried construction of huge tower blocks on the outskirts of cities, which were in full expansion at the time as a means of rapidly housing the workforce, especially for migrants. The neighbourhoods in question may well be in the city itself (former industrial neighbourhoods whose factories that employed the residents have long since gone or whose more well-off workers have moved to a "better" neighbourhood) and comprise blocks built at the end of the 19th/beginning of the 20th century, or in large peri-urban housing estates built between the 1950s and 1980s under social housing programmes. The construction of these buildings in geometric shapes and straight lines that were neither aesthetically pleasing nor conducive to social interaction is now being called into question. It must not be forgotten that these buildings were designed for short-term use. Temporary sites became permanent settlements with occupancy regulations often limiting access to them to households below a certain threshold.

Nor was the single purpose of areas a long way from city centres and designed as dormitory suburbs conducive to establishing a climate of social interaction and community building. Dormitory housing estates were the first to feel the effects of the economic recession, the collapse of the Fordist system and the disintegration of the welfare state. Their neighbourhoods then sank into a process of decline: the disappearance of businesses providing employment, structural changes, de-industrialisation, an imbalance in demographic trends, a large proportion of foreigners, etc.

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93. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2003.

In southern Europe, housing-related exclusion situations seem to be associated more with the age of the buildings, their cramped size and potential for sub-standard conditions.[94]

As their family homes are often unsuitable, young people seek places they can go to in order to escape the pressures they face. They often find it hard to come to terms with their families' frequently limited material circumstances, the quality and cramped nature of their accommodation and parental control. Without enough space to lead an autonomous life within the family home, young people seek places of refuge. With limited financial means for making better use of their time in other places, which often entail additional costs, they develop alternative socialisation activities. Wishing to escape the family circle and its "unwelcome" hold, young people occupy spaces elsewhere. The congregation of young people represents an essential refuge and a form of leisure activity in the absence of any alternatives.

Relevant indicators:
– household occupancy index in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– overcrowding in housing in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– satisfaction vis-à-vis housing in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– own space in the family home in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– accessibility of social housing to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– number of facilities for socialising or leisure for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– average budget of a young person from a lower-income neighbourhood for recreational purposes.

How may exclusion factors lead young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Relevant indicator:
– relative perception of the function of community/public areas.

C. Measuring the consequences

What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may this stereotype lead to?

The issue surrounding the way communal areas are occupied has taken on inordinate proportions in some countries to such an extent that in France for example certain occurrences have been classified as criminal offences. In the United Kingdom, there has been an increasing willingness to reintroduce curfews for minors. This issue, which comes to the fore more specifically in large housing complexes and in deprived areas, should give us cause to rethink the approach to housing and urban planning. Nonetheless, local culture has its part to play: young people taking over public areas poses less of a problem in southern Europe; it is large concentrations of people of immigrant origin that tend to give rise to fear there.

The report by the French Auditor-General's Department on the reception of immigrants and the integration of immigrant populations, published in November 2004, has already pointed the finger at the role played in the crisis by subsidised housing. It states that subsidised housing is no longer the aspiration and step towards progress it once was. "Subsidised housing no longer acts as a first stage towards integration

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94. Ibid.

for immigrant populations; it too encourages concentration, generally in the most run-down parts of the housing stock." The same report advocates giving particular attention to the issue of young people and the employment market. It also highlights the difficulties faced by young people from problem neighbourhoods in obtaining employment.

In Germany, the "Social City" programme *(Soziale Stadt)* focuses on the regeneration of three types of neighbourhood: the large estates on the outskirts of towns and cities; "brownfield areas", the former inner-city industrial districts; and the communal housing complexes in the former GDR. The programme goes beyond a mere "housing" approach, incorporating the needs of a sense of community, culture and independence.

> Relevant indicators:
> – existence of legal provisions to counter the occupancy of community areas by young people;
> – meeting place extension/maintenance policies in lower-income neighbourhoods and participatory management arrangements.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

Measures must be taken to address the occupation of public areas. They must focus on drop-in centres and community facilities, housing policy, improvements in schooling conditions and opportunities for young people to develop.

> Relevant indicators:
> – perception of the quality of leisure facilities available to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – perception of the accessibility of leisure facilities for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – perception of accessibility to places for socialising outside the neighbourhood.

To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?

> Relevant indicators:
> – inclusion in urban redevelopment programmes of "open spaces" for young people;
> – inclusion in urban redevelopment programmes of projects to make lower-income neighbourhoods less impersonal.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

With regard to drop-in centres, leisure facilities and community spaces, intensive efforts made to increase the number of neighbourhood facilities should include measures to involve young people in managing and setting them up. These spaces should enable young people to meet up and to carry out the activities they need. We need to think about how attractive those facilities are, about their quality and to consider why they do not manage to attract the full range of young people. Certain key areas of youth culture (Internet, music, the media, sport) could be used with much more imagination as a means of expression and dialogue. Such

activities should be attractive, professional and practical, in other words diametrically opposed to diversion tactics simply to get the young people off the streets. The streets and other physical areas need to be re-established as dynamic meeting places between generations and cultures. Street educators could help forge links between young people who are unlikely to enter spontaneously into contact with each other.

Neighbourhood social work must go beyond a paternalistic approach. Examples have shown that it should instead be based on local social interaction. In this respect, the Community Development projects in the United Kingdom, and the Soziale Stadt programme in Germany could serve as models for initiatives to empower citizens. These projects, which encourage residents to take control of their day-to-day lives, help find solutions that are firmly rooted in the local context. Appropriate arrangements must be put in place, and most importantly, the initiatives and resources of the various administrative and institutional entities must be properly co-ordinated. Young people must become fully-fledged players in the development of quality areas where community life can thrive, and which will facilitate exchanges between residents and allow for improved community management of the neighbourhood.

Serious thought needs to be given to providing higher-quality housing with better conditions for low-income households. Activity areas accessible to young people and managed by them in conjunction with residents, along with landscaped and park areas should be incorporated into the existing stock of subsidised housing. Such areas must also be carefully maintained in order to make them more attractive and conducive to social interaction, serving as meeting places. Working closely with the families of young people could lead to the development of appropriate forms of social control.

In so-called "problem" neighbourhoods, it is important to ascertain young people's needs in terms of cultural, sports and artistic opportunities. The presence in city centres of young people from these neighbourhoods often seems to be an attempt to gain access to the consumption and leisure opportunities the city has to offer, unlike their neighbourhoods, most of which offer few or no such opportunities.

> Relevant indicators:
> – consultation and dialogue between associations and the public authorities on the leisure facility needs of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – presence of street educators;
> – presence of community development workers;
> – support for neighbourhood cultural/sports projects.

2.4. Justification for corrective and punitive measures: "Young people make public areas unsafe"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

The relationship young people from lower-income neighbourhoods have to the city as a whole becomes problematic when their presence in public areas arouses fear in certain members of the population, who feel increasingly threatened by those some go as far as calling the "new barbarians". That fear is heightened when these young people move in groups and thus become more visible within the city. Their presence arouses so much suspicion, or indeed fear, that electronic surveillance devices are becoming increasingly common

in urban areas, while it is becoming standard practice for shopkeepers in shopping centres to have security guards man their doorways.

It is also important to bear in mind the subjective nature of such feelings, which often do not reflect an objective reality of an increase in the number of assaults committed, but rather a multidimensional process leading to greater insecurity, which includes the casualisation of the labour market and a return to mass vulnerability.

Relevant indicators:
- ratio between the feeling of insecurity and the victimisation rate;
- relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the total prison population of young people;
- ratio between the increase in the prison population of young people and the number of serious crimes committed by young people;
- relative proportion of shoplifting by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in relation to that committed by young people in general.

Is this stereotype widespread?

This feeling of insecurity is linked to the public's image of "potential attackers" and its perception of the social environment, a perception that tends to be constructed and reinforced by the media. The image of these young people is closely related to their living environment, the so-called "problem" neighbour-hoods generally typified by their decaying social and physical environment. The young people who live in such neighbourhoods are thus identified with these areas of deprivation and disorder, from which they are assumed to come. There is excessive media coverage of incidents in such neighbourhoods, compounding the tendency in policies to counter urban violence to blame and criminalise young people. Furthermore, media coverage of incidents involving young people from problem neighbourhoods increasingly tends to depoliticise them, treating them as merely meaningless acts of "urban violence" devoid of any anti-establishment connotation or sociological dimension.

Relevant indicators:
- perception by residents of lower-income neighbourhoods that young people from those neighbourhoods make the place unsafe;
- relative trends in the perception of the behaviour of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
- image in the media of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

How does the stereotype gain ground?

This fear of young people and the prevailing "hostility" towards them is not unrelated to the prevailing dis-course about "feelings of insecurity" and the "youth peril". There is no need to point out that some political leaders have an interest in making this sensitive subject a key political and election issue. While there is undoubtedly a growing "feeling of insecurity", it must be emphasised that this is a direct consequence of a fragmented society and the breakdown of former mechanisms for social control.

Relevant indicator:
- trends in media coverage of incidents involving young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

How may exclusion factors lead young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

The image the public has of these young people along with all the associated stigma have an undeniable impact on their behaviour. Some researchers and observers note that certain young people: on housing estates wish to keep the observer at a distance through the manipulation of discourse or, sometimes, attempts at intimidation. Such attitudes reflect a desire to reproduce people's image of them as "bad boys". This demonstrates the danger of such an image, in that it has a negative impact on the self-esteem and self-respect necessary in order to develop a positive attitude towards one's environment. We then find ourselves in a spiral in which one "symbolic" form of violence produces another form of violence, this time physical.

Lastly, it should be emphasised that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are also the main victims of physical and, above all, material insecurity, which have a profound effect on how they relate to the world. They are confronted on a daily basis with violence arising from financial insecurity, hardship and a lack of hope for a better future. Beyond their diverse backgrounds, and lacking any point of reference, these groups create a shared subculture held together only by a sense of continual, latent rebellion, particularly among young people. The fact that these young people speak loudly, using words and gestures loaded with violence, reflects, first and foremost, considerable fear and a sense of abandonment (see Sheet 13).[95] Violence is thus initially found in speech and gestures. The words used by these adolescents are vehement words intended to upset and to provoke a reaction. It is primarily a form of aggressive communication.

> Relevant indicator:
> – perception by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of use of language to intimidate.

C. Measuring the consequences

What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may this stereotype lead to?

> Relevant indicator:
> – tightening of legislation to clamp down on young people from lower-income neighbourhoods gathering in public areas.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

It is important to break with the illusion that the problems of "tough" neighbourhoods originate in these neighbourhoods themselves, and to be careful not to treat in isolation issues that are meaningful only as part of a wider context. Yet the current trend is to emphasise concepts such as juvenile delinquency and urban or school violence, which tend to shift the problem into the police or judicial arena. The prevailing

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95. The range of vocabulary of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is significantly less than that of young people from the middle classes; this is compensated for by a strong emphasis on symbolism and gestures.

understanding of the problem plays a crucial role, for it determines how it is addressed and thus the policies pursued.[96]

The issue of young people today is closely bound up with the processes of casualisation and exclusion, which erode the security of lower-income sections of the population. These structural problems, which are the cause of the urban crisis, must be taken into account, just as there is a need to show that "problem" neighbourhoods are not social "no man's lands". It is important to highlight the liveliness, inventiveness and forces for social change that are typical of such places, alongside the demands for development on the part of their residents, who express themselves in different ways.

> Relevant indicators:
> – forms of recognition for the creativity of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – local management arrangements for developing positive initiatives in lower-income neighbourhoods.

To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?

All the research shows that a vast majority of young people having committed violent and criminal acts are also excluded from the labour market because they lack qualifications and have left school early (Prince's Trust, 2004; Danish National Institute of Social Research, 2002). In terms of schooling conditions and social and vocational integration, efforts must therefore be made to improve the quality of education and increase supervision ratios in the areas in question. More extra-curricular activities should be offered with a view to fostering learning. In order to combat school dropout rates, it is also essential to improve the quality of education in lower-income neighbourhoods. Education should be made more relevant to young people's lives, and offer real opportunities for social and vocational integration and access to employment. The democratisation of schooling means that the problems faced by young people must be addressed, and a joint effort made to find solutions.

Another significant issue is the hostility shown in the city towards these young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, which helps to fuel conflict and aggression towards places that become symbols of their exclusion. The fortification of certain city areas and restrictions on access simply fuel an already intense conflict that is not only spatial and social in nature, but also intergenerational. Such fortification is in itself a form of hostility, negating these young people's right to gain access to various amenities on the same footing as other people. The process of democratising access to public areas and efforts to counter discrimination should therefore be stepped up. In particular, democratising access means introducing measures designed to make these amenities more accessible to young people.

> Relevant indicator:
> – facilities/activities for developing alternative and attractive forms of expression (Internet, gym, theatre, music) accessible to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

Mechanisms must therefore be put in place to prevent and resolve conflicts over the occupation of space and the local tensions that can arise from them. In this connection, it is essential to work for greater involve-

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96. Bonelli, 2003.

ment of young people in the management of public spaces so that they can appropriate them in a positive way. Participatory management of housing estates and cities should be stepped up. Efforts should be made to raise public awareness with a view to bringing about a more democratic representation of the city, along the lines of the German "Social City" model. All the city's stakeholders must be made aware of their respective needs, and there should be a genuine sharing of responsibility among the various players to this end. It is essential to tackle sources of fear and to develop collective forms of interaction that bring together the city's stakeholders and young people so that they can get to know one another. The emphasis should be on mediation and the need to meet one another, to embrace others and to develop a comprehensive blueprint for co-operation that will be part of a new way of "living alongside one another".

> Relevant indicators:
> – existence of "mediators" as an interface between urban areas and groups of young people;
> – meetings and exchanges between young people in the same town/city;
> – identification of factors/processes which will bring about a change in the situation.

2.5. Arguments stressing the need for such measures: "The police no longer come into the neighbourhoods"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

This stereotype relates more to the perception of the way the undisciplined behaviour of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is regulated. This argument is put forward again and again by some residents who are witnesses – more rarely victims – of criminal or delinquent behaviour: drug dealing, handling stolen goods, street racing, etc. who feel abandoned by the police. It is also voiced by local councillors calling for more police resources, and certain experts eager to reform police action. As such it warrants our attention.

In point of fact, this stereotype should be seen in tandem with the feeling of insecurity seen in the context of crime strictly speaking, since it refers to a perception rather than the actual situation. It is the expression of an unease felt by certain sections of the residents of these neighbourhoods. There are many causes for it, which are to be found primarily in the phenomena of collective destabilisation which have affected lower-income communities over the last twenty-five years. The return of individual vulnerability (vocational and residential) linked to the transformations brought about by post-Fordism (mass unemployment, uncertain status) has exacerbated tensions in these areas. Competition for rare resources (unskilled work, housing, social benefits, etc.) generate daily problems between vulnerable workers and unemployed youth. The constant – and noisy – occupation of public areas by those whom Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson call the "minority of the worst" and their value system clash head on with those of their elders, to whom they are a continual reminder of their collective decline, the loss of their social status and the associated working-class pride, the remnants of an industrial world slowly going downhill.[97] They cause these workers, "estate prisoners", to retreat into their homes and look for new forms of protection, in particular from the police.

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97. Bonelli, 2003.

This leads to comments and statements that the neighbourhoods have become lawless areas in which the "voluntary" absence of the police gives free rein to the activities of a criminal minority.

Relevant indicators:
– relative police presence in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– relative frequency of police checks.

Is this stereotype widespread?

Relevant indicators:
– perception of the police presence by residents of lower-income neighbourhoods;
– perception of the nature of police activity in lower-income neighbourhoods.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

The police alone cannot – nor is it its role – solve all these problems, which go far beyond the criminal framework.

It should be remembered that its coercive action is not necessarily visible. All the police work designed to build up sound procedures to neutralise those engaged in trafficking of all sorts is based mainly on discreet enquiries, necessarily so if they are to be successful. Enquiries of this type are the only ones that can bear fruit in the long term. High-profile police action in most cases is just for political show and goes against this meticulous work. Moreover, such high-profile action generally leads to very few court convictions.

A police presence comprising patrols may be a deterrent – or indeed police officers may see crimes being committed – but in no way can it be a solution to all the tension brewing in a neighbourhood.

This is particularly so, given that a stronger police presence in a neighbourhood will inevitably create tension, especially with the younger members of the community, as shown by the many instances of insults and obstruction.

This tension can be explained by the huge difference in social and cultural backgrounds between young people and police officers. In the French context, the police operating in the "sensitive" neighbourhoods are primarily young (the longer-standing police officers tend to play their seniority card and asked to be assigned to more "peaceful" areas or closer to their home region) and therefore not that experienced. Generally speaking, they are much better educated than the people they will be dealing with (in 1998 almost 80% of candidates for the external competitive examination for police constables had at least the *baccalauréat* and over 25% had a diploma attesting to a further two years of study). They mostly come from small provincial towns (topping the list of police constable home *départements* are, in order, the Pas-de-Calais, the Pyrénées-orientales and the overseas departments (P. Massal, 1993)), which means that their social background is very different from that of the residents of the lower-income neighbourhoods, whether of immigrant origin or not. All this explains their unease when they go into the housing estates whose codes and methods of functioning are unfamiliar to them; this gives rise to both fear of taking appropriate action and a lack of the necessary distance developed by more experienced officers who are more at home with the environment.

Relevant indicators:
– average age of police officers on duty in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– average number of years of service of police officers on duty in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– training for police officers;
– geographical origin of police officers on duty in lower-income neighbourhoods.

How may exclusion factors lead young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Relevant indicators:
– relative prevalence of young people among persons implicated in crimes and offences;
– prevalence of young people implicated in crime in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who have actually taken part in criminal activity;
– perception of the police presence by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– proportion of young people taking part in riots who had already come to the attention of the police;
– repeat offending among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

C. Measuring the consequences

What factors facilitate such behaviour and constitute an obstacle to building up a sense of community?

Without in any way wishing to call into question the need for police action when crimes are committed or likely to be committed, we need to think about the nature of policing in lower-income neighbourhoods and how they can build up a relationship with all sectors of the community there based on mutual trust and respect.

Community policing[98] appears to produce encouraging results. It generally involves having the same officers assigned to the areas in question. Such officers carry out a global role combining close familiarity with the life of the neighbourhood and an active partnership with all players in the social life of their "beat".

The police reform in Belgium illustrates the need for community policing in cities and lower-income neighbourhoods. In a presentation at a colloquy in Canada, David Yansenne, superintendent of the Schaerbeek-St Josse-ten-Noode-Evere local police in Brussels, speaking of the law reforming the Belgian police, said that it also confirmed that the global, integrated approach based on the principles of community policing was, following the urban riots which shook the Belgian capital, increasingly seen as the only relevant police response.[99]

Relevant indicator:
– existence of neighbourhood policing.

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98. The role of community policing is different from that of the public order police and response units, which have a deterrent role to play by maintaining a visible police presence or a law enforcement role by investigating crimes and those responsible. It is the role of community police officers to forge a direct relationship with all those in the neighbourhood, be they residents, shopkeepers or employees of the various public services (postal workers, members of the roads department, etc.). One should not consider young people as the only residents of these neighbourhoods, but view them as one section among all the citizens who as a whole perfectly accept and often call for community policing, recognised by the residents as serving a very useful purpose.

99. Yansenne, 2005, p. 2/3 available (in French) at: http://www.cicc.umontreal.ca.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

In our view, it is perfectly feasible to influence the attitude and practices of police officers by focusing on their training.

First of all, we note, at least as far as France is concerned, that the basic training given to the majority of police officers is primarily geared to familiarising them with legal and administrative norms. The professional culture of police officers is strongly focused on compliance with laws and regulations. For this reason, many young police officers believe that it is not for the police to adapt to the mentality of the young people, but rather for the latter to abide by the law and respect the police.

There needs to be a change to the perception police officers have of the way they serve society and all its members. It is only in this way that there can come about an exchange with young people in order to open up new prospects and dispel incomprehension.

The police approach to lower-income neighbourhoods needs to be reviewed, without of course losing sight of the necessary law enforcement role of the police when crimes are committed. There has to be a new climate in which ultimately relations between the police and young people from lower-income neighbourhoods can be brought back to "normal". Moreover, the effectiveness of police action is clearly linked to the extent of physical decay and social fragmentation in the neighbourhoods. There appears to be a strong correlation between (i) crime levels and rioting, and (ii) neighbourhood renewal. Dissatisfaction with living conditions underpins rebellion. In a recent documentary, young people in Amsterdam, all of foreign origin, claimed to be satisfied with their neighbourhood centres. In point of fact, there are no massive estates with 500-metre-long tower blocks in the Netherlands and considerable work has been done on renovating lower-income neighbourhoods.

Relevant indicators:
- training of police officers in the socioeconomic context of lower-income neighbourhoods;
- rate of antisocial behaviour or violence by young people in rehabilitated lower-income neighbourhoods compared with that in non-rehabilitated neighbourhoods;
- comparative assessment of the feeling of insecurity of residents of lower-income neighbourhoods in relation to the rehabilitation level of the neighbourhoods in question;
- assessment of the feeling of attachment by residents to rehabilitated neighbourhoods compared with that of residents of non-rehabilitated neighbourhoods.

To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?

To achieve this objective – which is no easy task – there is a need for innovative police practices vis-à-vis young people based on as much relevant information as possible from research and experts in various disciplines (psychologists, doctors, sociologists, educators, etc.).

The resources must be available to set up new partnerships and consolidate existing ones by using every opportunity for consultation at various levels of responsibility, municipal authorities, non-governmental organisations, youth-oriented organisations, etc.

Such an approach must not make do with contacts alone; it should entail lasting collaboration and co-ordination. It will require, for all partners, an ability to communicate effectively and to pass on information internally and externally on good police practices vis-à-vis young people and the advantages for crime prevention that can come about as a result.

Relevant indicators:
– mechanisms for consultation and dialogue on maintaining order;
– existence of local neighbourhood self-management committees.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

In order to obtain positive results, appropriate training needs to be developed. This should include both a psychological and sociological approach to the "young" population, offering police officers relevant courses and other learning possibilities.

The ultimate aim is to reach a better understanding of others in order to engage in dialogue; and it is dialogue that will help avoid the tension that often leads to incidents.

These new practices will significantly change the public service mission approach carried out by the police in these neighbourhoods.

Such specialist training is not designed to turn police officers into social workers but to enable them to contribute – as undisputed players – to social well-being in the neighbourhoods.

With reference once again to Belgium, there are five dimensions to the action of the Belgian police: outreach, that is involvement in society and taking citizens' needs and expectations into account; problem solving, that is a proactive anticipatory approach; partnership, that is police involvement in a joint approach to all aspects of society; justification, that is transparency vis-à-vis citizens; and empowerment, that is putting in place the mechanisms of consultation and participation for dialogue with local communities. This is an avenue to explore.[100]

Relevant indicators:
– multidisciplinary approach to security in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– relative importance of preventive action vis-à-vis intervention or remedial action;
– existence of opportunities for dialogue between local public authorities, the police and youth representatives;
– evaluation of police action in relation to the expectations of the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods.

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100. Ibid.

Chapter 3: Stereotypes concerning autonomy and occupational fulfilment

3.1. Original stereotype: "Young people prefer easy money from the street and the informal economy to serious work"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is the stereotype?

Young people are not only said to prefer dependence on their parents and the state but they are also attracted by the "easy money" of the informal economy. The attraction is seen to work at two levels – firstly, in economic terms – the informal economy is seen as offering more money for less work; secondly in terms of status and identity – the informal economy is seen to hold out a certain glamour, an aura of living dangerously and thinking on one's feet, one possible route for recuperating some of the "virile" pride that went with certain traditional manufacturing jobs.

> Relevant indicators:
> – relative involvement of young people in the informal economy;
> – relative involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in illegal trafficking;
> – prevalence of informal-economy activities among young people;
> – relative proportion of all young people who have a bank account or savings account.

Is the stereotype widespread?

> Relevant indicator:
> – perception by the population as a whole of the prevalence of informal economy activity among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?

Firstly, it is important to place young people's decisions within the context of their job prospects within the formal economy. Following on from the analysis of the previous stereotype it can be seen that for certain groups of young people, the prospects are of dismal, unrelenting grind in low paid, low status jobs with little prospect of progression.

Low pay increased during the 1990s to reach around 15% of the workforce in most EU countries. It has stabilised since then in most of western Europe with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands. However, low pay is far higher in east European countries. Young people, women, the low-skilled and older people are not only at risk of having a weaker position in the labour market both in terms of precarious

contractual arrangements and low pay, but also have fewer chances to improve their position in the labour market relative to other groups.[101]

As we have seen, firms are increasingly using temporary employment either to meet uncertainty and cyclical fluctuations or to screen employees. This would not be such a problem if people progressed to better jobs afterwards. However, after six years, 16% will have remained where they are while 20% will become unemployed. Over a third of the low-paid (36%) do not manage to increase their income above the low pay threshold after seven years while a further 20% will have become unemployed. In France, for example, around one third of the 2001 generation of young people have actually experienced a fall in income.[102] So for a substantial minority of young people, the formal economy offers only the prospect of a life of drudgery with barely enough income to cover basic necessities.

Secondly, it is necessary to place what is happening at the lower end of the formal labour market in the context of developments in the informal economy. It is now estimated that a staggering 38% of the economic activity of the transition countries takes place in the informal economy. Even in west European countries a massive 18% of gross national income comes from the informal economy. This ranges from 28.6% in Greece and 27% in Italy to 8.8% in Switzerland. Altogether about 30 million people are involved in the informal economy in eastern Europe, far more than the numbers of unemployed. The numbers in the informal economy increased during the 1990s in nearly all member states in parallel with the increase in low pay.

However, the term "informal economy" hides a multitude of different activities. It can include companies in perfectly respectable sectors that do not declare all or part of their income or the wages of their employees. It also refers to workers who do not declare all or part of their earnings in activities such as domestic work, construction, home maintenance, street selling and so on. None of these activities is in itself illegal. Yet they constitute one of the main escape routes for people, young and old, living in lower-income neighbourhoods.

Very little is known about real conditions in the informal economy but they are a long way from the glamorous image of "street life" that is often presented in the media. A recent project carried out by the Association pour le droit à l'initiative économique (ADIE) with over 200 women in Parisian neighbourhoods found that 40% were in employment, while others received certain kinds of benefit but their income was very low in relation to the cost of supporting themselves and dependants. Similarly, all were imbued with a strong work ethic and a very relative sense that they were doing anything wrong by not declaring their income. This is not a case of having to motivate the work-shy. The women were innately entrepreneurial and wanted to work more. In all cases, the informal economy was seen as a strategy for survival in extremely difficult circumstances.

Of course, when people talk about the informal economy and youth, they are not usually thinking about these mundane survival strategies but about an explicitly illegal set of activities around drug trafficking, petty theft and pick-pocketing and prostitution. Once again it is important to put these into context. A case study of the Raval neighbourhood of Barcelona found that only around 10% of young people were involved in what can be considered to be "street life" and only 10% of these again were associated with any kind of illegal activity. Although many young people may be aware of what is happening, the risks are just too high for most of them.

Young people argue convincingly that the majority of hard drug dealing is done by older people outside lower-income neighbourhoods. The dealing that takes place by young people on the street is often the last

101. European Commission, 2004.

102. Daumas, 2005.

and least important rung in a ladder that does not have its origins in their neighbourhoods. On the other hand, the growth in the consumption of cannabis by young people is something that crosses all classes and is not restricted to lower-income neighbourhoods. If anything, the limited purchasing power of young people in these areas limits their consumption of more expensive hard or designer drugs. Similarly, the young women from these areas tend to be the victims and not the organisers of prostitution rings.

For all these reasons the vast majority of young people, and even those who regularly frequent the "street" resent being tarnished with the same brush as a small minority.

Relevant indicators:
 – main areas of the informal economy present in lower-income neighbourhoods;
 – extent of illegal activity in the informal economy;
 – extent of legal activity in the informal economy;
 – average income in the 15-24 age group in lower-income neighbourhoods.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Relevant indicator:
 – perceptions of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of the informal economy.

C. Measuring the consequences

What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?

Relevant indicators:
 – stricter legislation on the informal economy;
 – more intensive policing of informal activities of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

Alternative strategies must be based upon a recognition of the extremely hard reality and lack of a "future" faced by young people in many urban neighbourhoods. In this context, further penalties simply drive existing activities underground and make it even harder to survive. Lasting change involves re-creating pathways which can lead to genuine self-improvement, dignity and economic independence. Some of the steps required have already been referred to in other sheets. In addition, it is necessary to change the balance of benefits and incentives for entering the formal economy.

Furthermore, it is essential that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are able to obtain personal micro-credits to cover certain essential needs or develop an activity. For example, young people wishing to drive find it difficult to afford the cost of learning. Appropriate micro-credits can also be a way of learning about managing money.

Access to premises to start up an activity can be all the more difficult given that certain lower-income neighbourhoods were designed as "dormitory suburbs" rather than places for economic activity. The monofunctional nature of these neighbourhoods, which dates back to a time when the aim was simply to house a cheap labour force, is not suited to the current context when self-employment through developing community activities represents a challenge for the new generations. The highly speculative design of buildings in peripheral areas, with few opportunities for upgrading to acceptable quality standards, has a total lack not only of socialising areas but also of any premises for commercial or service activities, thereby transforming vast urban areas into zones bereft of all social life. Such spatial planning has become a real obstacle to the development of formal community activities. The few shops and services available, apart from the institutions, transform these neighbourhoods into inaccessible bunkers with an increasing tendency towards self-government.

Relevant indicators:
- micro-credit projects for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
- surface area assigned to commercial activities and local services in lower-income neighbourhoods.

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?

Routes out of benefit dependency have to be put in place. Legislation in most parts of Europe is geared around having one principal activity. As soon as one declares another activity a series of fixed costs and administrative burdens take effect which wipe out most of the gains from working. Even when various schemes for continuing to receive benefits while earning income from other sources are taken into account, legalisation is often not a viable option for any workers except those who earn a very substantial proportion of their income from the informal economy.

Relevant indicators:
- percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods carrying on two activities;
- cost of legalising an activity;
- profitability of the informal economy.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

Proposals to develop the status of "temporary self-employed worker", which could help activities generating a small amount of income become legal and at the same time a viable step towards entrepreneurship, were put forward in the Equal project mentioned above. Such an approach could be combined with tax concessions and incentives and effective centres to offer support with the development of young people's projects for small and micro businesses.

The local authorities could play a key role by placing their contracts for products and services with local businesses (for example, school transport, meals in childcare facilities, creation and maintenance of landscaped areas, etc.).

Relevant indicators:
- arrangements for registering young people's entrepreneurial ideas in lower-income neighbourhoods;
- extent to which local authorities buy products and services from firms/suppliers located in lower-income neighbourhoods.

3.2. Generalisation of the original stereotype:
"Young people have it too easy. They are not prepared
to adapt to reality and work for long-term goals"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is the stereotype?

There are many modern variations of this stereotype which has probably been repeated by adults since the dawn of time. Today, the main evidence used to support it has to do with the fact that "transition" associated with youth is longer and more difficult. Youth unemployment rates in nearly all industrialised countries have tended to hover stubbornly at around twice the national average. Similarly, there is a trend for young people to stay at home longer especially in southern and eastern Europe. In the countries of northern Europe and particularly in Scandinavia, the transition tends to be more direct, depending on factors such as periods of work, studies and unemployment, when there may be intermittent returns to the family home.

Relevant indicators:
- unemployment among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
- percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods (15-29 age group) who are neither in training nor employment;
- relative employment rate of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
- ratio between the unemployment rate for young people and the overall unemployment rate in lower-income neighbourhoods.

Is the stereotype widespread?

All of the versions of the above stereotype place the main burden of responsibility firmly at the feet of young people themselves. The young are said to have unrealistically high expectations, they are not prepared to be flexible over what, where, how long and how much they get paid to work. They prefer to depend on their families or on state benefits rather than make their own living. As a result they exclude themselves from the labour market and from access to styles of consumption which would bring them closer to the rest of society. It is claimed that lower-income neighbourhoods contain especially large pockets of these problem youth.

Relevant indicators:
- relative percentage of demotivated unemployed among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
- relative percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods drawing minimum social benefits or receiving other forms of social aid;
- part-time work (comparison);
- relative average number of CVs sent by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods before they obtain employment.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

What are the specific aspirations of this group which are misunderstood and help explain how the stereotype came about?

One of the most important aspects to be highlighted for putting the stereotype into its proper context is the way in which the economy is evolving and the kinds of jobs that are becoming available for young people. The picture is complex and varies considerably both between countries and between areas within the same country. Nevertheless, certain broad trends do emerge.[103]

Firstly, there just are not enough jobs to go round. Massive industrial restructuring over the last thirty years has led to a situation where there is an overall shortfall of around 22 million jobs in the EU-25.[104] In the UK, for example, more than twice as many people want to work (2 million extra people) than show up in the official unemployment statistics.[105] Globalisation had led to particularly large reductions in traditional craft, unskilled and semi-skilled industrial jobs.

This means that unless the number of jobs is increased, education, training and other labour supply side policies will simply displace the least skilled and the most vulnerable groups. As Beatrix Niemeyer has said, they may find themselves in a different position in the queue at the factory gates, but the gates themselves are no wider.[106] For example, since 1960 each successive generation of Europeans has found it harder and harder to find a job and especially stable employment whatever their educational qualification. Partly as a result of these changes in the labour market, young people in most parts of Europe are staying on longer in secondary and tertiary education. In France, "credential inflation" has meant that only 20% of the young people who obtain their *baccalauréat* today go on to work in "intermediate" professional jobs compared with 60% of the post-war generation.[107]

Secondly, the shift from industrial to service sectors has changed the nature of work and decimated the organised bastions of trade unionism right across Europe. Within the pre-enlargement EU-15, there is a continued "shake out" of jobs in manufacturing, utilities, mining and agriculture. These were mostly sectors based on Fordist production methods. The work was often monotonous and badly paid but it also nurtured workplace solidarity and a certain "male" working class sense of pride and identity. A proportion of these traditional industrial sectors have been relocated; at the same time, the east European countries have experienced the wholesale destruction of their state-owned industries.

In the most developed parts of Europe, most of the evidence suggests that globalisation is associated with the upgrading of both products and skills towards high-quality, high-value-added segments. EU commentators argue that although high-skill jobs are the backbone of job creation there has been a deterioration for certain groups like young people and the low skilled. The new jobs tend to be far more individualised, less unionised, and require a different set of client-orientated, interpersonal skills. The gap between the skills and competences required for the high-flying professional jobs and the reality of young school dropouts in deprived urban areas is just too large to bridge in most cases. So there is a strong "risk" of a two-tier labour market with insiders benefiting from a high level of employment protection and career opportunities

103. European Commission, 2004.

104. Revised European Employment Strategy.

105. Trades Union Congress, 2004.

106. Niemeyer, Budapest, 2005.

107. Daumas, 2005.

and outsiders fluctuating between low paid temporary work, unemployment and inactivity. In France, for example, the income differential between 30 and 50 year olds has increased from 15% to 40% over the last thirty years. The barriers between the different tiers of the labour market mean that it is not unusual to find severe pockets of youth unemployment right next door to some of the most dynamic service and financial centres in Europe.

Thirdly, in order to deal with the rapid pace of global change companies are externalising many tasks and demanding new forms of flexibility from their own workers. In theory this flexibility could be used to accommodate broader community, social and family needs in people's individual life cycles. However, in practice, the drivers of change are nearly always increases in productivity and cost savings for companies. This is creating a massive turnover or "churn" in jobs and major changes in contractual conditions which mean that no one really feels secure. Over the last ten years each EU member state had an average turnover of 5 000-15 000 jobs per day. At the bottom of the pile, there are a series of sectors (hotel and catering, cleaning, construction, etc.) which deal with the demands for flexibility by offering very low paid, temporary, seasonal, part-time "contracts". Between 1998 and 2003, there was a growth of over 10% in each of these sectors in the 15 countries of the pre-enlargement EU. The problem here is not only one of insecurity but also the fact that workers hardly ever acquire skills that allow them to progress to better jobs.

Many of these low status jobs tend to be filled by migrants. However, given the reluctance to increase immigration in most European countries, there has also been a trend to "activate" young people, women and others to take these jobs by threatening welfare reductions. The insecurity created by the combination of precarious welfare benefits and employment conditions can have a profound psychological affect on young people which increases their exclusion from society and pushes them towards other forms of survival such as the underground economy.

Finally, the young people living in lower-income neighbourhoods can lose out even when growth is right on their doorstep. London[108] provides and excellent example. It fits all the stereotypes of the dynamic internationalised city. Its recent success is based upon clusters of innovative firms in financial and business services, the creative industries, leisure and culture, the knowledge economy and certain high-value-added manufacturing activities. Some 45% of jobs are in managerial, professional and technical occupations. As a result productivity per person is 25% higher than the rest of the country and the number of jobs is predicted to grow by 580 000 before 2020. Most city managers would eat their heart out to have such favourable conditions.

However, despite this, inner London has the second highest rate of unemployment of any city in the UK. More shockingly, it is estimated that a staggering 48% of children in inner London live in poverty, after housing costs are taken into account. In fact nearly a quarter of the households with dependent children have no adult in employment. Unemployment among ethnic minorities is twice the city average. Finally the gender pay gap and the earnings of ethnic minority and disabled workers are all worse than average.

The analysis in the London Economic Development Strategy suggests that young people in inner London face a series of major barriers to employment. In particular, housing, transport and childcare are massively expensive. As a result, the extra costs of working can easily wipe out any gains unless the job is relatively well paid. Finally, many of the available jobs are part-time, casual and temporary. In this situation the risks of having to come off benefits for a prolonged period of time can outweigh the possible benefits of a job.

108. "Sustaining Success", *Developing London's Economy*. Draft, London Economic Development Strategy, 2004.

Relevant indicators:
– trend in unskilled or less-skilled employment as a proportion of total employment;
– trend in insecure jobs as a proportion of total jobs;
– relative unemployment rate for further/higher-education graduates;
– relative insecurity of employment;
– relative income of a young adult with a job;
– relative distribution of types of employment found by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– relative recurrence of unemployment among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– relationship between unemployment and qualifications among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods in comparison with young people nationally;
– relative difficulty of obtaining work-experience placements;
– relative proportion of young people with further/higher-education qualifications from deprived neighbourhoods who find a job matching their qualification in the year after qualifying;
– relative indicator of social mobility;
– relative ownership of private transport;
– possession of a driving licence.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Relevant indicators:
– young people's reasons for registering unemployed;
– perception of access to employment;
– rate of refusal by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of job offers originating from employment services.

C. Measuring the consequences

What corrective, police or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype result in?

As a consequence, stick and carrot policies are used to get young people to adapt to what exists. One of the main forms is the use of different kinds of "workfare" schemes which combine training and advice with the threat of withdrawing benefits if young people do not accept certain job offers or community work.

Relevant indicators:
– workfare policies;
– main sectors for vocational integration;
– promoting start-ups among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– employment counselling.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

Measures to retrain and orientate labour supply must go hand in hand with measures to influence the kinds of jobs available (demand). At a micro level, the public sector has a major impact on the jobs available through its procurement and investment policies for sectors like health, education, care and housing. The

social economy can often play a vital role both in creating markets for unmet social needs and in ensuring that young people and other disadvantaged groups gain access to the new jobs created. Youth employment schemes, such as those introduced in France, are one way of helping young people acquire relevant skills.

In parallel, it is necessary to identify and reduce the main structural barriers to employment faced by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods.

The UK Trades Union Congress argues that, if anything, unemployment is higher in countries with low levels of benefits and that generous benefits are essential to help all workers take on change. They must help rather than hinder people from experimenting and taking risks. This means turning the arguments about flexibility on their head and maintaining that tax-benefit regimes must be adapted to the reality of people's lives rather than the reverse. At a very basic level, this involves a series of tailored tax credits or concessions, on the one hand, and the possibility of accumulating benefits with certain income activities, on the other. However, far more needs to be done to understand these routes and adapt them to different types of people and area.[109]

Many cities have "invisible" borders making it especially difficult to travel from lower-income neighbourhoods to areas of economic expansion. Some cities have experimented with special vouchers or subsidised transport. It goes without saying that cheap and good quality childcare is a prerequisite for enabling young women with children to work. The challenge is ensuring high-quality care. If not, the long-term effects on children and young people of taking women away from caring for their children and putting them into low-paid jobs could be disastrous. Finally, very little attention has been given to affordable housing for young people near the growth areas.

> Relevant indicators:
> – employment policies enabling young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to acquire experience;
> – joint reflection by social partners and civil society on job creation in lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – availability of childcare (1);
> – availability of childcare (2);
> – cost of transport.

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?

There is a need for serious long-term investment to build the human and social capital of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods. This means designing far more holistic educational systems targeted at not only employability, but also personal development and active citizenship. Apart from changes in the curriculum and teaching methods, this involves improving links between schools, informal education, employers and civil society in general.

> Relevant indicators:
> – local/regional projects for consultation between public authorities, schools, families, firms, young people and other institutions.

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109. Welsh Development Agency, 2004, and New Economics Foundation, 2003.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

Lasse Siurala, in a paper for the Council of Europe, argues for extending these principles to create "minimum packages of opportunities and experiences" that equip young people in deprived urban areas for survival in today's society. Some of the key elements of these minimum packages include: the application and recognition of non-formally acquired skills and competences; opportunities for intercultural learning (mobility, exchanges, etc.); the right to individualised counselling and information; opportunities for youth-led cultural activities; and access to information technology.

Relevant indicators:
– recognition of qualifications and abilities acquired through life experience and informal education.

3.3. Arguments justifying the generalisation of the original stereotype: "They do not want to attend vocational training"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is the stereotype?

Despite the fact that a significant proportion of children from lower-income communities will fail at school, growing numbers of them are refusing to enrol in vocational courses, even though such courses might lead to a qualification that would probably be of greater benefit to them in the future. This may be due to influence from their parents, as described in a study on the German school system,[110] or as a result of education policy itself.[111]

This apparent paradox stems from changes in the different education systems, which have had a considerable impact on how lower-income families view and use the institution of school.

The situation in France, in fact, offers a perfect example: in 1959 (Berthoin reform), schooling became compulsory up to the age of 16. Between 1959 and 1974, the entire school population rose from 9 million to more than 13 million (+44%), and secondary school enrolments from fewer than 2 million to almost 5 million.

Relevant indicators:
– percentage of all students in lower-income neighbourhoods (or with parents who are unskilled workers) in secondary schooling, further/higher education and technical or vocational education.

How does the stereotype spread?

Relevant indicators:
– low status of technical qualifications;
– opportunities afforded by the education system as perceived by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

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110. National Institute on Student Achievement, 1999.

111. French Government education policy is to bring 80% of an age cohort up to *baccalauréat* level.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?

Adolescents who would previously have been working found themselves placed, for fairly lengthy periods, in a position where they were virtually out of the running socially, in which they were to discover the "half-child, half-adult", "neither child nor adult" status they had previously not experienced.

Their education would also prompt them to cherish future aspirations entailing a break with traditional patterns of following in the family's footsteps, yet would not enable them to realise those aspirations, owing among other things to the devaluing of school qualifications as they became more common.

The increasing number of secondary-school subject streams and the fact that secondary education have led to a kind of blurring, which encourages aspirations that are out of step with actual opportunities. The previous, extremely hierarchical school system forced pupils to internalise limitations at a very early stage, by making them accept failure as fair or inevitable. There was a clear separation between vocational training and general education, and between the pupils they attracted.

One of the effects of mass access to education and the rise in the general level of qualifications has been the gradual discrediting of vocational secondary schools, technical secondary schools and technical courses in general.

Between 1975 – the year the Haby reform scheduled the advent of the single lower secondary school – and 1985, the second year in school was still an "orientation level". It was only from 1985 that entrance rates to general third-year studies began to increase steadily. At the same time, the percentage of pupils repeating a year fell, and entry into vocational training tended to be postponed until after the fourth year. The successful introduction of vocational *baccalauréats* from 1985 is a clear indication of this development. Enrolment rates for general and technical fifth-year studies rose 10 points from 1984 to 1990, before stabilising at nearly 64%. The percentage of an age cohort obtaining the *baccalauréat* was 4.9% in 1950, 19% in 1970, 25% in 1980, 43% in 1990 and 62.7% in 1995.

By making children from classes for which secondary education was previously totally inaccessible attend upper secondary school, even where they take less academic courses, the school system encourages an expectation among these children and their families that it will give them access to the social positions it offered back when such was out of their reach. School is not simply a place for learning knowledge; it is also an institution that awards qualifications and thus imparts aspirations.

While the meritocratic position held by schools is in many ways still simply a "line", the fact remains that it upsets the reproduction cycle of lower-income communities. Workers' children are even less inclined to see themselves as workers now that their education has opened up other possibilities, even if the latter are illusory (S. Beaud and M. Pialoux, 1999; C. Grignon, 1971).

This gives rise to a dual discrepancy between background and aspirations, and between aspirations and probable future. These discrepancies lead to a kind of social fantasy that makes people desire the improbable, if not the impossible; it is a fantasy that goes hand in hand with the loss of a sense of boundaries, vol-

untary blindness, liberation from the reality principle, dishonesty, a propensity to "lie to oneself", playing with grey areas, showing off, bluffing and sham (G. Mauger, 1998).[112]

The rejection of vocational training is also reinforced by the impact of the restructuring of working-class jobs on internal and external representations of this group.

Since the worker class is no longer in a position to offer an attractive alternative, in terms of self-image, to deferred promises of a better future via education, it is understandable that everything associated with it – including vocational training – is being devalued.

Relevant indicators:
- educational direction taken, according to socio-occupational category of the head of the family;
- tracks given priority in the education system;
- match between school qualifications and economic structure;
- average start-of-career earnings of holders of a technical qualification.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Relevant indicators:
- relative perception of the value of a vocational qualification;
- relative perception of manual/craftwork by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods.

C. Measuring the consequences

What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?

Relevant indicator:
- promotion of technical and vocational education.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

The development of a new model attractive to unskilled young people will probably require guaranteed wages and conditions (including safety conditions) in order to offset the tiresome, thankless nature of the tasks involved.

Relevant indicator:
- placements.

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112. This passage is a repeat of part 1, chapter 2.3, point b, p. XX.

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?

> Relevant indicators:
> – programmed meetings bringing together schools, young people and businesses/firms in lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – measures to develop apprenticeship and/or combined work and training.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

One of the first stages has to be to give a higher status to the vocational and technical streams within the education system, so that they are no longer portrayed or perceived as a second-best option for underachievers or those not motivated enough to study in the general stream, but rather as an opportunity for these young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to become integrated into the labour market, provided of course that the education on offer matches the demands of employers.

Providing an opportunity for relatively early, short-term experience in various employment sectors, in both industry and administration, would enable these young people to see what possibilities are open to them, so that they decide on their future path out of choice rather than by default. At least, that is to be hoped.

> Relevant indicators:
> – forms of mentoring in business/industry as a complement to technical training;
> – non-discrimination in occupational mobility.

3.4. Justification for corrective and punitive measures: "Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are misfits in a world that prizes mobility above all else"

A. The stereotype and its causes and effects

How justified is the stereotype?

In the current context of rapid globalisation, the concept of exclusion makes reference to the demands of a "connectionist" world in which the lack of security among disadvantaged groups is caused by their lack of mobility. To quote Boltanski and Chiapello: "In a connectionist world, mobility, the ability to move autonomously, not only in geographical space but also between individuals or in mental spaces, between ideas, is an essential quality of the haves, so that the have-nots are characterised primarily by their immobility (rigidity)." Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods suffer from several disadvantages, therefore, since it is they who stay in one place and cannot improve their mobility or their ability to make new connections. They are consequently left where they are, outside the networked world. As in the case of the concept of employability, responsibility for exclusion is therefore assumed to lie in the shortcomings of the individual, who does not possess the necessary attributes for the new forms of organisation of labour, particularly in terms of flexibility and continual adaptation to change. For young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, local roots, loyalty and stability in relation to their territory consequently represent both

a means of survival and a way of constructing their identity, as well as, paradoxically, a factor in financial insecurity, since they are at variance with the requirement for mobility.

Relevant indicators:
– relative residential mobility;
– home connection to the Internet in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– ownership of a mobile phone;
– relative percentage registered with temporary employment agencies;
– relative take-up of very short-term jobs;
– social mixing by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods.

Is the stereotype widespread?

The stereotype seeing young people from lower-income neighbourhoods as being physically ghettoised over-looks the influence the way transport and other services are structured has on the perception of mobility and the vitality of a particular area. All the institutional services tend to shut up shop in these neighbourhoods at 6 p.m., when public transport also becomes very infrequent. The risk of isolation and social decline increases with the absence of any representatives of the institutions who live in the neighbourhood.

Relevant indicators:
– perception of lower-income neighbourhoods as ghettos;
– public transport services;
– affordability of public transport for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– independence of movement;
– existence of public services in lower-income neighbourhoods.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

What are the specific aspirations of this group which are misunderstood and help explain how the stereotype came about?

Contrary to this view, in practice young people demonstrate considerable ability to place themselves in the global context and adapt to changes in it. They perfect their technological skills in order to gain access to artistic production via the Internet, and use exchange networks and increasingly sophisticated computer tools, thereby showing exemplary situational intelligence. By being in sync with modernity, these young people are not merely consumers, but also actors and producers. For instance, they show considerable capacity for technological adaptation when it comes to pirating copies of DVDs and CDs and decoding satellite channels in order to gain access to products that are beyond their means.

These various aspects reflect a significant ability to "connect", which is also found in the vitality and hybrid-isation processes of what is known as "street culture". There is talk of a youth "subculture" that is "embarking on a process of symbolic creation" (A. Raulin, 2001). Certain activities taking place in streets and in public spaces must now be recognised as possessing an impressive level of cultural creativity that goes far beyond neighbourhood boundaries and is particularly sensitive to the reality outside those neighbourhoods (for example, see the very rapid spread of the dress and music codes of American street culture to the rest of the world). The "tag" and rap phenomena that emerged during the 1980s may reflect a desire to create specific

spaces and forms of expression, enabling young people to enter into communication with other young people far beyond their own neighbourhood and social circle.

Young people's cultural production and practices, particularly in public spaces, are continually expanding. It is impossible to ignore improvised street performances by young people in the busiest places, in which they present different types of acrobatics, dance, skate-boarding and other forms of creative and cultural expression. Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are re-creating socially mixed areas and connection points by appropriating certain public spaces in the city centre. Rap and hip hop, which is identified with by a broad youth audience, is also an important medium of communication, since it conveys a discourse of denunciation and demands that attests to the reality of day-to-day life in these neighbourhoods and the socioeconomic changes affecting their living conditions.

Researchers point out that a distinguishing feature of lower-income neighbourhoods is that the young people there do not forego the latest fashions, which implies that such products are obtained through other means, enabling them to keep up with their contemporaries in the rest of the city, despite belonging to a social world where financial insecurity is viewed as a social status and defined institutionally as such.

> Relevant indicators:
> – bilingualism among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods (among those of immigrant origin);
> – young artists in lower-income neighbourhoods.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype

> Relevant indicator:
> – percentage of young people not leaving the neighbourhood at least once a week.

C. Measuring the consequences

What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?

> Relevant indicators:
> – transport provision for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – support for the siting of traditional firms in lower-income neighbourhoods.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

"Connectivity" initiatives must be encouraged by facilitating high-speed Internet access for young people, enhancing their abilities in these areas and supporting the vast number of civic, artistic and other youth initiatives on the web. To this end, UNESCO has launched a programme for "young digital creators", a

web-based project bringing together young participants from different cultures to develop a tool for reconciliation between cultures and dialogue on issues of relevance to us all.

Relevant indicators:
– support for the residential and occupational mobility of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– helping young people in lower-income neighbourhoods to set up websites.

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?

Young people have grown up in the networked information society, and are a great deal more than mere consumers of this new information culture. They are also very active participants in it, including as creators of a variety of personal sites, online businesses and Internet radio programmes that reach a far wider audience than just their neighbourhood. The web also enables them to interact with others, to participate in forums, to express their opinions and to be informed, thereby helping them to become citizens who are interested in the social issues that affect them.

Various facilities must also be made available for the improvised street performances and productions found in European cities. Local bodies can be instructed to subsidise such creative endeavours and to ensure that they are more widely available. Young people's community and association-based projects must receive the backing they need in order to enable them to be set up and to secure recognition. In order to promote youth initiatives and their potential, it is essential to make full use of the various communication and information media. In a lower-income neighbourhood in Berlin, for example, as part of the "Social City" project, a team of professional cameramen visited young Turks in their favourite haunts and produced a film with them on how they see their neighbourhood.

The media can therefore play an important role in changing the image of such neighbourhoods by giving their inhabitants a positive profile through reports on the creative processes being developed within them. Exhibitions and events organised in these neighbourhoods would enable outsiders to find out more about and come into contact with the people who live there. For example, an association working in a "problem" neighbourhood in Brussels (Quartier Maritime) arranged a walking tour for workers from a large firm nearby, affording an opportunity to demystify the neighbourhood, to raise awareness of it and to establish better relations, amongst other things through the organisation of occasional group meals in the homes of residents, many of whom are of migrant origin.

Lastly, it is important to expose adolescents from these neighbourhoods to new situations, by giving them the opportunity to discover unfamiliar things and places and forms of expression they were not previously aware of, giving them confidence in their creative abilities and helping them to construct a positive self-image in order to guide them towards a new realm of action and reaction. Such a process of raising awareness of the range of possibilities is essential in order to enable these young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to become active subjects, prepared to make a commitment to improving their living conditions within their area. Realising that their future is not set in stone, learning to depart from mechanical obedience and becoming aware of their own resources, these young people can become prime movers in community mobilisation within their areas.

Relevant indicators:
- – percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods who use the Internet at least once a week;
- – the percentage of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods taking new technology or enterprise management training in relation to the percentage for all young people;
- – helping young people in lower-income neighbourhoods to take part in cultural or artistic exchanges.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

Such informal expression and learning systems must be fully acknowledged in order to create new opportunities for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. Recognition of other aspects of cognitive capacity, such as emotional intelligence, often very much developed amongst these young people, would help underline their potential for and not just their shortcomings in learning and "connectability" with all society.[113]

These processes to empower young people and enhance their mental and physical mobility are desirable, however, only if a comprehensive social action network is also mobilised to increase their freedom of action and control over their destiny, so as to enable them to pursue, at least to some extent, an alternative life plan. Young people need to be made aware that another world is possible, that they can do well at school and have a decent job and a normal life. Only then can they change their image of themselves. Yet if nothing is done at the same time to make it easier for them to secure a decent job and income, such intervention is more destructive than positive, reinforcing these young people's frustrations and sense of exclusion. Any potential escape route which, perhaps chiefly in their minds, takes young people out of the confines of their neighbourhood will be socially and culturally destructive if it does not provide any scope for creating a new environment. Those responsible for social action in such neighbourhoods are well aware that their work with adolescents must go hand in hand with genuine alternative solutions, but such issues lie well outside their power. This is nevertheless a decisive test of a project's legitimacy. Considerable efforts are consequently being made in conjunction with employers and public authorities to develop vocational integration/training paths in order to facilitate the integration of these adolescents into the labour market, in sectors other than the traditional ones familiar to their parents. As stated in another sheet, the proof that young people are ready for mobility is that they want to be pulled upwards.

Relevant indicators:
- – research on the aspirations of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
- – support for training in fields relevant to their aspirations.

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113. Williamson, Budapest, 2005.

Chapter 4 – Stereotypes concerning autonomy and personal and family fulfilment

4.1. Original stereotype: "Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are incapable of accepting responsibility for themselves or for others"

This stereotype is echoed in the others described in this guide. The "responsibility" of young people is often viewed separately from financial autonomy and the ability to construct an integral identity or one not based on a feeling of marginality. In all circumstances, responsibility is dependent on being able to fulfil both these conditions. This stereotype therefore brands young people as irresponsible without, however, raising the issue of how these conditions can be fulfilled. In a context in which there is an increasing lack of security – at school, in employment, in access to housing and in other areas of life – the very question of individual responsibility when the social conditions have been undermined is a difficult if not impossible one. How can one increase individual responsibility in a context of social polarisation and impoverishment, in the absence of any long-term political strategy?

4.2. Generalisation of the original stereotype: "Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods drop out of school"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

Since the early 1990s, the issue of young people from lower-income backgrounds "dropping out of school" has become a major concern for public authorities, which divide it into a number of categories: leaving school without any skills, leaving school without any qualifications, repeated truancy and school "violence".

> Relevant indicators:
> - relative school drop-out rate;
> - relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods classified as underachievers;
> - relative truancy rate;
> - relative repeat rate;
> - relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who leave school with no qualifications;
> - relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods among those with a higher education qualification;
> - relative gross schooling rate.

Is this stereotype widespread?

> Relevant indicators:
> - public perception of the effectiveness of the education system for pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods;
> - perception of teachers as to the potential of pupils from disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?

"Dropping out" is simply the most visible aspect of a socially differentiated relationship to school, however, which depends on different groups' experience of schooling and the role it plays in their social reproduction strategies.

The "correct usage" of school, that is, the reproduction of behaviour consistent with what the school system – and its staff – expects of the children entrusted to it, is thus by no means either natural or automatic. Academic achievement requires a belief in the school system's ability to change (or reproduce) social circumstances, and a recognition of the validity of its knowledge and judgments. Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods do not always meet these criteria.

For a long time, there was considerable continuity between workers' children's attitudes to school and a "shop-floor culture", deeply rooted in the working class (P. Willis, 1978). The emphasis on practical skills and experience is thus at variance in every way with the theoretical and academic knowledge taught at school.

Similarly, a tough, manly appearance with a strong emphasis on physical strength and the associated values is clearly quite at odds with school requirements based on the docile learning of intellectual challenges and games. It is as if, beyond school discourses, children from lower-income backgrounds, doomed to almost certain academic failure owing to their lack of cultural capital, anticipate their probable future and develop strategies for resisting this social domination right from primary school.

This explains an "anti-school" culture, or "school counterculture", taking the form of a rejection of those who do come up to the institution's expectations – "fools" and "teachers' pets" – and more generally of school rules: discipline, obedience, cultural goodwill. Joking around, insolence, cheek and disturbances constitute repeated grounds for confrontation and conflicts with the school authorities, who in return issue negative educational judgments: punishment, expulsion or encouragement to leave school and find a job.

What is at stake in the schooling of these children is not the building of a future career path, in the sense intended by the system and those groups that make academic achievement the mainstay of their replication. Individual choices of occupation appear to be random, not based on a rational, end-means type of analysis. They share the vague certainty that most manual and semi-skilled jobs are tedious and unrewarding, to differing degrees, and that they will have to change jobs regularly. What matters first and foremost, therefore, is finding a group of peers ("mates") with whom they will enjoy working, since they share the same values. It is important to be able to trust them and to know that no one will go and spill the beans on ways of getting around the rules, whether this means break schedules, pace of work or the "pilfering" that supplements one's meagre wage. In short, it is a question of establishing a group whose cultural norms make work, in whatever form it takes, bearable.

The way these young people are received in workshops and on building sites – by other workers and their superiors – seems to allow them to express their personalities, whereas school has done its utmost to change them. It goes a long way to explaining their initial reaction, in which the transition from school to work is experienced as a kind of "liberation".

Mass access to education and the impact of unemployment and the casualisation of the labour market have altered these traditional forms of social integration for "bad pupils", of whom the figure of the "class clown", the traditional, likeable troublemaker destined for a short educational life expectancy, embodied the classic example.

In "mass" schooling, the most marginalised pupils are kept within the system for much longer, and in many cases take "normal" courses. It is in this latest phase of the massification and formal standardisation of secondary education since the mid-1980s that the public authorities are discovering the issue of "dropping out of school" and what goes with it: truancy and school disturbances. This is also the point at which they have introduced a series of measures to address the problem: reporting and punishment of truancy, classes for problem pupils, integration mechanisms, etc. (B. Geay, 2003a).

Relevant indicators:
  – relative school success rate of pupils from disadvantaged social groups;
  – siting of schools (lower secondary/upper secondary) in lower-income neighbourhoods;
  – households with children of school age living under the poverty threshold;
  – trends in the school success disparity index;
  – average years of service of teachers in schools in lower-income neighbourhoods and/or schools most attended by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
  – relative education disadvantage;
  – relative expenditure per pupil in lower-income neighbourhoods;
  – actual cost of higher studies (including subsistence) in relation to average wage.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Relevant indicators:
  – relative rate of physical and psychological violence among pupils;
  – relative prevalence of drug consumption in lower-income neighbourhoods;
  – feeling of insecurity at school;
  – pupil satisfaction regarding teaching content;
  – general pupil satisfaction;
  – school contribution to the feeling of belonging to society.

C. Measuring the consequences

What factors facilitate this action and constitute an obstacle to building up a sense of community?

In a context characterised by both mass access to schooling and the development of underemployment and new forms of financial insecurity, the internal segmentation of school pupils is far more acute than in the past. The diversification of tools for dealing with academically deviant groups thus appears to be a reaction to the new situation faced by the system. Old ways of medicalising academic failure are consequently being supplemented by a whole series of new arrangements, most of which only offer "support" for school-leavers, or supervise the transition from school to working life or to those institutions providing the best preparation for it.

This is not an attempt to discredit these projects. The work carried out in such facilities is often innovative and of a high quality. As the history of special education shows, the most sophisticated trials and advanced professional skills are often developed in sectors established on the fringes of the school system, coexisting with situations of greater financial insecurity and virtual institutional abandonment.

For all that, research on such facilities shows that, rather than tools for "combating the problem of school dropouts", the only instruments available to most of the professionals working in them are those allowing a legitimate "exit" from the education system (B. Geay, 2003b).

Like classes and workshops for problem pupils, these facilities serve to manage the potentially unemployable, in that unemployability is anticipated in the form of an inability to accept firms' operating rules. Where it is impossible to find a stable socio-professional solution for young people who do not satisfy the necessary requirements for entering the labour market, other than on its fringes and without any kind of job security, the role of classes and workshops for problem pupils in finding a "place" for lower secondary school students is part of a series of moves aimed at preventing total alienation or a complete lack of supervision (M. Millet and D. Thin, 2003).

Unable to offer equal access to knowledge and school qualifications, schools reproduce spaces of internal exclusion within the different levels of the education system.

At lower secondary school level, the transition from a discourse aimed at reducing social and academic inequalities to policies for countering "school disturbances" and managing "problem" pupils means that these spaces are set up as ways of dealing with and supervising those of the "internally excluded" who cause the greatest disruption to the school system; they tend to function as spaces allowing an institutional transition from internal exclusion within the education system to dominated positions within society.

The establishment of educational supervision units, the growing number of classes for problem pupils and the creation of classes for children who early on in their education have already been labelled as illiterate are all symptoms of "massified" schooling, which, having been unable to provide appropriate learning conditions, is able to deal with its own "malfunctions" or to address the inequalities within it only by increasing the number of special arrangements and facilities under such vague categories as "illiteracy" and "dropping out of school".

> Relevant indicators:
> – system for encouraging teachers to go to schools with a high level of pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – assistance and support for young people leaving the education system;
> – employment of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods before the end of compulsory schooling;
> – making parents more accountable.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

A rapid, insufficiently developed reappraisal of education systems is thereby taking place without any real discussion of the effects of the new forms of labelling.[114] A critical assessment of the functions and uses of

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114. All education systems, segmented or not, are today being re-examined. Countries such as France tend to develop different streams, whereas in Germany there is currently a debate on shifting from a stream-based system to a single-stream *(Gesamtschule)*.

such arrangements must therefore be undertaken as a matter of urgency; with a view to early intervention, the knowledge and skills gained must be transferred to those institutions attracting the largest number of pupils from diverse backgrounds.

The system of selecting and steering young people from lower-income neighbourhoods towards certain educational streams should be reviewed to counter the increasing correlation between initial social disparities and low qualifications.

In Germany, for example, roughly two thirds of pupils in the technical and vocational streams are children of manual workers (and there is a similar percentage of children of salaried workers in the general streams). There are almost twice as many young people of foreign origin in the technical streams than in the German education system as a whole (20% in the technical streams; 11.2% in the education system). These figures date from 1991; however, the OECD data from 2001 classify Germany as the most inegalitarian system in terms of results in relation to social origin.

Relevant indicators:
- surveys on the educational and career aspirations of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
- arrangements to encourage studies by children and young people from poor families;
- aid to parents who find it difficult to help their children with their schooling;
- career guidance in lower-income neighbourhoods.

To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?

Relevant indicators:
- pupils being given "second-chance" education;
- links between schools and businesses;
- study grants for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to attend higher education courses.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

Relevant indicators:
- action taken in partnership between schools and outside institutions;
- existence of educational teams in schools.

4.3. Arguments justifying the generalisation: "Boy-girl relationships have become more tense in lower-income neighbourhoods"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

Girls from lower-income neighbourhoods complain of a growing malaise in their relationships with boys. This problem has been recognised since the early 1990s. Girls state that they are finding it increasingly difficult to develop within their neighbourhoods. It is legitimate to wonder whether there are really new

tensions and antagonisms between boys and girls in lower-income neighbourhoods. Or must it be accepted that the upsurge in violence between young people of opposite sexes is merely apparent? Are the living conditions and socioeconomic status of girls from these neighbourhoods genuinely declining, giving them a sense of "inferiority" to boys, particularly in such neighbourhoods? (H. Kebabza, 2005)

Changes in the mix of the sexes in young people's living environments: public, semi-public and private areas

The family home, schools and training institutes, workplaces, social and cultural centres, sports and leisure centres, local meeting places for young people, places of entertainment in town and holiday locations form the normal framework for young people's lives. For young people affiliated to a religious group, there are also places such as churches and mosques. The sexes mix in all of these places, to a greater or lesser extent. But the kind of gender mixing that takes place is never the same. It would be useful to have surveys comparing the rules and procedures governing the mixing of the sexes in these respective areas.

It may be argued that many young people's experience of mixing with the opposite sex does not vary, since they spend most of their time with their gang. Yet surely such research is worthwhile: a gang does not always act in the same way. The gang shifts, re-forms and changes depending on what it is doing. The experience of mixing with the opposite sex is different each time. The way members of a particular gang, meeting outside a building, mix with the opposite sex does not take the same form or perform the same function when the gang meets in a basement or in town. Both qualitative and spatial distinctions must therefore be made in assessing forms of gender mixing among young people: the way the same young people mix with the opposite sex in public, semi-public and private areas is not identical.

Relevant indicators:
- mixed-gender sports activities;
- mixed-gender cultural activities;
- gender violence.

Is this stereotype widespread?

Relevant indicators:
- perception of the influence of groups of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods on behaviour and relations between women and men;
- psychologists'/teachers' perception of boy-girl relationships at school;
- satisfaction/dissatisfaction expressed by girls in lower-income neighbourhoods in respect of their relationships with boys from the same neighbourhoods.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?

Relevant indicators:
- influence on gender violence of the lack of mixed leisure/recreational opportunities;
- influence on gender violence of traditions;
- correlation between ghettoisation and gender violence.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Girl-boy relationships in lower-income neighbourhoods are heavily influenced by the moral criterion of reputation. Reputation must be understood as being known to be morally honourable, being famous, being known favourably for one's courage. It so happens that town planning in housing estates reproduces certain aspects of village mentalities. On a housing estate, as in any village, it is impossible to escape the gaze of others. This scrutiny operates in accordance with the criterion of reputation: "Far from constituting categories within the sociological meaning of the term, these reputations must be taken seriously, insofar as they appear to be the basis for the organisation of social gender relations, in particular. Reputation is an enduring social label, irrespective of how plausible it is" (H. Kebabza, 2005).

For girls, reputation derives from the exercise of various forms of control over them. This includes control over their relationships, which can go as far as ensuring virginity, a "state" that must be preserved. "Good" girls are those who have good, acceptable friendships. For boys, reputation is based on the criterion of manliness. This is why networks of boys develop a strategy designed to give them a high profile within their territories. In order to secure such a profile, they must be loud and conspicuous. They maintain a phobia about everything "outside" the neighbourhood. This leads to a relationship of hostility at various levels: boys' hostility towards everything outside their territory; boys' hostility towards girls who seek to liberate or free themselves from forms of control; girls' hostility towards boys, reflected in their attempts to show that they too have the ability to "occupy" the area in force. Boys and girls are clearly trying to outdo one another in occupying public areas. Each network of young people appropriates part of the public space in order to make it a kind of extension of private space, a kind of second "home". It is wrong to think boys have a monopoly over the control of public space. It is true they would like to exercise such a monopoly, but the girls step in. They show that they exist, even if it means wearing the headscarf in order to move freely around the housing estate.

a. Gender parity and disparity in gangs

Girls and boys from lower-income neighbourhoods organise themselves into networks, in accordance with procedures of which very little analysis has hitherto been undertaken. The visibility of these contact networks may escape those who have a simplistic view of life in such neighbourhoods. It is a mistake to imagine that networks of young people in public or semi-public areas (outside buildings, small squares, snack bars, community centres, etc.) are male. In actual fact, girls are in the habit of going around in networks, in public, even very late at night. Moreover, some gangs are mixed. Above all, it should be pointed out that many girls have decided to contribute to the construction of the "strong", visible identity shared by young people from these neighbourhoods, through their presence in public areas. The form and *modus operandi* of these "visible" forms of gender mixing have yet to be analysed: who are these girls who hang around outside and mix with gangs? What kinds of relationships do they have with the boys? Are they friendships, brother-sister relationships or more explicit emotional relationships? Such a study of gender mixing in these neighbourhoods remains to be carried out, taking into account parameters based on the ethnic, cultural and religious affiliations of young people who mix with the opposite sex in this way. In the meantime, it is important to counter the idea of the "supposed invisibility" of girls in the public sphere within such neighbourhoods.

b. Regulation and supervision of mixed gangs

Young people in networks, whether they belong to organised gangs or vague networks, exercise strict control over members' "boy-girl" relationships. The community nature of these networks is such that it is virtually

impossible for a male member to isolate himself in order to meet up with a girl, and even more difficult to go out with a girl. The law of the network, and thus of the gang, is community life. It is not unusual to see girls belonging to a network of young people. Once again, it should not be imagined that these networks indulge in sexual practices. Even flirtations are unusual. The more young people are involved in networks, the later couples form. It is not unusual for first sexual experiences to take place during a trip to the young person's country of origin, where it is sometimes easier to escape family control, paradoxical as this may seem. Lastly, being part of a network encourages fabrications and challenges. Young people tend to boast of having had sexual relations, even though they have done nothing of the sort.

Mixing between the sexes within such gangs is not automatic from the outset. It has to be learned. The first "fundamental" when it comes to initiation into mixing with the opposite sex is to free oneself from parental control while one is with the gang. Both boys and girls have to deserve to be allowed out in the evening. For it is in the evening that these networks meet up and spend time doing things together. This consequently implies that girls go out in the evenings. Moreover, these meetings take place almost daily. The key times are Friday night, Saturday night, and late Sunday afternoon. In the case of mixed gangs, the etiquette for meeting up follows different rituals: mobile phone calls, the affectionate yet codified rite of a kiss on the cheek, sharing news, deciding what to do. As these young people do not have access to leisure sites in the city or the countryside, they plan their own activities: drinking, tour of the neighbourhood, music sound system from a car, improvised dances, etc. Roles are shared between boys and girls.

c. Role of traditional mechanisms for integration

The way gangs of young people mix with the opposite sex in public or semi-public neighbourhood areas is subject to strict control. At first sight, this control is exercised by gang leaders, who impose their approach and code in relation to the gender mix. This even extends to controlling how girls dress, so as to prevent them being "categorised" as "easy". Family control, exercised by older brothers and sisters or other family members, also plays an important role, but it is less visible than that exercised by the gang.

d. Gender mix is also subject to religious, cultural or ethnic customs

This can be seen in relation to the way Muslim women dress, in which the public sphere-private sphere dichotomy is very visible. Wearing the headscarf and very long outfits does not have the same significance in public areas as it does in the private sphere. Head-covering bandanas, long trousers and long sleeves are forms of dress that have recently appeared in public areas. The stronger the religious identification, the greater the codification of sexual practices. This is true of all religious affiliations. There is a very significant relationship between sexual behaviour and religious ties. Both among practising Portuguese Catholics and in Christian Tamil circles, girls have to sleep at their parents' homes or at the home of a family member. Among practising Muslims, both girls' and boys' friendships are strictly monitored by a family member. A girl's virginity until marriage is still prized. This is less true of circles with few religious ties, in which parental authority is more lax. In fact, it is in these circles that the girl's oldest brother assumes all the rights.

As far as culture is concerned, opinions differ regarding gender disparity within the hip-hop phenomenon, for example. It would also be helpful to know how gender mixing is experienced within the sphere of work and employment.

The recent book by sociologist Michel Fize (2003) raises another issue, that of co-education. The regulations governing co-education in France were introduced in 1960. They did not become an integral part

of the education system until 1975 (Haby reform). In 1982, a circular defined the role of co-education: co-education must allow "completely equal opportunities" and help to "counter sexist prejudices". It is now thought that the role of co-education should be redefined. Mixed sports participation is declining significantly. Most sports participation follows ethnic lines and is strictly divided by gender. The only exceptions are athletics and swimming. It would be interesting to know which sports are practised mainly by girls.

e. Forms of activism

The effects of groups and territories, as commonly found in lower-income neighbourhoods, very often work to girls' disadvantage. In response, hubs of resistance are forming. Some of them, such as "Neither Whores nor Submissive", have attracted extensive media coverage, owing to the positions of its founders, but there is a broader movement. These groups campaign for freedom and equality between men and women in lower-income neighbourhoods, and oppose all forms of submission imposed on women today. At the other extreme, there are demands for time slots reserved for women and girls at swimming pools and even gyms. This trend towards dedicated time slots is also emerging within "ethnocultural" associations. The idea is that activities undertaken by women should take place out of the sight of men, including (male) maintenance staff. Between these two extremes lies a vast range of attitudes and behaviour. These should be the subject of research, which could serve as a basis for qualifying the stereotypes frequently used to describe the relationship between mixing of the sexes and activism.

f. Sexual initiation of young people, sexual practices and "moving in together"

One stereotype is very widespread. It asserts that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods do not have access to a normal process of sexual initiation. Their sexual initiation, when it happens, takes two forms. Owing to the control exercised by families, gangs and networks, first sexual initiation is said to take place through pornography, via the Internet or other channels. This gives a degraded image of women, which trivialises or legitimises sexist attitudes. Another way of learning about sexuality is through sexual violence. Thus, first sexual relations are claimed to be part of the process of initiation into gangs, which indulge in gang rapes. What are we to make of this?

We are talking about sexuality here. Three points should be made. Sexuality is a phenomenon that escapes any direct observation. As a result, many of the acts talked about are based on rumours circulated by or about young people from these neighbourhoods. Sexual initiation is a rite of passage. In any rite, customs evolve. This can be seen in lower-income neighbourhoods, and will differ in line with cultures and religious affiliations. Furthermore, sexual behaviour can also be part of deviant, high-risk behaviour. Drug and alcohol use, violent practices and challenges to be taken up inevitably affect sexuality.

These deviant practices remain the exception, however. So-called "easy" women or girls sometimes go along with such group initiations, in basements or in homes. In this case they are consenting, or are more or less forced to consent. Yet here again, rumours gain ground (L. Mucchielli, 2005). If such practices were common, people would know about it. First and foremost, sexual initiation is a rite. It takes place in private, following on from an encounter or a relationship. It is not easy to be alone as a couple in a neighbourhood where everyone sees everything and knows everything.

Neighbourhood life does not give young people access to a sexual life that observes all the stages of initiation. More so than elsewhere, young people are constrained by the lack of privacy in their living environments and homes. There is a tendency for couples to form rapidly, and to cut themselves off from family

ties so that they can be alone and live as a couple. In point of fact, these couples, who leave the family circle early on, represent the new form of sexual initiation.

Another issue relates to homosexual practices or tendencies among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. There is a serious lack of research. Yet there are undoubtedly stereotypes to be deconstructed.

> Relevant indicators:
> – sexual violence trends in lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – changes in the structure of young people's networks in lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – average age difference between girls and boys in peer groups;
> – prevalence of religious criteria in the organisation of young people's networks.

C. Assessing the consequences

What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?

> Relevant indicators:
> – tightening of legislation on gender violence and its treatment by the courts where young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are concerned;
> – stepping up of police activity against gender violence in lower-income neighbourhoods.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

One possible area for guiding future decisions regarding young people's access to fulfilling gender relations and sexual lives is that of moving away from gender injunctions. According to the report produced by the ORIV (Regional Observatory on Integration and the City) following a speech by Horia Kebabza (2003 and 2005), the gender injunction to which girls are subjected is the obligation to be responsible and respectable (including virginity); for boys, it is the obligation to be manly. How can these gender injunctions be overcome or neutralised?

> Relevant indicators:
> – vocational guidance encouraging girls and boys alike to enter sectors which are traditionally reserved for the opposite sex;
> – associations and NGOs working for equal opportunities in lower-income neighbourhoods.

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?

The question of gender mix and sexual relations in lower-income neighbourhoods needs to be addressed more openly between practitioners (in the health care and social sectors) and the young people themselves. It would be helpful if these sensitive subjects were broached in schools other than from a purely biological point of view in order to bring about some democratisation in a frequently male-dominated environment.

Lastly, work needs to be done on promoting tolerance between the sexes at an early age. However, religion (whatever form it takes) in lower-income neighbourhoods continues to impede greater openness in addressing these subjects.

> Relevant indicators:
> – existence of crèches and other childcare facilities in lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – proportion of young children from lower-income neighbourhoods enrolled in crèches or other childcare facilities;
> – differences in parental attitudes to girls and boys in lower-income neighbourhoods;
> – role of educational establishments in the social mix;
> – steps taken to promote equal opportunities in lower-income neighbourhoods.

4.4. Justification for corrective and punitive measures: "In health matters, young people from lower-income neighbourhoods engage in high-risk behaviour"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

This stereotype gives the impression that any change in young people's health depends on two parameters: normality and high-risk behaviour.

It follows that if the norm is to enjoy perfect health, then those whose health has been damaged are "not normal". One might legitimately wonder where the "average" norm lies, and whether it is "abnormal" to be in poor health or to be ill.

This stereotype also implies that all high-risk behaviour automatically leads to serious health problems. In that case, simply avoiding those neighbourhoods in which such behaviour prevails would be sufficient to improve one's chances of good health.

In actual fact, health is as much a state as a question of "being able to". Prevention is not confined to education about risks and information about protective behaviour. It incorporates other aspects, such as the role of health in young people's lives. Health education requires a joint effort and general work on social interaction.

> Relevant indicators:
> – comparative amount of time devoted to sport;
> – comparative alcohol and cannabis consumption;
> – comparative rate of psychological disorders;
> – comparative rate of stress-related disorders;
> – visits to health professionals in the past twelve months;
> – comparative access to sex education;
> – comparative rate of young people not covered by social security;
> – comparative dental check-up rate.

Is this stereotype widespread?

Relevant indicators:
  – public health services' perception of how young people from lower-income neighbourhoods behave in the health sphere;
  – school medical officers' perception of how young people from lower-income neighbourhoods behave in the health sphere.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

What are the specific aspirations of this group which are misunderstood and help explain how the stereotype came about?

Changes in young people's attitudes to health are found in all social environments. The following data may be given as an indication; they concern across-the-board problems, irrespective of background or affiliation.

A WHO study[115] on Europe shows that in 2001 the trend in smoking was down in relation to the peak in consumption in 1997, with the average being around 17.5% (16.9% for girls and 18.1% for boys) of young people at age 15 smoking on a daily basis. The trend did, however, vary from country to country and the proportion of young people smoking was rising in some countries, such as the Czech Republic and Lithuania. With regard to alcohol consumption, the same study states that the proportion of 15 year olds claiming to have been drunk on several occasions was 35% (girls: 31.4%; boys: 39.8%). In most cases, the drunkenness was intentional. The most widely drunk alcohol was beer. Lastly, around 8% of 15 year olds claimed to be regular consumers of cannabis.

Behind this general picture, all the research published on such behaviour clearly establishes the existence of a link between young people's social and psychological characteristics. Social characteristics relate to age, sex, education and lifestyle. Psychological characteristics are connected primarily with the relationship to self (self-esteem) and relationships with parents and peers. The increasingly worrying issue of depression must be placed in this latter category.

Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods live in a context in which all health indicators are weakened. The observations made on the basis of research relating to the "youth" population as a whole may be applied to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, although the scale and variables are different. The explanation is simple. The living environment associated with high-rise blocks of flats (widespread in northern Europe), unlike rural areas or leafy suburbs, is unpleasant and oppressive. Except for sport, physical activities are limited. This situation is compounded by families' limited means. They inevitably disregard diagnoses, treatments or care that would entail considerable expense. This is particularly obvious in the area of dental and ophthalmological care. Lastly, the crowding prevalent in housing estates puts young people in daily contact with high-risk behaviour.

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115. WHO, 2004.

Relevant indicators:
– comparative malnutrition rate in young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– sports facilities in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– comparative average sport budget of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– comparative average household food budget in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– comparative numbers of general practitioners in lower-income neighbourhoods.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Five indicators are commonly used to analyse changes in young people's health.

a. Diet

It is well known that figures for obesity and excess weight are rising rapidly. There are a number of causes, but poor diet is almost always involved. The problem is significantly more urban than rural in nature. Among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, however, this poor diet does not lead to excess weight. It provokes serious metabolism problems, often resulting in weight loss.

The poor nutritional state observed among young people from these neighbourhoods is caused by an unbalanced diet, in terms of both quantity and quality. It also stems from a breakdown in routines. Regular, sit-down family meals morning, noon and night are typical of childhood and early adolescence. As soon as young people start upper secondary school or take up apprenticeships, they lose the routine of family meals, and do not bother with meals at school or work canteens. They prefer the cheaper option of sandwiches. In addition, devout Muslims abstain from non-*halal* products, without compensating by eating other products that are good for their health. Young people hanging out in gangs do not eat meals. They "snack". What they eat seems to "take the edge off" their hunger, hence the illusion of having had a meal. Excessive consumption of fizzy drinks or alcohol goes hand in hand with this form of malnutrition. There is thus a correlation between the intense social life of young people in gangs and eating patterns that endanger their health.

b. "Drug" use

The process of "drug" use is unclear. The term "drugs" usually includes all consciousness-altering products. It consequently refers to alcohol as well as illicit drugs. Yet prevention work almost always focuses on illicit drugs, particularly cannabis. Another very widespread source of confusion is the fact that those involved in prevention do not make a clear distinction between use, abuse and addiction. Ongoing confusion between these areas distorts all prevention work. Moreover, for a long time these very prevention workers considered the goal of drug prevention to be abstinence. They have now realised that, before they can advocate abstinence, they must first tackle drug abuse. They have also understood the stakes involved in addressing high-risk behaviour.

A particular type of drugs supply and demand is found in lower-income neighbourhoods. Drug trafficking is common. Yet this is not where the main users of hard drugs and large-scale traffickers live. Police checks, which are far more frequent in these neighbourhoods than in the city or in rural areas, tend to give substance to the idea that drugs are more common there than elsewhere, whereas in fact drugs are found in all

social environments. What stands out in these neighbourhoods, however, is the fact that the use of cheap drugs has become commonplace. Nevertheless, the leading drug is beer.

Various forms of prevention seek to reduce drug use through direct or indirect action. The provision of information is the most common approach. There are also wider-ranging forms of action. Life skills training (LST) has been introduced, for instance. This programme offers comprehensive intervention, designed primarily to teach young people how to communicate, how to resolve interpersonal conflicts and to how cope with the problems of day-to-day life, before focusing specifically on the use of particular drugs. These programmes are not found in lower-income neighbourhoods. Moreover, little effort is made to involve parents in prevention work. What is more, action by the police appears to be ineffective in reducing drug use.

c. Prevention of the risks associated with smoking

Anti-smoking measures are now more readily accepted. It is a fact that smoking is the behaviour that causes the most deaths in the long term. Firstly, it is important to analyse why smoking is more common among adolescent girls than adolescent boys. This has been a marked trend over the last five years. None of the research has been able to offer a suitable explanation.

Secondly, it is worth listening to what is being said by medical specialists in the field of nicotine addiction. They divide the process of nicotine addiction into five stages: a preparatory stage, the stage of first initiation to tobacco, a broader experimental stage, a stage of regular use without dependency, and lastly a stage of dependency with daily use. The best form of prevention sets out to prevent, or least postpone, initiation to tobacco. Once young people enter the dependency stage, attempts to stop smoking are hit or miss.

Action taken to prevent smoking from the late 1950s focused chiefly on preventing cardiovascular disease and cancer. Little attention was given to young people's motivations for smoking. These days, the emphasis is on action that takes into account personal factors and factors connected with the young person's family and friends. The aim is to make the young person aware of the issues in terms of his or her personal development and equilibrium. It is now clear that a joint effort by peers and adults yields better results than the efforts of peers alone.

d. Alcohol consumption

Excessive alcohol consumption, even on an occasional basis, always has an adverse social, medical and personal impact. Alcohol consumption is seen as a serious problem, owing to the accidents and violence it can cause. Yet alcohol is more widely consumed and more prestigious than tobacco or drugs. For many young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, being able to consume a large quantity of alcoholic drinks boosts one's "profile". Alcohol consumption is a rite that enhances a person's status, according to the attitudes in vogue among many young people. The most widespread form of alcohol is beer. Often, if they have the means, young people also consume alcopops.

Countering excessive alcohol consumption is a complex business. It is easier to combat smoking. The first reason is that the practices associated with alcohol consumption are semi-private, if not totally "secret". The second reason is that prevention policies focus primarily on the consequences of alcohol consumption. Alcohol abuse is addressed in terms of its outcome, intoxication, whereas its causes must

also be identified. The dangers of intoxication are well known: numerous high-risk acts, violence, road accidents, unrestrained sexual behaviour and reduced academic and intellectual ability. Addressing the causes of excessive alcohol consumption and preventing alcohol consumption among young people involve radical action, the results of which are convincing. Such action must be aimed first and foremost at "high-risk" groups.

Religion can be a decisive factor. It is common knowledge that Islam categorically forbids alcohol and drugs. Young people who "become Muslims" or "re-Islamise" are closely supervised by Islamic associations and their trainers. The latter are aware of the route taken by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, and are in a position to encourage more responsible behaviour. Other spheres of influence are comparable to the religious sphere. This is particularly true of the demands of high-level sport, for example. Excellent fitness is essential.

e. Risks associated with sexuality

There is a lack of research identifying the main features of the sexual lives of young men and women in lower-income neighbourhoods. However, we do possess very precise data about the behaviour of the youth population as a whole, irrespective of affiliation or background. We also have at our disposal the findings of elaborate surveys conducted among marginalised social groups, whose behaviour is easy to "identify". In particular, this applies to the behaviour of homeless young people.

The latest surveys available in France, for example, on the sexual behaviour of young people from all backgrounds shows that:
- 1% of young people aged 15 to 18 have had a sexually transmitted infection (STI) other than thrush (by way of comparison, one in four adolescents in the United States has had an STI while at secondary school);
- 3% of girls in this age group have had a pregnancy. The number of pregnancies per year among girls under the age of 18 is estimated at about 10 000, 6 500 of which result in a termination (source: Analysis of the Sexual Behaviour of Young People aged 15 to 18 (ACSJ) survey carried out in 1994, the findings of which were published in 1997); by way of comparison, 10% of girls aged 15 to 19 in the United States become pregnant;

in Europe
- the average age at first sexual intercourse is about 17 (in France, 17 years and 3 months for boys and 17 years and 6 months for girls); no significant increase in risk factors associated with greater sexual precocity has been observed;
- 85% of 15 year olds claimed to have used some form of contraception the last time they had sexual intercourse.[116]

The few studies carried out on the practices of young people from lower-income communities focus almost exclusively on high-risk behaviour. The risks mentioned most frequently are STIs, unwanted early pregnancies and sexual violence. These three risks are significantly increased in communities facing financial insecurity as a result of social disadvantages. In addition, drug use, including excessive alcohol consumption, appears to be a "multiplier" of sexual risks.

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116. Ibid.

It is now accepted that school is where sex education should take place. Most prevention programmes are confined to schools. This raises at least two issues. Firstly, should the family's role be permanently circumvented? Secondly, are those young people who have been expelled from the school system, who are not reached by such programmes, not entitled to such awareness-raising activities? The aim here is not to assess prevention work. However, it is already clear that, in Europe, adolescents are the population group that has adapted best to the threat of Aids. It also turns out that the most effective prevention activities are those that target all the potential partners in young people's health: family, school environment, work environment, leisure centres, associations, youth movements and cultural or social centres.

> Relevant indicators:
> - comparative teenage pregnancy rate;
> - impact of fast-food restaurants and vending machines on young people;
> - the perception among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods of practices which entail health risks.

C. Measuring the consequences

What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?

> Relevant indicator:
> social services' support provided to the family only when a problem occurs.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

There are three groups in a position to help young people with health problems. Firstly, there is the family circle, with parents in the centre. The role and place of parents and the whole family circle are vital. They are the main players in their children's health education. Then there are those who intervene "directly", whom we may call "health educators". Their areas of expertise include communication, psychology, sociology, education and, naturally, health. Those who intervene indirectly come from health and prevention bodies and associations of patients and consumers.

These three groups represent different issues and a range of possible forms of action. The problem is therefore one of defining their respective responsibilities, roles and fields of action.

> Relevant indicators:
> - sex education;
> - health and healthy lifestyle education at schools attended by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
> - preventive help for families from lower-income neighbourhoods.

To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?

> Relevant indicator:
> – existence of associations or NGOs offering support in the health sphere to young people in lower-income neighbourhoods.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

> Relevant indicator:
> – support for associations active in the health sphere in lower-income neighbourhoods.

CHAPTER 5 – STEREOTYPES CONCERNING PARTICIPATION AND CITIZEN COMMITMENT

5.1. Original stereotype: "Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods play no part in local development"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

The prevailing view of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is often a bleak, defeatist one, as in the case of young people of migrant origin, who are seen as uprooted victims of social exclusion whose sociocultural disadvantages warrant outside intervention in the form of integration policies. Irrespective of their good intentions, such policies regard these young people as non-players trapped in a situation of exclusion, and tend to essentialise the culture and background of young people from such neighbourhoods in order to explain the living conditions they have to cope with. The danger of an approach defined in terms of exclusion is that it locks young people from lower-income neighbourhoods into an administrative category – "young victims of social exclusion" – implying various forms of passivity and renunciation.

Field studies carried out in Europe in recent years demonstrate, on a daily basis, these groups' capacity for initiative in the face of economic recession and the crisis of governance, and their determination to take up the struggle, by various means, to maintain or restore some degree of dignity in their lives. Notwithstanding the new forms of casualisation and exclusion inherent in economic globalisation, it must not be concluded that such groups passively endure this state of affairs. It is, therefore, precisely in the growing number of social spaces marked by financial insecurity that individuals are likely to give new meaning to their behaviour and to develop new connections and forms of interaction with others. Moreover, it is striking how often the residents of "problem" neighbourhoods express their refusal to be labelled as victims of social exclusion. Everywhere, these losers in the current socioeconomic transformations feel that they are on the margins, but do not see themselves as "inferior", despite the symbolic violence of the discourse about exclusion and employability.

In a variety of ways, reflecting their cultural and social diversity, they express – with varying degrees of inventiveness – their integration into the social fabric and their contribution to the shaping of their living environment. Their ability to see the world and their development plans in the light of their cultural identity, history and living environment must therefore be acknowledged. Young people's drive is not expressed solely through the creation of a "subculture", but also through political participation. In a case study of a "problem" neighbourhood in Brussels, Andrea Rea (2001) highlighted the political commitment of a number of young people, some of whom were former "rioters". These young people were looking for political commitment, developing a form of activism in their neighbourhoods. Some of them were becoming social workers, while others stood out for their community involvement. Andrea Rea has shown the existence of a range of forms of collective action and individual and political mobilisation.

It is against this background that the numerous initiatives taken at local level in apparently disintegrating city neighbourhoods must be analysed. These grass-roots practices, which could be described as typical of lower-income districts, combine individual strategies, networking and community structures of varying

degrees of sophistication. They combine economic initiative, redistribution, solidarity and the introduction of innovative forms of regulation intended to ensure safer living conditions for residents. The "identity" deficit these neighbourhoods face may therefore give rise to a process of reconstructing a collective identity with a direct relationship to the "construction" of a territory. This reconstruction can then serve as a basis for restoring a real sense of community.

> Relevant indicators:
> - relative participation rate of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in formal activities organised by associations;
> - comparative number of clubs and associations set up by young people in their neighbourhood;
> - most common areas of participation by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
> - relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods engaging in cultural activity;
> - relative proportion of young people engaging in out-of-school personal development activities.

Is this stereotype widespread?

> Relevant indicators:
> - perception by residents of lower-income neighbourhoods of the role of young people in neighbourhood development;
> - proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who actually take part in neighbourhood activities.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?

> Relevant indicators:
> - exclusion of young people at the planning stage of neighbourhood activities/projects;
> - number of formal organisations in the neighbourhood which allow young people to take part;
> - cost of out-of-school activities;
> - public action in lower-income neighbourhoods taking no account of young people's opinion.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

> Relevant indicators:
> - perception of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of their role in the neighbourhood;
> - perception of the appropriateness of programmes/services on offer within the neighbourhood.

C. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

It is essential to go beyond an idealised picture of local initiatives, however, to try to ascertain which of these many practices involving resistance, survival, solidarity and efforts to ensure safer living conditions can give rise to new ways of "being together and doing things together". They are often mere survival or "coping"

strategies, or are part of attempts to reinvent an identity, which themselves make for social disintegration and new forms of violence. In addition, the very real existence of these practices does not mean that they reverse the processes of casualisation and exclusion, to which the inhabitants of such neighbourhoods continue to be exposed. However, it should be emphasised that subordination and the weight of external pressures do not exhaust these inhabitants' capacity for initiative.

Relevant indicators:
– degree of autonomy for organising local development activities in the neighbourhood;
– young people's perception that they have the opportunity to play a part in the development of their neighbourhood;
– existence of a feeling of distrust of authorities among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– the authorities' perception of the young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– perception of the authorities' respect for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– links that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods have with networks or associations outside their neighbourhood;
– existence of youth organisations in the neighbourhood itself.

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?

The city envisaged as a set of communities is now an important aspect of the practices engaged in by players in lower-income neighbourhoods. The city is consequently becoming a major focal point for conflict and ongoing negotiation between different players. The latest research on urban issues in the 1990s shows that – urban and other – institutional policies are no longer the only urban realities to be taken into account, since other elements of the urban context are not passive. A growing number of processes involving adjustment and negotiation, reconstruction and innovation may be observed: ways of "making do" that often seem to be cobbled together, but sometimes reflect genuine attempts to identify other ways of living alongside one another.

Relevant indicators:
– existence of opportunities for dialogue with young people as opposed to mere information facilities;
– local authorities' presence in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– number of community and activity leaders from the neighbourhood itself.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

Neighbourhood patterns of social organisation are a very important channel for restoring social cohesion and stimulating community life and the economy. Building on the solutions and facilities already in place and supporting grass-roots initiatives are conducive to neighbourhood development. Roles such as that of "older brother" can be acknowledged by local institutions and used in promoting public involvement in community life. Incorporating young people's own initiatives will enable them to find their own place and to take part in a collective, local process. As regards improvements in material living conditions, young people need to find organisations able to provide the support they need. The "welfare" model, integration policies and the top-down model of public intervention have shown their limitations. It is important to build on existing initiatives and to make resources available to young people and residents of the neighbourhoods in question in order to assist them with both material and legal aspects, so as to enable their projects to take shape. Exchange initiatives (at national and European level) could be taken to enable young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to gain access to networks; these could be cultural projects or activities using the new technologies or innovative services. Those running associations assisting with enterprise creation

point out that young people above all else want to be pulled upwards, which in this case is not into a manual job, but rather towards the social professions, sociocultural work and artistic careers, etc.

It is therefore essential to combat the institutional and political solitude and the isolation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods from social, economic and contact networks outside their neighbourhood. There are examples showing that a young person running a neighbourhood association can have access to political and institutional networks enabling him or her to play a mediation role, become familiar with the workings of the relevant institutions, come into contact with political circles, manage funds and, lastly, build up a position and social capital providing the opportunity to break away from his or her typical social destiny as son or daughter of a manual or unemployed worker. Analysing the ways and means of deploying this "middle class" with support from the public authorities, its influence on life in the neighbourhoods, and its role in the political and social processes in play could be a way of rethinking the social environment of lower-income neighbourhoods from the inside, having due regard for the social boundaries that cross them and give them shape, rather than regarding them as a world that poverty has rendered uniform.

Relevant indicator:
  – support for job creation/business start-ups in the fields of culture, sociocultural activity and innovative services.

5.2. Generalisation of the original stereotype: "Young people are not politically active"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

As we have seen, the turnout rate among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is still very low. Similarly, their rate of union membership is also low. Are these young people completely depoliticised?

Trade unionism has long been a major focal point for the political socialisation of lower-income communities. By concentrating on action that is directly relevant to day-to-day experience (work), it is possible to transpose tendencies associated with the class ethos (being anti-authority, attitudes of resistance) to a political struggle. Unionism enables individuals to acquire an "activist capital", in the form of practical skills (public speaking, writing leaflets, running meetings) and ways of looking at the world. This helps overcome the collective sense of a lack of political skills or influence felt by the lower-income classes.

Relevant indicators:
  – comparative trade union membership among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
  – relative proportion of young people who regularly read a general daily newspaper;
  – type of information favoured by young people.

Is this stereotype widespread?

Relevant indicators:
  – political parties' perception of the involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
  – trade unions' perception of the involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

What are the specific aspirations of this group which are misunderstood and help explain how the stereotype came about?

So are there no politics in lower-income neighbourhoods? The public authorities' enthusiasm for initiatives such as Stop la Violence ("Stop Violence") and Ni Putes ni Soumises (Neither Whores nor Submissive) might give that impression in France. These movements, which set out to combat "violence" and "gender violence" respectively, have secured immediate recognition from successive governments, and their representatives have been received by the Prime Minister and several members of the government. They have also had an enthusiastic reception from the main media, all of which have praised these activist ventures.

Conversely, campaigns against police "blunders", racist offences, the "double sanction", etc., despite giving rise to numerous local and national groups (such as the Mouvement de l'Immigration et des Banlieues (MIB) (Immigration and Suburbs Movement)), are alternately explained in emotional or mechanical terms and discounted politically, by both local and national authorities (L. Bonelli, 2003; M. Kokoreff, 2003).

What is the explanation for this different treatment?

It depends primarily on the extent to which such movements fit – in terms of both substance and form – into the categories currently seen as being of relevance within the political process.

Firstly, the former take the appropriate form: publication of a manifesto, use of political discourse (but the "youth" version of it), centralised, vertical organisation of committees and awareness-raising campaigns, and so on. The fact that the leaders of these movements are themselves actively involved in the management of political parties, and in some cases are even political journalists, makes them even more politically savvy. The substance of these movements is also fitting: by bringing up "major social problems" ("violence" and "gender violence"), without raising the issue of underlying social circumstances, they turn them into moral causes likely to attract very broad support, transcending political divisions. The fact that these campaigns call for ethical solutions rather than political or economic solutions, which are considerably more difficult to implement, makes it even easier to achieve a consensus.

Conversely, the second group of campaigns does not draw on the vocabulary, issues or forms of action specific to politics. These campaigns pose a more radical challenge to the rules of the game or legitimate divisions, by emphasising inequalities, a sense of injustice and power relationships. They consequently seem a great deal more confrontational, and are dismissed as being sub-political, spontaneous or, even worse, expressions of a kind of "communitarianism" intended to dilute national identity.

Relevant indicators:
- main demands of young activists from lower-income neighbourhoods;
- number of independent press publications available containing information and opinions (fanzines, association newsletters, etc.);
- number of independent local radio and television stations.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Union involvement in lower-income neighbourhoods was a way of making young people in these neighbourhoods in particular more politically aware. Yet unionism is having considerable difficulty attracting unskilled young people, partly because of the positions they hold in the division of labour associated with the transition to a post-Fordist system of production, and the rise in job insecurity.

The fact is that the very nature of the posts intended for these "odd-job youngsters" is based on rapid rotation in workshops, irregular working hours and, above all, fixed-term contracts, which are often very short and found through temping. In France, in March 2001, temporary work, fixed-term contracts and work experience accounted for 17% of unskilled jobs, compared with 4% in 1982. This figure rises to 35% among unskilled transport workers and packers (9% in 1982), 34% among unskilled electronics and electricity workers (5% in 1982), 25% among unskilled workers in the civil engineering and building sectors (4% in 1982) and 25% among unskilled workers in the mechanical engineering and metalwork sectors (5% in 1982) (O. Chardon, 2001).

In Europe in 2000, on average between 16% and 18% of all employees were in insecure employment.[117] Countries such as Ireland (18%), Denmark (18%), the Netherlands (18%), the United Kingdom (16%) and France (16%) found themselves within this average. The countries with the highest percentages of job insecurity were Spain (35%), Portugal (24%) and Finland (21%) whereas the highest proportion of stable jobs were to be found in Sweden and Austria (14%), Germany (12%) and Luxembourg (10%). Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe the trends in insecure employment in these countries between 1995 and 2000, since there was an increase in five countries (the United Kingdom, Portugal, Finland, Austria and Ireland); three saw no change (Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands) and only three saw an improvement (France, Spain and Belgium).[118]

Irrespective of whether employers see it as a matter of tailoring staff numbers to their order books or lowering production costs, this trend has had a disastrous impact on unionism.

By making the renewal of temporary employment contracts directly dependent on productivity and a worker's "attitude" within the factory, such techniques have partially destroyed resistance, in both passive and active forms. Automatic union membership is being lost along with the memories and skills associated with union action, the main catalyst of political socialisation.

Moreover, the nature of employment itself is changing: the large industries which were the traditional stronghold of trade unions are disappearing, leaving instead a variety of forms of subcontracting and service enterprises which do not have a large workforce in a common location. The dispersal of both work and workers makes it less easy to become politically active through unions.

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117. Insecure employment is defined as fixed-term contracts, work experience and traineeships, temporary work, auxiliary work, seasonal employment, etc.

118. It is important to take on board the wide-ranging nature of insecure employment in Europe and the sectors concerned. See: ILO Conference on the Future of Work, Employment and Social Protection, Annecy, 18 and 19 January, 2001 (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/papers/confrnce/annecy2001/bodin/index.htm).

Relevant indicators:
- proportion of workers lacking job security;
- trend regarding employment which offers no job security;
- proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods whose parents are trade union members;
- proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods employed by firms with fewer than 20 workers;
- formation of the opinions of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
- leadership among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

C. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

Finding alternative approaches presupposes that the public authorities are able to grant political legitimacy to initiatives which really get young people from lower-income neighbourhoods involved. Institutionalisation, or at least the recognition of talking-partners, is essential in order to develop a way of living alongside one another that shows consideration for the sensitivities and interests of all concerned. Conversely, the systematic discounting of such initiatives can only entrench antagonisms, with disastrous consequences for social cohesion. In addition, access to the media or support for setting up relevant means of communication – for self-expression – will also contribute to the political recognition of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

Relevant indicator:
- trust shown in the media by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?

Relevant indicators:
- comparison of pupils' opportunities for participation in the life of their school;
- political discussions in schools;
- study of civic rights and duties;
- opportunities at school for open debate.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

Relevant indicator:
- comparison of the types of organisations in lower-income neighbourhoods receiving public financial support.

5.3. Arguments justifying the generalisation of the original stereotype: "Young people do not vote, and are not interested in voting"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

All the electoral studies linking age, social status and voting behaviour agree on the low turnout rate among 20 to 30 year olds from lower-income communities.[119]

The social determinants of abstention show that those most likely to be affected are people living in urban areas, with few or no qualifications, manual workers or employees, those on temporary contracts or the unemployed (F. Héran, 1997 and 2004; F. Clanché, 2002). In other words, the social situation of the vast majority of the unskilled young people we are talking about.

Relevant indicators:
– relative rate of voter registration;
– relative election turnout, according to type of poll;
– relative rate of youth membership of political parties.

Is this stereotype widespread?

Relevant indicators:
– the rest of the population's perception of the political involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– political parties' perception of the involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?

This self-exclusion from the electoral process is based on now-familiar mechanisms of political sociology. Involvement in anything to do with politics depends chiefly on the authority each individual sees himself or herself as having to act in this area. Such political competence is based both on the ability to understand and reproduce political discourse (guaranteed amongst other things by school qualifications) and on the (socially permitted and encouraged) feeling that one is justified in taking an interest in politics, allowed to talk politics and has the authority to talk actively about political things, invoking explicitly political principles of classification and analysis, rather than responding on an ad hoc basis, according to ethical principles (P. Bourdieu, 1979; D. Gaxie, 1991).

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119. Approximately 10 points lower than the national average in, for example, Germany and France.

Conversely, individual and collective feelings of a lack of political skills or influence lead to withdrawal or self-surrender. Withdrawal is shown through abstention, a failure to register on the electoral roll and, more generally, a lack of interest in the subject. As for self-surrender, it involves forms of automatic support for the political organisations one thinks best embody one's social identity ("the working-class party", for example). Such self-surrender and the electoral affiliation it entails are thus a consequence of these organisations' routine efforts to ensure that they exist in the day-to-day lives of their voters.

The gradual, steady decline of such organisations, as a result of political professionalisation, on the one hand, and the transition to a post-Fordist society, on the other, has led to a rise in abstention rates (G. Michelat and M. Simon, 2004). Between the 1995 and 2002 French presidential elections, the number of workers registered on electoral rolls who abstained rose from 20% to 31%. Scrutiny of election results in French lower-income neighbourhoods yields the same findings. The average abstention rate in those neighbourhoods is 52.1%, 20 points higher than the national average (H. Rey, 2001). In some cases, it is higher than 70%, to which should be added the 20% to 30% of non-EU foreigners not entitled to vote and a significant number of people not registered on electoral rolls.

The remote, abstract nature of the issues and the lack of well-known activists recognised within the neighbourhood make it impossible to reverse the collective sense of a lack of political skills or influence; in most cases, they result in a position of withdrawal, indifference and distrust.

These problems may be worsening. The fact is that while the very act of voting is an individual one (the voter slips his or her voting paper into the ballot box on his or her own), voting is the result of processes of collective mobilisation. The more people vote, the more the election is the focus of conversations between friends, family members or colleagues, and the more chance there is that people who would not necessarily have voted go and vote. Conversely, the lower the turnout in a given neighbourhood and within networks of acquaintances, the more the election appears to be purely abstract and incidental. From this perspective, the exclusion of non-EU foreigners from the electorate has a disastrous effect on the general turnout in those neighbourhoods in which they are present in large numbers.

Relevant indicators:
- relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are members of an association organising activities in the area;
- relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are members of a local, national or European association;
- political parties campaigning on issues relating to lower-income neighbourhoods and their relations with the rest of the city;
- link between the proportion of foreigners not entitled to vote and election turnout in lower-income neighbourhoods.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

Relevant indicators:
- perception of politics by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods;
- political competence;
- feeling that politics is relevant;
- perception that election promises are kept.

C. Measuring the consequences

What factors may facilitate corrective, punitive or discriminatory action and constitute an obstacle to building up a new sense of community?

Relevant indicator:
– failure to take account in election manifestos of the situation of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Firstly, participation by young people from lower-income communities – and more generally by lower-income communities in elections – necessitates practical efforts to rebuild links with political parties.

Relevant indicators:
– encouragement to register on the electoral roll;
– existence of a local youth parliament;
– inclusion in election manifestos of issues concerning young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and their relations with the rest of the city.

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?

This means that political organisations – via their activists and their elected representatives – have to be able to take practical action on a daily basis with regard to the new living, housing and working conditions experienced by these groups. The difficulties faced by trade unions in targeting temporary workers, and by political parties – even when they come to power – in curbing the growing impoverishment and insecurity of these communities, distance them from such organisations and prompt them to seek other alternatives, in particular through religion.

The very low number of activists from these groups – particularly from associations – involved in the management of such parties, in anything other than a purely symbolic capacity, is also an impediment to participation, which can be overcome by proactive policies.

Relevant indicators:
– political figures and elected representatives at various administrative levels who originally came from lower-income neighbourhoods;
– proportion of MPs who originally came from lower-income neighbourhoods.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

Secondly, it is worth noting that some political initiatives succeed where others have failed. During the European elections in June 2004, lists such as Euro-Palestine, the leaders of which had campaigned in

disadvantaged neighbourhoods on the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,[120] and on the issue of exclusion, scored highest in precisely those neighbourhoods with a large number of inhabitants not entitled to vote, which are characterised by continual abstention. As soon as the issues seem less abstract and more relevant to everyday concerns, the turnout increases.

Lastly, extending the right to vote to foreigners lawfully resident in France might bring about the necessary conditions for a renewed interest in the electoral process among the inhabitants of such neighbourhoods, and ensure that greater consideration is given to their aspirations.

Relevant indicators:
– foreigners' entitlement to vote;
– appropriateness of political programmes to the needs of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
– perception of the results of political action in neighbourhoods.

5.4. Arguments stressing the need for such measures: "Participation is the answer"

A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent

How justified is this stereotype?

"Participation" is now emerging as the magic recipe for urban policy and local and regional development. There is a proliferation of discourses on participation, each defining the best technical and legal framework and most appropriate procedures for participation, or suggesting a whole series of participatory techniques. Such calls claim that from now on, it is crucial that the victims of poverty and exclusion be given a voice, and be included in government measures, since the success of socioeconomic intervention policies depends on their participation.

Relevant indicators:
– process of monitoring the opinions of the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods;
– the authorities' awareness of the context of lower-income neighbourhoods.

Is this stereotype widespread?

From the 1990s, a broad consensus emerged around the idea that any attempt to impose change from outside stands a good chance of provoking resistance from within and creating barriers to change rather than facilitating it. The introduction of participatory mechanisms during the project development process should therefore allow a consensus to be built around priorities and the associated *modus operandi*. This makes it possible to foster a process of involvement in the initiatives put in place. In this context, new kinds of policies have been introduced in so-called "problem" neighbourhoods all over Europe, with the aim of involving the various stakeholders in these neighbourhoods, particularly young people.

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120. In French peri-urban areas, solidarity with the Palestinians – reflected in the setting up of committees, the organisation of debates, exhibitions and demonstrations – is explained by a vague feeling that the Palestinians are in a similar situation to young immigrants here: discrimination, racism, repeated contact with the police, etc. This is in addition to the work undertaken by activist leaders.

This recognition of the need for participation reflects a recognition of the fundamental role played by the various stakeholders and their strategies. One of the greatest dangers for any initiative intended to bring about change is not simply rebellion or active resistance, but also indifference. In the case of so-called "problem" neighbourhoods, the risk is therefore not only that young people will start smashing up public buildings or burning cars, but also that they will refuse point blank to listen, having no interest in what project leaders have to say. In order to overcome such obstacles, an effort should be made to reach a compromise regarding a comprehensive co-operative blueprint for development. Participatory processes enable residents' demands for development and concerns to be both heard and addressed. Change is thereby made acceptable, and resistance to it loses its intensity.

This framework for analysis, which incorporates conflict and subjectivity, emphasises the fact that any local or regional development process is far from linear and harmonious in nature. On the contrary, it is a process characterised by doubts and rifts. It challenges existing hierarchies and forms of regulation. Any successful development project instigates change and upsets the established order. In order to be effective and to bring about far-reaching social change, it needs to persuade individuals to participate, and to overcome their hostility or indifference. Coercion is not enough for this purpose. Development processes need to harness creative energies and the willingness of those involved to invest their time and resources, to be innovative, to solve problems and to make sacrifices. These elements have to be harnessed much earlier, however, well before the process actually begins, long before there is any certainty as to its outcome. Participants consequently take a gamble on the future and, despite their differing and sometimes conflicting objectives, choose to co-operate, by putting their trust in a project they consider fair and in the success of which they have a mutual interest. This gamble will allow social cohesion to take shape, and set in motion a process of collective learning resulting from this individual investment in the community.

> Relevant indicators:
> - the authorities' perception of the need for the young people of lower-income neighbourhoods to participate;
> - allowances made for conflict in programme negotiation processes;
> - method of setting the objectives of programmes for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods;
> - perception of the need for allowances to be made for conflict in programme negotiation processes;
> - programmes incorporating a long-term contractualisation process with the most relevant local/ regional units.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue

How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?

The structural and social changes that have affected lower-income neighbourhoods in recent years have had a serious impact on the voluntary associations on which such processes depended. The departure of those with the greatest cultural and economic capital and the worsening social conditions of those left behind have significantly reduced the recruitment pool available to associations.[121] This has not, however, resulted in any let-up in the institutions' never-ending search for the neighbourhoods' "lifeblood" among the residents themselves. While all urban policies lament the systematic difficulty of "involving residents", this idea remains absolutely crucial.

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121. There is greater participation in voluntary associations where there is a high level of (cultural and economic) capital. See Offerlé, 1998.

We therefore see strong and weak approaches to participation. In the weak approach, the whole paradox is that it sets out to give victims of social exclusion (in this case young people from lower-income neighbourhoods) a voice and scope for taking initiative, even though, at the same time, it fears that their demands and initiatives will depart from the channel for dialogue it has carefully marked out. In other words, victims of social exclusion can participate as long as they do not seek to change the rules of the game, and do not demand a redistribution of resources and power that may in fact be quite radical. This approach is characterised by a functional view of participation, and may be seen as a new form of social control within which the power relationship is no longer confined to giving orders. It now involves persuasion, the provision of information and training designed to ensure that groups of players share a particular assessment of a situation and to guide them towards a new realm of action and reaction. Tensions arise between, on the one hand, those who are prepared to play by the new rules of the game and enter into the participatory mechanism in order to secure the resources and opportunities it offers, and, on the other hand, those who wish to continue to rebel against supervisory regulations and to retain their independence.

What is not mentioned in the functional approach to participation is that the power to take initiative is never distributed equally, and that it cannot be possessed freely. Thus, the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods – who do not have decision-making power, are subjected to the technical and moral orthopaedics of urban policy project leaders and have little credibility with the staff of administrative departments, who "only really tolerate dialogue with those worthy of it, i.e. another, slightly less important version of themselves" (P. Bourdieu, 2000) – generally have little weight when it comes to influencing the major urban, policy or economic decisions that will affect the future of their living environment. Furthermore, by introducing divisions among residents, these decisions intensify the competition now being experienced by the lower-income classes, thereby causing a rift within them. For instance, the occupation of public areas by alienated young people is now being addressed solely from the standpoint of institutions (lessors, municipalities, police) and those who complain about the nuisance they cause, rather than as a more general issue calling for longer-term solutions.

> Relevant indicators:
> – average duration of urban and social renewal programmes for lower-income neighbourhoods.

How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?

> Relevant indicators:
> – young people's perception of the effects of the measures/programmes in which their participation is requested;
> – young people's perception of participation as an aim in itself.

C. Assessing the consequences

What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?

> Relevant indicator:
> – compulsory participation measures.

D. Finding alternative approaches

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches

Power relationships are not set in stone, however. The introduction of participatory mechanisms, inadequate as these may be, has the potential to foster the emergence of active subjects able to question the initiatives put to them and to suggest alternatives. Enabling citizens and their representative organisations to play a more active role in framing urban policy clearly does not alter power relationships, but it does modify the resources available and the way they are distributed, which may help to change negotiating relationships.

In the strong approach, participation has to be part of a more comprehensive blueprint for substantive democracy guaranteeing the community's rights to self-expression and self-determination in respect of its plans for the development of its living environment. Such an approach to participation consequently requires a radical shift in focus towards so-called "excluded" players, who in the past have always been seen as instruments and targets for the tireless pursuit of integration policies. These collective players are not passively awaiting outside intervention, but in many cases – albeit not always – are actively involved in the preservation and continual reinvention of a sense of community and individual and collective identity. They are thereby redefining their relationship to their environment and their way of life with a view to enhancing their well-being and making their living conditions more secure within a given area.

This radical shift in focus towards these "forgotten players" – that is, those who for a long time were seen as non-players in local and regional development – must give rise to a completely different conception of the current issues in urban policy. It is clear that there is often a gulf between, on the one hand, residents' demands for development as shown by the many practices they have instituted in these so-called "tough" neighbourhoods, and, on the other hand, the many and often conflicting priorities set by the dominant players in urban policy. For example, the Kalk renewal programme in Cologne, Germany's fourth largest city, almost failed because of the lack of co-operation between two municipal departments.

> Relevant indicators:
>   – delegation of decision-making power to the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods;
>   – neighbourhood delegates/elected representatives on municipal and regional councils.

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?

Such an approach also requires an acknowledgement of the central role of conflict, negotiation and compromise at the level of the key neighbourhood players and the public services having different responsibilities in the same urban area. The concept of conflict makes it possible to discover the community as a player that explains its plans, compares its views, confronts other players and works to reach agreement and compromise and to retain its independence and room for manoeuvre. Conflict is a normal *modus operandi*; it necessitates the finding and formulation of a common, mutually acceptable definition of the issue at stake by means of negotiation. It is also the path to reaching a compromise defining an area of agreement that is acceptable to the parties involved but does not erase the conflict, as it is simply a temporary solution thought up by the players, which will depend on the power relations between them.

> Relevant indicators:
>   – agreements between public services on co-ordinated action in lower-income neighbourhoods;
>   – dialogue on objectives between the young people of lower-income neighbourhoods and public services.

How can these alternative approaches come about?

Priority must therefore be given to institutional creativity in order to foster the emergence of arenas for participation by young people from "problem" neighbourhoods, which, rather than places of social inclusion, will be places of social construction that promote citizenship. By opening the way for negotiation, participatory mechanisms help to create active subjects able to ask questions, to query the effectiveness or value of applying the rules and to take their future in hand. Participation, in this sense, means refusing to turn young people into inert underlings who mechanically obey the rules, and recognising that young people possess a scarce resource: their participation, and therefore their independence.

Relevant indicator:
– young people's involvement in the management of lower-income neighbourhoods.

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Indicators: description and references

INTRODUCTION

This third part of the guide supplements the aspects covered in the preceding two parts. It presents a series of indicators already used by different organisations and bodies, and ideas for indicators intended to verify or question the assumptions often underlying integration policies. They are also intended to open up discussion on possible alternative approaches, namely to explore further avenues for relationships, action and initiatives based on dialogue, consultation and due consideration for the aspirations of young people whose situation of exclusion from playing a genuine role in society often leads them to adopt a violent stance in the public area. These indicators are just guidelines. Others are equally possible. They are divided into four chapters in line with the analysis of well-being put forward in each chapter, following a detailed introduction outlining the difficulties inherent in constructing the indicators in question.

1.1. Variables

There are a number of difficulties in approaching the issue of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods from a statistical point of view.

The first concerns the precise definition of the variables (in the statistical sense) studied. In the first part of this report, the authors clearly showed that it was a mistake to consider youth as a biological age, sandwiched between childhood and adulthood. Youth should be understood as a stage in the life cycle whose limits will vary considerably with each individual. Unfortunately, the statistical description of a given population cannot make do with an approximate definition of the criteria for including or excluding an individual in that category. Here, we regard a person as being young if he or she is aged between 15 and 25. Accordingly, we are adopting the definition agreed upon by the UN and the European Commission for framing their youth policies. However, defining "youth" as the 15-25 year-old age group is not set in stone; it merely provides a reference point, essential for the statistical analysis of the phenomena being studied, which can be modified at will in line with the diverse situations to be found in the countries of Europe. Similarly, the definition of "lower-income neighbourhood" is a stylistic exercise. In some instances, depending on location, period or the social policies put in place, people will refer to sensitive or difficult neighbourhoods or districts, working-class areas, disadvantaged neighbourhoods, inner-city areas, etc. Because of the numerous ways of categorising urban areas suggested by sociologists and the multiplicity of local situations, it is not possible to put forward a unanimous and definitive definition of lower-income neighbourhoods. Once again, the requirements of statistical analysis prompt us to define a lower-income neighbourhood as a clearly identified geographical entity within a municipality or urban area, whose residents are faced with an accumulation of socioeconomic difficulties. Often, this view of lower-income areas coincides with the administrative definition of the districts which are the focus of urban policies. This precise geographical delimitation of the neighbourhood(s) covered by the analysis is essential for the purposes of making comparisons between the people living there and other residents of the municipality or urban area.

The second difficulty inherent in the statistical observation of lower-income areas is connected with the multiplicity of concepts covered and the interdisciplinary nature of the approach envisaged here. For example, the somewhat vague definitions put forward by sociologists of concepts such as dignity, self-esteem and attitudes towards authority do not always coincide easily with the requirements for measuring them statistically. Furthermore, topics of this kind are virtually never covered in the studies carried out by the public authorities or national statistics institutes. All the definitions that will be put forward are intended to make the concepts workable, most of which will be variable depending on the authors or sources available. By their very nature, therefore, these definitions will be open to debate and adaptable.

In addition, the objective of closer observation of lower-income neighbourhoods will involve devising appropriate measurement tools. Anyone wishing to understand the actual situation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods must go beyond the conventional external description and its legion of quantitative statistical indicators and focus instead on what is "felt" within the neighbourhood. As a rule, traditional institutional statistics have no information on this more qualitative dimension. Insecurity is a good example of the dual nature of the concept: insecurity as seen via the monthly statistics on crime is very different from the insecurity as experienced and felt by the residents of a neighbourhood. Similarly, a study of the invisible barriers in young people's access to the labour market (employers' reluctance to give

serious consideration to a CV from someone with a foreign-sounding name, for example) will be hard pressed to make any headway from the public statistics generally available. Many of the appropriate tools for observing lower-income neighbourhoods still have to be developed if we want to see what is under the tip of the iceberg.

1.2. The limits of the institutional statistics system

The institutional statistics system comprises the information coming primarily from the different ministries and local and regional authorities, national statistic institutes and public study and research bodies. It covers a very disparate range of data, in terms of both manner of collection and level of accuracy and detail. Some of the statistics available on lower-income neighbourhoods come from exhaustive administrative files, while others are based on one-off polls. The diversity of the type of information places a limit on the usefulness of institutional statistics for an in-depth analysis of lower-income neighbourhoods.

The main difficulty resides in obtaining data at sub-municipal level, so as to isolate the neighbourhoods in question in order to be able to compare them with the rest of the municipality or conurbation. A prime example is given by the *zones urbaines sensibles* (ZUS) in France. The geographical limits of these zones have resulted from negotiations based on an empirical approach to the various social, urban and economic situations, the aim being to establish as precisely as possible the contours of the neighbourhoods in difficulty in order to target them for specific urban policy measures. Although this is often at a sub-municipal level (one or several neighbourhoods within a municipality), the geographical area covered by a ZUS may include several municipalities. These zones are therefore ad hoc geographical constructions which, while they might display a degree of unity and continuity from an urban development point of view, do not tie in with any of the traditional administrative boundaries (region, *département* and municipality). The fact is that institutional statistics are geared to such historical administrative entities. Although INSEE provides census-derived data at a more detailed level than the municipality, namely sector (comprising one or several adjoining blocks of houses), it is very rare for the boundaries of a ZUS as defined for urban policy purposes to coincide with those used for statistical purposes (even after sector aggregation). Furthermore, devising any statistical indicator for a ZUS presupposes specific tailor-made exploitation of the existing individual data.

At this level, general statistical instruments are not accurate enough: even the results from a supplementary exploitation of individual data from a sample survey are to be interpreted with caution.

The second sticking point concerns the dispersal among several production entities of the data needed to obtain a detailed picture of lower-income neighbourhoods, in particular the administrative files of the departments responsible for the questions being studied (social security, education, etc.). This fragmentation of data makes it very difficult to obtain them, even in countries which have sophisticated public information systems.

While some areas are generally well covered by institutional statistics (demography, employment, education or income), others are less so (security, justice, access to health care or public services) and, for the purposes of observation, require considerable effort to be deployed.

It is also important to remember that particular caution is required in the invariably delicate exercise of interpreting statistics. This is a general requirement and by no means specific to lower-income neighbourhoods, but it may be especially important in their case. It must never be forgotten that the results obtained from a poll or census are largely determined by the measurement methods used to obtain them.

These methods do not always lead to an exhaustive and unbiased understanding of the phenomenon being studied. Here of course, we are faced with the problem of the validity of the measurement tool, a problem well known to statisticians. The issues of insecurity and crime, at the very heart of public debate on problem neighbourhoods, are a perfect illustration of this problem. The concepts of insecurity and crime are often quoted together and taken up by the media. In point of fact they are very different insofar as crime is a factual matter and insecurity a matter of feeling. Crime involves victims (of an attack, a robbery, etc.) whereas insecurity is just the possibility or probability of being a victim, without yet becoming one.[1] Being a victim is an objective matter, whereas insecurity can only be estimated. In this connection, it is often found that those who state that they are most afraid of being attacked are not always the ones most exposed to the threat. Similarly, there is often a considerable gap between the fear people feel for themselves and their feeling of insecurity in general.

Annual crime figures published by the Ministry of the Interior do not give an accurate or complete picture of the situation. Trends in these figures over time reflect both the growing tendency of victims to report the offences and the police's law enforcement objectives. In addition to the variations in these two aspects, we find variations in crime itself. For example, in France, since the early 1990s there has been an increase in the number of cases of violence between people who are acquainted, or crimes involving minors. Police statistics are biased means of measuring crime influenced both by the changes in claimant behaviour and police practices, independently of the actual trend in crime. This is not intended to imply that crime in lower-income neighbourhoods is an artificial statistical construction but to point out that if we are to gain a real insight into the problem, it is not enough to look at the figures published by the Ministry of the Interior.

1.3. A new statistical approach to lower-income neighbourhoods

A detailed study of the situation of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods requires a change to both the nature of the information on the resident population traditionally collected by the institutional statistics system, and the way the data is used. Only by rethinking the statistical description of these neighbourhoods, in form and substance, will it be possible to grasp the complexity of the situations observed and to move beyond the stereotypes which so often appear in the media. Several avenues should be explored in this connection.

First, we should no longer restrict ourselves to a quantitative vision of lower-income neighbourhoods as proposed by the institutional statistics system. A richer and more systematic qualitative perspective needs to be given to the phenomena and population groups being studied. The aim is to bring together an external quantitative description (a "recorded" description) and a more qualitative view of what the resident populations feel (a "telling" description). The picture of insecurity in lower-income neighbourhoods depicted by police statistics (an external view) is not the same as that portrayed by the residents (an internal view). The behaviour of young people can occasionally be the consequence of the perception of the world around them (particularly their attitude towards authority); perceptions often set off mechanisms only the consequences of which are described by traditional statistical indicators. If we are to understand the reality of lower-income neighbourhoods and, therefore, frame relevant urban policies, it is absolutely essential to have a means of obtaining qualitative information on the perceptions and feelings of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods vis-à-vis the issues being studied.

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1. INSEE, 2004.

Over and above an attempt to make a qualitative observation, thought must also be given to improving the use made of the existing data, collected in the national statistics institutes' regular surveys or recorded in official files. This implies cross-referencing of individual data from various sources, essential if the topics being studied are to be fully understood.

In addition, the figures generally put forward by the public authorities or the media to describe the situation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods should doubtless be compared with those observed among young people not living in such areas. The prevalence of drug addiction is without a doubt one of the most frequent stereotypes about young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, but what is the situation in middle-class areas? A comparative approach to all the factors affecting young people in lower-income neighbourhoods should help identify those that have an external origin (that is, these neighbourhoods are merely subject to the changes affecting society as a whole, trends in the relationship between qualifications and employment, for example) and those that are specific to the neighbourhoods in question (as areas where disadvantages are amplified and compounded).

More relevant still, it is not just a question of observing and comparing raw indicators but of observing and comparing variation rates in the indicators among the sub-populations in question. For example, the impact of the family crisis on social alienation has a snowball effect on youth crime. This factor is specific to young people but external to disadvantaged neighbourhoods because the rise in offences among single-parent reconstituted families is perfectly comparable between lower-income families and the families of managers and the intermediate professions.

This highlights the need for more longitudinal studies. No proof is now needed that they provide a much more telling analysis than sample surveys. A longitudinal study (or a study on a group of individuals) involves an observation at regular intervals of the same individuals. It is therefore like producing a film over a period of time of the same sample of individuals rather than producing a number of snapshots — at different times — of samples which vary each time the shot is taken. Monitoring individuals gives a better picture of the mechanisms and dynamics of the phenomena being studied. The aim is therefore to promote a diachronic as opposed to synchronic approach to neighbourhoods. This makes for closer analysis of the paths followed by the residents of these neighbourhoods, and at the same time shows the effects of population renewal and the actual changes in the living conditions of those firmly settled there.

In addition, it makes it possible to observe several aspects (employment, income, living conditions, etc.) from the same source.

CHAPTER 2: STEREOTYPES CONCERNING DIGNITY AND RECOGNITION

2.1. "Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods have little or no regard for accepted social norms"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods implicated in crimes and offences in relation to young people in general/ adults	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods implicated in crimes and offences in relation to the equivalent proportion observed among young people in the control area over a given reference period (x100)	While young people from lower-income neighbourhoods may be proportionally more frequently implicated than the control group in certain types of offence (robbery with violence, for example), this is not necessarily the case for other offences (such as drug offences and shoplifting). This indicator can be calculated for all crimes and offences or for specific types of offence (see, for example, the crime type definitions, UK Home Office)
Relative prevalence of young people among persons implicated in crimes and offences	Proportion of young people out of the total number of people implicated in crimes and offences committed by people living in a lower-income neighbourhood in relation to the equivalent proportion observed in the control area (x100)	An increase in the relative prevalence of young people (particularly minors) among the total number of people implicated in crimes and offences is a general phenomenon which goes beyond the boundaries of lower-income neighbourhoods. This indicator can be calculated for all crimes and offences or for specific types of offence (see, for example, the crime type definitions, UK Home Office)
Relative proportion of incidents reported to the relevant authorities but where no further action has been taken	Proportion of incidents reported to the relevant authorities involving young people from lower-income neighbourhoods but where no further action is taken, in relation to the equivalent proportion observed in the reference population (x100)	Further action is not necessarily taken with regard to a number of incidents reported and these are therefore not recorded in police statistics. Depending on the area in question, the police may be more inclined or less inclined to make an official record of incidents involving young people (particularly minors)
Relative proportion of antisocial behaviour by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the total number of youth-related incidents reported to the police	Ratio between the number of instances of antisocial behaviour and the total number of incidents (whether or not considered crimes or offences) carried out by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods reported or registered by the police (x100) compared with the equivalent ratio for all young people	This indicator measures the relative prevalence of antisocial behaviour in relation to all incidents concerning young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. Antisocial behaviour is not necessarily a criminal offence, and while it fosters a climate of insecurity, it cannot be included in crime statistics

Is this stereotype widespread?		
Perception that young people in general/young people from lower-income neighbourhoods have of the "antisocial" nature of certain types of behaviour	Assessment by young people themselves of the antisocial nature of certain acts and behaviour	Some of the behaviour considered by society as a whole as "barbaric", "violent" or "deviant" may be regarded as "normal" by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. It is essential to understand the perception that young people have of such behaviour so as not to adopt a law-and-order response to something that can be dealt with by negotiation The list of acts or types of behaviour for evaluation should differentiate between offences and antisocial behaviour
Relative perception of the deterioration of public areas attributed to the antisocial behaviour of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of residents in lower-income neighbourhoods who believe that young people are responsible for the deterioration of public areas in the neighbourhood, in relation to the equivalent proportion observed in the reference population or area (x100)	Deterioration of public areas is often attributed to young people in lower-income areas, reinforcing the perception that young people engage in antisocial behaviour
Perception of the inhabitants of lower-income areas of the action needed to address the problem of insecurity	Views of the inhabitants of lower-income areas themselves on the type of action (preventive or punitive) needed to address the problem of insecurity	Responses focusing primarily on preventive solutions could indicate that the residents are aware of a link between social circumstances and insecurity The result could be obtained by calculating the proportion of "preventive"-oriented responses out of the total number of responses received to the question "In addressing insecurity, would you prefer 'preventive' or 'punitive' measures?"
How does the stereotype gain ground?		
Relative rate of judicial proceedings against young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods implicated in and charged with criminal offences in relation to the equivalent proportion observed in the reference population or area (x100)	The fact that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods implicated in criminal offences are charged more systematically than other groups helps significantly to reinforce the perception of the violent nature of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative rate of repeat offending among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of repeat offenders among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in relation to the equivalent proportion observed in the reference population (x100)	A high rate of repeat offending could be a sign that the majority of offences are committed by a small number of young people. It might also indicate that the police are concentrating their efforts on a limited number of individuals. An index above 100 indicates a higher rate of reoffending among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods

Victimisation rate of residents of lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of residents of lower-income neighbourhoods claiming to have been victim of attacks of violence committed by young people over a reference period	Victimisation surveys offer another view of crime: the view of the victims. Police statistics do not relate solely to crimes and offences that have been reported or caught in the act. This indicator should be seen in relation to that on the feeling of insecurity
B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to exclusion?		
Relative unemployment rate of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Ratio between the unemployment rate among young people (18-25 year olds) in lower-income neighbourhoods and the unemployment rate among young people observed in the reference population or area (x100)	Social transformations affect young people from lower-income neighbourhoods more acutely than those in other urban areas. An index above 100 indicates a higher rate of unemployment among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative school underachievement rate	Proportion of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods who leave school without any qualification, in relation to the equivalent proportion observed in the reference population or area (x100)	School underachievement is much more marked in lower-income neighbourhoods than anywhere else. An index above 100 indicates a higher rate of school underachievement among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods Example: in Scotland, 11% of young people from lower-income backgrounds have no qualifications, as opposed to 3% for the country as a whole (source: Scottish Executive)
Relative difficulties in finding work-experience placements	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in or about to complete training who have serious difficulty in finding work-experience placements, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people	This indicator shows the difficulties in finding work placement opportunities and, consequently, acquiring the experience often asked for in job vacancies
How may exclusion factors lead young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Feeling of social exclusion among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who feel they are disadvantaged or socially excluded	A perception of financial insecurity or social exclusion could prompt young people to reject the dominant social norms This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. socially excluded; 1. socially disadvantaged; 2. neither excluded nor integrated; 3. relatively well integrated socially; 4. socially integrated The overall result is obtained by calculating the proportion of 0 and 1 replies

Feeling among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods that they conform to social norms	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who believe they conform to social norms	Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who behave in a way deemed to be antisocial may not be aware of deviating from the norm insofar as they have a different reference norm
Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods displaying antisocial behaviour	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (out of all young people in the neighbourhoods in question) whose behaviour is deemed to be antisocial by residents	Whether young people can be seen as constituting a risk depends to a large extent on the residents' perception of young people's behaviour and whether this perception is widespread or not
Perception of antisocial behaviour as a means of asserting an individual or group identity	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who believe that some of their behaviour which might be seen as antisocial is in fact a means of asserting an individual or group identity	Antisocial behaviour may be seen by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods as the only way they have of asserting their identity in society
C. Measuring the consequences		
Tightening of legislation on antisocial behaviour	Is there a tendency for legislation to introduce tighter controls on antisocial behaviour?	This indicator shows the extent to which the legal response from the public authorities is more punitive in focus
More severe penalties for antisocial behaviour	Is there a tendency for more severe penalties to be given for antisocial behaviour?	This indicator gives a clearer picture of the extent to which the public authorities opt for a punitive approach in the short-term to deal with "antisocial" behaviour
D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Existence of dialogue between local authorities and young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are local authorities engaged in dialogue with young people on the different forms of social control in force?	Engaging in dialogue on the forms of social control could help nurture a sense of community
Existence of processes co-ordinating the action of the institutional players in fostering integration in urban areas	Are there any processes co-ordinating the action of the institutional players in fostering integration in urban areas?	Co-ordinating the efforts of all the institutional players involved in lower-income neighbourhoods can considerably contribute to integration in these urban areas
To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Existence of official social organisations in the lower-income neighbourhood in question	Are there any officially established associations, unions or other organisations run by the residents of the area in question?	The existence in a given neighbourhood of social organisations run by local residents can help formalise claims and develop dialogue on forms of social control as alternatives to the dominant social norm

Participation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in general social groupings	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who take part in general social groupings (associations, trade unions, etc.)	This indicator reveals the extent to which young people from lower-income neighbourhoods take part in formal social groupings having general claims, and their level of representation
Participation of young people in political dialogue on solutions to improve their situation	Are there any mechanisms for enabling young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to become involved in political dialogue on solutions to improve their situation?	This indicator shows whether the conditions in place are conducive to developing the means for a joint approach to questions concerning the lives of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Prizes or forms of recognition for social/cultural projects undertaken by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any prizes or forms of recognition for social/cultural projects undertaken by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	This indicator shows whether there is any form of recognition for the investment of young people in social or cultural projects
Support for leadership training among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any means of support for leadership training among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	This indicator shows whether the conditions in place are conducive to developing leadership among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods likely to take part in a process of joint social control, giving legitimate representation to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Policy of encouraging meetings between young people in the same town/city	Are there any initiatives organised jointly with the public authorities to encourage a social mix between young people in the same town/city?	This indicator reveals the extent to which there are initiatives to promote a social mix between young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and other social groups in the town/city

2.2. "Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are going through a serious identity crisis"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods born in the country of residence	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (out of all young people from such neighbourhoods from an immigrant background) born in the country of residence	The majority of young people living today in lower-income neighbourhoods in certain European countries – and who benefit from integration policies – belong to what is termed the "third generation" of migrants, an expression which denies their links to the country in which they were born For our purposes, young people from an immigrant background are understood as being individuals whose parents or grandparents were born outside the country
Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods having the nationality of the country of residence	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (out of all young people from such neighbourhoods from an immigrant background) having the nationality of the country of residence	The majority of young people living today in lower-income neighbourhoods in certain European countries – and who benefit from integration policies – belong to what is termed the "third generation" of migrants, an expression which denies their links to the country in which they were born For our purposes, young people from an immigrant background are understood as being individuals whose parents or grandparents were born outside the country
Feeling of belonging	The views of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods on whether they feel a part of society	The fact that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods have or do not have a feeling of belonging to society is an indication that they identify with the values and norms of society This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. low sense of belonging; 1. average sense of belonging; 3. strong sense of belonging For lower-income neighbourhoods where there is a strong ethnic mix, this indicator can also be used to reflect whether young people feel their allegiance lies with the host culture or the culture of origin
Mastery of the official language	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (out of all young people from such neighbourhoods from an immigrant background) who have a mastery of the official language	Mastery of the official language is a precondition for developing a sense of belonging This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. very poor; 1. poor; 2. passable; 3. good; 4. excellent Each point on the scale should then be expressed as a proportion of the total

Use of the language of the country of origin (other than the official language) in their neighbourhood	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (out of all young people from such neighbourhoods from an immigrant background) who regularly use the language of their country of origin (other than the official language) in their neighbourhood	Regular use of the language of their country of origin (other than the official language) might give the impression that young people find it difficult to deal with their dual cultural identity This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. language of the country of origin exclusively; 1. mainly the language of the country of origin; 2. regularly; 3. often; 4. occasionally; 5. rarely; 6. never Each point on the scale should then be expressed as a proportion of the total
Use of the language of the country of origin (other than the official language) within the family	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (out of all young people from such neighbourhoods from an immigrant background) who regularly use the language of their country of origin (other than the official language) within the family	Regular use of the language of their country of origin (other than the official language) could give the impression that young people reject integration into the country of residence. It could also be seen as a difficulty vis-à-vis their dual cultural identity; lastly, use of the language of origin could be seen as a cultural enrichment. The indicator has to be placed in a precise context to ensure that it is not misinterpreted This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. language of the country of origin exclusively; 1. mainly the language of the country of origin; 2. regularly; 3. often; 4. occasionally; 5. rarely; 6. never Each point on the scale should then be expressed as a proportion of the total
Is this stereotype widespread ?		
Perception of "youth subculture" by the population as a whole	The way the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods and the town/city as a whole view "youth subculture"	The reaction of the population as a whole of a town/city or a lower-income neighbourhood vis-à-vis the identified "youth subculture" will determine the nature of the interactions between both parties This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. very worried; 1. worried; 2. indifferent; 3. positive
How does the stereotype gain ground?		
Portrayal of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the media	Proportion of media coverage of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in which they can be identified by a generally acknowledged dress code or the type of language they use	Media portrayal of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods can give a partial or distorted image of the young people in these neighbourhoods Before this indicator can be constructed it is essential to ascertain what the population as a whole regards as their typical dress code or mode of expression
Image of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the media	Qualitative analysis of the image of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods portrayed in the media	Media treatment of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods often helps reinforce the "identity crisis" stereotype It might be necessary to consider here several types of media content: news, fiction, cultural programmes, documentaries, entertainment, etc.

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B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
What are the specific aspirations of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods that are misunderstood and therefore give rise to this stereotype?		
Existence of a clearly identifiable form of language	Is there a clearly identifiable form of language that is particular to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	The development of a form of language particular to lower-income neighbourhoods could indicate that these young people have not integrated into wider society. The form of language used often reflects difficulty in mastering the language and cultural cross-fertilisation This indicator can be constructed from the point of view of the players on the ground or of the population. There is bound to be a level of subjectivity involved, which may slightly distort the response
Existence of a particular dress code	Is there a clearly identifiable dress code in the area in question which is shared by a large proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	The existence of a dress code might indicate the existence of a "subculture" among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, of which the dress code is a part. The existence of a "subculture" means that each of its components must be analysed in order to implement any programmes aimed at encouraging youth participation This indicator can be constructed from the point of view of the players on the ground or of the population. There is bound to be a level of subjectivity involved, which may slightly distort the response
Behavioural differences	Are there, in the area in question, any notable behavioural differences in attitudes, cultural preferences, etc., in comparison with young people as a whole?	The behaviour of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods may be misconstrued because it is different from that of young people as a whole. Understanding these differences could help improve relations.
To what extent do young people themselves contribute to the spread of this stereotype?		
Identity symbols (male/female)	Qualitative analysis of identity symbols as seen by young males and females in lower-income neighbourhoods	Modes of expression and asserting identity vary between males and females in lower-income neighbourhoods; they also differ from those observed amongst young people outside lower-income neighbourhoods Here, it will be necessary to undertake a specific study on the codes, rites and language of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Age of leaving the parental home (males/females)	Average age at which young males and young females in lower-income neighbourhoods leave the parental home	Leaving the family home is a step towards independence. Becoming independent can help firmly establish the identity of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods Age refers to the age reached in the relevant calendar year
Age of setting up home (males/females)	Average age at which young males and females from lower-income neighbourhoods set up home on their own	Setting up home is one of the most important steps towards independence and asserting one's own identity Age refers to the age reached in the relevant calendar year

Forced marriage	Number of marriages (out of all those in lower-income neighbourhoods) in which one of the spouses claims to have been obliged to marry by his or her family	Forced marriage is a form of submission, primarily of women, which is difficult to assess. It constitutes a major obstacle to the emancipation of the individuals concerned An assessment of the proportion of forced marriages can also be made based on the statistics compiled by social services It may be relevant to differentiate between forced marriages involving two residents and forced marriages involving one resident and a non-resident
Existence of identifiable peer groups	Are there clearly identifiable peer groups (males/females) in the area in question?	The existence of peer groups that have formed needs to be taken into account when devising programmes to encourage youth participation Here, it will be necessary to carry out a specific study on the codes, rites and forms of language of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods Information on peer groups can also be obtained from players on the ground, such as social workers, or via third parties such as the police. Questioning residents may also yield information. However, information obtained in this way might offer a slightly distorted picture
Leisure facilities for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (males/females)	Distribution of the main leisure facilities for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in relation to all residential areas	Leisure facilities for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are a territorial expression of their identity. Where they are sited in the urban environment is an important factor in the appropriation of territory This indicator can be divided according to the intended beneficiaries – by gender and age
D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Possibilities for building up a "social mix"	Number of areas in or outside lower-income neighbourhoods accessible to young people from such neighbourhoods and frequented by residents of the town/city	The provision of areas where there can be a social mix can help develop a sense of belonging to the town or city as a whole
Perception of peer groups by the authorities	Views of the authorities on the nature of peer groups	Basically, peer groups can be viewed in two ways: (i) as a resource for solidarity networks; (ii) posing a risk of an escalation in crime This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. negative; 1. neutral; 2. positive Each point on the scale should then be expressed as a proportion of the total

To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Balance in facilities for young males and females	Proportion of leisure facilities which are designed for young females	Successive urban policies have primarily focused on providing leisure facilities for males, leaving young females somewhat on the sidelines There can be three types of leisure facilities from the gender point of view. Those intended for: – males – both males and females – females It may be relevant to ascertain the proportion of females out of all users of mixed facilities
Support for initiatives by groups of young females in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any support arrangements (public or private) for initiatives taken by young females in lower-income neighbourhoods?	Support for initiatives taken by groups of young females in lower-income neighbourhoods can allow them to escape the authority of males and the process of ghettoisation within the neighbourhood
Mechanisms for preferential access to employment	Are there any mechanisms for preferential access to employment for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	Such mechanisms could nurture young people's sense of belonging, thereby contributing to the development of their identity
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Media action to enable young people (males and females) from lower-income neighbourhoods to assert their identity	Is there any media action to enable young people (males and females) from lower-income neighbourhoods to assert their identity?	The identity of young people (males and females) portrayed by the media influences how they see themselves and, indirectly, therefore, their behaviour
Programmes to assist immigrant mothers in developing the creative potential of their children	Are there any programmes to assist immigrant mothers in developing the creative potential of their children?	Personalised programmes to assist immigrant mothers help encourage learning at home and enable them to play a key role in their children's success at school
Measures to overcome the legal or structural barriers to the full development of the potential of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any measures taken by the public authorities to overcome the legal or structural barriers to the full development of the potential of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	The public authorities can play a key role in overcoming these barriers

2.3. "Young people take over public areas"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Perception of the unrest caused by young people in their use of community areas in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of residents of lower-income neighbourhoods who complain of regular intrusion by young people in the use of public areas	This indicator reflects the perceived extent of unrest caused by young people in the normal use of public areas in lower-income neighbourhoods
Is this stereotype widespread?		
Perception of young people hanging around in the street	Proportion of adults in lower-income neighbourhoods who believe it is a problem to see young people hanging around in the streets	The inactivity of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is seen as a major problem by some residents. This indicator should be tied in with the residents' perception of the quality of facilities provided for young people. There may be an underlying contradiction in their perceptions
B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to exclusion?		
Household occupancy index in lower-income neighbourhoods	Average number of rooms per person residing in housing in lower-income neighbourhoods	A low index reflects significant crowding in households. This may encourage young people to find some space outside the household, particularly on the public highway. Note: the number of rooms gives no indication of surface area Example: in France, INSEE defines a household overcrowding index (see glossary). Under this definition, all dwellings consisting of just one room (other than kitchen and bathroom) are considered to be overcrowded, irrespective of the number of occupants
Overcrowding in housing in lower-income neighbourhoods	Average surface area (in square metres) per person residing in lower-income neighbourhoods	A low average surface area per person reflects the very limited size of housing in lower-income neighbourhoods. This overcrowding may prompt young people to find space outside the household, in public areas
Satisfaction vis-à-vis housing in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of residents of lower-income neighbourhoods who are fairly or totally dissatisfied with their housing conditions.	Dissatisfaction with housing conditions may prompt young people to avoid spending time at home as much as possible This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. totally dissatisfied; 1. fairly dissatisfied; 2. neither dissatisfied nor satisfied; 3. reasonably satisfied; 4. very satisfied
Own space in the family home in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who have their own room in the family home	Not having one's own space at home may prompt young people to seek out other areas they can feel as their own

Accessibility of social housing to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Ratio between the average annual disposable income of young adults in lower-income neighbourhoods and the average annual rent of a social housing unit for one person/one household	Being unable to afford social housing is an obstacle to the independence of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and may give rise to conflictual occupancy of public areas
Number of facilities for socialising or leisure for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Number of cafes, bars, youth centres, cultural centres, etc., in the neighbourhood	The availability of such facilities in the neighbourhood may help channel young people away from public areas
Average budget of a young person from a lower-income neighbourhood for recreational purposes	Average monthly budget of a young person from a lower-income neighbourhood for recreational purposes	Access to socialising or cultural facilities often costs money. The economic hardship of young people and/or their household may not enable them to take advantage of such facilities, with public areas therefore being the only place they can afford to frequent This indicator could be compared with that observed in the reference area or population
How may exclusion factors lead young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Relative perception of the function of community/public areas	Qualitative comparison of the functions attributed to community/public areas by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and young people from the whole reference area	This indicator reflects the differences in perception of community/public areas in terms of use and occupancy by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and those from other urban areas. These differences could in part explain the tendency to take over public areas. One might also look at the differences in perception between young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and the residents of those neighbourhoods
C. Measuring the consequences		
What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may this stereotype lead to?		
Existence of legal provisions to counter the occupancy of community areas by young people	Are there any legal provisions to counter the occupancy of community areas (both indoors and outdoors)? If yes, how is such occupancy classified (petty offence, misdemeanour or crime)?	If there is legislation governing the use of community areas and providing for sanctions, this is an indication of the extent of the cohabitation problems that may arise in lower-income neighbourhoods between young people and the rest of the population Example: in France, a law has been passed governing the use of corridors and walkways in or adjoining blocks of flats, whereby gatherings of young people in such places may be punishable (Section 61 of Law No. 2003-239 of 18 March 2003 on internal security) In the United Kingdom, the law introducing ASBOs provides for similar measures (Crime and Disorder Act, 1998)

Meeting place extension/ maintenance policies in lower-income neighbourhoods and participatory management arrangements	Are there any public policies to extend/maintain meeting places in lower-income neighbourhoods incorporating participatory management arrangements?	The existence of such policies reflects a desire by the public authorities to undertake non-punitive measures for concerted rehabilitation of the areas used by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Perception of the quality of leisure facilities available to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of adults who believe that the facilities (leisure, cultural, sports) provided for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are of adequate quality	The different surveys carried out on this topic in Europe show that a vast majority of adults think that the facilities provided for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods are manifestly inadequate, in terms of both quantity and quality
Perception of the accessibility of leisure facilities for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of adults who believe that the facilities (leisure, cultural, sports) provided for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are easily accessible (in terms of opening times and capacity)	The different surveys carried out on this topic in Europe show that a vast majority of adults think that the facilities provided for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods are manifestly inadequate, in terms of both quantity and quality
Perception of accessibility to places for socialising outside the neighbourhood	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who feel that places for socialising outside their neighbourhoods are easily or fairly easily accessible	Places for socialising, in particular night spots (bars, nightclubs, etc.) located outside lower-income neighbourhoods and frequented by young people from the town/city as a whole are often selective about who they let in. This can reinforce a feeling of exclusion among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Inclusion in urban redevelopment programmes of "open spaces" for young people	Do urban redevelopment programmes include projects to provide "open spaces" for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	Where there are such projects, this shows that the public authorities are attempting to ensure that the conditions are in place to enable young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to develop their potential for self-fulfilment
Inclusion in urban redevelopment programmes of projects to make lower-income neighbourhoods less impersonal	Do urban redevelopment programmes include measures to make lower-income neighbourhoods less impersonal?	It is essential to take on board the impersonal nature of lower-income neighbourhoods in order to improve social living conditions

How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Consultation and dialogue between associations and the public authorities on the leisure facility needs of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there in the neighbourhood(s) in question any consultation and dialogue procedures between associations and the public authorities focusing on the leisure facility needs of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	Providing such facilities is an essential step towards building up a sense of community and a friendly climate in the neighbourhood
Presence of street educators	Number of street educators per 100 young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator reflects the human resources allocated to young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Presence of community development workers	Number of community development workers per 100 young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator reflects the human resources allocated to young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Support for neighbourhood cultural/sports projects	Are there any support procedures for neighbourhood cultural/ sports projects?	Where there are such procedures, this can help develop appropriate facilities to satisfy the needs of young people in the neighbourhoods

2.4. "Young people make public areas unsafe"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Ratio between the feeling of insecurity and the victimisation rate	Ratio between the feeling of insecurity and the victimisation rate (x100)	This indicator shows the extent to which the perception of insecurity exceeds the actual crime situation. If the indicator is higher than 100, it shows that there is a climate of fear Comparing the feeling of insecurity (subjective) with the victimisation rate (more objective) highlights the difference between the two phenomena; the first is a feeling, an impression (subjective by its very nature), while the second is an attempt at being more objective, based on facts
Relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the total prison population of young people	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the total prison population of young people in relation to their relative incidence in the total population of young people (x100)	Over-representation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the prison population in relation to their relative incidence in society could be interpreted as reflecting a higher rate of offences committed. Note, however, that this over-representation could also reflect a greater tendency by the courts to send young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to prison
Ratio between the increase in the prison population of young people and the number of serious crimes committed by young people	Annual variation rate in the prison population of young people in relation to the annual variation rate of the number of serious crimes committed by young people (x100)	A faster growth in the prison population of young people compared with the variation in the number of serious crimes committed by them could reflect a greater tendency by the courts to send young people to prison systematically
Relative proportion of shoplifting by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in relation to that committed by young people in general	Annual number of shoplifting offences committed by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (per 1 000 young people) in relation to the annual number of shoplifting offences committed by young people in general (per 1 000 young people) (x100)	This indicator compares the level of shoplifting offences committed by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods with that of young people in general. An index higher than 100 reflects a greater propensity for shoplifting among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Is this stereotype widespread?		
Perception by residents of lower-income neighbourhoods that young people from those neighbourhoods make the place unsafe	Proportion of residents of lower-income neighbourhoods who feel that young people from those neighbourhoods make public areas unsafe	A high perception of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods as a factor of insecurity reveals a weak social bond and a high potential for conflict between young people and the other residents of the neighbourhood Differences in perception may be significant

Relative trends in the perception of the behaviour of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Trends over time in the proportion of adult residents in lower-income neighbourhoods who feel that the behaviour of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is worse than in the past, compared with trends in the perception of the total population vis-à-vis the behaviour of young people in general	Changes in social norms may alter the perception of a given type of behaviour, which may mean that it begins to be viewed as unacceptable or dangerous. For example, children playing in the street, something that was accepted in the past, now tends to be viewed as antisocial or unlawful Example: in Scotland in 2004 for the population in general: – 60% of adults believe that young people's behaviour is worse than in the past and the same percentage feel that the views of young people "are not listened to enough" – half of adults believe that young people have no respect for their elders, while 57% think they are friendly and helpful (source: Scottish Executive, 2004 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey)
Image in the media of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Qualitative analysis of media (radio, television, press) coverage of young people, with a comparison of negative and positive content	A poor image of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods conveyed in the media can be undermining in two ways: (i) in the minds of the community at large and (ii) in the minds of the young people themselves who might take the attitude "if that is how they think we are, that is how we will be"
How does the stereotype gain ground?		
Trends in media coverage of incidents involving young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Qualitative analysis of media coverage of incidents involving young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Excessive and biased media coverage of incidents involving young people from lower-income neighbourhoods cannot but reinforce the idea that they are a source of insecurity
B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
How may exclusion factors lead young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Perception by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of use of language to intimidate	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who claim to use deliberately an aggressive form of language or communication	This indicator reflects the young people's own perception of the nature of the language they use, often seen from the outside as aggressive
C. Measuring the consequences		
What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may this stereotype lead to?		
Tightening of legislation to clamp down on young people from lower-income neighbourhoods gathering in public areas	Has there been a tightening of legislation to clamp down on young people from lower-income neighbourhoods gathering in public areas?	Tighter legislation is often seen as the only response to a perception of insecurity

D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Forms of recognition for the creativity of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any forms of recognition for the creativity of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	Recognition for the creativity and inventiveness of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is essential for bringing about social change
Local management arrangements for developing positive initiatives in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there in lower-income neighbourhoods any local arrangements to support and develop positive initiatives taken by the residents?	It is essential to support and develop the positive initiatives of the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods in order to bring about social change
To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Facilities/activities for developing alternative and attractive forms of expression (Internet, gym, theatre, music) accessible to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there outside the lower-income neighbourhoods any facilities/activities for developing alternative and attractive forms of expression (Internet, gym, theatre, music) accessible to young people from such neighbourhoods?	Difficulties in accessing such facilities or activities encountered by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods reinforce the feeling of exclusion and encourage a process of "fortification" among young people in these neighbourhoods
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Existence of "mediators" as an interface between urban areas and groups of young people	Are there any forms of mediation between groups of young people and the different parts of the urban area?	Such forms of mediation can contribute to the social decompartmentalisation of the urban area by reducing respective fears
Meetings and exchanges between young people in the same town/city	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who have regular contacts with young people from other neighbourhoods in the town/city	An absence of contacts between different social groups reinforces respective feelings of fear
Identification of factors/processes which will bring about a change in the situation	At municipal level are there any collective initiatives (taken by the local authorities or private bodies) to encourage and improve interaction between the various social groups from different urban areas?	Such initiatives reflect a commitment at local level to address problems in cohabitation in large urban areas

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2.5. "The police now regard lower-income neighbourhoods as no-go areas"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Relative police presence in lower-income neighbourhoods	Number of police officers assigned to lower-income neighbourhoods (per 1 000 inhabitants) in relation to the equivalent proportion observed in the whole urban area (x100)	A strong police presence in lower-income neighbourhoods may cause tension but is not necessarily synonymous with effectiveness in terms of security A value above 100 reflects a heightened police presence in lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative frequency of police checks	Average number of police checks to which a young person from a lower-income neighbourhood is subjected each month in relation to the number of times this is the case for a young person in the reference population (x100)	A high frequency of police checks may be seen as a form of institutional persecution
Is this stereotype widespread?		
Perception of the police presence by residents of lower-income neighbourhoods	Assessment by the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods of the police presence	Too small a police presence in the neighbourhood could give rise to a feeling of insecurity, including amongst young people, and generate tension between residents; a disproportionate police presence in the neighbourhood will be seen as provocative and give rise to tension between young people/residents and the police forces This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. inadequate; 1. low-level; 2. reasonable; 3. significant; 4. overstated; 5. disproportionate A differentiation should be made between neighbourhoods where there has been some urban renewal and those where there has not
Perception of the nature of police activity in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of police officers assigned to lower-income neighbourhoods who believe they have a preventive and educational role to play and are not there merely to enforce the law	The perception by police officers of the nature of their role determines their relationships with young people in the neighbourhood
B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
Average age of police officers on duty in lower-income neighbourhoods	Average age of police officers patrolling and maintaining order in lower-income neighbourhoods	Where police officers are young and inexperienced, this may fuel tensions in their relations with local youths

Average number of years of service of police officers on duty in lower-income neighbourhoods	Average number of years of service of police officers patrolling and maintaining order in lower-income neighbourhoods	Where police officers are young and inexperienced, this may fuel tensions in their relations with local youths
Training for police officers	Proportion of hours devoted to psychological and social dimensions out of the total number of hours of basic and in-service training for police officers	Inclusion of psychological and sociological aspects in police training will lead to greater insight into the problems encountered on the ground
Geographical origin of police officers on duty in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of police officers on duty in lower-income neighbourhoods who themselves come from such a neighbourhood or a large urban environment	The fact that police officers, because of their background, are familiar with the living conditions in lower-income neighbourhoods or large urban areas is conducive to a better approach to relations with the young people of the neighbourhood
How may exclusion factors lead young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Relative prevalence of young people among persons implicated in crimes and offences	Proportion of young people out of the total number of people implicated in crimes and offences committed by people living in a lower-income neighbourhood, in relation to the equivalent proportion observed in the total population (x100)	An increase in the relative prevalence of young people (particularly minors) among the total number of people implicated in crimes and offences is a general phenomenon which goes beyond the boundaries of lower-income neighbourhoods. This indicator can be calculated for all crimes and offences or for specific types of offence (See, for example, the crime type definitions, UK Home Office)
Prevalence of young people implicated in crime in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of crime and offences committed by young people in the total number of crimes or offences in lower-income neighbourhoods	By analysing the evolving proportion of young people involved in crime and offences, it will be possible to differentiate between the variation in youth crime due to the general variation and that relating to young people alone Example: in France, while in the country as a whole there has been a 11% increase in crime and offences, between the year 2000 and 2002, juvenile crime fell from 21% to 19.9%. Crime and offences committed by minors increased in absolute terms, but basically because of the overall increase observed; in relative terms, juvenile crime fell over that period (source: calculations based on INSEE's living conditions survey)
Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who have actually taken part in criminal activity	Number of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who have been convicted of crimes or offences in relation to the population of young people in such neighbourhoods	The proportion of young people actually involved in criminal activities is generally small in relation to the total population of young people Example: in Barcelona, only 3% of young people in the inner-city district of El Raval have been actually convicted of involvement in criminal activities (source: Council of Europe, Trends in social cohesion, No. 9)

Perception of the police presence by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Assessment by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods of the police presence	Too small a police presence in the neighbourhood could give rise to a feeling of insecurity, including amongst young people, and generate tension between residents; a disproportionate police presence in the neighbourhood will be seen as provocative and give rise to tension between young people/residents and the police forces This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. inadequate; 1. low-level; 2. reasonable; 3. significant; 4. overstated; 5. disproportionate
Proportion of young people taking part in riots who had already come to the attention of the police	Proportion of young people among all those involved in rioting who had already come to the attention of the police	A high proportion of young people might indicate a concentration of police efforts on young people who had already come to their attention, and this may distort the make-up of the population participating in riots, reflected in statistics such as "X% of rioters arrested were already known to the police"
Repeat offending among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of repeat offenders among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	A high number of offences committed by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods can in reality be attributed to the same individuals. This may lead to the systematic and general equation that is made between young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and crime
*C. Measuring the consequences*	
**What factors facilitate such behaviour and constitute an obstacle to building up a sense of community?**	
Existence of neighbourhood policing	Is there any neighbourhood policing in the district in question?	Neighbourhood policing is considered by many authorities as one of the few lasting solutions to maintaining a climate of security by avoiding tension with young people and developing peaceful relations, facilitating prevention Example: recommendations of the Council of Europe, integrated project "Responses to violence in everyday life in a democratic society": Seminar on the Role of Local Policing in the Prevention of Crime and Violence (Prague, 10 November 2003)
*D. Finding alternative approaches*	
**Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches**	
Training of police officers in the socioeconomic context of lower-income neighbourhoods	Does the training of police officers working in lower-income neighbourhoods include modules on the socioeconomic context of these neighbourhoods?	Providing police officers with training that takes greater account of the socioeconomic context of such neighbourhoods is an essential precondition to better management of action to maintain order
Rate of antisocial behaviour or violence by young people in rehabilitated lower-income neighbourhoods compared with that in non-rehabilitated neighbourhoods	Number of antisocial or violent acts committed by young people (per 1 000 inhabitants) in rehabilitated lower-income neighbourhoods in relation to the equivalent number observed in non-rehabilitated lower-income neighbourhoods (x100)	Studies in Europe have shown that antisocial or violent acts are less frequent in rehabilitated neighbourhoods. A value under 100 confirms this

Comparative assessment of the feeling of insecurity of residents of lower-income neighbourhoods in relation to the rehabilitation level of the neighbourhoods in question	Proportion of residents of rehabilitated lower-income neighbourhoods who claim to have experienced, occasionally or regularly, a feeling of fear (without any aggression having taken place) caused by young people on the public highway during a reference period, in relation to the equivalent proportion observed among residents of non-rehabilitated lower-income neighbourhoods (x100)	Studies in Europe have shown that antisocial or violent acts are less frequent in rehabilitated neighbourhoods. A value under 100 confirms this Actual crime (evaluated by police statistics or victimisation surveys) and the feeling of insecurity are two phenomena often wrongly confused in public discourse. Feelings of insecurity are more frequent among the population than actual exposure to crime
Assessment of the feeling of attachment by residents to rehabilitated neighbourhoods compared with that of residents of non-rehabilitated neighbourhoods	Proportion of residents of rehabilitated neighbourhoods who express a feeling of attachment to their neighbourhood in relation to the equivalent proportion observed among residents of non-rehabilitated neighbourhoods (x100)	The feeling of belonging and attachment to their neighbourhood among residents is more marked in rehabilitated lower-income neighbourhoods. A value above 100 confirms this
To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Mechanisms for consultation and dialogue on maintaining order	Are there any mechanisms for consultation and dialogue between the police and the social players on the ground aimed at improving the approach to maintaining order in lower-income neighbourhoods?	Providing possibilities for consultation and dialogue leading to ongoing collaboration between all the stakeholders in lower-income neighbourhoods is a vital factor in police effectiveness
Existence of local neighbourhood self-management committees	Are there any local self-management committees in the neighbourhood in question?	The action taken by self-management committees can supplement that taken by the public authorities in addressing conflicts in the neighbourhood
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Multidisciplinary approach to security in lower-income neighbourhoods	Is there an emphasis on a multidisciplinary (sociological, psychological, social) approach in deciding on policies for maintaining order in the neighbourhood in question?	Taking into consideration the social and psychological dimensions in organising the policing approach in lower-income neighbourhoods can improve its effectiveness

Relative importance of preventive action vis-à-vis intervention or remedial action	Assessment of the relative proportion of public preventive action in lower-income neighbourhoods (expressed numerically or in terms of the budget allocated) in all public action taken (in particular intervention or remedial action)	This indicator reflects the importance attached by the public authorities to prevention in lower-income neighbourhoods, in relation to other forms of intervention
Existence of opportunities for dialogue between local public authorities, the police and youth representatives	Are there in the neighbourhood in question any opportunities for dialogue between local public authorities, the police and youth representatives?	Such possibilities enable conflicts in the neighbourhood to be addressed on the basis of consultation and dialogue
Evaluation of police action in relation to the expectations of the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any procedures for evaluating police action in relation to the expectations of the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods?	The perception by residents of lower-income neighbourhoods of police action is closely linked to their expectations in this area

CHAPTER 3: STEREOTYPES CONCERNING AUTONOMY AND OCCUPATIONAL FULFILMENT

3.1. "Young people in lower-income neighbourhoods prefer the easy money afforded by the informal economy"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is the stereotype?		
Relative involvement of young people in the informal economy	Young people as a percentage of all those in the neighbourhood regularly engaged in an activity within the informal economy	The informal economy is often viewed as mainly involving young people in lower-income neighbourhoods. A cross-check on this can be performed by looking at police work concerned with activities chiefly engaged in by young people (for example, sale of cannabis-type drugs). Figures obtained from police services need comparing with other sources (residents, social workers, etc.)
Relative involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in illegal trafficking	What proportion of those charged with illegal trafficking throughout the reference area each year are young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	This indicator measures young people's real involvement in illegal trafficking, which is not necessarily as extensive as is imagined
Prevalence of informal-economy activities among young people	Percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods regularly engaging in an activity within the informal economy	General indicator of the prevalence of involvement in the informal economy among young people in the neighbourhood
Relative proportion of all young people who have a bank account or savings account	Proportion of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods who have a bank account or savings account in relation to the equivalent proportion for all young people (x100)	Not having a bank account or savings account may be indicative of activity in the informal economy A value under 100 indicates that fewer young people in lower-income neighbourhoods have bank or savings accounts
Is the stereotype widespread?		
Perception by the population as a whole of the prevalence of informal economy activity among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Percentage of residents of lower-income neighbourhoods believing involvement in the informal economy to be extensive among local young people	This indicator reflects how widely a connection is made between young people and involvement in the informal economy among residents of lower-income neighbourhoods

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?		
Main areas of the informal economy present in lower-income neighbourhoods	What kind of activities coming under the informal economy are most frequently found in lower-income neighbourhoods?	The type of informal economic activity found in lower-income neighbourhoods may give some indication as to young people's involvement in such activities A comparison can be made of the facts as recorded by the police and the facts as seen by local residents
Extent of illegal activity in the informal economy	Estimated proportion of the total informal economy in the particular lower-income neighbourhood accounted for by illegal activities	The general public largely associates the informal economy with extensive illegal activities. A comparison with legal activities within the informal economy in terms of economic flows provides pointers to the prevalence of one or other form of informal economy in particular lower-income neighbourhoods Illegal activities in the informal economy include: – monetary transactions: trade in stolen goods, drug dealing and manufacturing, prostitution, illegal gambling, smuggling and fraud (counterfeit goods, etc.) – non-monetary activities: barter of drugs or stolen or counterfeit goods, etc; drug production for own use and theft for personal use
Extent of legal activity in the informal economy	Estimated extent of legal activity as a proportion of the total informal economy in the particular lower-income neighbourhood	The extent of legal activities within the informal economy is often obscured by public perceptions. A comparison with illegal activities within the informal economy in terms of economic flows provides pointers to the prevalence of one or other form of the informal economy in the particular lower-income neighbourhood Legal activities in the informal economy include: – monetary transactions *Tax evasion:* undeclared income from self-employment; wages, assets and income from undeclared activities relating to legal goods and services *Tax avoidance:* employee discounts, fringe benefits – non-monetary transactions *Tax evasion:* barter of legal goods and services *Tax avoidance:* domestic activities, neighbour help

Average income in the 15-24 age group in lower-income neighbourhoods	Average monthly disposable income of a young person in a lower-income neighbourhood	The income level of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods may point to the need for informal economy activities as a survival strategy. Figures of course relate here to declared (legal) disposable income This indicator can be compared with the figure for the reference area or reference population as a whole Large income discrepancies between the youngest and oldest in the age group may distort the result. It may be necessary to subdivide the age group into 15-18, 18-21 and 21-24 for the sake of data consistency
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Perceptions of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of the informal economy	What proportion of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods regard informal economy activities as usual and unobjectionable?	A large proportion of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods regard informal economic activity as normal, a view that is at odds with social norms
C. Measuring the consequences		
What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?		
Stricter legislation on the informal economy	Is legislation shifting towards stricter measures to combat the informal economy?	Stricter legislation shows that the public authorities are opting for a law-and-order approach to countering the informal economy
More intensive policing of informal activities of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Is there a police crackdown on informal activities by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods?	Any such crackdown is evidence of an official law-and-order line in countering the informal economy
D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Micro-credit projects for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any micro-credit projects for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods?	Research in Europe on micro-credit experiments shows them to be effective generators of self-directed economic activity
Surface area assigned to commercial activities and local services in lower-income neighbourhoods	Surface area assigned to commercial activities and local services in lower-income neighbourhoods (in square metres per 1 000 inhabitants)	Availability of premises for starting up an activity is all the more of a problem in that some lower-income neighbourhoods were never designed for the development of economic activity

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods carrying on two activities	Young people in lower-income neighbourhoods carrying on two activities as a percentage of all young people engaged in an occupational activity	In many countries, declaring any activity besides the main one means having to pay various taxes, administrative charges and fixed costs which wipe out most of the gains
Cost of legalising an activity	Ratio between net hourly income from a declared activity and hourly income from the same activity if it is not declared (x100)	This indicator measures the loss of income incurred by moving from paid activity in the underground economy to the formal economy
Profitability of the informal economy	Ratio between average monthly income from the informal economy of a young person in a lower-income neighbourhood and the (net) legal minimum monthly wage (x100)	The informal economy may become more attractive to young people if the legal minimum wage is low in that there is no other way for young people without any qualifications to earn more
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Arrangements for registering young people's entrepreneurial ideas in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there arrangements for registering young people's entrepreneurial ideas in lower-income neighbourhoods?	Such arrangements can promote legal economic activity among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Extent to which local authorities buy products and services from firms/ suppliers located in lower-income neighbourhoods	What proportion of their total annual requirement for products and services do local authorities buy from firms/suppliers located in lower-income neighbourhoods?	This indicator measures local authorities' efforts to support enterprise development in lower-income neighbourhoods

3.2. "Young people do not believe in hard work; they are not equipped for employment"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is the stereotype?		
Unemployment among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Unemployment rate found among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods (18-25 age group)	Basic indicator of occupational inactivity among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods (15-29 age group) who are neither in training nor employment	Percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods (15-29 age group) who are neither in training nor employment	Indicator of occupational inactivity among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative employment rate of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Ratio between the employment rate for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods and the equivalent rate for all young people (x100)	The employment rate for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods is not necessarily very different from that for young people in other neighbourhoods A value under 100 reflects a lower employment rate among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Ratio between the unemployment rate for young people and the overall unemployment rate in lower-income neighbourhoods	Ratio between the unemployment rate for young people and the overall unemployment rate in lower-income neighbourhoods (x100), compared with the equivalent ratio for the national population	Unemployment of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods has to be assessed against the same rate for the working population as a whole in those neighbourhoods. Overall, the latter is much higher than the national average as the neighbourhood itself compounds the problem A value above 100 reflects a situation unfavourable to young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Is the stereotype widespread?		
Relative percentage of demotivated unemployed among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Ratio between the percentage of demotivated unemployed among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods and the percentage of demotivated unemployed among young people as a whole (x100)	Demotivated unemployed means those who say they have given up looking for a job because they believe they have little prospect of finding one. Because of their specific job-finding difficulties young people in lower-income neighbourhoods may display more marked job-seeking demotivation A value above 100 reflects a higher rate of demotivation among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods

Relative percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods drawing minimum social benefits or receiving other forms of social aid	Ratio between the percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods drawing minimum social benefits or receiving other forms of social aid and the equivalent percentage for all young people (x100)	This indicator evaluates aid dependency among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods A value above 100 reflects a higher percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods dependent on aid.
Part-time work (comparison)	Ratio between the percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods who have part-time jobs but want longer hours and the equivalent figure for all young people (x100)	This indicator evaluates work among young people on an undesired part-time basis A value above 100 reflects a situation in which a higher proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are engaged in part-time work, not necessarily out of choice
Relative average number of CVs sent by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods before they obtain employment	Ratio between the average number of CVs sent by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods before they obtain employment and the figure for all young people (x100)	Young job seekers in lower-income neighbourhoods may be penalised by their address/postcode A value above 100 reflects a situation unfavourable to young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
What are the specific aspirations of this group which are misunderstood and help explain how the stereotype came about?		
Trend in unskilled or less-skilled employment as a proportion of total employment	Annual trend in the proportion of total national employment which is unskilled or less skilled	The regular post-industrial decrease in unskilled or less-skilled jobs swells unemployment among the under-qualified young in lower-income neighbourhoods.
Trend in insecure jobs as a proportion of total jobs	Annual trend in insecure employment (temporary employment, fixed-term contracts, traineeships or subsidised contracts in the public or private sectors) as a proportion of total employment nationally	General indicator of growing insecurity of employment
Relative unemployment rate for further/higher education graduates	Ratio between the unemployment rate for further/higher education graduates among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods and the equivalent rate for all young people (x100)	A figure above 100 reflects a situation unfavourable to further/higher education graduates from lower-income neighbourhoods relative to the population as a whole

Relative insecurity of employment	Ratio between the insecure-employment figure as a proportion of total employment of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods and the figure for all young people (x100)	This indicator reflects increased insecurity of employment among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods in relation to young people in other neighbourhoods A value above 100 reflects a situation in which there is a higher level of insecure employment among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative income of a young adult with a job	Ratio between the average income of a young employed adult from a lower-income neighbourhood and the average income of a young employed adult from elsewhere (qualifications being equal) (x100)	This indicator shows the income discrepancies produced by the "neighbourhood effect" A value under 100 reflects a situation unfavourable to young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative distribution of types of employment found by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Percentages for different types of employment found by young working adults from lower-income neighbourhoods after a period of unemployment (permanent contract, fixed-term contract, seasonal contract, temporary employment, part-time employment, subsidised employment, etc.) in relation to the percentages for all young adults (x100)	This indicator illustrates the degree of insecurity affecting young unemployed adults from lower-income neighbourhoods The evaluation must be performed for each type of contract: in the case of permanent contracts a value below 100 indicates a situation unfavourable to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods For other kinds of contract a value above 100 reflects a situation unfavourable to young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative recurrence of unemployment among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Ratio between the average number of unemployment periods in a five-year period for a young working adult from a lower-income neighbourhood and the figure for all young people (x100)	This indicator illustrates recurrence of unemployment among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods A value above 100 reflects greater recurrence of unemployment among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Relationship between unemployment and qualifications among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods in comparison with young people nationally	For each qualification level, ratio between the relative frequency of the socio-occupational category among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and the equivalent figure for all young people (x100)	A figure under or over 100 reflects, according to the particular case (high or low qualifications), a situation unfavourable to young people from lower-income neighbourhoods as relative to the whole population in terms of the link between employment and qualifications (less skilled employment or underemployment of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods relative to their qualifications) This indicator is calculated solely for population categories with an occupation (namely, not including the unemployed, the non-working and the retired)

Relative difficulty of obtaining work-experience placements	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in or about to complete training who have serious difficulty in obtaining work-experience placements in relation to the equivalent percentage for all young people (x100)	This indicator measures the difficulty of obtaining work-experience placements and, consequently, of acquiring the work experience often asked for in job vacancies A value above 100 reflects a situation in which young people from lower-income neighbourhoods encounter greater difficulties in finding work-experience placements
Relative proportion of young people with further/ higher education qualifications from deprived neighbourhoods who find a job matching their qualifications in the year after qualifying	Proportion of young people with further/ higher education qualifications from deprived neighbourhoods who find a job matching their qualifications in the year after qualifying, in relation to the equivalent percentage for all young people (x100)	This indicator reflects the special job-finding difficulties experienced by young people with further/higher education qualifications from lower-income neighbourhoods A value under 100 reflects a situation in which young people from lower-income neighbourhoods experience greater difficulty in finding a job matching their qualifications
Relative indicator of social mobility	Ratio between the percentage of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in a socio-occupational category higher than that of their parents and the equivalent percentage for all young people (x100)	This indicator measures social-mobility capability among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods A value under 100 reflects a situation in which social mobility is less prevalent among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative ownership of private transport	Ratio between the percentage of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods with private transport of their own and the equivalent percentage for all young people (x100)	Private transport is a recognised factor in shortening unemployment A value below 100 reflects a situation in which fewer young people from lower-income neighbourhoods own a private means of transport
Possession of a driving licence	Percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods holding a driving licence	A driving licence is a recognised factor in shortening unemployment
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Young people's reasons for registering unemployed	Relative significance of the various reasons for registering unemployed among young working adults (redundancy, other dismissal, giving notice, end of contract, end of placement, etc.)	This indicator illustrates the level of insecurity affecting the young unemployed in lower-income neighbourhoods

	Percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods who believe that they are having real job-finding difficulty	This indicator reflects young people's personal views as to possible difficulties encountered in the labour market
Perception of access to employment		
Rate of refusal by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of job offers originating from employment services	Average number of refusals of employment-service job offers per young job seeker from a lower-income neighbourhood	This indicator, to some extent, reflects the readiness on the part of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to accept a job

C. Measuring the consequences		
What corrective, police or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype result in?		
Workfare policies	Have workfare policies been introduced for the neighbourhoods concerned?	This indicator tells whether "stick and carrot" policies are being used to help young people adjust to realities
Main sectors for vocational integration	List of main employment sectors for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator lists the activity sectors which are the main routes into employment (though not from personal preference) for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, particularly those with few qualifications
Promoting start-ups among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any national schemes for promoting start-ups among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	Start-ups by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are an alternative solution to the job-finding difficulties which they may encounter, and also promote personal development.
Employment counselling	Number of vocational counsellors with special training in the difficulties of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (per 100 young people)	This indicator is a measure of official efforts on behalf of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the employment sphere

D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Employment policies enabling young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to acquire experience	Are there any employment policies to help young people from lower-income neighbourhoods acquire experience?	Experience greatly improves employability. Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods often lack relevant experience.
Joint reflection by social partners and civil society on job creation in lower-income neighbourhoods	Is there machinery for consultation and dialogue between social partners and civil society on job creation in lower-income neighbourhoods?	Co-ordination of action by the different stakeholders is a prerequisite for the success of efforts to improve the employment situation

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Local/regional projects for consultation between public authorities, schools, families, firms, young people and other institutions	Are there are any local/regional projects for consultation between public authorities, schools, families, firms, young people and other institutions?	Special characteristics of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods may necessitate adapting instruction content and teaching approach; this requires development of links between schools, informal education, employers and civil society
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Recognition of qualifications and abilities acquired through life experience and informal education	Are there any kinds of recognition of skills or aptitudes acquired from life experience or informal education?	Explicit recognition of informally acquired knowledge or skills may make young people from lower-income neighbourhoods more employable
Availability of childcare (1)	Average monthly cost of childcare (nursery or individual childminder) for someone from a lower-income neighbourhood as a proportion of average per capita monthly income (including social transfers) in lower-income neighbourhoods (x100)	Unavailability/unaffordability of childcare may hamper return to or retaining employment
Availability of childcare (2)	Number of places in public or private nurseries in lower-income neighbourhoods per 100 inhabitants	Unavailability/unaffordability of childcare may hamper return to or retaining employment This indicator may be compared with the urban unit as a whole
Cost of transport	The average monthly cost of public transport as a proportion of average disposable income in lower-income neighbourhoods (after deduction of accommodation expenses) (x100)	The cost of travel between home and work may hamper return to or retaining employment

3.3. "Young people are not interested in vocational training"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is the stereotype?		
Percentage of all students in lower-income neighbourhoods (or with parents who are unskilled workers) in secondary schooling, further/higher education and technical or vocational education	Percentage of all students in lower-income neighbourhoods (or with parents who are unskilled workers) in secondary schooling, higher education and technical or vocational education	This indicator measures the actual situation regarding the education paths of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
How does the stereotype spread?		
Low status of technical qualifications	Average net annual wage of employees who took secondary-school technical courses, as compared with the minimum net annual wage (x100)	This indicator reflects the attractiveness of employment opportunities offered by secondary-school technical courses Poor pay prospects may seriously affect uptake of such courses
Opportunities afforded by the education system as perceived by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	The personal views of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods as regards the prospects which school opens up	Indicator of educational motivation among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. Investment in schooling presupposes belief in school's ability to change one's social condition This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. no prospects; 1. poor prospects; 2. good prospects; 3. very good prospects
B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?		
Educational direction taken, according to socio-occupational category of the head of the family	Percentage of young people in technical, general and further/higher education, according to the socio-occupational category of the head of the family. To be calculated for socio-occupational categories unskilled worker, office/service worker, professional[2] (ISCO 9, 5 and 2)	Over-representation of working-class children in technical education, and of professional-class children in higher education, indicates a tendency in the school system to replicate social patterns Example: in Germany 7.6% of pupils aged 13 to 14 are in the short technical track *(Hauptschule)* and 67.1% of pupils in the general track have office/service worker parents. The percentage is the exact opposite in the case of children of unskilled workers (source: National Institute on Student Achievement, US Department of Education)

2. Depending on the country there are age differences as regards counselling and the structure of the school system. In Germany, for example, there is a three-track school system (technical, general and mixed) which tends very much to replicate social inequalities and which practises a kind of racial discrimination. Most European education sysetems are divided into technical/vocational and general tracks.

Tracks given priority in the education system	Secondary school and further /higher education tracks with the largest numbers of students	The priority track(s) may point to a devaluation of vocational courses and thus also devaluation of certificates as a result of their being obtained by increasing numbers of students Example: France has an objective of 80% of the age cohort at *baccalauréat* level (level ISCED3) (source: French Ministry of Education)
Match between school qualifications and economic structure	Percentage of holders of technical or vocational qualifications unable to find jobs because their studies have not provided them with the appropriate qualifications required	Indicator of the relevance of technical or vocational training to abilities required by the labour market
Average start-of-career earnings of holders of a technical qualification	Average annual start-of-career earnings of holders of a technical qualification	Low status of vocational tracks is linked to the kind of opportunities which they open up, particularly in terms of earnings Average earnings here may be compared with average earnings across the workforce
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Relative perception of the value of a vocational qualification	Percentage of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods attaching importance to a vocational qualification in relation to the equivalent percentage for all young people (x100)	Indicator of perceptions regarding the value of paper qualifications for entering employment A value below 100 reflects greater disenchantment with vocational qualifications on the part of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. little value; 1. medium value; 2. great value. Replies may then be compared as between different qualifications and different categories of pupil
Relative perception of manual/craftwork by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods attaching great value to manual or craftwork in relation to the equivalent percentage for all young people (x100)	Indicator of perceptions regarding the value of manual or craftwork among young people A value below 100 reflects a situation in which young people in lower-income neighbourhoods attach less value to such work
C. Measuring the consequences		
What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?		
Promotion of technical and vocational education	Do the authorities regularly engage in action to interest young people in technical and vocational education?	Lack of interest in vocational and technical tracks may be countered by greater promotional efforts This indicator may be calculated for different areas of technical and vocational education.

D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Placements	Are there any short in-community placements or compulsory placements in business/industry for pupils in the different tracks in secondary schooling?	This indicator shows whether the curriculum provides opportunities for pupils to experience the realities of community life or working life This indicator can be calculated for different areas of technical and vocational education
To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Programmed meetings bringing together schools, young people and businesses/firms in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any programmes of meetings bringing together schools, young people and businesses/firms in lower-income neighbourhoods?	Regular meetings bringing together schools, young people and businesses/firms in lower-income neighbourhoods may give young people a better grasp of the realities of the employment market
Measures to develop apprenticeship and/or combined work and training	Are there any measures to develop apprenticeship and/or combined work and training?	Various studies in Europe have shown apprenticeship and combined work and training to be effective vocational integrators of young people
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Forms of mentoring in business/industry as a complement to technical training	Are there any forms of mentoring in business/industry to complement technical training?	Giving young people more opportunities to experience vocational realities (particularly as a component of technical education) enables them to make more informed career choices
Non-discrimination in occupational mobility	Are there any measures encouraging occupational mobility?	Too frequent changes in vocational direction are often viewed adversely by employers. However, occupational insecurity among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods may lead them to change direction more often than other young people

3.4. "Young people in lower-income neighbourhoods are ill-adapted to a world which puts a premium on mobility"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. The stereotype and its causes and effects		
How justified is the stereotype?		
Relative residential mobility	The annual percentage of households moving away from lower-income neighbourhoods to other more attractive areas in relation to the equivalent percentage for the whole population (x100)	Residential mobility is a prerequisite for other types of mobility (social, occupational, cultural, etc.) A value below 100 reflects less residential mobility among households from lower-income neighbourhoods. Example: in the United Kingdom in 2004, among persons monitored since 1991: of people living in areas in the first quintile (the poorest 20%): – 79% stayed on in the area – 7% moved away to the next quintile up – 14% moved away to the three most favoured quintiles 87% of all tenants in the sample stayed on 79% of all owners in the sample stayed on (source: Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex)
Home connection to the Internet in lower-income neighbourhoods	The percentage of households with Internet access in lower-income neighbourhoods	Owning a computer connected to the Internet may be a factor in open-mindedness and intellectual mobility among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods Example: in the United Kingdom, of the 7% of households in severe hardship, 34% have a computer and 25% Internet access. Severe hardship is based on a composite index including employment level, overcrowded accommodation, not owning a car and non-home-ownership (social housing) (source: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister)
Ownership of a mobile phone	The percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods owning a mobile phone	Owning a mobile phone is a factor in independence and inclusion among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative percentage registered with temporary employment agencies	The percentage of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods registered with a temporary employment agency in relation to the equivalent percentage for all young people (x100)	A value above 100 reflects over-representation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in numbers registered with temporary employment agencies as compared with young people generally and may point to somewhat limited occupational mobility

Relative take-up of very short-term jobs	The percentage of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods regularly taking on very short-term jobs in relation to the equivalent percentage found among all young people (x100)	Hindrances to job-finding and occupational mobility may mean that young people in lower-income neighbourhoods more frequently hold very short-term jobs A value above 100 reflects a situation in which young people from lower-income neighbourhoods more regularly take up very short-term jobs
Social mixing by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	The percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods regularly engaging in an organised social activity outside the neighbourhood (sport, leisure, culture, etc.)	Social activity outside the neighbourhood promotes social mixing by young people from the neighbourhood and introduces them to alternatives
Is the stereotype widespread?		
Perception of lower-income neighbourhoods as ghettos	The percentage of the total population regarding lower-income neighbourhoods as ghettos (geographically, socially and/or economically)	This indicator reflects how isolated the general public perceives lower-income neighbourhoods to be
Public transport services	Time of the first and last bus, underground or tram into or out of the lower-income neighbourhood, and frequency of service	Public transport into or out of the lower-income neighbourhood may not operate at times convenient for young people (particularly in the evening, for return to the neighbourhood), thus hindering their cross-city mobility
Affordability of public transport for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Cost of a return journey by public transport in relation to the average weekly disposable budget of a young adult from a lower-income neighbourhood	High public transport fares restrict physical mobility within the city of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Independence of movement	The percentage of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who have their own means of transport (bicycle, motorbike, car, etc.)	Having their own means of transport is a key factor in increasing physical mobility among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Existence of public services in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there basic public services available in lower-income neighbourhoods?	Availability of public services in a neighbourhood constitutes recognition of its vitality. The basic public services are: infant and primary schools, post offices, public transport, public parks. The list of services can be added to: sports facilities, youth facilities, etc.

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
What are the specific aspirations of this group which are misunderstood and help explain how the stereotype came about?		
Bilingualism among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods (among those of immigrant origin)	The percentage of young people of immigrant origin in lower-income neighbourhoods who are bilingual (language of the parents' or grandparents' country of origin)	Use of the parents'/grandparents' language of origin by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods may reinforce their feeling of exclusion vis-à-vis the general population
Young artists in lower-income neighbourhoods	Number of young artists (musicians, painters, etc.) from lower-income neighbourhoods (per 1 000 residents)	Emergence of artists in neighbourhoods reflects a cultural dynamism specific to those areas
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Percentage of young people not leaving the neighbourhood at least once a week	The percentage of young people not leaving the neighbourhood at least once a week	This indicator reflects the proportion of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods who experience serious geographical isolation
C. Measuring the consequences		
What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?		
Transport provision for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any special arrangements enabling young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to use the public transport network?	Arrangements of this type give young people in lower-income neighbourhoods opportunities for physical mobility Example: in France there are reduced fares for persons drawing social minimum benefits and for young people
Support for the siting of traditional firms in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any official support or incentive arrangements for traditional firms locating in lower-income neighbourhoods?	Enterprise start-ups significantly promote the social regeneration of lower-income neighbourhoods
D. Finding alternative approaches		
To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Support for the residential and occupational mobility of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any official or community arrangements in support of the residential and occupational mobility of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	Such arrangements are crucial to the social mobility of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Helping young people in lower-income neighbourhoods to set up websites	Are there any official/community arrangements to help young people in lower-income neighbourhoods set up websites?	Schemes to help young people from different cultural backgrounds to develop websites have proved useful for bringing cultural communities closer together

Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods who use the Internet at least once a week	The percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods who use the Internet at least once a week	Regular Internet use promotes receptiveness to alternatives among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
The percentage of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods taking new technology or enterprise management training in relation to the percentage for all young people	The percentage of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods taking training in the new technologies and enterprise management in relation to the equivalent percentage for all young people	Young people's degree of interest in new technology and enterprise management courses reflects energetic identification with social and economic modernity
Helping young people in lower-income neighbourhoods to take part in cultural or artistic exchanges	Are there any official/community schemes to help young people in lower-income neighbourhoods take part in cultural or artistic exchanges?	Official support for the development and display of cultures specific to lower-income neighbourhoods helps to familiarise young people with cultural models and potential
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Research on the aspirations of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there regular official surveys of the (occupational) aspirations of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods?	Such surveys are evidence of political will to cater for the specific aspirations of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods as regards occupational prospects
Support for training in fields relevant to their aspirations	Are there any official support schemes for training in areas relevant to their aspirations?	Such support points to political will to cater for the specific aspirations of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods as regards vocational prospects

CHAPTER 4: STEREOTYPES CONCERNING AUTONOMY AND PERSONAL AND FAMILY FULFILMENT

4.2. "Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods drop out of school"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Relative school drop-out rate	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who leave school before the statutory leaving age, in relation to the equivalent proportion observed among all young people (x100)	A basic indicator for school system performance A value higher than 100 indicates that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are more likely to drop out of school
Relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods classified as underachievers	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are classified as underachievers by the school system in relation to the equivalent proportion observed among all young people (x100)	This indicator may show that lower-income neighbourhoods are at a disadvantage as far as schooling is concerned, but it might also show a greater propensity for the education authorities to classify pupils as underachievers A value higher than 100 indicates a situation in which young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are more likely to be classified as underachievers
Relative truancy rate	Proportion of pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods having been absent without justification at least four half-days per month in the school year (out of the total number of pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods) in relation to the equivalent proportion observed among all young people (x100)	This indicator measures the proportion of pupils at risk of educational marginalisation A value above 100 indicates a higher truancy rate among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods.
Relative repeat rate	Proportion of pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods (out of all pupils in the study year concerned and broken down by level of education) who repeat a year of schooling, in relation to the equivalent proportion amongst all young people (x100)	High repeat rates reveal a problem in the effectiveness of the education system A value over 100 reflects a higher repeat rate among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods Education levels are those given in the ISCED classification (see glossary of the *Concerted developments of social cohesion indicators – Methodological guide*)

Relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who leave school with no qualifications	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who leave compulsory schooling with no qualifications, in relation to the equivalent proportion observed amongst all young people (x100)	A value over 100 indicates a higher rate of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods leaving school without qualifications Example: in Scotland, 11% of young people from lower-income backgrounds have no qualifications, as opposed to 3% for the country as a whole (source: Scottish Executive)
Relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods among those with a higher education qualification	Ratio between the relative proportion of people from lower-income backgrounds having a higher education qualification and the relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the total national age class (x100)	An index lower than 100 reflects an under-representation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in higher education Example: in Scotland, 5.5% of those with a higher education qualification are from the 10% most disadvantaged neighbourhoods, as opposed to 15% from the 10% least deprived neighbourhoods (source: Scottish Executive)
Relative gross schooling rate	Number of pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods attending schools in a given education level, irrespective of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of the official age corresponding to that level of education (x100)	This indicator assesses the overall participation at the education level under consideration. It assesses the capacity of the education system to enrol pupils belonging to a particular age group The indicator should be broken down by education level (ISCED, 1977 classification) and fields of specialisation (for ISCED level 3)
Is this stereotype widespread?		
Public perception of the effectiveness of the education system for pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of the population (aged 25 and over) who believe that the education system is effective for pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator reflects public opinion on the effectiveness of the education system for pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. ineffective; 1. not very effective; 2. average; 3. effective; 4. very effective
Perception of teachers as to the potential of pupils from disadvantaged neighbourhoods	Proportion of teachers in schools in lower-income neighbourhoods (or attended by pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods) who believe that pupils from such neighbourhoods have potential equivalent to that of other pupils	This indicator reflects the perception held by teachers of pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. very low potential; 1. low potential; 2. average potential; 3. good potential; 4. high potential

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?		
Relative school success rate of pupils from disadvantaged social groups	Percentage of students in higher education whose father works in a lower-status socio-professional category in relation to the percentage of the active population in this socio-professional category (x100)	This indicator measures the capacity for school success of young people from disadvantaged social groups

A value lower than 100 reflects a poorer success rate for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods

A "labourer" can be regarded as being representative of the disadvantaged social groups (group 9 in the ISCO classification)(see glossary of the *Concerted developments of social cohesion indicators – Methodological guide*)

A similar calculation can be carried out with other population groups such as the unemployed |
| **Siting of schools (lower secondary/ upper secondary) in lower-income neighbourhoods** | Number of available places in non-fee-paying state schools (lower secondary/upper secondary) located in lower-income neighbourhoods (in relation to the school-age population) | If few or no state schools at lower and upper secondary level are sited in lower-income neighbourhoods, this constitutes an institutional barrier to the educational development of the children in these neighbourhoods |
| **Households with children of school age living under the poverty threshold** | Proportion of households with children of school age living under the poverty threshold in relation to the total number of households in lower-income neighbourhoods with children of school age | This indicator expresses the degree of risk of school underachievement linked to the child's social conditions |
| **Trends in the school success disparity index** | Proportion of children of parents with professional occupations in relation to the proportion of children of manual workers enrolled in secondary education and obtaining their school leaving qualification between t and t+n | Indicator of massification/democratisation of secondary education

Example: in France in 1973, the ratio was four children of parents with a professional occupation to 1 child of a labourer; in 1980, the ratio had fallen to 3:1 (source: OECD) |
| **Average years of service of teachers in schools in lower-income neighbourhoods and/or schools most attended by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods** | Average number of years of service of teachers in schools in lower-income neighbourhoods and/or schools most attended by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods | Schools in lower-income neighbourhoods do not attract the most experienced teachers. It is often newly qualified teachers who end up in the most difficult schools |

Relative education disadvantage	Differential in results in maths, science and reading between the weakest and average pupils	This indicator measures the dispersion of results at the lower end of pupil performance. A significant differential may indicate a lack of monitoring and support for the least able pupils from the education system. By extension, it could indicate a tendency towards elitism in the school system
Relative expenditure per pupil in lower-income neighbourhoods	Annual amount of public expenditure per pupil in lower-income neighbourhoods in relation to the amount spent on young people as a whole (x100)	An index lower than 100 reflects a lower level of "investment" by the public authorities in the education of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods Example: public expenditure in US$ per student and per level (primary/secondary/higher) – France 4 777 – 8 107 – 8 837 – Netherlands 4 862 – 6 403 – 12 374 – Italy 6 783 – 8 258 – 8 347 – Portugal 4 181 – 5 976 – 5 199 – UK 4 415 – 5 933 – 10 753 – Slovakia 1 252 – 1 874 – 5 285 – average 4 850 – 6 510 – 10 052 (source: OECD)
Actual cost of higher studies (including subsistence) in relation to average wage	Average total cost of a year of higher studies per student (including board and lodging)	This indicator reflects the financial cost of following a course of higher education for a student not living with his or her parents. The economic factor is decisive in access to higher education studies
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Relative rate of physical and psychological violence among pupils	Proportion of pupils (out of the total number of pupils in lower-income neighbourhoods) claiming to have been victims of physical or psychological violence from other pupils in relation to the equivalent proportion observed among young people as a whole (x100)	This indicator measures the overall scale of violence between pupils at school in lower-income neighbourhoods. A child's perception of insecurity is a factor in school underachievement It may also be relevant to classify the type of psychological and physical violence in order to ascertain a "tolerance threshold" vis-à-vis these acts A value over 100 indicates that the phenomenon is higher in schools in lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative prevalence of drug consumption in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of pupils in lower-income neighbourhoods who occasionally take drugs (hard or soft) in relation to the equivalent proportion observed among young people as a whole (x100)	Drug consumption is a factor contributing to school underachievement It may also be relevant to categorise the type of drugs consumed A value over 100 reflects higher drug consumption in lower-income neighbourhoods
Feeling of insecurity at school	Proportion of pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods who feel unsafe at school	A feeling of insecurity is a factor contributing to school underachievement

Pupil satisfaction regarding teaching content	Proportion of pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods who claim to be satisfied with the teaching content made available by the school system	Indicator on the level of pupils' satisfaction in relation to their teaching content expectations
General pupil satisfaction	Proportion of pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods who claim to be satisfied with school in general	Indicator on the level of pupils' satisfaction with school in general
School contribution to the feeling of belonging to society	Proportion of pupils in lower-income neighbourhoods who state their view that school makes an important contribution to the feeling of belonging to society	Indicator on the perception of the role played by school in nurturing a sense of belonging to society
C. Measuring the consequences		
What factors facilitate this action and constitute an obstacle to building up a sense of community?		
System for encouraging teachers to go to schools with a high level of pupils from lower-income neighbourhoods	Is there a system to encourage teachers to go to schools in risk or isolated areas (bonuses, promotion, etc.)?	This indicator reflects the extent to which the education authorities encourage teacher mobility towards problem areas (for example, sink estates) or rural areas in order to maintain the geographical consistency of the state education system
Assistance and support for young people leaving the education system	Are there any educational assistance and support arrangements for young people leaving the normal education system?	Such facilities play a decisive role in addressing the needs of young people and avoiding their marginalisation This indicator can be subdivided into the different situations on leaving the education system (without qualification, disciplinary measure, minimum qualification, etc.)
Employment of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods before the end of compulsory schooling	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods still of statutory school age who work	Young people who work are automatically excluded from the education system
Making parents more accountable	Are there any legislative measures to make parents more accountable?	Making parents more accountable attributes greater responsibility to parents for school underachievement

D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Surveys on the educational and career aspirations of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there regular surveys on the educational and career aspirations of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	When deciding on the educational measures to be taken, it is important for the public authorities to take account of the educational and career aspirations of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Arrangements to encourage studies by children and young people from poor families	Are there any arrangements to encourage studies by children and young people from poor families (aid, grants, etc.)?	This indicator clarifies the extent to which a child or young person from a poor family is able to obtain assistance from the authorities in order to pursue normal studies
Aid to parents who find it difficult to help their children with their schooling	Are there any arrangements to assist parents experiencing difficulties in helping their children with their schooling?	School underachievement can, in certain cases, be addressed by assisting parents experiencing difficulties in helping their children with their schooling
Career guidance in lower-income neighbourhoods	Average number of school career officers in lower-income neighbourhoods (per 1 000 pupils)	This indicator reflects the scale of human resources allocated by the school system to career guidance in lower-income neighbourhoods
To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Pupils being given "second-chance" education	Proportion of pupils having left or been expelled from mainstream schooling (out of all pupils in lower-income neighbourhoods who have done so) being given "second-chance" education	This indicator measures the proportion of pupils being given "second chance" education
Links between schools and businesses	Are there any arrangements to encourage links between schools in lower-income neighbourhoods and businesses or firms in the region?	Links between schools and businesses can lead to specific and collaborative measures to assist young underachievers
Study grants for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to attend higher education courses	Are there any study grants for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to attend higher education courses?	A study grant system may encourage young people who have the potential to move on to higher education

How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Action taken in partnership between schools and outside institutions	Average number of initiatives run in partnership between schools and outside institutions (per year and per pupil from lower-income neighbourhoods) (secondary and primary education)	This indicator measures the overall extent to which schools in lower-income neighbourhoods are open to wider society
Existence of educational teams in schools	Proportion of schools (primary and secondary) having a multidisciplinary team focusing on education issues (team teaching, psychologists, teachers, social workers, career officers) out of the total number of schools in lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator assesses the efforts made by the education system to adapt the educational approach to the particular conditions prevailing in lower-income neighbourhoods

4.3. "Boy-girl relationships have become more tense in lower-income neighbourhoods"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Mixed-gender sports activities	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who regularly participate in mixed-gender sports activities (outside school)	Participation in mixed sports indicates a degree of openness to gender mixing among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods The proportion of the mix needs to be predefined (for instance 15%, 25% or 50%). Certain formal sports activities do not exist in mixed-gender form
Mixed-gender cultural activities	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who regularly participate in mixed-gender cultural activities (outside school)	Gender mixing seems to be more widespread in cultural activities than in sport. It would nevertheless be judicious to study the types of cultural activities where mixing is widespread and the role that girls play The proportion of the mix needs to be predefined, and may vary, with 50% indicating absolute gender parity
Gender violence	Proportion of girls from lower-income neighbourhoods who are regularly or occasionally subjected to physical or psychological violence by young men from the same neighbourhoods	Gender violence is a fundamental indicator of increasing tension in boy-girl relationships
Is this stereotype widespread?		
Perception of the influence of groups of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods on behaviour and relations between women and men	Proportion of adult residents of lower-income neighbourhoods who consider that groups of young people from their neighbourhood have a negative influence on relations between women and men	This indicator shows the perception that residents of lower-income neighbourhoods have of the effect that groups (gangs) of young people have on the deterioration of relations between women and men This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. very bad effect; 1. bad effect; 2. no effect; 3. good effect; 4. very good effect The proportion of replies at 0 or 1 indicates whether there is a negative influence
Psychologists'/teachers' perception of boy-girl relationships at school	Proportion of psychologists/teachers who consider that boy-girl relationships have become more tense in schools attended by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator shows psychologists'/teachers' perception of the increasing tension at school between boys and girls This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. greater tension; 1. no change; 2. less tension The proportion of replies at 0 indicates whether relationships have become more tense

Satisfaction/ dissatisfaction expressed by girls in lower-income neighbourhoods in respect of their relationships with boys from the same neighbourhoods	Proportion of girls from lower-income neighbourhoods who consider that their relationships with the boys of the neighbourhood are satisfactory	Indicator of the general perception among girls from lower-income neighbourhoods of their relationships with the neighbourhoods' boys This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. very dissatisfied; 1. dissatisfied; 2. neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 3. satisfied; 4. very satisfied The proportion of replies at 0 and 1 indicates dissatisfaction with relations between the sexes
B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?		
Influence on gender violence of the lack of mixed leisure/recreational opportunities	Correlation between the number of mixed leisure/ recreational opportunities and the occurrence of gender violence (as defined above) in lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator shows the link between a lack of mixed leisure/recreational opportunities and gender violence in lower-income neighbourhoods For this kind of correlation, it is important to compare the results with those from other areas with identical characteristics in order to eliminate any bias caused by another influential factor
Influence on gender violence of traditions	Correlation between the proportion of households belonging to cultures where masculine domination prevails and the occurrence of gender violence (as defined above) in lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator shows the link between the influence of cultural traditions and gender violence in lower-income neighbourhoods For this kind of correlation, it is important to compare the results with those from other areas with identical characteristics in order to eliminate any bias caused by another influential factor
Correlation between ghettoisation and gender violence	Correlation between the proportion of the population living in households whose total equivalised income is less than 60% of the mean national equivalised income during the current year and in at least two of the three previous years and the occurrence of gender violence (as defined above) in lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator shows the link between (economic) ghettoisation and gender violence in lower-income neighbourhoods For this kind of correlation, it is important to compare the results with those from other areas with identical characteristics in order to eliminate any bias caused by another influential factor This indicator can also be calculated for other types of ghettoisation factor, such as geographical isolation or physical or occupational immobility
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Sexual violence trends in lower-income neighbourhoods	Annual rate of variation in the number of cases of sexual violence (per 1 000 inhabitants) recorded in lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator shows sexual violence trends in lower-income neighbourhoods

Changes in the structure of young people's networks in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there more or fewer girls in the networks of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods than there used to be?	The level of gender mixing in young people's networks may be an indicator of gender relations in lower-income neighbourhoods
Average age difference between girls and boys in peer groups	Mean difference between the average age of boys and that of girls in peer groups	A significant age difference may increase boys' feeling of dominance over girls
Prevalence of religious criteria in the organisation of young people's networks	Are there behavioural criteria within young people's networks which draw on religious rules or affiliations?	If religious criteria govern the organisation of young people's networks, this may indicate an extension of family control, especially over girls
C. Assessing the consequences		
What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?		
Tightening of legislation on gender violence and its treatment by the courts where young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are concerned	Can a tightening of the legislation on gender violence and harsher treatment thereof by the courts be observed in lower-income neighbourhoods (particularly where young people are concerned)?	A punitive response to gender violence is essential, but will not make it possible to bring about significant changes to girl-boy relationships in lower-income neighbourhoods
Stepping up of police activity against gender violence in lower-income neighbourhoods	Has police activity against gender violence in lower-income neighbourhoods been stepped up?	A punitive response to gender violence is essential, but will not make it possible to bring about significant changes to girl-boy relationships in lower-income neighbourhoods
D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Vocational guidance encouraging girls and boys alike to enter sectors which are traditionally reserved for the opposite sex	Are there any vocational guidance experiments encouraging boys and girls alike to enter sectors which are traditionally reserved for the opposite sex?	Such experiments may make it possible effectively to combat gender-based conventions
Associations and NGOs working for equal opportunities in lower-income neighbourhoods	Number of associations and NGOs working for equal opportunities in lower-income neighbourhoods (per 1 000 inhabitants)	This indicator gauges private action to promote equality of opportunity in lower-income neighbourhoods

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Existence of crèches and other childcare facilities in lower-income neighbourhoods	Number of places available in crèches and other childcare facilities in lower-income neighbourhoods (per 1 000 inhabitants)	If gender violence is to be reduced, children must adapt to mixed activities from their earliest years
Proportion of young children from lower-income neighbourhoods enrolled in crèches or other childcare facilities	Proportion of young children from lower-income neighbourhoods enrolled in crèches or other mixed childcare facilities	If gender violence is to be reduced, children must adapt to mixed activities from their earliest years
Differences in parental attitudes to girls and boys in lower-income neighbourhoods	Qualitative analysis of parents' attitude to girls and boys in lower-income neighbourhoods	It is interesting to make an in-depth study of the attitude taken by parents in lower-income neighbourhoods, and particularly the differences that may exist between their attitude to, for instance, the freedom of girls and boys This indicator should be obtained through study of a representative sample of the population of lower-income neighbourhoods
Role of educational establishments in the social mix	Qualitative analysis of the role in the social mix of the educational establishments attended by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	The aim of this analysis is to find out how educational establishments encourage young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to mix This indicator should be obtained through study of a representative sample of the population of lower-income neighbourhoods
Steps taken to promote equal opportunities in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are public arrangements in place to encourage and promote equal opportunities in lower-income neighbourhoods?	This indicator shows whether the authorities at local or regional level encourage equality of opportunity in lower-income neighbourhoods

4.4. "In health matters, young people from lower-income neighbourhoods engage in high-risk behaviour"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Comparative amount of time devoted to sport	Number of hours per week spent on sports activities by individual young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, in relation to the equivalent statistic for all young people (x100)	There is no longer any doubt about the health benefits of sport A value below 100 shows that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are devoting less time to sport
Comparative alcohol and cannabis consumption	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods regularly consuming alcohol and/or cannabis, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people in the reference area or population (x100)	It is generally believed that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods engage more frequently in at-risk behaviour in terms of the consumption of substances such as alcohol and cannabis, although this is not borne out by the relevant studies A value above 100 shows that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are more inclined to make regular use of alcohol/cannabis In France, for instance, in 2004, a secondary study of the CADIS survey, carried out in such a way that ZEPs (priority education areas) could be singled out, showed that cannabis, alcohol and tobacco consumption was far lower in upper secondary schools in ZEPs than in their counterparts elsewhere; the cannabis consumption rate in the former was 19%, against 31% in the other schools (source: CADIS)
Comparative rate of psychological disorders	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods suffering from psychological disorders, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people in the reference area or population (x100)	The difficult living conditions endured by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods may have severe effects on their mental health A value above 100 shows a higher incidence of psychological disorders among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Comparative rate of stress-related disorders	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods suffering from stress-related disorders, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people in the reference area or population (x100)	The difficult living conditions endured by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods may give rise to significant stress; this may then manifest itself in the form of various disorders A value above 100 shows a higher incidence of stress-related disorders among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods

Visits to health professionals in the past twelve months	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who have visited a health professional at least once in the past twelve months	Indicator of the level of health care enjoyed by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Comparative access to sex education	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who received sex education lessons at school or in another form, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people (x100)	Sex education lessons can provide young people with information about unsafe sexual behaviour
Comparative rate of young people not covered by social security	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods without social security or any other form of social cover, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people in the reference area or population (x100)	Indicator of the level of social cover enjoyed by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods A value below 100 shows that young people from such neighbourhoods have a lower level of cover
Comparative dental check-up rate	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who have had a dental check-up in the past twelve months, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people (x100)	Indicator of the level of health care enjoyed by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods A value below 100 shows that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are at a disadvantage in terms of dental care
Is this stereotype widespread?		
Public health services' perception of how young people from lower-income neighbourhoods behave in the health sphere	Proportion of public health service officials who consider that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods take health risks	This indicator shows how widespread the idea is within public health services that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods take more health risks than others
School medical officers' perception of how young people from lower-income neighbourhoods behave in the health sphere	Proportion of school medical officers who consider that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods take health risks	This indicator shows how widespread the idea is among school medical officers that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods take more health risks than others

B. *Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue*		
What are the specific aspirations of this group which are misunderstood and help explain how the stereotype came about?		
Comparative malnutrition rate in young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods (in a specific age group) suffering from chronic malnutrition	Indicator showing the prevalence of poor nutrition in lower-income neighbourhoods
Sports facilities in lower-income neighbourhoods	Surface area (in square metres) per resident of the sports facilities in lower-income neighbourhoods	The limited capacity of sports facilities in lower-income neighbourhoods makes it more difficult in practical terms for young people to engage in sport
Comparative average sport budget of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Average annual sport budget per young person in lower-income neighbourhoods, in relation to the equivalent budget of all young people (x100)	Restricted financial resources may limit access to sports activities for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Comparative average household food budget in lower-income neighbourhoods	Average food budget per person in lower-income neighbourhoods, in relation to the equivalent budget in the population as a whole (x100)	Availability of limited financial resources for food may lead to cases of malnutrition A value below 100 shows a greater prevalence of poor nutrition among the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods.
Comparative numbers of general practitioners in lower-income neighbourhoods	Number of general practitioners in practice in lower-income neighbourhoods per 1 000 inhabitants, in relation to the equivalent number in the area as a whole (x100)	Medical care is often less widely available in lower-income neighbourhoods A value below 100 shows that fewer general practitioners are located in lower-income neighbourhoods
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Comparative teenage pregnancy rate	Proportion of girls from lower-income neighbourhoods aged 14 to 18 who have had a pregnancy, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all girls (x100)	Teenage pregnancy is associated with a greater risk of adverse effects on the mother's health and social situation A value above 100 shows that teenage pregnancy is more prevalent among girls in lower-income neighbourhoods
Impact of fast-food restaurants and vending machines on young people	Average number of meals per week eaten outside the home at fast-food outlets or from vending machines (excluding breakfast) (based on two meals a day) by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Changes in young people's eating habits (they often eat "fast food") may ultimately give rise to public health problems (especially obesity). The situation seems to be worse in lower-income neighbourhoods

The perception among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods of practices which entail health risks	How young people in lower-income neighbourhoods view the risks associated with drug or alcohol consumption and their eating habits	If the risks are perceived to be low or such behaviour is considered desirable, serious health disorders may well ensue This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. not at all concerned; 1. not particularly concerned; 2. very concerned
C. Assessing the consequences		
What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?		
Social services' support provided to the family only when a problem occurs	Number of cases of intervention by social services prompted by an awareness of a problem, in relation to the total number of cases of social services intervention	Social services' intervention in the health sphere is essential, but too much or too little may have damaging results
D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Sex education	Is sex education provided by any public bodies (outside the education system) for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	This indicator shows whether direct/indirect action is taken to prevent the risks associated with sexual practices among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Health and healthy lifestyle education at schools attended by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Total number of hours of health and healthy lifestyle education per child in the primary/secondary schools attended by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator shows the importance attached to health and healthy lifestyle education as part of the school syllabus
Preventive help for families from lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any voluntary/public bodies which offer a preventive health service to families in lower-income neighbourhoods?	This indicator shows whether direct/indirect preventive health services exist for families in lower-income neighbourhoods
To what extent are the players concerned able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Existence of associations or NGOs offering support in the health sphere to young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Are there any associations or NGOs which offer support in the health sphere to young people in lower-income neighbourhoods?	This indicator shows whether private direct/indirect preventive health services exist for families in lower-income neighbourhoods

How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Support for associations active in the health sphere in lower-income neighbourhoods	Do authorities at local or regional level make arrangements to provide support to associations active in the health sphere in lower-income neighbourhoods?	This indicator shows the extent to which such authorities can create conditions conducive to the provision of preventive health initiatives in lower-income neighbourhoods

CHAPTER 5: STEREOTYPES CONCERNING PARTICIPATION AND CITIZEN COMMITMENT

5.1. "Young people are not playing their part in activities contributing to local development"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Relative participation rate of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in formal activities organised by associations	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are members of associations, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people in the reference area (x100)	This indicator compares the participation rate of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in local life and local development activities with that of all young people in the reference area A value below 100 indicates relative under-representation of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Comparative number of clubs and associations set up by young people in their neighbourhood	Number of clubs and associations (per 1 000 inhabitants) set up and organised themselves by young people in the lower-income neighbourhood concerned, in relation to the number set up and organised for all young people (x100)	The existence of clubs and associations set up by young people is evidence of their ability to organise for themselves activities appropriate to their aspirations A clear distinction should be made between their participation in clubs and associations set up for them and their participation in those they have set up for themselves A value below 100 indicates a smaller number of clubs and associations set up by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods themselves
Most common areas of participation by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Which activity areas feature most in participatory programmes for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods?	The fact that the areas in which activities are most commonly offered to young people are invariably the same may be evidence that the bodies implementing such projects pay no attention to young people's expectations Examples of common activity areas are sport, art, music and information technology
Relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods engaging in cultural activity	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who regularly engage in a cultural activity (outside school), in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people (x100)	Participation in a cultural activity promotes harmonious personal development of the individuals concerned A value below 100 indicates a lower participation rate among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods
Relative proportion of young people engaging in out-of-school personal development activities	Proportion of pupils at school in lower-income neighbourhoods who regularly engage in personal development activities outside school, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people (x100)	Out-of-school personal development activities may be of various kinds, involving music, singing, artistic expression, sports activities, and so on A value below 100 indicates that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods play less part in such activities

Is this stereotype widespread?		
Perception by residents of lower-income neighbourhoods of the role of young people in neighbourhood development	Proportion of adult residents of lower-income neighbourhoods who consider that young people contribute to neighbourhood development	This indicator shows how other residents of the neighbourhood perceive young people's contribution to neighbourhood development
Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who actually take part in neighbourhood activities	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who regularly take part in cultural expression, arts or sports activities either within or outside formal organised structures	This indicator reflects young people's actual participation in neighbourhood activities, whether structured (for example, by associations) or not (street culture: rap, hip hop, tagging, etc.)
B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?		
Exclusion of young people at the planning stage of neighbourhood activities/projects	Proportion of neighbourhood activities/ projects which include young people at the planning stage	A low indicator shows a form of exclusion of young people from the preparation of neighbourhood projects
Number of formal organisations in the neighbourhood which allow young people to take part	Number of formal organisations in the neighbourhood which allow young people to take part (per 1 000 inhabitants)	This indicator shows what participation opportunities are available to young people from the lower-income neighbourhood concerned
Cost of out-of-school activities	Average cost of participation in an out-of-school activity organised by a public body or an association	The cost of participation may make activities less accessible\n\nFor this indicator, calculate the average annual cost of a range of cultural and sports activities and compare this with the minimum annual wage
Public action in lower-income neighbourhoods taking no account of young people's opinion	Proportion of public action (over a reference period) in lower-income neighbourhoods where no account is taken of young people's opinion at the planning stage	Failure to take regular account of young people's opinion at the planning stage of neighbourhood projects automatically makes them less likely to participate in neighbourhood life
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Perception of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of their role in the neighbourhood	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who take a negative view of their role (effective or potential) in the neighbourhood	A high proportion of young people with a negative opinion of their role in the neighbourhood indicates a sensitive psychological situation in respect of readiness to participate

Perception of the appropriateness of programmes/services on offer within the neighbourhood	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who consider that the programmes/services on offer to them meet their expectations	Programmes' objectives must be brought into line with young people's expectations before young people will commit themselves to such programmes
C. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Degree of autonomy for organising local development activities in the neighbourhood	Do the young people of the neighbourhood have a degree of autonomy for organising local development activities?	If young people are given a degree of autonomy for working on projects, their initiatives will not be deterred by outside constraints
Young people's perception that they have the opportunity to play a part in the development of their neighbourhood	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who consider that they have the opportunity/capacity to play a part in the development of their neighbourhood	Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods need to feel that they have the capacity to play a part in the development of their neighbourhood if projects to enable them to play their role as citizens are to be carried out
Existence of a feeling of distrust of authorities among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who feel distrust of authorities at local/regional/national levels	These authorities' ability to get young people involved in local development programmes depends on the young people's perception of the various tiers of authority
The authorities' perception of the young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Do the authorities perceive these young people as a social problem or as a potential resource for neighbourhood development?	The view of the young people from lower-income neighbourhoods taken by authorities at local level determines how far it is possible to get young people to take on responsibility through participation as citizens
Perception of the authorities' respect for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who consider that the authorities show them respect	Young people must perceive the authorities to be showing them respect if forms of youth participation are to be introduced
Links that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods have with networks or associations outside their neighbourhood	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who have regular links with networks or associations outside their neighbourhood	Regular contact with formal or other networks outside the neighbourhood enables feelings of solitude or social isolation to be overcome
Existence of youth organisations in the neighbourhood itself	Number of organisations created by civil society in the neighbourhoods concerned and dealing with youth issues (per 1 000 inhabitants)	The existence of such organisations encourages young people to participate through activities specifically arranged for them

To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Existence of opportunities for dialogue with young people as opposed to mere information facilities	Are there in the neighbourhood(s) concerned opportunities for dialogue between the authorities and young people (as opposed to mere information facilities)?	The appropriateness and success of public action very much depend on the existence of opportunities for dialogue with young people
Local authorities' presence in lower-income neighbourhoods	Does the municipality have an office or local branch in the area of the lower-income neighbourhoods concerned?	The proximity of municipal departments may encourage trust in the local authority and legitimise its programmes of action
Number of community and activity leaders from the neighbourhood itself	Number of community and activity leaders from the neighbourhood itself (per 1 000 inhabitants)	Community or activity leaders from the neighbourhood itself may play an important role in mediating with the authorities, but may also set an example in terms of changing the social destiny of lower-income neighbourhoods
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Support for job creation/business start-ups in the fields of culture, sociocultural activity and innovative services	Are there public facilities offering support for job creation/business start-ups in the fields of culture, sociocultural activity and innovative services?	Such facilities may make it possible for bodies to be set up in lower-income neighbourhoods which can help to open young people's minds to new possibilities

5.2. "Young people are not politically active"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Comparative trade union membership among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of young working people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are members of a trade union, in relation to the equivalent proportion of the young population as a whole (x100)	The presence of trade union activists in lower-income neighbourhoods may help to prompt discussions of political issues A value below 100 indicates that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are less active in trade unions
Relative proportion of young people who regularly read a general daily newspaper	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who say that they read, skim through or look for information in a general daily newspaper "every day" or "three to five times a week", in relation to the equivalent proportion of the young population as a whole (x100)	Indicator of the number of readers of general daily newspapers among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods Political involvement presupposes a minimum level of understanding of society and its news A value below 100 indicates that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods make less use of newspapers. This indicator could use a scale such as: 3. every day; 2. three to five times a week; 1. less frequently; 0. never Each point on the scale should then be expressed as a proportion of the total
Type of information favoured by young people	List of the main information areas favoured by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods (sport, business news, political news, etc.)	This indicator makes clear the nature of the information used by young people for their personal development prior to the formation of their political awareness
Is this stereotype widespread?		
Political parties' perception of the involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of political party officials who consider that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods play a part in the political process	This indicator shows the level of involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the political process, as perceived by the political parties. If a low level is perceived, this may deter political parties from addressing the young people of lower-income neighbourhoods
Trade unions' perception of the involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of trade union leaders who consider that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods play a part in the political process	This indicator shows the level of involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the political process, as perceived by trade unions. If a low level is perceived, this may deter trade unions from addressing the young people of lower-income neighbourhoods

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
What are the specific aspirations of this group which are misunderstood and help explain how the stereotype came about?		
Main demands of young activists from lower-income neighbourhoods	Qualitative analysis of the main demands of young activists from lower-income neighbourhoods	The political demands made by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are often disregarded by local or national political parties, as they are far removed from the favoured subjects on which political parties agree
Number of independent press publications available containing information and opinions (fanzines, association newsletters, etc.)	Number of independent press publications available containing information and opinions (fanzines, association newsletters, etc.) set up by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator shows how much access young people have to space in the printed media which they can use to communicate information The aim here is to identify those press publications which offer at least some information content
Number of independent local radio and television stations	Number of independent local radio and television stations set up by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	This indicator shows how much access young people have to media airtime which they can use to communicate information The aim here is to identify those radio and television stations which offer at least some information content
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Proportion of workers lacking job security	Proportion of young workers from lower-income neighbourhoods who have no job security	The widespread lack of job security accompanying the various forms of short-term contracts reduces the trade union involvement of workers in insecure employment, as they are at risk of failing to obtain renewal of their contracts NB: an appropriate social security system may remedy this situation, insofar as social security takes over from job security The proportion of posts lacking job security in the countries listed below in the year 2000, for example, was: – Denmark: 18% – Netherlands: 18% – France: 16% – Spain: 35% – Germany: 12% (source: ILO)

	Annual variation in the proportion of all employment which offers no job security	A rise in the proportion of employment lacking job security will aggravate the decline in trade union membership NB: an appropriate social security system may remedy this situation, insofar as social security takes over from job security Between 1995 and 2000, for example, employment lacking job security: – rose in the United Kingdom, Portugal, Finland, Austria and Ireland – remained stable in Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands – fell in France, Spain and Belgium (source: ILO)
Trend regarding employment which offers no job security		
Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods whose parents are trade union members	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods whose parents are trade union members	Trade union culture is often passed on within the family unit. A decline in parents' trade union membership affects the membership figure among their children.
Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods employed by firms with fewer than 20 workers	Proportion of all young workers from lower-income neighbourhoods who are employed by firms with fewer than 20 workers	Employment in small firms adversely affects the development of a trade union culture
Formation of the opinions of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Main sources of information shaping the political opinions of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Indicator showing how young people from lower-income neighbourhoods process information
Leadership among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Do young people from lower-income neighbourhoods have leaders, or are some leaders emerging?	The presence of leaders among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods is evidence that these young people play an active political role and have representatives to initiate dialogue with the authorities
C. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Trust shown in the media by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who say that they trust the media	Indicator of the level of trust in the media among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. no trust whatsoever; 1. limited level of trust; 2. average level of trust; 3. reasonable level of trust; 4. high level of trust Each point on the scale should then be expressed as a proportion of the total

	To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?	
Comparison of pupils' opportunities for participation in the life of their school	Proportion of schools in lower-income neighbourhoods (out of all schools), whose pupils have the opportunity to take part in school councils or other assemblies dealing with internal school matters, apart from those relating to teaching, in relation to the equivalent proportion for all schools (x 100)	This indicator shows the extent to which pupils play a role in the taking of decisions relating to the life of the school, thereby learning about participation as citizens A value below 100 indicates that pupils have fewer such opportunities in the schools in lower-income neighbourhoods
Political discussions in schools	Average number of hours on the syllabus devoted to discussions of current political issues each year (at the different levels of education) in lower-income neighbourhoods	Schools should provide pupils with the opportunity to discuss topical subjects in a constructive environment which encourages them to express their opinions and raise questions in an atmosphere of mutual respect (as recommended in: "Citizenship: young people's perspectives", Home Office Development and Practice Report No. 10, UK) The levels of education are those defined by ISCED
Study of civic rights and duties	Ratio between the average annual amount of teaching time devoted to civic rights and duties (including the rights of the child) in the different levels of education in lower-income neighbourhoods and the equivalent figure for schools as a whole (x 100)	This indicator shows the efforts made to teach pupils how to play their future role in society and about the political dimension of citizenship A value below 100 indicates that such education is less available in schools in lower-income neighbourhoods The levels of education are those defined by ISCED
Opportunities at school for open debate	Do the schools in lower-income neighbourhoods offer opportunities for open debate?	Opportunities for debate between pupils and their teachers may make a contribution to citizenship education
	How can these alternative approaches come about?	
Comparison of the types of organisations in lower-income neighbourhoods receiving public financial support	Qualitative analysis of the purpose and legal form of the organisations receiving public financial support in lower-income neighbourhoods, in relation to the purpose and legal form of those receiving support throughout the area	The nature of the activities and/or demands of organisations in lower-income neighbourhoods which receive public financial support reveals the subject areas to which the authorities give priority If the purpose and legal forms of organisations receiving public financial support are similar in lower-income neighbourhoods and throughout the area, this may be interpreted as being to the detriment of lower-income neighbourhoods

5.3. "Young people do not vote and are not interested in voting"

Indicator	Definition	Explanation and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Relative rate of voter registration	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of statutory voting age registered on the electoral roll, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people (x 100)	Registration on the electoral roll (in those countries where such registration is optional) is the first step in the democratic process A value below 100 shows a lower registration rate for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods This indicator should be taken into account only in countries where voter registration is optional
Relative election turnout, according to type of poll	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who voted in the most recent elections (European, presidential, legislative, regional or municipal), in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people (x100)	Election turnout by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods tends to be lower than the national average A value below 100 shows that fewer young people from lower-income neighbourhoods cast their votes
Relative rate of youth membership of political parties	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are members of a political party, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people (x100)	Membership of a political party may encourage young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to talk about politics with their peers A value below 100 shows that fewer young people from lower-income neighbourhoods join political parties
Is this stereotype widespread?		
The rest of the population's perception of the political involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of the adult population (aged over 25) who consider that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are involved in the political process	This indicator shows the level of political involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods, as perceived by the population as a whole
Political parties' perception of the involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of political party officials who consider that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods are involved in the political process	This indicator shows the level of involvement of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods in the political process, as perceived by the political parties. If a low level of involvement is perceived, this may deter political parties from addressing young people from lower-income neighbourhoods

B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?		
Relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are members of an association organising activities in the area	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are members of an association organising activities in the area, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people (x100)	Experience of association membership enables the idea of participatory democracy to develop in young people from lower-income neighbourhoods A value below 100 shows that fewer young people from lower-income neighbourhoods join such associations
Relative proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are members of a local, national or European association	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are members of a local, national or European association, in relation to the equivalent proportion of all young people (x100)	Experience of association membership enables the idea of participatory democracy to develop in young people from lower-income neighbourhoods A value below 100 shows that fewer young people from lower-income neighbourhoods join such associations
Political parties campaigning on issues relating to lower-income neighbourhoods and their relations with the rest of the city	Proportion of political parties which included in their election campaign (at the time of the most recent municipal elections) issues relating to lower-income neighbourhoods and their relations with the rest of the city	The remote and abstract nature of election issues usually leads to an attitude of withdrawal, indifference or even distrust among young people in lower-income neighbourhoods
Link between the proportion of foreigners not entitled to vote and election turnout in lower-income neighbourhoods	Correlation of the proportion of foreigners not entitled to vote and election turnout in lower-income neighbourhoods (at the time of the most recent municipal, regional and national elections)	People vote as a result of the dynamics of collective mobilisation. The more people vote, the more the election is talked about; hence the exclusion from the electorate of non-Community foreigners has disastrous effects on overall turnout in the neighbourhoods where they are present in large numbers
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Perception of politics by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who consider politics to be important, and a subject that they should take an interest in	The fact that young people from lower-income neighbourhoods may reject politics can cause severe difficulties to the introduction of participation programmes, and their participation rate in democratic elections will therefore be all the lower

Political competence	Assessment by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of their own political competence	The perception of political competence is based on the ability to understand political discussions and the feeling of being allowed to engage in politics This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. completely lacking political competence; 1. having little such competence; 2. having an average level of competence; 3. having a fair level of competence; 4. having a high level of competence
Feeling that politics is relevant	Assessment by young people from lower-income neighbourhoods of the impact of political action on their everyday lives	If young people from lower-income neighbourhoods feel that political action is beneficial to them, this may help to involve them as active participants in political life. If election issues seem too remote from their own concerns, this can only aggravate their lack of interest This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. no benefits; 1. very few benefits; 2. some benefits; 3. fair level of benefits; 4. high level of benefits
Perception that election promises are kept	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who consider that, generally speaking, politicians or political parties fail to keep their promises	A feeling that politicians and political parties generally fail to keep their promises can only increase the feeling among young people from lower-income neighbourhoods that the political process is remote from them
C. Measuring the consequences		
What factors may facilitate corrective, punitive or discriminatory action and constitute an obstacle to building up a new sense of community?		
Failure to take account in election manifestos of the situation of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of political parties which expressly mention the situation of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods in their election manifestos (local, regional or national elections)	The political parties say little or nothing about the situation of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods, and this can only make the young people concerned feel that the political process is remote from them
D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Encouragement to register on the electoral roll	Are information campaigns run to encourage young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to vote in elections (information sheets, citizens' initiatives, Internet sites, lessons at school)?	Making young people from lower-income neighbourhoods aware of, and encouraging them to participate in the democratic process through the provision of information about election issues is vitally important to election participation

Existence of a local youth parliament	Is there a municipal youth parliament or a youth parliament for lower-income neighbourhoods?	National youth parliaments are relatively widespread in Europe. Young people from lower-income neighbourhoods may be encouraged to play a greater part in democratic life if local or even neighbourhood youth parliaments are set up An additional indicator may be devised relating to the membership and appointment arrangements for youth parliaments
Inclusion in election manifestos of issues concerning young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and their relations with the rest of the city	Proportion of political parties which have included items concerning young people from lower-income neighbourhoods on their election manifestos	Explicit campaigning by political parties on issues concerning young people from lower-income neighbourhoods and their relations with the rest of the city may create interest in politics among young people Also possible is an examination of the changes in manifesto content, namely whether the number of issues in election manifestos relating to these specific matters rises or falls
To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Political figures and elected representatives at various administrative levels who originally came from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of political figures and elected representatives at different administrative levels who originally came from lower-income neighbourhoods	The presence of only a small proportion of political figures and elected representatives at different administrative levels who originally came from lower-income neighbourhoods may increase young people's feeling of remoteness from politics. Conversely, a higher proportion might make them feel less remote
Proportion of MPs who originally came from lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of MPs who originally came from lower-income neighbourhoods	The presence of only a small proportion of MPs who originally came from lower-income neighbourhoods may increase young people's feeling of remoteness from politics. Conversely, a higher proportion might make them feel less remote
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Foreigners' entitlement to vote	Foreign residents' right to vote in national, regional and local elections	If foreigners resident in the country are granted the right to vote, this may automatically increase election turnout in lower-income neighbourhoods. Not only is a greater number of persons effectively allowed to vote, but a greater number of residents in such neighbourhoods may take an interest in the elections; debates and discussions may also encourage young people to participate
Appropriateness of political programmes to the needs of young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Qualitative analysis of the appropriateness of political programmes to the needs expressed by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Political programmes more appropriate to the needs expressed by young people in lower-income neighbourhoods would be likely to revive their interest in politics
Perception of the results of political action in neighbourhoods	Proportion of the population of lower-income neighbourhoods who consider that politics has perceptible effects on their own neighbourhood	One of the main reasons for populations' disinterest in politics is the shortage of perceptible effects of political action on their everyday lives

5.4. "Participation (in neighbourhood bodies) is the answer"

Indicator	Definition	Explanations and approach
A. Assessing the stereotype and its extent		
How justified is this stereotype?		
Process of monitoring the opinions of the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods	Qualitative analysis of the process of monitoring and gathering the opinions of the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods	The extent to which the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods take part in participatory programmes depends primarily on a proper understanding of their problems by authorities at local level, so monitoring of their opinions may help to ensure that they participate
The authorities' awareness of the context of lower-income neighbourhoods	Determination of the extent of any bias in the view taken by the authorities of lower-income neighbourhoods	If the context is misunderstood, any participatory programme started is likely to fail through lack of participation by residents Indicator determined through a series of questions, relating amongst other things to residents' social and financial conditions and their expectations A proper understanding of the context is an essential precondition for the development of programmes in which residents are to participate
Is this stereotype widespread?		
The authorities' perception of the need for the young people of lower-income neighbourhoods to participate	Proportion of officials of authorities at local level who consider it important for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to play their part in the devising of neighbourhood action programmes	Studies carried out in Europe (Council of Europe, Trends in Social Cohesion, No. 9, 2004) show that the effectiveness of public action relating to lower-income neighbourhoods depends largely on consultations with residents, and particularly with young people
Allowances made for conflict in programme negotiation processes	Do the arrangements for negotiating the objectives of programmes agreed with young people from lower-income neighbourhoods allow for conflict?	Disputes of course occur in processes involving numerous partners. It is impossible for everyone to agree on every point in a discussion

Method of setting the objectives of programmes for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	Arrangements for setting the objectives of programmes for young people in lower-income neighbourhoods	The differences in the results of programmes for young people from lower-income neighbourhoods run on a top-down and bottom-up basis are considerable. According to case studies carried out in six European cities (Council of Europe, Trends in social cohesion, No. 9, 2004), the best results are achieved in programmes in which the greatest numbers of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods participate This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. top-down model; 1. top-down model with needs evaluated without consultation; 2. model in which there is consultation on objectives, but not on the preparation and implementation of action; 3. model in which there is consultation on objectives and on the preparation and implementation of action
Perception of the need for allowances to be made for conflict in programme negotiation processes	Proportion of officials of authorities at local level who consider it important for allowances to be made for conflict during the negotiation process relating to neighbourhood action programmes	If allowances are made for conflict during the negotiation processes, an opportunity for dialogue is created. If conflict is not allowed for, no such opportunity can arise
Programmes incorporating a long-term contractualisation process with the most relevant local/ regional units	Are there public action programmes relating to the neighbourhood(s) concerned incorporating a long-term contractualisation process with the most relevant local/ regional units?	Public action relating to lower-income neighbourhoods can be truly successful only if it is based on consultations on an overall renewal project with a long-term aim; short-term, sporadic or sectoral measures tend to increase the feeling of failure
B. Understanding the reasons for the stereotype in order to address the issue		
How does inadequate attention paid to the needs and aspirations of the group lead to social exclusion?		
Average duration of urban and social renewal programmes for lower-income neighbourhoods	Average duration of urban and social renewal programmes for lower-income neighbourhoods	Public action relating to lower-income neighbourhoods can be truly effective only if it is based on consultations on an overall renewal project with a long-term aim; short-term, sporadic or sectoral measures tend to increase the feeling of failure
How may exclusion factors lead the group to disconnect from the rest of society and thus sustain the stereotype?		
Young people's perception of the effects of the measures/ programmes in which their participation is requested	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who say that they can perceive the effects of the measures/ programmes in which their participation is requested	Young people's inability clearly to perceive the effects of the measures/programmes in which their participation is requested offers them no encouragement to commit themselves to participation

	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who consider it important to participate in consultations on urban renewal of their neighbourhood	This indicator shows young people's motivation to play a part in the participatory process
Young people's perception of participation as an aim in itself		
C. Assessing the consequences		
What corrective, punitive or discriminatory action does or may the stereotype give rise to?		
Compulsory participation measures	Do the authorities adopt compulsory measures requiring young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to participate?	The authorities' reaction to the failure of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods to participate may be to introduce compulsory measures, which are not conducive to long-term consultation and may prove counterproductive
D. Finding alternative approaches		
Scope for or obstacles to alternative approaches		
Delegation of decision-making power to the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods	Extent of the decision-making power of the residents of lower-income neighbourhoods in programmes affecting them	If residents have a genuine feeling of involvement in participatory processes, including through the delegation to them of decision-making power, this may help to increase the participation in such programmes of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods. This indicator could use a scale such as: 0. little or no decision-making power; 1. indirect or shared decision-making power; 2. delegated decision-making power; 3. devolved decision-making power. Explanation of this scale: 0: no communication with residents; decisions are taken by the authorities without providing them with explanations, or with one-way communication offering some explanations of the decisions taken, but allowing residents no influence. 1: bilateral communication, namely discussions do take place between the authorities and the residents about programmes. The residents act as consultants to the authorities. 2: decisions are ultimately taken by the authorities, but the residents are involved in certain specific tasks (including the relevant budget management), as these are delegated to a residents' organisation. This organisation has to report to the authorities, and its power may be withdrawn at any time. 3: the main feature of the highest point on the scale is that final decisions are taken by a residents' organisation, through, for example, a neighbourhood council to which responsibilities such as the management of local schools, social cover, employment programmes, spatial planning and environmental management are delegated. This requires a formal democratic structure to which residents elect representatives

Neighbourhood delegates/elected representatives on municipal and regional councils	Proportion of neighbourhood delegates/ elected representatives on municipal and regional councils	If the citizens of lower-income neighbourhoods and their representative organisations are allowed to play a more active part in municipal policy making, this may help to change the negotiating relationship
To what extent are the players involved able to develop these alternative approaches?		
Agreements between public services on co-ordinated action in lower-income neighbourhoods	Does consultation take place on action carried out by public services in lower-income neighbourhood(s)?	Co-operation between municipal services has proved effective in many European countries
Dialogue on objectives between the young people of lower-income neighbourhoods and public services	Are there procedures whereby the young people of lower-income neighbourhoods and public services can engage in dialogue on the objectives to be set?	Where there is dialogue and consultation on the setting of objectives for programmes of action, this can significantly contribute to their success
How can these alternative approaches come about?		
Young people's involvement in the management of lower-income neighbourhoods	Proportion of young people from lower-income neighbourhoods who are directly or indirectly involved in neighbourhood management	This indicator shows young people's involvement in neighbourhood management, and thus indirectly their involvement in control of their own destiny

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